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Reference	IOR/R/15/5/27
Title	'File 10/4 British relations with Bin Saud'
Date(s)	18 Mar 1911-1 Oct 1920 (CE, Gregorian)
Written in	English and Arabic in Latin and Arabic script
Extent and Format	1 file (508 folios)
Holding Institution	British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers
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About this record


This file contains correspondence related to Ibn Sa'ud's [ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz bin ʿAbd al-Raḥmān bin Fayṣal Āl Saʿūd] relationship with the British Government and the Ottoman Empire (and to a lesser extent, Kuwait) including the impact of the First World War. In addition to internal correspondence between British officials on this topic, the file also contains a large amount of correspondence from Ibn Sa'ud himself, in both Arabic and English translation.

The principal correspondents in the file are Captain William Shakespear; Political Residents, Major Percy Zachariah Cox and Major Stuart George Knox; Political Agent in Bahrain, Major Arthur Prescott Trevor; and the Ruler of Kuwait, Shaikh Mubarak al-Sabah. The file also contains copies of letters sent from various Ottoman officials to Shaikh Mubarak (folios 189-198) and a number of copies of letters sent by Saiyid Talib Pasha [Talib al-Naqib].


In addition to correspondence, the file contains several extracts from the diaries of the Political Agencies in Kuwait and Bahrain related to political developments concerning Ibn Sa'ud and the following documents:

- a 'memorandum setting forth the position as regards Bin Saud for guidance at the time of contemplated meeting with him' by Major Percy Zachariah Cox, 1913 (folios 154-158);
- a memorandum on meeting Ibn Sa'ud by Captain William Shakespear, December 1913 (folios 171-172);
- an account of a trip to Riyadh in 1914 by Captain William Shakespear (folios 219-222);
- a memorandum entitled 'A Contribution to the History of Tribal Fights in the Shamiyah Desert' (folios 426-429);

- an article about Ibn Sa'ud authored by C Stanley G Mylrea and published in *The Near East* , 11 May 1917;
- a 1917 copy of a treaty agreed between Ibn Sa'ud and the British Government and ratified 18 July 1916 (folios 457-459);
- an account of a visit to Riyadh in the summer of 1917 by P W Harrison (folios 499-502).











DRAFT—(For Approval).

Agency
POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

No/Confidential

No.

Koweit

Camp XXI

Dated 18. 3. 1941.

To Political Resdt Basra.


My dear Colonel,

I am having a delightful time in the desert.

I found Bin Saud and he did me well as stray Ateyba bands are out he wouldn't let me go south now, but was quite willing for me to accompany him when he should go himself!

He talked a lot of politics and though I tried to choke him off, explaining that I was only out to enjoy the desert, he insisted on it. It appears that all the Arabs of the interior are more than ordinarily fed up with the Turks, they don't trust the new régime at all, but fear it at the same time. They all hate the Turks and from what Bin Saud told me, all the big men, like himself, Ibn Rashid, Yaghya, Idris etc are corresponding with each other to make a big and simultaneous

S 638—12,000-7-08






rise against the Turks. Bin Saud said ^{(X) (4)}
~~that~~ ^{NOTE.} that he did not care so far as the rest
of Arabia was concerned but he
would like to turn the Turks out of
Hasa + Kalif and reassert the Wahabi
power there. The people wanted him to
but he was afraid of the Turks' reprisals.
He said he wanted us to do god-father to him
like we do to Mebarak. I told him plainly
that it was not worth our while for one
thing, and besides we had no interest
in Central Arabia or indeed anywhere
except on the sea-board, and consequently
were not unlikely to be foolish enough to
embroid ourselves with the Turks. He said he
had sent a secret-agent to you named,
I think, Mashur, to ask if the As Saud might
"dakhil" with us. It means much the same
as the Persian "bas" but not that he would
come personally.

I will send you a proper official letter
about it when I get back to Koweit as Bin
Saud made out a devil of a case and I want
references before writing officially. As there
is no pressing hurry I am just sending this

S 741-11,000-10-08






DELETED NOTE.

for your information in case Bin
Saud's confidential man has
turned up.

Bin Saud particularly
wished that no mention of the subject
should be made to Kubarak.

Yours sincerely
W.H.F. Sharpe

S 741-11/00-10-08





DRAFT—(For Approval).

POLITICAL ^{Agency} RESIDENCY / PERSIAN GOVT. /

Kuwait

No. *C.17*

CONFIDENTIAL

Dated 8th April 19*31*.

To,


Political Resident,
BUSHIRE.

Sir,

I have the honour to report below for the information of Government the substance of a number of long *and intimate* conversations which took place between Abdul Aziz bin Saud, *the Wahabi* Amir of Nejd, and myself when, during my recent tour, I spent some days in his camp.

2. I would *first* observe *that* Abdul Aziz *gave me* *the impression of being endowed with a* me *very* particularly straightforward, frank and generous nature and *such* *is* his reputation among the Bedouin tribes in Central and Eastern Arabia, *and is* corroborated *moreover* by every Sheikh from whom *at various times* I have made incidental enquiries. He treated me most hospitably and in the most genuinely friendly manner, sparing no pains to make my stay with him as pleasant as possible. He and his brothers did not show *a trace* of the fanatical spirit which might have been expected from the ruling Wahabi family *and his* *his* advisers and the heads of his forces also treated me and my men with the most cordial friendship; all my questions regarding their country, its customs, resources etc *were* *being* answered in the frankest manner, whilst I was free to wander among the tents and converse with all and sundry without *apparently* arousing a *particle* *trace* of that suspicion which generally attaches to a foreigner amongst Arabs of the interior. *I feel convinced*

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


21.
(Continuation of Note, Précis or Draft.)

of the ~~truth~~ ^{conclusion} of this impression for I frequently dis-
-cussed matters of doctrine, custom and religion
which are held to be anathema by the Wahabi sect and
was answered
always ~~with~~ ^{with} calm/intelligent reasoning without a
trace of fanatical heat. My object in stating the above
is to show that my relations with the As-Saud family
were of ^{as a} intimate ~~a~~ description ~~that~~ ^{to} leave no
doubt ~~of~~ ^{their} sincerity in what passed between
us; indeed I was habitually addressed ~~as~~ ^{as} "Brother" and if I had been one in fact I could not
have been treated more as one of the family.

3. When Abdul Aziz after some ~~of~~ ^{of} conversations
on general ~~politics~~ ^{politics} began to ask my op-
-inion on the relations between the British Government
and Turkey, the aims of the latter, our views on the
same and the like I said at once I had not come to dis-
-cuss politics but to enjoy touring in the desert, and
meet him if possible on his native heath in order to
see how Arab Chiefs lived in the desert; ~~now~~ ^{and} moreover,
I had no sort of authority to discuss politics with him
for we had no political relations with Central Arabian
Chiefs and so far as I knew desired none. ^{as far as} ~~as far as~~ ^{provided}
they were content with their own affairs and did not
force us to protect our interests ^{amongst the chiefs} ~~along~~ the coast-line
as had been necessary in former times, when the Wahabi
power under Faisal bin Turki had interfered in Oman and
Bahrain affairs. Abdul Aziz said he quite understood
my position but would be grateful if I would hear what
he wanted to say and then if ~~then~~ ^{views} I desired to send
on his ^{views} ~~to~~ my superiors ^{afterwards} ~~he~~ ^{please myself} could ~~do so~~ ^{do so}, but that
he was glad of the opportunity to "show his heart"
fully in conversation for he had already sent a secret
messenger to Bushire ^{re-} ~~to~~ ^{the} open relations with the Resident

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


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but that the man carried no letters, and his instructions had ^{only} been to see the Resident personally, intimate generally that the As-Saud wished to enter into relations with the British Government, and that anything more formal than this might be conducted through the Political Agent at Kuwait. The man's name, he told me, was Mashuq and he left Abdul Aziz secretly (^{C.E.} ~~was~~ his purpose and destination were unknown even to the Amir's ^{brothers &} ~~entourage~~) about the last week of January.

4. Seeing that he was bent upon having his say I explained to Abdul Aziz that I presumed his object was ~~to~~ (much as that of other Arabs) to bring about some form of relation with the British Government which ~~he~~ ^{more patent} would enable him to repudiate any allegiance which the Turkish Government might in the future require of him or his house; (~~for none at present exists~~); if such was the case I was as nearly certain as I could be without ^a reference to Government or a discussion that His Majesty's Government, while always desirous of peace, would not support him, and would not enter into Central Arabian affairs for they had always confined themselves to their interests on the coast line and had never, so far as I knew, challenged any Turkish claim to the ordering of affairs in Central Arabia; ^{moreover, being in} ~~he~~ ^{person} would be aware from anything of the nature of our ^{amicable terms with that type; they would be aware from anything of the nature of our} ~~intrigue against~~ ^{Course} ~~him~~ ^{himself} that he must expect the slightest support from His Majesty's Government, that from his isolation in Central Arabia he knew little or nothing of the affairs of nations, that he was not in a position to judge ~~such~~ ^{such} matters and though my words might be unpalatable I felt bound to tell him plainly at once to save future dis-
-appointment. Having enjoyed his hospitality and been ~~so~~ ^{intimate} created as his friend it would not be fair to him if

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
(Continuation of Note, Précis or Draft.)

I permitted him to gather an impression that having dis-
-cussed political matters with a British Government
official he would obtain any support or countenance
from that Government *or that they would even consider his discussion seriously,*
when I felt almost certain that
the British Government would do nothing to disturb the
existing ^{state} of affairs. I reiterated my opinion as
given above ^{on} several occasions and Abdul Aziz ^{always} re-
-ceived it as ^{rendered} ~~kindred~~ in good faith and without resent-
-ment.

5. Abdul Aziz first pointed out that his suggest-
-ions had the approval of his father Abdur Rahman bin
Faisal with whom alone he had discussed them, for his
brothers had not been as yet taken into his confidence
in the matter. From separate discussions with them,
however, I am convinced that they are of his mind and
would certainly support him. In passing I would ob-
-serve that though both Abdul Aziz and his father Ab-
-dur Rahman are known ^{as} and ~~well~~ spoken of the "Imam" or
"Amir ~~emir~~" ^{indisputably} the actual power and government of Nejd
is almost entirely in the hands of Abdul Aziz, his fath-
-er having virtually abdicated the position of ruler in
favour of the son.

6. Abdul Aziz ^{after Ibrahim} pointed out that ~~he~~ ^{had} ~~retired~~ ^{retired} Turki bin Abdulla reconquered ~~the~~ ^{the}
~~the~~ ^{the} original Wahabi dominion, including Hama
and Rafif and most of the Oman coast from Kalar to
near Maskat, thus ~~clearing~~ removing all signs of Turkis
dominion, and that he then made a treaty with the Bri-
-tish Government. This is apparently the period des-
-cribed in Section VIII on page 10 of Mr Saldana's
Precis of Nejd Affairs in Part I of the Historical Mat-
-erials for the Persian Gulf Gazetteer. Shortly after
Turki was murdered by Mashari, and he in turn killed

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(Continuation of Note, Précis or Draft.)

6. Abdul Aziz recounted a deal of ancient history of which I give an abbreviated version below, arranged, so far as I have been able to locate it in time, chronologically.

1814/6
1819.

He began with the invasion by Ibrahim Pasha and said that

Note. A reference to Mr

Saldana's Précis of Nejd

Affairs in Part I of the

"Historical Materials for the

Persian Gulf Gazetteer" of

October 1904 will be useful

as a comparison to what follows and Katif and most of the follows.

1824

after the Egyptians had

been expelled from Nejd

his ancestor Turki bin

Abdulla reconquered most

of the original Wahabi do-

-minion, including Hasa,

Oman coast from Katar to

near Maskat, thus remov-

-ing all signs of Turkish

1831.

* Vide Sect VIII, page 10

of Saldana's Précis

power, and that he then made


a treaty with the British Gov-

-ernment.

1834

Shortly after this Turki was murdered by Mashari and

he in turn was killed by Faisal.....



9 (11)

1838

1842

1843

185-2

1859


1861

1865

1866

Midhat Pasha, Wali of Baghdad and got him to invade Nejd

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1871

(Continuation of Note, Précis or Draft.)
on his behalf. When the Turks came to Hasa all the
As-Saud family were at feud with each other and the
Turks therefore easily seized Hasa and Ratif but they
went no further west towards Nejd. The Turks would
never have been able to come by land and it was not right

on the British Government's ^{not have allowed} to ~~not~~ them come by sea,
as the British ships ^{have always guarded to make it and allowed} ~~had not~~ ^{to allow armed expeditions} ~~had not~~ ^{represented this to} ~~allowed~~ on it. Saud ^{the Resident at Basra}

~~about this~~ and ~~the~~ threw himself on his protection, but
As the English would not ^{listen to his representations} ~~allow~~ he tried to make an
arrangement with the Turks who promised much but did not

thing. In their usual way they wanted Saud to come
in person to Baghdad so as to imprison him ^{there} and then take

the whole of Nejd ^{and when} ~~then~~ they had agreed to his brother
Abdur Rahman bin Faisal going in his place promising

1872

him a safe conduct, ^{did actually} ~~they imprisoned him~~ ^{the latter} By this time
the Arabs had seen that the ^{Turkish officials high & low} ~~men~~ were not to be trust-
ed and so joined Saud with a view to an attack on Hasa

so as to recover by force what they could not get by
diplomacy. Saud however was afraid ^{venture} to do this ~~because~~ ^{would probably} for

the Turks ~~would~~ kill his brother in Baghdad, and also
^{because} ~~the same time~~ the English would not stop ^{Turkish} ~~the~~ troops com-
ing into Hasa by sea. When Abdur Rahman was released

1874

after ³ ~~4~~ or 4 years captivity at Baghdad and landed in

Hasa he found that the Arabs loathed the Turks and ^{was ready} ~~was~~

^{to join him} ~~to join him~~. As the Turks were weak owing to sickness
and deaths he attacked Hasa fort but before it could be

taken the Turks brought more troops and he left ^{for Basra} ~~Hasa~~


1875

Saud then died and Abdur Rahman became Imam but there
was continual war between him and Abdulla bin Faisal

who still loved the Turks. ^{Abdulla gradually became stronger &} ~~he~~ ^{was}
^{acknowledged ruler} ~~he~~ ^{he made} ~~the power~~ ^{peace with all his relatives}

1880

except Abdur Rahman ^{his brother}





(Continuation of Note, Précis or Draft.)

It was during these years of trouble between the sons of Faisal themselves ^{or} between the As-Saud and the Turks in Hama that the Ibn Rashid family ^{of Hail} formerly vassals of the Wahabi ruler became so strong and ^{eventually} took Kasim and Boraidah.

1882 Abdullah bin Faisal tried to re-assert the power of the As-Saud but Mahomed ibn Rashid was too strong. At the same

1887 time there were more dissensions between Abdulla and his relatives so that Abdulla became weak and the sons of Saud bin Faisal took the power from him; but, Mahomed ibn

1888 Rashid to help Abdulla attacked Riadh and took it and thus became ~~the~~ ruler of practically all the ~~land~~ country formerly belonging to the Wahabis. He also took Abdulla bin Faisal off to Hail. Abdur Rahman bin Faisal then

1890 made an effort to ~~take~~ restore the power of the As Saud, and succeeded in taking Riadh from Ibn Rashid's people, but he was ^{not} strong enough ^{to maintain his position} and finally ~~he~~ was utterly defeated

1891 by Ibn Rashid and had to take to the desert, where he wandered about ^{with his family} until they took refuge with Mubarak in Kuwait.

1897 When Mahomed Ibn Rashid died the tribes which he held together by his superior political acumen began to drift apart ~~apart~~ and the As-Saud saw their opportunity. After a consid-

erable amount of intrigue Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman, ^{had been living at Kuwait for some years} ~~had~~ who with his younger brothers and father, ~~was~~ ^{was}


^{from 1892} left secretly with about 30 chosen men for Riadh, ^{which} by a coup-de-main ^{he} captured ^{in a night} ~~the~~ ^{on} and proclaimed himself ^{was} hailed with joy by the people as their legitimate ruler. The settled people of Southern Nejd who were tired of ~~the~~

Ibn Rashid's rule flocked to him and he soon had a considerable force with which he ^{drove Ibn Rashid's representatives from} ~~was~~ town after town until in a year ~~and~~ he had again made the As-Saud family a power to be reckoned with. He then recalled his father

Abdur Rahman and his brothers and proceeded to win back what he could from Ibn Rashid. Mubarak assisted him to

~~break Ibn Rashid's power but suffered the death of his~~

S 639-12,000-7-08






He was soon master of Aridh, Sadaiv, Washm, ^{14r} ~~Washm~~ ^{Haulah & Mahmal} and eventually of Kasim. ^(Continuation of Note, Precs of Draft.) The
~~which was the last occasion on which he was actively and~~
~~with the exception of Kasim. Abdul Aziz continued his~~
~~campaign against Ibn Rashid until he recaptured the whole~~
~~of Kasim, Washm, Sadaiv, Aridh, having previously made him-~~
~~self master of Aridh, Sadaiv, Washm, Haulah and the country~~
~~surrounding country~~
~~acknowledged him~~
~~and for~~
~~most~~
~~of~~
~~the~~
~~came~~
~~back so increased his power that~~
~~tribes under his banner. Ibn Rashid then appealed to the~~
~~Turks and a Turkish force was sent into Kasim overland which~~
~~with the Rashids forces~~
~~was utterly routed at Boraidah. Following upon this~~
~~the Turks sent a larger force again into Kasim~~
~~under~~
~~Mushir~~
~~but fighting did not take place; the~~
~~Abdur Rahman~~
~~bin Faisal met the Mushir and an arrangement was come to~~
~~between them by which parties of this force were left in~~
~~Boraidah, Anaizah, and some of the other towns of Kasim.~~
~~Shortly afterwards Abdur Rahman went north and had a meeting~~
~~with the Wali of Basra at Safwan, in which nothing took place~~
~~of consequence. The Turkish troops in Nejd dwindled owing~~
~~disease~~
~~and death and eventually were given a safe con-~~
~~duct out of Nejd by Abdul Aziz and Mubarak, who sent them~~
~~from Kasim to As-Safa and thence to At-Towil near~~
~~near Koweit and thence to Basrah land.~~
~~Since this evacuation there have been no signs of Turkish~~
~~authority~~
~~in Nejd and Abdul Aziz has so consolidated his power~~
~~that his word is law over the whole of Nejd from within~~
~~two days' march of Hail to the Persian Gulf~~
~~coast-line, excepting only the actual towns of Hofuf and Kat-~~
~~if where the Turks maintain garrisons.~~
~~In 1910 the Shar-~~
~~if of Mecca made an expedition to Kasim, whether in his own~~
~~personal interests or at the instigation of the Turkish Govt~~
~~is not known for certain but finding Abdul Aziz much too~~
~~strong for him left hurriedly after an exchange of presents.~~
~~Abdul Aziz was hampered~~
~~by the Sharif having~~
~~in his power his brother Saad, who had been~~
~~treacherous~~
~~and handed over~~
~~ly captured by the Ateyba Bedouin.~~
~~I am assured by Abdul Aziz that no documents pass-~~

June 1904

Dec 1904

S 639-1





13¹⁵

(Continuation of Note, Précis or Draft.)

passed between him and the Sharif regarding the revenge and Government of Kasim. All the reports published ^{in Egyptian papers} are pure fiction invented by the Sharif to save his own face after he had safely returned to Mecca. He asserts that he made no profession of being the vassal of the Sultan, and being a Wahabi does not admit the Sultan's Khalifate in Islam.

The Wahabis hate the Turks ~~for the same reason~~ only less than they hate the Shi'ahs of Persia for the infidel practices which both have imported into the true and pure ~~Islamic~~ faith revealed ~~to the Prophet~~ ^{in the} the Prophet Mahomed.

Koran.


Abdul Aziz

8. ^{He} reverted frequently to the letters which his father ^{the Resident} had sent to ^{at Basra} Basra about the time of the appointment of a Political Agent in Kuwait and regretted that we had not met his friendly advances with the ~~same~~ cordiality of former times. He said that he had given me their history for so many years to prove that the As-Saud had always been in friendly relations with the English and that they had always cordially hated the Turks but once the latter effected their lodgment in Hasa by sea and were able to maintain ~~XX~~ their position ~~there~~ there by the same means they had not been able to eject them. The As-Saud had frequently mooted the idea ^{of ejecting them} but had ^{each time} ~~never~~ come to the conclusion that ^{an expedition} ~~such~~ would be ^{fruitless} ~~useless~~ until the ability of the Turks to ~~send~~ bring in troops by sea was limited, and that was only possible through the English. The As-Saud bitterly resent the Turkish occupation of Hasa for two main reasons -

- (a) ^{the district} ~~The district~~ is ^{is} ~~is~~ part of the As-Saud ancestral property as much as Aridh and ^{is} ~~is~~ by far the richest, (b) the Turkish occupation deprives the Ruler of Nejd of ^{the} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~the~~ natural port to his dominions, and makes the proper control of the Bedouin tribes between the sea and Riadh impossible, with consequent detriment to the commercial prosperity of Nejd.

9. Abdul Aziz also told me that he was not alone in his hat

S 639-1 2,000-7-08





(Continuation of Note, Précis or Draft.)

hatred of the Turks, for all the princes of Arabia were in communication with each other regarding ~~the~~ a combination to attack the Turks simultaneously and drive them out ^{of Arabia} for good and all. He frequently had letters from the Imam

Yahyah, from ^{Sayid Saud al-} ~~Yahyah~~ ^{from} ~~Saud~~ Idrisi, the Chiefs of the tribes through whose country the Hejaz railway ran, and the

responsible Arabs in Hasa and Katif begging him to assist ^{in that} ~~in that~~ ^{making} ~~making~~ a general revolution throughout Arabia successful. Even Ibn Rashid had made overtures to the same effect, but

Abdul Aziz was prepared to yet
~~he had not committed himself as he did not~~ ^{yet} ~~had the un-~~
happy recollection of how the Turks came to be in Hasa be-
fore him, *and desired to give them an opportunity for*
a further advance into Nejd. The As-Saud had

no ambitions towards and increase of his ~~his~~ ^{his} dominion north or west or anywhere with the exception of Hasa & Katif.


But above all the ~~As-Saud~~ ^{As-Saud} desired to be in relations with the British Government, so that the Turkish Government would hesitate to oppress them or interfere in their affairs

in Nejd. *Abdul Aziz* ~~he~~ cited Sheikh Mubarak's position as nearly as possible representing what he desired, ^{(adding that the As-Saud} ~~the As-Saud~~ ^{were} ~~the As-Saud~~ ^{off} ~~the As-Saud~~ really better than Mubarak ^{for they} ~~for they~~ had no dealings whatever with the Turks, ~~and~~ ^{and} did not fly their flag ^{like Mubarak or} ~~did not~~ admit even the Khalifate of the Sultan.

He appealed to the English on the ground of long previous relations, and because they were ^{always} ~~for~~ peace ^{or justice} and could be trusted to keep their ^{promises.} ~~word~~ The new regime in Constantinople had already shown its aggressive policy and he feared that

before very many years there would be another attempt to sub-
jugate Nejd. Though the Wahabis had formerly fought us ⁱⁿ ~~in~~ regard to the Coast chiefs ^{at} ~~at~~ they saw the benefit of our rule amongst them and had no wish to alter the ^{present position} ~~present position~~ ^{having} ~~having~~ mentioned that he ~~had~~ received letters from Dabai whose ~~the~~ ^{the} Sheikhs had written after the "Hyacinth's" gun-running inci-
dent asking to be taken under his protection.

S 639-1 2,000-7-08





17 15

(Continuation of Note, Précis or Draft.)

11. He was quite prepared to accept a British Political Agent but as the Turks at present occupied the only two ports which belonged to the Wahabis he could only suggest such an appointment in either Ratif or Ojair after the Turks had been made to evacuate Hassa. ^{When} ~~that~~ that auspicious event had taken place he would welcome the British flag as a sign that he would no longer be molested by Turkey. He went on to point ~~out~~ ^{that} if ~~the~~ the As-Saud controlled Hassa and a British official resided at one of the ports, we should benefit largely by the increased trade which would result from a settled and effective power over the ~~Wahabis~~ ^{made} Bedouin who ~~used~~ ^{made} the trade routes to the interior so insecure at present.


12. I have given above what passed in some detail for it seemed of ~~some~~ ^{at first hand with} importance to record a discussion ~~in which~~ ^{and in which he expressed} the man who at present rules Central Arabia; ~~his~~ ^{his} views ~~and~~ ^{and} ambitions with absolute frankness. It will be of advantage to refer in this connection to the cor-

respondence noted in the margin. Unfortunately I had no papers with me in the desert and it was therefore impossible at the time to follow all Abdul Aziz's references to previous appeals to the Residency. Since my return I find that he does not seem to have exaggerated his side of the case so ~~much~~ ^{was my impression} as ~~much~~ ^{much as I thought at the} ~~time~~ ^{original}.

Koweit letter No 8 d/18.8.1904
Bahrein " No 238 d/7.11.1903
Copy of Despatch to Secy of State No 69
d/26.3.1904
Koweit No 313. d/28.8.1906
Bushire No 2181. d/16.9.1906
Enclosure to Baghdad No 805
d/29.9.1906
Koweit No 451. d/20.11.1906
" 228 d/13.5.1907
Bushire No 1321. d/22.6.1907

13. ~~Further information~~ ^{on} ~~receiving~~ ^{receiving} how he ~~recovered~~ ^{regular} got over the difficulty of receiving a Turkish

S 639-1 2,000-7-08





(Continuation of Note, Précis or Draft.)

Annuity with the claim to absolute independence. Abdul Aziz said that the annuity dated from the time of his father's (Abdur Rahman bin Faisal) incarceration in Baghdad, ~~the~~

was given then ~~to Abdul Rahman~~ ^{only to Abdul Rahman personally;} for his living expenses, and has continued since it amounts to ~~the same amount~~ ^{only £ T. 60/- per annum.} and is personal to Abdul Rahman. The As-Saud have never accep-

-ted anything else from the Turkey in the way of ~~aid~~ ^{aid on his father's death Abdul Aziz was proposed to allow} decorations or pensions. What correspondence they had had ^{with the Turkish officials} has been of a diplomatic nature ^{to allow}


either to effect the removal of ~~Turkish~~ ^{Turkish} troops on ~~the~~ ^{the} pretext ^{of a} ~~show~~ ^{show} of submission or smooth over ~~their~~ ^{other} difficulties. If the English had kept up their old relations and brought the As-Saud under their wing as desired by them none of these shifts and expedients would have been necessary.

14. In concluding I would venture to remark that a serious consideration of the Central Arabian problem seems to be called for in the light of recent events in the Hauran in Yemen and in Irak. All reports point to an ever-increasing unrest and hatred of Turkish pretensions. ^{perhaps also} ~~the~~ ^{does} combination ~~and~~ take place between the principal leaders in

Arabia ~~and~~ ^{and} when men so ~~divided~~ ^{divided} in far apart in religion

as the Imam Yahyah and the Wahabi Imam ~~take a discussion~~ ^{seriously} ~~in a~~ ^{such a union seems not improbable - it is very} a joint revolt, ~~it seems to me~~ ^{it seems to me} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~probability~~ ^{probability} ~~that a simultaneous revolt of the~~ ^{that a simultaneous revolt of the} ~~tribes throughout~~ ^{tribes throughout} ~~Arabia will be brought about~~ ^{is possible and judging by what I have seen of} ~~the~~ ^{their temper in the subject of Turkish rule, would be enough to hold} ~~strength of Turkey in Arabia has been her ability to play~~ ^{the}

off one tribe against another and when this goes it does not appear what they will be able to do.





(Continuation of Note, Précis or Draft.)



17
If a combination ~~was~~ were to take place between the principal leaders in Arabia — and ~~the fact of~~ ^{the} the fact of serious discussion of ~~such~~ ^{simultaneous revolt} a ~~project~~ between men of so widely divergent religious tenets as the Imam Yahyah and the Wahabi Imam makes such a union at least possible — I am inclined to the opinion that ~~such~~ a revolt is not only probable but would be welcomed by nearly every tribe throughout Arabia. The idea of ^a simultaneous rising to drive out the Turks would certainly, I think, hold the Arabs together until their object was accomplished, at least in Eastern Arabia. Whether the Turks would be able to regain their positions ^{seems} ~~is~~ uncertain, ^{but} ~~but~~ from all I can learn hatred of the Turks seems to be the one idea common to all the tribes and the only one for which they would sink their own differences.

The strength of Turkey in Arabia has always hitherto been her ability to play off one tribe against another, but now it appears that this cardinal fact seems to have penetrated the ~~first~~ ^{sober} unsophisticated brain of the Arabs ^{for inter-tribal war} and any suggestion which can be traced to a Turkish source is at once suspect ^{and the more likely for that reason to defeat its own object.}

15. From our own point of view in the Persian Gulf I venture to think that with ^{the As-} ~~Bin~~ Saud established in Haea ~~the~~ ^{place of the Turks} and in friendly relations with us our position would be considerably strengthened, there would be an absence of the present attempts at intrigue between the Tribal chiefs and the Turks, and there is no doubt that Bin Saud's power in the hinterland would render the main caravan routes to the interior so safe that ^{trade} ~~which at present is~~ ^{already} almost entirely British or Indian, would benefit materially.

16. Before parting I informed Abdul Aziz that I would forward his views to my superiors but I did not anticipate any answer ^{of the nature} ~~of the nature~~ he desired for the reasons already given. He replied he was content to wait as he knew that whatever answer ~~would~~ might be



S 639-1 2,000-7-08





18 (20)

He particularly I have also
requested that the
matter might not be
discussed with ^{Sheila} Plutarch, as he
would be likely to draw false
inferences and perhaps divulge
it to Turkish officials.

Reference: IOR/R/15/5/27. Copyright for this page: [Open Government Licence](#)





DRAFT—(For Approval).

Agency,
POLITICAL RESIDENCY, PERSIAN GULF//
Kuwait

CONFIDENTIAL No. DEWL.official

Dated 11th April 1961.

To,
Political Resident,
BUSHIRE.

FWW

My dear Colonel,



On reading over my appalling long epistle.
G.17 of the 8th April re Bin Saud's desire to "dakhil"
with us, I see I have not said that Bin Saud told me when
I met him the second time later that he had had a line from
his secret agent Washuq whom he sent to you. I saw the
letter myself, and he merely said he had seen the "sahib"
(apparently you), that you had heard what he had to say,
had remarked you were pleased and thanked him, and told him
that no doubt you would receive further particulars through
Kuwait for the P.A. was in the desert and likely to meet
Bin Saud.

I don't know if this tallies with what passed,
but I am wondering whom Washuq saw for you seem to have been
away all the time and I have had nothing about it
from you.

Yours sincerely,

W.H.I.S.

S 638-12,000-7-08





OFFICE NOTE.

22
20



Abdul Aziz bin Saud uses a respectable
nephew of good birth, named
Mas'ad as Suwailim
as his agent in secret matters
with Sheikh Mubarak.
This man is considerably but not
altogether in his confidence.

Bin Saud's agent-resident in
Kuwait is Abdulla an-Nafisi
and letters etc for Abdul Aziz bin
Saud should be handed over to
him. I do not think this man either
is entirely in Bin Saud's confidence.

Notes made from Abdul Aziz's own words.

May 13 ⁴/₁₁

S 741—11,000-12-08





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 1020 of 1911.

21⁽²³⁾

British Residency and Consulate-General.

Bushire, 20th April 1911.

W. H. S.
APR 28 1911
C-36

A copy of the undermentioned letter is forwarded, with compliments, to the Political Agent, Koweit, for information with reference to his letter No.C/17, dated 8th April 1911,



page 4
By Order,

J. Noel

Lieutenant,

Second Assistant Resident.

No. 1019 dated 20th April 1911, from Resident, Bushire, to Foreign, Simla.





24 22

No. 1019 of 1911.

British Residency and Consulate-General.

Bushire, 20 April 1911.

From

Lieut-Colonel P. E. Cox, C.B.I., C.I.E.,

Political Resident in the

Persian Gulf.

To

The Hon'ble Lieut-Colonel Sir Henry McMahon,

K. C. I. E., C. S. I.,

Secretary to the Government of India

in the Foreign Department,

S i m l a.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of an interesting report received from the Political Agent, Koweit, in which he narrates the No. 0/17, dated 8th April 1911 purport of conversations which passed between himself and Abdul Aziz "Bin Saud" in the course of some days' halt by Captain Shakespear at the latter's camp during a recent tour in the Koweit hinterland.

2. The report reaches me just as I am leaving for Koweit and I would prefer to defer comment until my return, merely observing that Bin Saud's emissary Mashuq referred to at the end of paragraph 3 of the report did present himself here at Bushire about 6 weeks ago with a verbal message purporting to come from Bin Saud.

In any case having regard to existing instructions he would have received no encouragement; and as a matter of fact though his bearing suggested that he was what he professed to be, he carried no credentials or other proof of his identity, so that I had no means of being sure of his bona fides, and therefore treated him with the due circumspection, merely giving



10/4
No. 1019 of 1911.
British Residency and Consulate-General.
Bahrain, 20 April 1911.

From
Lieut-Colonel P. E. Cox, C.B.I., C.I.E.,
Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf.

To
The Hon'ble Lieut-Colonel Sir Henry McMahon,
K.C.I.E., C.B.I.,
Secretary to the Government of India,
in the Foreign Department,
L. I. M. I. A.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the
Government of India, a copy of an interesting report received
from the Political Agent, Kuwait, in which he narrates the
No. 1019, dated 20 April 1911, purporting to be a conversation which
passed between himself and Abdul Aziz "Bin Saud" in the course
of some days' visit by Captain Chesapeake at the latter's
camp during a recent tour in the Kuwait hinterland.

2. The report reaches me just as I am leaving for
Kuwait and I would prefer to defer comment until my return,
merely observing that Bin Saud's emissary Mahomed referred to
at the end of paragraph 3 of the report did present himself
here at Bahrain about 3 weeks ago with a verbal message pur-
porting to come from Bin Saud.

in any case having regard to existing instructions he would
have received no encouragement; and as a matter of fact
though his bearing suggested that he was what he professed to
be, he carried no credentials or other proof of his identity,
so that I had no means of being sure of his bona fides, and
therefore treated him with the due circumspection, merely
giving



giving instructions that as an Arab stranger in a foreign ⁽²⁵⁾ 23
country he should be supplied with anything he needed in the
way of food pending his departure by the next steamer.


I have the honour to be

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

sd/- P. I. Cox.

Lieut-Colonel,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.





CONFIDENTIAL

No. 2372 of 1911.

(26)

24

British Residency and Consulate-General.

Bushire, 10 September 1911.

W. H. S.
SEP 15 1911
C. 92
page 21

In continuation of this office endorsement No. 1020,
dated the 20th May 1911, copies of the undermentioned
letters are forwarded, with compliments, to the Political
Agent, Koweit.


By Order,

E. Noel.
Lieutenant,

Second Assistant Resident.

-
- (1) Bushire letter No. 1825, dated 23rd July 1911.
(2) Demi-official communication from Foreign to Resident
dated 30th August 1911 (Note - Not to be referred
to in official correspondence).

Bin Saud





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 1825, dated Bushire, the 23rd (received 31st) July 1911.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL P. Z. COX, C.S.I., C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—THE HON'BLE LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR HENRY MCMAHON, K.C.I.E. C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

I have the honour to refer to the correspondence ending with Foreign Department endorsement No. 1251, dated 3rd July 1911, in connection with Captain Shakespear's recent meeting with Abdul Aziz "Bin Saud", at which the latter renewed his former overtures for closer relations with the British Government.

2. The subject was last in evidence in 1906-1907, and was then exhaustively reviewed in Foreign Department despatch No. 28, dated 21st February 1907, to His Majesty's Secretary of State. At that time the Government of India inclined to the view that it might be expedient in our general interests not to ignore altogether the advances of Bin Saud; but His Majesty's Government felt unable to modify their former attitude towards the question, and I was ultimately directed to let Bin Saud know through the third parties who had approached me, that his proposals involved considerations which it was impossible for His Majesty's Government to entertain, and that no other answer than this must be expected. Since then Bin Saud has made our Political Agent's personal acquaintance, in the course of two visits to Shaikh Mubarak at Kuwait; and in March last at a chance meeting in the hinterland, when Captain Shakespear was on his usual spring excursion, unburdened himself again to our representative.

3. During the five years which have elapsed since the situation was last examined, the Porte has not felt in a position to make the slightest attempt to re-establish its footing in Nejd, while, on the other hand Abdul Aziz-bin-Saud has greatly increased his personal prestige and the sphere of his influence and control. In fact, Captain Shakespear tells me that he now asserts himself northwards to a point more than half way between Buraida and Haifa, while on the south he collects tribute as far as the Wadi Dowasir. He thus feels no doubt that he is in a stronger position than ever to recover Hasa and Katif, if only the sea were closed to the Turks.

4. Meanwhile, our own point of view seems to be somewhat affected by the fact that we are, or are likely to be, at issue with the Porte in regard to our respective rights and interests in the Persian Gulf, in connection with which the Porte seems disposed to be intractable, and it may be considered that we cannot afford to ignore, without mature deliberation, any indirect means ready to our hand, for putting such pressure on the Turks as may be likely to make them more amenable.

So long, however, as our diplomatic relations with them are satisfactory, or at all events correct, we seem to be no more in a position now than we were five years ago, to enter into any understanding with Bin Saud, whether open or secret, which would envisage the expulsion of the Turks from Hasa and Katif, and the resumption by the Wahabi Chief of these former possessions of his family. On the other hand, we have excellent and natural reasons for being desirous of maintaining cordial, if distant, relations with Bin Saud; at any rate for not wishing to create in him a feeling of soreness and ill-will towards us. Granting that the friendly sentiments which he evinces for us are mainly promoted by a consideration of his own material interests, yet the treatment accorded by him to Captain Shakespear, the latter's impressions of the Arab's fine personality, and the phenomenon of his frank and spontaneous offer to receive a British representative if he ever got down to the coast, seem to give us reason for pause before again rejecting his advances absolutely. At all events, it seems incumbent on Captain Shakespear to send him a direct and friendly reply, even if it be a disappointing one.

4. The present expediency or in expediency of coming to any friendly and innocuous understanding with him, hinges upon the attitude of the Porte in



26

2

regard to our various interests in the Gulf, a consideration regarding which I have no information which would justify me in making recommendations. I can, therefore, do no more than indicate arrangements which would appear to me to be conceivably feasible, if consonant with the policy of His Majesty's Government.

In return for a nominal subsidy or occasional present, Abdul Aziz-bin-Saud might be willing to undertake in writing—

- (i) to oblige his subjects to observe the Maritime Truce and to send no armed dhows to sea without our concurrence; and not to allow coast under his control to be used as base for piratical exploits (such as we experience from individuals like the outlaw Ahmad bin-Salam);
- (ii) to maintain friendly relations with Chiefs and principalities in relations with the British Government;
- (iii) to prohibit by Notification the import of arms by sea, by his dependents.

It might be explained to him that his observance of the above innocuous conditions of agreement, especially the last one, would furnish us with some grounds for objecting to the disturbance of the present *status quo* by the Turks, which *status quo* would be considered to involve the retention of Hasa and Katif by the Porte and the independence of Nejd under its Arab rulers.

It is quite conceivable that Abdul Aziz wants no half measures and would prefer to be left unhampered if we cannot respond in the way which he would like, but if we offered him terms somewhat on the above lines, he would at all events be left with no further grounds for dudgeon at having his friendly advances ignored; while the terms themselves would seem to be innocuous and to admit of diplomatic justification.

5. As between ourselves and the Turks, the fact of our having put pressure on Bin Saud to prohibit the import of arms by sea, should give us reasonable grounds for objecting to the Turks taking advantage of the fact and sending troops by sea to coerce him: while, if our relations with them became sufficiently strained, we might usefully remind them that they only retained control of Hasa and Katif, thanks to our pacific and deterrent influence over Bin Saud, and that were that influence withdrawn, their position in those districts would not be worth a month's purchase.

I have ventured with much diffidence to offer the foregoing suggestions to the Government of India, in case they may be considered to possess any element of practicability.



26
27

Copy of a demi-official letter dated 30th August 1911
from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in
the Foreign Department, Simla, to the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf.

Please refer to your letters Nos. 1019 of the 20th April
and 1825 of the 23rd July, and to our endorsement No.

no copy
1251-E.A., of the 3rd July, about relations with Abdul
Aziz, Bin Saud. I write to let you know that, while it
is possible that the intractable attitude of the Turkish
Government in the Persian Gulf may sooner or later render
it desirable that we should respond to the overtures of
Abdul Aziz, it is not considered desirable to take any
action in that direction at present. You may be sure that
the matter will not be lost sight of here.

28r



Copy of a semi-official letter dated 30th August 1911

From the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in
the Foreign Department, Simla, to the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf.

Please refer to your letters Nos. 1019 of the 20th April
and 1888 of the 23rd July, and to our endorsement No.

1881-R.A., of the 3rd July, about relations with Abdul
Aziz, Bin Saud. I write to let you know that, while it

is possible that the intractable attitude of the Turkish
Government in the Persian Gulf may sooner or later render
it desirable that we should respond to the overtures of
Abdul Aziz, it is not considered desirable to take any
action in that direction at present. You may be sure that
the matter will not be lost sight of here.

Recd in Hyderabad.
12

News letter from my.
Mullah Abdullah of
Kuwait Agency forwarding a letter from
Abdul Aziz bin Saud.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
الحمد لله الذي جعل في كل شيء حكمة وحجراً
والصلاة والسلام على من لا نبي بعده
وبعد فقد بلغنا هذا اليوم من شهر ربيع الأول سنة ١٢٨٥ هـ
والله اعلم بالصواب


١٢٨٥ هـ / ١٨٦٧ م

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

[illegible]

аус.

View on the Qatar Digital Library: http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100036623255.0x00003c





Letter from Capt Shakespeare.

To Abdul Aziz bin Saud


11th March 1912 = 21st Rabi al Awwal 1330.

من قبلاً سفير بونكل اجنت الدولة البرية الفخرية الانكليزية في الكويت
الاجناب لاجل الدخول في المصالح المتفق عليها بين الشيخ عبد العزيز بن الشيخ عبد الرحمن السعدي دام بقاءه
عقب السوال عن غير خاطركم لارتم اخبار وسرور حاله وصفاً رجاءكم عباس وسئلاً
عن صحتكم واخبارنا انكم بخير وعافية سابقاً ارسلنا لكم كتاب مع انسان متوجه لظرفكم
صحة عبد العزيز ولد عثمان الحمد بن جمانة وصلكم واشرفكم عليه وانتم بخير وحالا ارسلنا لكم
عن يد رجاءكم عباس سحابة اننا الله تشكرومون بقبولها لكونكم ممنونين وايضا
تجد هذه احراركم كتاب صحة عباس المذكور هذه الما لازم ببياننا لجانكم مع سلامنا على الالة
والاخوان والولة ودمتم سالمين ٢١ ربيع الاول ١٣٣٠ مطبوع ١١ امارج ١٩١٢

WV
11 3/12

Given to Abbas to forward by despatch man.

A/c. Duponts line that the man Abbas
has arrived & have had speech on the line.
That a bore is sent by Abbas which
he hopes will be acceptable and also
a second letter.





DRAFT—(For Approval).

Agency,
POLITICAL RESIDENCY, PERSIAN GULF,/
KUWAIT .

No. 108

ARABIC.

Dated 11th March 1911.

To,


Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman al Faisal
"Bin Saud"

After compliments,

On this day your man Abbas al Falaifi arrived to us and told me your news and of your success against the Ateyba . Your letter of the 20th Shawal 1329 was forwarded to me when I was in India attending the crowning of our King there at Delhi and I only returned to Kuwait in the middle of Safer . In your letter you mention having written before but that letter has never reached me . However, of the matters of which we spoke in your honour's camp I wrote of them to the great ones as promised and I was afraid and told you at the time they gave me no such answer as you desired : they said that the present is not a suitable time to discuss these matters , what the future may bring forth God knows , but they were pleased to hear of your Honour's kindness to me and said "we shall not forget Bin Saud's affairs (welfare)". Owing to my absence from Kuwait for nearly four months much work has accumulated for me here and has made it impossible for me to go very far into the desert this spring which I regret as it has not been possible for me to meet you again and to talk face to face. If God wills I will try again next year in the cold weather.

By the hand of Abbas I send a box containing a few ~~things~~ things which I trust you and your brothers will accept and

9,000-3-10






find useful.

A foreigner from a small country in Europe came here wishing to travel in Nejd . He is a sightseer and seeks after knowledge and is not a Government man or concerned with politics , therefore that you might know I gave him a letter to your Honour . I trust you will have seen him .

This is what was necessary and our salaams to all .

By 21st Rabi al. awal 1330
11th March 1912






١٠٨

٣٩

من قبلاً شاكير بونفيل اجنت الدول العربية القيصريه الانكليزية في الكويت
الى جناب الاعلى الامير الانيس الشريف محمد بن عبد الله بن عبد الرحمن
عقب سؤالي عن عزير خاظمكم العاظم وعنا من كرمه اخبرنا عن احوالكم وعن اخذكم عتيبه وعن
مكتوبكم المورخ من ١٢ شوال ١٢٤٩ هـ حال الكويت واسلنا وكيلنا الى الرشد
وقت الذي كنت حاضر عنده حضرة الملك المعظم في بلد دلي وانا ما رجعت
من الرشد وصار وصولي الى الكويت الا بالنصف من شهر صفر ١٢٤٩ هـ ومن
هذه السبب ما امكننا من الجواب بوقتته وفي هذا المكتوب جنابك يذكر انكم ارسلتم
لنا كتاب سابق هذه الكتاب ما وصل اما عن الامور التي صار من ذكره بيننا
في وقت الذي انا عنكم في البر بلفظها للاكابر مثلاً او عنكم ولاكن مثلاً
لوقعت هاتك الساعه ما جا وبوني بجواب الذي يريد جنابك وردولي
جواب انه هذه الايام ما هو وقت مناسب ليحت هذه الامور ولاكنهم
صار ومروين باكر انكم لنا بالبر ويقولون اننا لانشا مصالح بن اسود
المد اعلم عن المستقبل كيف يصير وبسبب عدم حضورني في الكويت قد رابعت
اشهر كثير على الشغل بعد رجوعي والان ما اتمكن على الخروج الى البر او وج بصيداً
او واجبه جنابك لاجل اذكر لك كل جرس بالتفصيل انشا الله انا اجتهده فيه
سنة ثانيه وبممكن في السنة المقبله يصير مواجهه بيننا انا سابقا ارسلت جنابكم
مكتوب مع انسان من بلاد اجنيه في اربابا وهو قصده بنفرض على بلاد العرب
ومن سبب ما هو من رجاء جيل الدوله ولاشغل سياسي انا ارسلت لكم مكتوب يصير
عنكم كم معلوم انشا الله وصل بالسلامه هو مع عبد العزيز وله عثمان المحمدي
الزلفي وهذا وصلك به رجاءك عباس الفلاحي سماع داخلها بعض اشياء
حق جنابك مع الاخوان انشا الله تتكلمون بقصد لها وتعلمونها بالصحة
والعافيه هذا الما لم مع الامناء على الدالة الشيخ عبد الرحمن ومع الاخوان محمد وسه
واسود وعبد الله وولدكم العزيز تركي ودمتم سالمين محرومين
(٢١ ربيع اول ١٢٤٠ مطابق ١١ مارچ ١٩١٢)

١١/٣/١٢





W. H. D.
APR 17 1912
C-5-D

33
34
35


بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
الحمد لله الذي جعلنا منكم أمة واحدة
بعد التقدير والاستغفار عن شرير خاطركم لاسيما في سرور
محبكم معكم من غير ضيق طريق صاحبكم الفاضل سيدي الوالد
عاضد قننا من بابلنا عن انه صار مع بعض الاشياء
ما وصل وتعرفون ان الذي منكم مقبول على كل حال
سيدي الوالد واخوانه والا اولاد سليمان ورومهم
دام بقاءهم

From Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman al Faisal
("Bin Saud")

To P. A. Kuwait - d/ 22 Rabi-ul-Akhir 1330

7 page 33
He acknowledges P.A.'s letter and says he
has understood with reference to his friend, who
arrived at Riyadh & was read by his father as
he himself was absent.

With regard to the ^{bro}bro, Abbas has not yet
arrived, but - the bro will be welcomed as
anything from a friend.






OFFICE NOTE.

36
35

Foregoing letter brought by
Abdulla Rafisi, "Bin Saud's"
agent, who says Abbas has gone
to Baghdad & he is still with
Abdulla Rafisi in Kuwait. Says
he will despatch in a few days
& asked for a list of contents
in case read while away.
Also asks for a reply to foregoing
letter.

W. 12 $\frac{4}{12}$

S 1918-5,000-3-06





(35) (37)
36


من قبطا كسيدر بوتكل اجبت الدولة البرية العيصرية الانكليزية في الكويت
الى جناب الامير الاخير في الشيم محبا العزيز الشيخ عبدالعزيز بن الامام عبد الرحمن الفيصل دام
عنه سوال فاطمكم هو انه يداد اخذة لنا بكم الشرف المؤرخ ٢٢ ربيع آخر الذي هو
عن يد محسوبكم عبد الله بن حمد النفيسي واسرنا طبكم وغنا عرف جنابكم صار له في
مكتبكم معلوم خصه صا نظف السامرة الذي كنا هاسا بقاء بيه عباس والمذكور
ما وصل لظنكم اخبرني عبد الله النفيسي ان عباس راح الى بغداد والسحار المذكور
ابناها عنده عبد الله والآن في تصلحكم عن يد عبد الله وقدرنا عن وصولها هذه المازم
رضه بجا بكم مع سلامنا الى الوالد مع الاخوان والاولاد ودمتم سالمين محروسين
٧ جماد اول ١٢٤٠ مطابق ٢٥ ابريل ١٩١٢

٢٥/٤

To Abdul Aziz "bin Saud" of 7th Tamaddun
-awal

acknowledges his letter & informs
that Abdul Aziz bin-Nafisi brought it &
said he was sending the box in a few
days.


my





36
37
MAY 3 - 1912
آب
مكة
دام
جنابا لكرمکم محبا نیر فبطان شکیر بولکل حبش الدوله الیه الیه الفطیر الیه
غیر سؤل الحاکم الکریم ولا تنفسا رعن زفا هیئہ الزاج الیہ السلام عن الدعی ولدیہ فزید
انک کو بخیر و سرور و نعمہ و جہور و قد سید الباری حضور نام الوطن الی ارض
تخدمہ سید الکریم علیہ السلام و المذکور کثیر الثناء علی جنابکم عا جہلکم
علم من الذکر و توقد الذکر و مکررم لا خذلک و بتی فینا فہ الباری جل شانہ
الامینہ شامکم انظر الیہ بنجدیہ بسعود الیہم سعوا الامام حرر بدعی داک
نرجو دوا م سودکم و التصل الی اخبار رسالتکم تمام علیہم و علیہم و ذکر فہ
البحر و بخیر و یبلغکم اسواتهم و در عظیمہم و درین ۱۵ شعبان ۱۳۳۱

From Mahd as Suliman
of 15th Shaaban (Bin Saud's
Secretary)
a/c. usual polite nothing






W. 10/4
MAY 3 - 1912

Note: This letter was written
by Abdullah al Mufidi & only
found & delivered to me to-
day Aug 3 1911 38


من محمد بن عبد الرحمن الفيصل الى حفيده الشيخ محمد بن عبد الله بن فيصل
القيصري في الرياض العربية
الحمد لله الذي جعلكم من جملة تلاميذنا من كماله والوجود وعن
جب سؤل لخطايركم ولا تستفسدوا عن زواج السليم احمد الناصر منكم انتم جميعا من كماله والوجود وعن
احوال طرفنا صمد وامان ولا جبر تخالف توجب الافادة وباقي الحقائق من مقتضى الشريعة لنا بكم كتابه
منصوص الساعة لا نذكره انما على بالكم املنا اننا اتصلنا مع خلف اخيه قصداك ويجعل لكم غفلة عن
حزنا ننظر وصوله مع التفاديف من طرفكم نرجو وودم مودتكم والتصال اخبار سلا منكم شرفنا بالبرام
مننا سيدنا الولد والاضول سئلنا فاطمكم ونه يحفظكم بحبيب (١٩) شعبان ١٣٢٩

From Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman
'Bin Saud'
19th Shaaban 1329
August 1911.

A/c. Enquiries of health, says he and family
are well. Enquiries of watches, states
Khalef arrived but apparently the watches
had been forgotten.
wishes well.



ack. acknowledges letter and the
box of presents, which have been
disposed of as written.






بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
 من عبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن الفيصل آل سعود
 غفر له ولجميع آل بيته عافاهم
 والاسفاد عن رفاهته الزايع السليم ان تسلمونا فله بزيادكم بخير وعافاهم
 راحونا من كرم الله جليل تسلمكم من كل فقه الوجوه اخذنا بديار المسرة لنا بكم العزيز رقيم ٧ اجم ١٧٤٣
 سنا سلامكم وبما ذكرتم من حالكم من المصالح حارمنا من حرب الدولة العثمانية مع دول البلقان وليزان
 وان المنايا لشد يد وانحياز بين الطرفين جسيم ولا عرضوا الشجيم كني نصير لربده تحفظوا لخيار
 والانصار لرحمنا من زجر لطفنا معلوما انهم من قبلنا اذا امكنا الفضة فزجوا لاطرافنا
 محبت منون بجمع ما يسركم ومشا في للاجتماع بخيركم فلفظ لرخي حنايك حاله الوقت واهل
 العام خرج سوارح يزعم انه ينتب للبيعة العلية الجفافية وحار شوشية وقال وقيل
 وراذي الميام لب علينا انطوني يزعم انه عسكر سياسي حار فظنا على بادية الشام من طرف
 احوال وطب القسيم وكذلك حار تشدش من الحكومة العثمانية واسا لوظفون وان لنا قد خل
 مع دولتهم الفخية ولا جل الصداقة تحتنا كل سوطن وحافظنا على المذكور من تقسيم الطرفنا
 الاحسا ولا بد عندكم خبره ولوان لنا اسباب ارتباط مع دولتهم الفخية كانه لا مرسى ولا
 من احد وبوسطن ما اثننا على كل حال تعذر لنا اذا لا حضا ما يانم ولا حضه وبدا كفاي لفظنا
 حرب بلقي والى نرجو دوام محبتكم والتصال اقباء سلامكم ومنا سير الكار والادخلون ولا نورسلكون
 فاطمته وبه يحفظكم مودع ١٩١٢ ع ١٤٣٤

W 770
 24 JAN 1913
 C-10.

Note.

above is in answer to a short note saying
 I hoped to get out this year if I wasn't busy.
 also gave him news of the outbreak of the
 Turko-Bulgarian war. etc.






(42) 41

TRANSLATION of a letter from Abdul Azis bin Abdur Rahman al Faisal (Bin Saud") to Captain W.H.I. Shakespear, I.A., Political Agent, Kuwait, dated the 29th Mohurram 1331 (6th January 1913.

After Compliments,


no copy kept

You ask of our health, we, thanks be to God, are well and in good health and our affairs are well and may you be rejoiced from all. We received your letter of the 7th Zu-al-Haj 1330 (17th November 1912) and were pleased with your greeting and what you said became known. Of the war between the Turkish Government and the Balkan states and Greece and that there had been heavy fighting and severe battles and losses on both sides and you did not know what the result would be. Certainly you will have certain information of the losses and victories as to whom (they are) (now) We wish from your kindness information detailed of these. You mentioned that if you had the leisure you would come out to our sides. Beloved we are grateful for whatever may please you and are desirous of meeting you. Only be it not hidden from you ~~the~~ the state of the time and its condition. Now there came out the traveller who was working on all the sciences, of geography (etc) and there were troubles and gossip and in these days there came upon us an Englishman, who said he was a soldier-politician. He started from the dwellings of Damascus by the Hamad road and came to Kasim and in the same way there was trouble from the Turkish Government and they thought evil that I had entered to Your High Government and because of friendship we took upon us all the suspicion and protected the above-mentioned from Kasim to our sides and then to Hasa and doubtless there is news of it to you. And if there was to us a connection with your high God it would be an easy matter and there would be to us nothing and because of what we have showed (above) in any circumstan





(43) 62
do not be suspicious upon us, if there is any thing necessary
which we see we will complete it and from this you will
understand sufficiently . The writing of this is for that.
We wish your affection always and the news of your safety
and also from our father . and the brothers and sons who
ask of your welfare . May God protect you .








من قبطا شكري بونكل اجبت له ذلك البرهية الفبرية الانكليزية في الكويت
 اجبا بل لاجل الاجم حمد الشيم المجيد الشيخ عبد العزيز بن الامام عبد الرحمن الفيصل دام بقاء
 غيب سوانا من شريف طائفة لانا انتم بغير وسرور هو ان يد المودة اخذت كتابكم الكريم
 المورخ في ٢٢ محرم عام ١٣٣١ واسكننا طيبكم وصحة عااكم ومما عرفتكم صار معلوم منكم
 ما سلمتم عن الحرب بين الدولة العثمانية مع اربع الدول البلقان واليونان كلهم ودون مدقكم
 يوم منسحبين الى لندن لاجل صلح بالصلح صار كلام قدر شهر اوزايه واخر بطل المجلس
 ما صار صلح من سبب العثمانيين ما قبلوا ببلد ادرنه وهي محصورة مع انه صار
 في اربع الدول المذكورة كل ارض العثمانيين في اوروبا واكثر من الجزائر الا فقط السطول
 وكم قطعة من الاراضي التي قريبة من السطول وكم قلعة منفردة وادرنه وما يمكن القيا
 نين بدون مدد الا هذه الاماكن المحصورة والعثمانيين ما قبلوا والظاهر يرجعون
 الى الحرب انكان الدول الكبار ما يجتمعون ويمنعونهم وانا كثير صرت ممنون
 من احسانكم عما فعلتم مع الرجل الانكليزي الذي طب عليكم من الشام هذا الانسان
 ما عندي خبر عنه الا من بعد ما اخبرني عنه الشيخ مبارك ولما كان عنده خبر لانه اخبر
 جنابكم اول ومن بعد ما توجه من عندهم الرجل المذكور الى البحرين اتفقت انا مع الرجل
 القليل الذي كان معه وهو اخبرني عما تقدم منكم من فعل الجبل والاحسان والمباشرة
 القامة منكم اما صاحب الانكليزي انا ما واجهته ولاكن انا اعرف عن حالته اصلا هو
 من ضباط العسكرية ما هو من دوله سياسي ولاكن وقت ما يحصل له رخصه يشناق
 بروح الى بلد الاجانب للتفرج وكذلك من قبل كون الشيخ مبارك عن سعدون هو
 ظهر من بعد ووصل الى ربيع شهر وواجه بن رشيد في البر ورجع انا سفان
 بصير تشويشة من الدولة العثمانية مع جنابكم منصرف هؤلاء الاجانب والاصل والصدق
 انا ببيتهم هنا وعن الرجل الاول مثلي كتبنا عنه جنابك قبل هو من دوله صغيره
 اجنبي وعنده مكتوب من والي البصر لوانا اواجهك كان اقدرا بين عندي تفصيلا
 عن اخبار الحرب واسبابه وانا مقصدي تفهيرا فلا ربيع اول اظهر اليرايام الربيع على
 حباله وانشا الله اظهر جرت الجنوب بمجمع من سبب انا شفت كل الارض
 الذي قرب الكويت وقصدي استوف ارض غيرها هذه اما ان رفع مع سلامنا الى الوالد
 وعلى الاخوان والاولاد كما في دمتهم سالمين مودعين

١٩٢١ صفر ١٣٣١ مطابق ٢٧ جنوري ١٩١٣

Ums









Telegram

From Resident, Bushire.

To Foreign, Delhi.

No 221.

Dated 3rd February 1913.

I have the honour to invite a reference to para 4 of my letter No 1825 dated 23rd July 1911, and to enquire whether there is now any possibility of action in the direction indicated.

Cox.

Telegram

From Foreign, Delhi.

To Resident, Bushire.


No 96 C.

Dated 14th February 1913.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your telegram No 221 dated February 3rd and to state that pending negotiations with the Porte, regarding P.C. questions nothing in the direction indicated is possible, but the matter will not be lost sight of.

You should of course encourage friendly and intimate relations with Bin Saud if opportunity offers in the meantime.


Foreign.




14th Feby 1913
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

من عبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن بن فيصل الراجحي محبته العزيز قطبان شكبير بولنكل اجنبا الدوله البريه القيصريه
واتت عاليه اينه عبد نفذ لخطايدكم والسؤل عن رفاهيته المزاج السليم اكله عافيه مزاجه طريفيه
وللزم الخيمه والصدقه طريفيه اعلان من كولهم جيله تسكم من كل فقه الوجوه اخذنا بلبيل المست كتابكم لغته
قيم ١٩ صفر موافق ١٢٧٠ جنوري ١٩١٤ سدا سلاتكم وما ذكركم حصار لدي البه مسلم احسنتم
الرفاده عن حاله الدوله العثمانيه مع دول البلبان واليونان وانهم يسيان فنوك احرب مع الدول المذكوره
انجامه توافوتا معلوما تهم ذكركم يصيركم عنكم اطروح في اول شهر محاري ايام الحج على حسب العاده انشاء
سفركم مقدون بالصدقه وسلامه عن احوال طرنا صده ولوان شامل العموم ولا طار متتابعه ورجع ولا ان
نحن باننا راج بطراف عرباننا وهذا امرنا به ذي ذلك نرجع دوام محبتكم والتقال اجناد سلاتكم
ومنا لرحطان وكروكود يسلكون فاطركم وله خيفكم موقب ١٤٠٠

McC. acknowledges Capt Shakerman's letter of
the 19th Sept 1331 & says all's well in his
27th July 1913
direction and that he himself is now in Behar.





W.H.I.S.
27. FEB. 1913
C-32



47

Feb. 23rd 1913.

my dear Shakespear page 44


Please refer to the papers sent to you under this office endorsement no. 528 dated Feb. 16th 1913, during my temporary absence; the reply of the Govt of India is an advance in a welcome direction, and if opportunity offers you will no doubt use it in an unobjectionable manner, on the lines of our recent conversation; but you had better not make any official report until you have consulted me semi officially.

*Yours sincerely
P. Z. Col.*

Captain W.H.I. Shakespear I.A.

Political Agent

KOWEIT





48

Extract from the Bahrein Agency Political Diary No 6
for the week ending 15th February 1913.

Local Officials.

(Hasa).

31. News from Nejd state that the Turkish Government has notified re-issue of the subsidiary allowance of T£ 150/- to Abdul Aziz al Saud, the Amir of Nejd. The said allowance had been stopped for some time back.

No 576 of 1913.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 21st February 1913.


W.H.W.
27. Feb 1913
C-33

Forwarded with compliments to the Political Agent, Kuwait, for information.

By order,


A.T.Wilkinson Captain,
Assistant Resident.

[Handwritten signature]





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CONFIDENTIAL

No C.10 of 1913.

Political Agency,

Kuwait -

15th May 1913.

From,

Captain W. H. I. Shakespear, I.A.,

Political Agent, KUWAIT.

To,


The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

BUSHIRE.

Sir,

I have the honour to invite a reference to the correspondence ending with your Second Assistant's endorsement No 528 dated the 16th February 1913.

2. In the course of my recent tour in the Kuwait hinterland this spring I again met Abdul Aziz "Bin Saud", the Amir of Nejd, and spent four days in his camp. He and his brothers were all apparently very glad to renew our old acquaintance and my reception in the camp was every whit as friendly and hospitable as on the former occasion in March 1911. The Amir was anxious to hear the latest news of the Turko-Balkan war as well as an account of its course as he said that he was unable to believe the accounts which reached him from either Turkish sources or Egyptian newspapers, for although these contained descriptions of many Turkish successes, the Turkish troops always seemed to be giving ground and he had heard from Kuwait and Bahrain that the Ottoman army then held only the Capital, some forts within a day's march, and a few other isolated towns, the whole of the rest of European Turkey having been absorbed by





(52) 51

by the Balkan Allies. I gave him such information as there was (news of the fall of Adrianople had not then been received) and was surprised to find that so far from a pro-Turkish spirit being evinced, the contrary was expressed and the Amir, his brothers and the Nejd notables in camp all seemed to consider that Turkey's misfortunes and present weakness furnished the best opportunity for Nejd to rid itself of all shadow of Ottoman suzerainty and to drive their troops from Hama and Katif.

3. ^{IX} ~~July 1911~~ I would here invite a reference to my report No G-17 of the 8th April 1911, as much of the conversation I had with "Bin Saud" on the present occasion was merely a recapitulation of what I have already submitted two years ago. I will endeavour now only to show what effects the events of the two years since elapsed, the Italian war in Tripoli and the Turko-Balkan war have had on the Amir's opinions and ambitions. He spoke with even greater vehemence of his hatred of the Turks and was manifestly disappointed that I could give him no encouragement nor even the faintest hope that his ambitions would have the approval, tacit, disguised or otherwise of the British Government. I was at pains to explain that we were on friendly terms with the Turkish Government, were in negotiation with them over certain matters regarding the Baghdad Railway and the Persian Gulf and that the present of all times was most unsuitable for us to embark on any championship of his claims, even if we were willing to do so, which so far as I could see was not the case. Though disappointed he showed no annoyance or resentment but merely remarked that some day we would be forced by circumstances to take up his case.

4. The



by the British. I gave him such information as I
was (news of the fall of Baghdad had not then been re-
ceived) and was surprised to find that so far from a pro-
-British spirit being evinced, the contrary was expressed
and the Amir, his brothers and the Kaja met in camp
all seemed to consider that Turkey's misfortune and pro-
-west weakness furnished the best opportunity for Kaja to
rid himself of all shadow of Ottoman suzerainty and to drive
their troops from Iraq and Egypt.
I would have liked a reference to my report
No 6-17 of the 24th April 1911, as was of the conven-
-tion I had with "Bin Saud" on the present occasion was
merely a recapitulation of what I have already submitted
two years ago. I will endeavour now only to show what
effects the events of the two years since elapsed, the in-
-crease in the power of the two tribes and the British-
-Arab relations and ambitions. He spoke with even
greater vehemence of his hatred of the Turks and was want-
-ingly disappointed that I could give him no encouragement
not even the faintest hope that his ambitions would have
the approval, tacit, disguised or otherwise of the British
Government. I was at pains to explain that we were in neg-
-otiations with the Turkish Government, were in negotia-
-tion with them over certain matters respecting the Baghdad
Railway and the Persian Gulf and that the present of all
things was most unfavorable for us to embark on any change-
-ment of his claims, even if we were willing to do so,
which so far as I could see was not the case. Though this
-appointment he showed no surprise or resentment but merely
repeated that now day we would be forced by circumstances
to take up his case.



(53) 52

4. The Amir said that since he had last spoken of the matter to me Turkey had been through two wars in both of which she had shown her incapability in military matters and that the Arabs consequently felt equal to evicting the Turkish troops from Hasa and Katif with the greatest of ease. They were all agreed that no opportunity is ever likely to offer better than the present when with her army broken and disorganised, her finances crippled and her Arab subjects in Iraq and Syria all demanding reforms and self-government, Turkey would certainly be much too occupied in her other Asiatic provinces and in recuperating after the war's conclusion to despatch a serious expedition to Hasa or Nejd. He said, moreover, that it was firmly believed by Arabs that the Turkish reverses were the judgement of the Almighty on a people who calling themselves Mussulmans, had for years neglected their faith, oppressed their subjects, embezzled religious endowments, broken every ordinance of the Koran and subverted the Khalifat. He averred that the present Sultan was in no sense the Khalifa, holding his throne as he does as the puppet of a clique of politicians in Constantinople whose only object was the filling of their own pockets and who would be ready to find another Khalifa to-morrow if a change should suit them better. The Arabs were not blind and they could not help contrasting the justice, truth, equity, material prosperity and religious freedom which obtained under the rule of other nations and more particularly under the British flag, with what they saw under Turkish government. Sentiments of the above description were not expressed secretly nor do I think especially for my benefit but such speech was held openly at almost every gathering of the Amir and his headmen and I certainly formed the impression



4. The Arab said that since he had last spoken of
the matter to me Turkey had been through two wars in both
of which she had shown her incapacity in military mat-
ters and that the Arabs consequently felt equal to resist
the Turkish troops from Hamah and Heli with the great
loss of money. They were all agreed that no expedition
is ever likely to offer better than the present when with
her army broken and disorganised, her finances crippled
and her Arab subjects in Iraq and Syria all demanding re-
form and self-government. Turkey would certainly be weak-
ened in her other Asiatic provinces and in reorga-
nising after the war's conclusion to dispatch a serious
expedition to Hamah or Heli. He said, moreover, that it
was firmly believed by Arabs that the Turkish revenues were
the judgment of the Khalifa on a people who selling them-
selves slaves, had for years neglected their faith,
oppressed their subjects, embroiled religious endowments,
broken every ordinance of the Koran and subverted the Khal-
ifat. He asserted that the present Sultan was in no sense
the Khalifa, holding his throne as he does as the puppet
of a clique of politicians in Constantinople whose only
object was the killing of their own subjects and who would
be ready to find another Khalifa tomorrow if a change
should suit them better. The Arabs were not blind and they
would not help maintaining the Turkish empire, equally
material prosperity and religious freedom which obtained
under the rule of other nations and were particularly ex-
posed the British flag, with what they saw under Turkish
government. Sentiments of the above description were not
expressed specially nor do I think especially for my benefit
but such speech was held even at almost every gathering
of the Arab and the Bedouin and I certainly formed the
impression



(54) 53

impression that Turkey's misfortunes had induced no sympathy for herself as a Power but had rather been taken as conclusive proof that as the Turks had neglected their religion so had the Almighty abandoned them and therefore it behoved all good Wahabis to rid themselves of all intercourse with such backsliders and reprobates. Such briefly appears to have been the effect on the minds of the more educated and responsible men of Najd.

5. In discussing his own ambitions "Bin Saud" said that the moment had now arrived when he must choose his definite policy for the future. By the Grace of God his power in Central Arabia had increased until he no longer feared any of its Sheikhs or Rulers, he was moreover in alliance with all of them excepting only one, viz:- the Sha-Wahabi-rif of Mecca, who fearing a second invasion of the Hejaz had therefore allied himself with the Turks. The As-Saud were prepared to hold what they had recovered during the last fifteen years of their ancient dominion in Arabia, and felt capable of being able to do so comparatively easily but for the menace of Turkish aggression, only possible from the east by way of Hama and from the west by Mecca and Medina. To withstand the Turks from both directions they felt was beyond their strength and to render secure their eastern borders, thus making their full force available for the defence of their western boundaries, was one of the reasons for their desire to evict the Turks from Hama and Katif. Another most important one was that the possession of these rich districts with their ports and especially Ofair, would furnish a valuable source of revenue to what was at present an extremely poor state. Moreover the As-Saud had other grounds and just ones for their claim to Hama and Katif; one was that these districts formerly belonged



impression that Turkey's intentions had indeed as yet-
-partly for herself as a power but had rather been taken
on constructive ground that as the Turks had neglected their
religion as had the Muslims abandoned their and therefore
it behoved all good Muslims to rid themselves of all inter-
-course with such paganism and superstition. Such philo-
-ly appears to have been the effect on the minds of the
more educated and responsible men of Mecca.
3. In discussion his own ambassador "Mr. Smith" held
that the moment had now arrived when he must choose his
beliefs for the future. By the Grace of God his
power in Central Arabia had increased until he no longer
feared any of the Muslims or Bedouins, he was moreover in
alliance with all of them excepting only one, viz. the Sha-
-rit of Mecca, who having a second, grandson of the Sultan
had therefore allied himself with the Sultan. The Arabian
were prepared to hold that they had conquered Mecca and
last fifteen years of their peaceful domination in Arabia
and felt anxious to bring this to an amicable settlement
-ly but for the reasons of Turkish aggression, only possi-
-able from the east by way of Hama and from the west by
Mecca and Medina. To withstand the Turks from both di-
-rections they felt was beyond their strength and to render
secure their eastern borders, they wished their full force
available for the defence of their western boundaries, was
one of the reasons for their desire to avoid the Turks from
Hama and Mecca. Another point important was that the
possession of these rich districts with their ports and ex-
-tensive fields, would furnish a valuable source of revenue
to what was at present an extremely poor state. Moreover
the Sultan had other enemies and that even for their attack
to Hama and Mecca; one was that these districts formerly
belonged



(55) 54

belonged to their house, another was that the Turks themselves in a document given to Abdulla bin Faisal by Nafiz Pasha, the General who commanded Midhat Pasha's expedition to Katif in 1871, had agreed that the area should belong to and be governed by Abdulla and his family. The Amir informed me that this document had only recently come into his possession and on his return to Riyadh he would send me a copy. Another document of which he had heard but ^{far} had not succeeded in tracing was one which purported to be an agreement made by Colonel Sir Lewis Pelly guaranteeing on behalf of the British Government that the As-Saud family would be recognised as the Sheikhs of the Katif district. This document he said was the result of negotiations after the naval action at Katif and Dammam (in 1865) when four men named Mahomed bin Ma'ana, Abdul Aziz bin Umar, Saleh al Widawi and Ibrahim bin Ghanim were sent by Faisal as-Saud as his representatives to the Resident. I have no archives with which to test the accuracy of the Amir's assertions, but I find a Declaration printed on page 153 of Aitahison's Treaties, Vol XII, as No XXVIII which seems to bear on this transaction.

6. Of late years and particularly during their wars with Italy and the Balkan States Turkish officials have been pressing Abdul Aziz to assist them practically with men and money and to show himself a loyal subject of the Sultan (a) by sending three of the As-Saud family to Constantinople for education and service in the Ottoman Army, (b) by acknowledging Turkish suzerainty openly in the acceptance of a Turkish title with a firman from the Sultan appointing him Governor of Nejd, and (c) by handing over to them all letters and documents which may have passed at any time between British officials and the As-Saud family, partic-



belonged to their house, another was that the Turks then-
received in a document given to Ibrahim bin Saud by the
British, the General who accompanied William Pasha's expedition
to Mecca in 1811, had agreed that the area should belong to
and be governed by Ibrahim and his family. The Amir informed
me that this document had only recently come into his
possession and on his return to Mecca he would send me a
copy. Another document of which he had heard but which
was not included in finding was one which purported to be an
agreement made by Ibrahim bin Saud with British representatives on
behalf of the British Government that the Al-Saud family
would be recognized as the rulers of the Meccan district.
This document he said was the result of negotiations after
the naval action at Mecca and Jeddah in 1818 when Lord
Ponsonby accompanied the British fleet. He said that the
British and Ibrahim bin Saud had agreed to a mutual non-
aggression pact in the Meccan district. I have no evidence
which would support the accuracy of the Amir's statement.
But I find a declaration signed on page 100 of Al-Saud's
Tawarikh, Vol. III, as No. XXVII which seems to bear on
this declaration.
6. Of late years and particularly during their wars
with Iraq and the Persian states British officials have been
pressing upon the Amir to assist them practically with men and
money and to show himself a loyal subject of the Sultan.
(a) by sending some of the Al-Saud family to Constantinople
for education and service in the Ottoman Army, (b) by sup-
plying British military assistance in the assistance of
a Turkish ally with a claim from the British Government
the Governor of Mecca, and (c) by handing over to them all
land and resources which may have passed at any time
between British officials and the Al-Saud family, particu-



56 55

particularly that referred to above. Hitherto he had refused in as polite language as was possible knowing that once the Turks gained any hold over him he would in truth eventually become a Turkish subject, which he did not admit himself to be at present and then there would be no security for himself or his house. He was, however, beginning to feel the pressure, for all the Arab leaders, Ibn Rashid and the like, had rejected similar Turkish overtures with the answer that they were prepared to comply as soon as they saw "Bin Saud" doing so, for they had as little cause to love the Turks as he had himself, and desired to maintain their present independence. Thus it would be seen that Arabia might be said to be awaiting his lead.

7. The Turks besides are convinced that some kind of understanding actually exists between the As-Saud and the British Government and this belief is one of the reasons for their repeated efforts to make him renounce his present complete independence. He himself is willing to make public any definite understanding with us for the fact of its existence would relieve him of the Turkish menace. Unless he is fortified by some understanding with the British Government which, however nebulous it might be, would make the Turks hesitate from attacking him gratuitously, he would always be subject to intrigues: though at present allied to the other important chiefs in Arabia he could not hope that such alliances will endure for ever and any differences would be exploited to the utmost by the Turks. While he felt able to hold his own against Ibn Rashid or other Rulers and even against combinations among them he was aware that the addition of Turkish troops to assist his enemies would probably be his undoing. Consequently he was



particularly that referred to above. It should be noted that
-land in an active language as was possible knowing that
once the Turks gained any hold over him he would in time
eventually become a Turkish subject, which he did not ad-
-self himself to be at present and then there would be no
necessity for himself or his people. He was, however, re-
-claiming to feel the pressure, for all the Arab leaders, in
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-tures with the answer that they were prepared to comply
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little cause to love the Turks as he had himself, and de-
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7. The Turks besides are convinced that some kind of
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for their repeated efforts to make him renounce his pro-
-and complete independence. He himself is willing to re-
public any definite understanding with us for the fact of
the existence would relieve him of the Turkish menace. Un-
-less he is fortified by some understanding with the Bri-
-tish Government which, however, he does not want, would
make the Turks hostile from attacking him eventually.
he would always be subject to incursions; though at present
added to the other important states in Arabia he could
not hope that such incursions will endure for ever and any
difficulties would be exploited to the extent by the Turks
while he felt able to hold his own against the Khalid or
other rulers and even against combinations among them he
was aware that the addition of Turkish troops to assist him
would probably be the end of his independence.



(57) 56

was driven either to ask for British protection of some such kind as we had accorded to Kuwait and to other Sheikhs as a result of old friendships and relations or to trust in his own sword and Providence. He was determined sooner or later to turn out the Turks from Hasa and Katif and if it could not be managed by diplomacy, it would be done by resort to arms. He could foresee no better opportunity than the present but before proceeding to extremities he wished to obtain some idea of what attitude we should take up. On this I told him at once that if he did proceed against Hasa, I was sure that we should certainly not endanger our relations with Turkey on his behalf for we had not hitherto in any way disputed the Turkish position in Hasa and he must know that we could hardly do so when or after he had brought the matter to a head by an unprovoked attack. Of course it might be possible for him to eject the Turks for the time being since they did not maintain a very large garrison but it would probably mean a severe fight and then he had to contemplate what would be the subsequent course of events. Any action on his part against Hasa would inevitably bring retaliation which might develop into a war like that lately waged in Yemen and finally might lead to a further Turkish advance into Nejd in the course of which he would lose all he now held. There was no denying the fact that he would be trying conclusions with a world-Power which could, if it exerted itself, crush him utterly and to me it seemed a foolish enterprise of which every possible advantage was far outweighed by the heavy risk, almost amounting to certainty, of his losing all that he now possessed. As his friend I could not let him labour under so serious a misapprehension of Turkish strength, even though the course of the Balkan war seemed to



was driven either to ask for British protection or some other
such kind as we had accorded to Kuwait and to other States
as a result of old friendships and relations or to turn
in his own sword and Providence. He was determined sooner
or later to turn out the Turks from Basra and Kafil and if
it could not be managed by diplomacy, it would be done
by force of arms. He could foresee no better opportunity
than the present but before proceeding to extremities he
wished to obtain some idea of what attitude we should take
up. On this I told him at once that if he did proceed
against Basra, I was sure that we should certainly not in-
danger our relations with Turkey on his behalf for we had
not influence in any way disputed the Turkish position in
Basra and he must know that we could hardly do so when ex-
actly he had brought the matter to a head by an unprovoked
attack. Of course it might be possible for him to eject
the Turks for the time being since they did not maintain a
very large garrison but it would probably mean a severe
fight and then he had to contemplate what would be the
subsequent course of events. Any action on his part against
Basra would inevitably bring relations which might de-
-grade into a war like that lately waged in Yemen and Khazir
might lead to a further Turkish advance into Najd in the
course of which he would lose all he now held. There was
no denying the fact that he would be trying conclusions
with a world-power which could if it wanted itself crush
his empire and to me it seemed a foolish enterprise of
which every possible advantage was far outweighed by the
heavy risk, almost amounting to certainty, of his losing
all that he now possessed. As his friend I could not let
him labour under so serious a misapprehension of Turkish
strength, even though the course of the Sultan was doubtful
at the



(58) 5-7

to warrant it, and though it might be unpalatable it was as well he should know how we regarded the matter. FROM

8. From all that I heard in his camp I have no doubt that some day an attempt will certainly be made on Hasa and Katif, most discussions pointing to the fact that the Arabs despised the Turkish troops of the garrisons as quite useless, that they were certain of their immediate success and were mainly concerned as to how it might be brought about in the most complete and if possible bloodless manner as they felt that then they might be able to enlist British sympathy. I felt it necessary to point out what seemed to me to be inevitable, viz:- severe reprisals from the Turks and the absence of interference on our part in the As-Saud cause, and did so whenever the subject came up.

9. There is no doubt that the Arabs of nearly all Arabia have now come to despise the Turks so much that they consider themselves quite able to deal with them; for this collapse of prestige the two wars are responsible while distrust of and contempt for the Turks has been intensified by the exposure, which every day becomes plainer, that so-called victories were only falsehoods deliberately^e circulated by the Government to cover their own failures and weakness. The unrest and desire for emancipation from Turkish rule is not confined to Nejd. The Press contains accounts of similar movements for self-government in Syria, Beyrout, Baghdad and Basra. In Basra I am informed that the new Wali on his arrival a few days ago was bluntly told that unless he fell into line with local notables he had better re-embark at once for Constantinople.

10. I venture to submit this report in the hope that serious attention may be directed to "Bin Saud" and Central Arabian



to warrant it, and though it might be regrettable it was
as well he should know how we regarded the matter.
8. From all that I heard in his camp I have no doubt
that some day an attempt will certainly be made on Haifa
and Haifa, most dangerous pointing to the fact that the
Arabs despised the Turkish troops of the garrison as
quite useless, that they were certain of their immediate
success and were mainly concerned as to how it might be
brought about in the most complete and if possible blood-
less manner as they felt that they might be able to
enlist British sympathy. I felt it necessary to point out
what seemed to me to be inevitable, that severe reprisals
from the Turks and the absence of interference on our part
in the so-called case, and did so whenever the subject came
up.
9. There is no doubt that the Arabs of Haifa all
Arabs have now come to despise the Turks so much that
they consider themselves quite able to deal with them;
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that so-called victories were only falsehoods deliberately
circulated by the Government to cover their own failures
and weakness. The unrest and desire for emancipation from
Turkish rule is not confined to Haifa. The press continues
to make of similar movements for self-government in Syria,
Mesopotamia, Baghdad and Persia. In Haifa I am informed that
the new Wali on his arrival a few days ago was bluntly told
that unless he fell into line with local necessities he had
better re-embark at once for Constantinople.
10. I venture to submit this report in the hope that
British attention may be directed to "Bin Saud" and General
Arabian



(59) 58

Arabian affairs. The man is a ruler of the best Arab type and his personality is one which is likely to lead Arabia should any extensive combination come into being among its tribes, an event which to me seems exceedingly probable in near future, unless some radical change takes place in Turkish policy towards the Arabs. As soon as some such combination occurs and perhaps even before I do not think that there is the least doubt that "Bin Saud's" first move will be on Hassa and Katif, and when that happens it seems to me that we shall be forced into relations with the Amir of Nejd, however much we may desire to avoid them. At present he is most friendly and inclined even to bind himself in some degree, for he has already expressed as much in his letter to me regarding the capture of his arms at Shargah, forwarded with my letter No G-7 of the 29th April 1913. How far he would go in putting this desire into the words of a documentary agreement is uncertain but I am inclined to believe that it would be a very long way if he had reason to think that we would assist him in effecting the removal of the Turks from Hassa and Katif. That we would ever find a method to assist him diplomatically in this direction I confess does not seem possible at present, for our success hitherto in a somewhat similar case, viz: the evacuation of the Umr Kasr and other Turkish posts on Kuwait boundaries, where we had far stronger grounds for exerting pressure on the Porte, has been infinitesimal. On the other hand to reject the Amir's overtures will assuredly cause a feeling of resentment which may re-act upon our interests along the whole Arabian littoral of the Gulf, perhaps not at once, but in the near future as "Bin Saud's" power increases, for increase it will so long as Abdul Aziz and his brothers are alive.

11. Exactly



Arabian states. The man is a factor of the Arab type
and his personality is one which is likely to lead Arabia
through any extensive combination some time being among the
tribes, an event which to me seems exceedingly probable in
near future, unless some radical change takes place in Tur-
kish policy towards the Arabs. As soon as some such com-
bination occurs and perhaps even before I do not think
that there is the least doubt that "Bin Saud's" first move
will be on Iraq and Egypt, and when that happens it seems
to me that we shall be forced into relations with the Arab
of Mecca. However much we may desire to avoid them, at
present he is most friendly and inclined even to bind him-
self in some degree, for he has already expressed an wish
in his letter to me regarding the attitude of his army at
Bagdad, forwarded with my letter No 0-7 of the 20th April
1915. How far he would go in pushing this desire into the
words of a documentary agreement is uncertain but I am in-
clined to believe that it would be a very long way if he
had reason to think that we would assist him in effecting
the removal of the Turks from Iraq and Egypt. That we
would ever find a method to assist him diplomatically in
this direction I cannot deem possible at present,
for our success hitherto in a somewhat similar case, viz:
the evacuation of the Umr Kaur and other Turkish posts on
Kurdish frontiers, where we had far stronger grounds for
existing pressure on the Porte, has been infinitesimal. On
the other hand to reject the Arab's overtures will assured-
ly cause a feeling of resentment which may react upon our
interests along the whole Arabian littoral of the Gulf,
perhaps not at once, but in the near future as "Bin Saud's"
power increases, for increase it will as long as Abdul Aziz
and his brothers are alive.

11. H. H. H.



60 59

11. Exactly what have been our relations with the As-Saud family in the past, for want of early records I do not know and whether they would warrant any move in the direction desired by the Amir I am not in a position to suggest. I am aware, however, that we had frequently to take punitive measures against the Wahabis for interference with the Trucial Chiefs and Bahrain, but in this connection now I am convinced that "Bin Saud" would be only too glad to furnish us with any undertaking we desired for the maintenance of the 'status quo' in the future.

In conclusion I have the honour to solicit your support for a re-consideration of the whole question of our relations with the Amir of Nejd for I cannot avoid the impression that the matter will become an urgent one before long and that it will be to our advantage to have reached beforehand some definite decision in regard to our future relations with "Bin Saud".


I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

Captain,

Political Agent, KUWAIT.






Extract from Nahrain News for the week edding Saturday,
the 3rd May 1913.

HAAA.

134. It is reported from the Hasa side that Bin Saud is
causing some trouble, but the rumours are conflicting. En-
-deavours are being made to collect reliable information.

x x x x x x





No. 1522 of 1913.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, May 13th, 1913.

CONFIDENTIAL


X Copies of the undermentioned telegrams ^{are} forwarded with
compliments to the Political Agent, Koweit, for information.

By Order,

P.S. Lock L^r
Lieutenant,
Assistant Resident.

Resident to Foreign. No. 866 dated 13th May 1913.
Political Agent Bahrein to Resident dated 11th May,
1913.

W.F.W.S.
15 MAY 1913
C.S.L.





63

61

Telegram.

From Trevor Bahrein. (Recd. through C.C. Henjam).


To Cox Bushire.

Wds 28.

Dated and recd. 11.5.13.

Bahrein Diary para. 134. Apparently authentic news received yesterday afternoon 8th instant that Bin Saud has occupied Lhasa without fighting.

Trevor Bahrein.





Telegram.

From Resident Bushire.

To Foreign Simla. 886. Repeated Foreign Office No.886


Dated 13th May 1913.

62 (64)

→ page 61

I have received a telegraphic report from the Political Agent at Bahrein via Henjam to the effect that news has reached him from a reliable source that Al Hassa has been occupied by Bin Saud without opposition. There is further a report current here in Bushire, based on information supplied by some Turkish officials who were passing through from Bahrein on board a German steamer corroborating the above and adding that Katif and Ojair are now being threatened by Bin Saud.

Cox.






(65)

Extract from Bahrain News No. 18 for week ending 10th
May 1913.

(HASA).

143. Reference para 134, news of capture of Hasa and
Ojair by Bin Saud are confirmed. Several Turkish officer
and soldiers arrived from Hasa and Ojair and left for Busa.
A separate report is being submitted to the Resident in the
connection.

x x x x x x



CONFIDENTIAL

C.12 ✓

Dated 20th

Political Resident.

→ page 60

I / K z / e / x h e / K /

with reference to your S

forwarding ~~the~~/Bahrain/ report from Bahrain of the occura-

submit-

2. The news ^{was} received with the greatest surprise &

letters from Bahrain arriving here by last mail on the 15th

is unnecessary to recapitulate for ~~of~~ the 17th May 1941//

2

appears to have been a very la

rapidly

- ~~Some~~ forces of Neja cowmen and marched from Kisau

accompanied by some, though not many Bedouin until he re

16

head-men and explained to them how Umu owing to Turkish

head-men and explained to them how ~~they~~ owing to Turkish

inaptitude the Bedonin tribes near Hasa were always raiding

desired

~~and~~ when bad characters whom he ~~wanted~~ ^{and} to punish took re-

-fuge in the Hasa villages/the Turkish officials were

† shielded them, how

how he had for years received invitations from the


in this district and having ~~within~~ them within 5 hours of

his shells arrived agreed with

Hoffmuf he asked them ^{to tell him} ~~if they~~ ^{if} to state whether they ~~were~~ ^{had been}

66-3-10








(67) 65

or not.
~~I should be turned out for good~~ (Note, Précis or Draft.)
 The headmen and Sheikh replied that they were prepared to follow him. In the afternoon Bin Saud intimated to his Sheikhs that he ~~was~~ required *only* 300 picked men for the ~~actual~~ *attack* and when these had been selected the party started ~~on~~ *on arrival at* a spot about an hour or less to the west of Hofuf itself shortly after sunset ~~the~~ *parked* camels and horses were left ~~and~~ *ropes collected* and other preparations made; ~~then~~ *Bin Saud and his men* proceeded ~~on foot~~ *until* close to the walls. At about two hours after midnight the party ~~reached~~ *proceeded to scale* the walls, ~~and~~ *and* the ropes were ~~taken~~ *quickly* to the top by men climbing upon ~~each~~ *one* ~~other's~~ *shoulders* and as soon as a good number were over the wall a move was made to open the western gate ~~which~~ *became* the Turkish sentries alarmed. On the alarm being given some firing took place ~~near~~ *near* the gate in which ~~eight~~ *eight* Turks ~~were~~ *were* and four of Bin Saud's men ~~were~~ *were* killed. The Turks all retreated to the central fort while the population came out and welcomed Bin Saud. Bin Saud then sent envoys accompanied by some of the Hasa notables to the Mutaserif and Commandant ~~proposing~~ *proposing* them a safe-conduct if they would surrender ~~immediately~~ *immediately* and remove themselves and their belongings. He also undertook to allow them to keep their arms and to provide them with transport to the coast, but insisted that the troops must leave at once ~~only one~~ *only one* day or two days' grace to those Turks who had families. The Mutaserif surrendered ~~and~~ *at once on the 5th May* and so far assisted Bin Saud as to send messages to outlying detachments ~~also~~ *in the Kut* to surrender. Within the Government buildings Bin Saud obtained treasure to the extent of 40,000 dollars ~~12~~ *and* guns of different calibres, 2 mitrailleuses, a large quantity of rifles and ammunition. *reserve* Messengers were also sent to Katif accompanied by a Shiah notables and the chief Shiah Muftahid in Hasa with a letter from the Mutaserif to





(Continuation of Note, Précis or Draft.)

the Kaimakam ordering him to surrender, with what result has not yet become known. "Bin Saud" has also occupied Ojair, and replaced the Turkish Customs staff by his own men. He appears to have ~~also~~ insisted on every Turkish soldier and official leaving at the earliest possible ~~time~~ moment.

are inclined to attribute it to high diplomacy on the part of the Political Agent during his recent tour. *boldness & success of Bin Saud's coup*
Kuwaitis are surprised at the ~~margin~~ *margin* and ~~on~~ *on*

Opinion is divided as to what ~~the Turkish Govt will take~~ *steps the Turkish Govt will take*, the general idea being that

Turkey will be too occupied with her own affairs in Basrah to be able to spare any troops for Hasa at present but that later on she may be expected to send an expedition by sea against Bin Saud. Sheikh Mubarak himself seems

inclined to think that the Turks will make the best of a bad job and dub Bin Saud Mutaserif of Nejd, leaving him *alone* to govern *as* he chooses, for the Hasa province has never paid its way, all Customs receipts being swallowed up in doles and subsidies to petty Bedouin sheikhs *in vain*

endeavour to make them desist *from looting caravans & threatening Turkish detachments.*


6. I confess I ~~was~~ *am* surprised at the suddenness of Bin Saud's attack, for while I ~~had~~ *was* expected it to come *sooner* *or later* ~~than~~ *when* I ~~gathered~~ *gathered* the impression that he would wait

to see what effect the movements for self-government in other Arab provinces would have on Turkish policy. *before actually committing himself.*

From other aspects it seems clear he could hardly have selected a better moment, or managed the affair more deftly as he appears to have secured the support of the responsible men of Hasa itself.

I have etc.

W. J.





DRAFT—(For Approval).

Agency.
POLITICAL RESIDENCY, PERSIAN/GULF.
Kuwait

No. D/O

CONFIDENTIAL

Dated 20th May 1913.

To,

Political Resident,

B USHIRE.


Dear Sir Percy,

You will get a lot about Bin Saud from me this mail, and I am sorry I could not get my letter C-10 ready in time for last mail. As a matter of fact it would have gone if the mail had been ^{even} a day late as ^{has been} usual ^{for sea} time but she was most unexpectedly punctual and I couldn't finish the typing before she left. Then came the news of the taking of Hasa and I wondered whether it was any use sending on the ~~finished~~ letter for approval as you want ~~it~~ in your D/O of the 23rd Febr'y, when the fat was already in the fire. Finally I thought you might just as well have it ^{for} as I had made no definite recommendation, and in view of ^{general} local opinion (and probably also Basrah & Turkish ^{during my tour I investigated} opinion) that ^{to attack Hasa} Bin Saud might be as well to have on record my report written before I was aware of what he intended and ^{actually} ~~was~~ carried out.

Personally now I think Bin Saud was wise in his generation and selected the best possible moment! But I am afraid it rather prevents all chance of our helping him or even of making Arms agreements and the like with him ~~no~~ just at present.

Yours truly,
W. G.

9,000-3-10





70 68


Extract from Bahrain Diary No. 19 for week ending
17th May 1913.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT.

(HASA & KATIF).

149. Reference para 143, the latest news is that Katif was also occupied by Bin Saud's men on 15th May. The garrison at Katif arrived at Bahrain on 18th May in S.S. "John-O-Scott" which with the Turkish soldiers from Hasa and Ojair - numbering in all some 5 to 600 men - is expected to leave for Bus-reh shortly. A separate report is being made to the Resident.

x x x x x x





CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1688 of 1913.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 27th May 1913.

(71)
W.F. W. 69
29 MAY 1913
C. 64

Copies of the undermentioned communications are forwarded with compliments to the Political Agent, Koweit, for information, in continuation of this office endorsement No. 1522 dated May 13th 1913.


By Order,

P. G. Lochth.

Lieutenant,
Assistant Resident.

page 60 (a)

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- (1). Resident to Foreign. Telegram No. 937 dated 25th May 1913.
 - (2). -----do-----do----- Letter No. 1668 dated 26th May 1913.





Telegram. P.

From Resident Bushire.

To Foreign. No. 937.

Dated 25th May 1913.

(72)
70

The expulsion of the Turks from Nejd and Al Hassa and the signature of the draft Anglo-Turkish Convention are two facts of a somewhat irreconcilable nature. It is not known to me whether His Majesty's Government intend to advise the Ottoman Government in any way or prefer to allow matters to adjust themselves. By the terms of the Convention we seem to have just committed ourselves afresh to recognise the dominion of the Turkish Government over Nejd, but if on the other hand the de facto ruler of the province is to be Bin Saud, it is essential in view of our interests and work in the Persian Gulf, that definite and friendly relations should be established with him as soon as possible.

Would it not conceivably be possible for us to induce the Turks to face the accomplished fact and with our assistance to devise some satisfactory solution of the difficulty which could then be included in the Convention? Such an arrangement might be based on the recognition of Bin Saud as the autonomy^{us} ruler of Nejd under the suzerainty of the Turkish Government, and on the grant to Great Britain of the right to accredit an Agent to him and, with the knowledge of the Turkish Government, to make agreements with him in virtue of his position as a maritime ruler in respect to the suppression of piracy, the arms traffic, and slave trade, and generally in connection with the duties we have undertaken in the Persian Gulf. It would, of course, be more satisfactory if Nejd were completely freed from the Turkish yoke, but it seems that we are too far committed to the Turkish Government to permit of it being countenanced. On the ground that urgent consideration of this matter may be necessary, I have ventured to communicate the above observations.

Cox.



70

Telegram. F.
From Resident British.
To Her Highness.
No. 927.
Dated 20th May 1915.

The question of the future of the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula and the signature of the Anglo-Turkish Convention was two sides of a somewhat inseparable nature. It is not known to me whether His Majesty's Government intend to advise the Ottoman Government in any way or prefer to allow matters to adjust themselves. By the terms of the Convention we seem to have just committed ourselves abroad to recognize the decision of the Turkish Government over the Gulf, but if on the other hand the de facto ruler of the province is to be Bin Saud, it is essential in view of our interests and work in the Persian Gulf, that definite and friendly relations should be established with him as soon as possible.

Would it not conceivably be possible for us to induce the Turks to face the accomplished fact and with our assistance to devise some satisfactory solution of the difficulty which would then be included in the Convention? Such an arrangement might be based on the recognition of Bin Saud as the autonomous ruler of the Gulf under the suzerainty of the Turkish Government, and on the grant to Great Britain of the right to accredit an agent to him and, with the knowledge of the Turkish Government, to make agreements with him in virtue of his position as a working ruler in respect to the suppression of piracy, the slave traffic, and slave trade, and generally in connection with the duties we have undertaken in the Persian Gulf. It would, of course, be more satisfactory if Bin Saud were completely freed from the Turkish yoke, but it seems that we are too far committed to the Turkish Government to permit of it being contemplated. On the ground that urgent consideration of this matter may be necessary, I have ventured to communicate the above observations.

Yours,



CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 1668, dated Bushire, the 26th May (received 2nd June) 1913.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR PERCY COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

With reference to the correspondence ending with my telegram No. 937, dated 25th instant, I have the honour to forward, copies of the marginally cited communications received from the Political Agent, Kuwait, in connection with the aims and doings of Abdul Aziz "Bin Saud."

(1) Political Agent, Kuwait, to Resident, No. C-10, dated 15th May 1913.
(2) Political Agent, Kuwait, to Resident, No. C-12, dated 26th May 1913.

2. The second enclosure merely relates in detail the account which had reached Kuwait of Bin Saud's proceedings in expelling the Turks from Hasa and Katif, and calls for no special comment.

3. Enclosure No. 1 is an interesting report addressed to me before Captain Shakespear had heard of the fall of Hasa and Katif.

It is no doubt somewhat awkward from our point of view that Bin Saud should have proceeded to extremities at the present stage of the Anglo-Turkish Negotiations, and so soon after a friendly meeting with our Agent, but however inconvenient the coincidence of events may be, the juncture was obviously an ideal one for Bin Saud to choose, and it would seem that the only course, whether for ourselves or the Turks, is to look the practical position in the face.

It is difficult to see how the Porte with an empty Exchequer and with trouble brewing simultaneously in the Basrah Vilayat, can hope for some time to come to undertake punitive operations against Bin Saud. In any case, if any attempt is made to operate by sea, we shall at once be faced with the question as to whether our policy in the Gulf will admit of our acquiescing in such a course, which in all probability would prove abortive and leave to us a legacy of bitter resentment on the part of Bin Saud.

It seems to me urgent that, if at all possible, we should endeavour to bring about a bloodless solution of the difficulty, which might conceivably be effected in time to be brought into the Convention now under negotiation, and I have therefore ventured to telegraph suggestions in that sense to the Government of India.

4. As regards Captain Shakespear's references to past history and to certain putative agreements between the British Government and the Wahabi Amir, I think one of the letters to which he refers is probably that addressed by Colonel Pelly to the Amir on 6th January 1866 in which he alluded to "Your Highness's Governor of Khatif", but this and all such correspondence as there is, is on the record of the Government of India, and I do not think I need do more than indicate it.

My own records have not so far produced anything of utility.

Trusting that the Government of India will see reason to give the situation their lively consideration.

No. C-10, dated Kuwait, the 15th May 1913.

From—CAPTAIN W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR, I.A., Political Agent, Kuwait,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have the honour to invite a reference to the correspondence ending with your Second Assistant's endorsement No. 528, dated the 16th February 1913.

2. In the course of my recent tour in the Kuwait hinterland this spring I again met Abdul Aziz "Bin Saud", the Amir of Nejd, and spent four days in his camp. He and his brothers were all apparently very glad to renew our old

C25FD



72

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acquaintance and my reception in the camp was every whit as friendly and hospitable as on the former occasion in March 1911. The Amir was anxious to hear the latest news of the Turko-Balkan war as well as an account of its course as he said that he was unable to believe the accounts which reached him from either Turkish sources or Egyptian newspapers, for although these contained descriptions of many Turkish successes, the Turkish troops always seemed to be giving ground and he had heard from Kuwait and Bahrain that the Ottoman army then held only the Capital, some forts within a day's march, and a few other isolated towns, the whole of the rest of European Turkey having been absorbed by the Balkan Allies. I give him such information as there was (news of the fall of Adrianople had not then been received) and was surprised to find that so far from a pro-Turkish spirit being evinced, the contrary was expressed and the Amir, his brothers and the Nejd notables in camp all seemed to consider that Turkey's misfortunes and present weakness furnished the best opportunity for Nejd to rid itself of all shadow of Ottoman suzerainty and to drive their troops from Hasa and Katif.

3 I would here invite a reference to my report No. C.-17 of the 8th April 1911, as much of the conversation I had with "Bin Saud" on the present occasion was merely a recapitulation of what I have already submitted two years ago. I will endeavour now only to show what effects the events of the two years since elapsed, the Italian war in Tripoli and the Turko-Balkan war have had on the Amir's opinions and ambitions. He spoke with even greater vehemence of his hatred of the Turks and was manifestly disappointed that I could give him no encouragement nor even the faintest hope that his ambitions would have the approval, tacit, disguised or otherwise of the British Government. I was at pains to explain that we were on friendly terms with the Turkish Government, were in negotiation with them over certain matters regarding the Baghdad Railway and the Persian Gulf and that the present of all times was most unsuitable for us to embark on any championship of his claims, even if we were willing to do so, which so far as I could see was not the case. Though disappointed he showed no annoyance or resentment but merely remarked that some day we would be forced by circumstances to take up his case.

4. The Amir said that since he had last spoken of the matter to me Turkey had been through two wars in both of which she had shown her incapability in military matters and that the Arabs consequently felt equal to evicting the Turkish troops from Hasa and Katif with the greatest of ease. They were all agreed that no opportunity is ever likely to offer better than the present when with her army broken and disorganised, her finances crippled and her Arab subjects in Iraq and Syria all demanding reforms and self-government, Turkey would certainly be much too occupied in her other Asiatic provinces and in recuperating after the war's conclusion to despatch a serious expedition to Hasa or Nejd. He said, moreover, that it was firmly believed by Arabs that the Turkish reverses were the judgment of the Almighty on a people who, calling themselves Musalmans, had for years neglected their faith, oppressed their subjects, embezzled religious endowments, broken every ordinance of the Koran and subverted the Khilafat. He averred that the present Sultan was in no sense the Khaifa, holding his throne as he does as the puppet of a clique of politicians in Constantinople whose only object was the filling of their own pockets and who would be ready to find another Khalifa tomorrow if a change should suit them better. The Arabs were not blind and they could not help contrasting the justice, truth, equity, material prosperity and religious freedom which obtained under the rule of other nations and more particularly under the British flag, with what they saw under Turkish government. Sentiments of the above description were not expressed secretly nor do I think especially for my benefit but such speech was held openly at almost every gathering of the Amir and his headmen and I certainly formed the impression that Turkey's misfortunes had induced no sympathy for herself as a power but had rather been taken as conclusive proof that as the Turks had neglected their religion so had the Almighty abandoned them and therefore it behoved all good Wahabis to rid themselves of all intercourse with such backsliders and reprobates. Such briefly appears to have been the effect on the minds of the more educated and responsible men of Nejd.



5. In discussing his own ambitions "Bin Saud" said that the moment had now arrived when he must chose his definite policy for the future. By the Grace of God his power in Central Arabia had increased until he no longer feared any of its Shaikhs or Rulers, he was moreover in alliance with all of them excepting only one, *vis.*, the Sharif of Mecca, who, fearing a second Wahabi invasion of the Hejaz had therefore allied himself with the Turks. The As-Saud were prepared to hold what they had recovered during the last fifteen years of their ancient dominion in Arabia, and felt capable of being able to do so comparatively easily but for the menace of Turkish aggression, only possible from the east by way of Hasa and from the west by Mecca and Medina. To withstand the Turks from both directions they felt was beyond their strength and to render secure their eastern borders, thus making their full force available for the defence of their western boundaries, was one of the reasons for their desire to evict the Turks from Hasa and Katif. Another most important one was that the possession of these rich districts with their ports and especially Ojair, would furnish a valuable source of revenue to what was at present an extremely poor state. Moreover the As-Saud had other grounds and just ones for their claim to Hasa and Katif; one was that these districts formerly belonged to their house, another was that the Turks themselves in a document given to Abdulla bin Faisal by Nafiz Pasha, the General who commanded Midhat Pasha's expedition to Katif in 1871, had agreed that the area should belong to and be governed by Abdulla and his family. The Amir informed me that this document had only recently come into his possession and on his return to Riadh he would send me a copy. Another document of which he had heard but so far had not succeeded in tracing was one which purported to be an agreement made by Colonel Sir Lewis Pelly guaranteeing on behalf of the British Government that the As-Saud family would be recognised as the Shaikhs of the Katif district. This document he said was the result of negotiations after the naval action at Katif and Dammam (in 1865) when four men named Mahomed bin Ma'ana, Abdul Aziz bin Umr, Saleh al Widawi and Ibrahim bin Ghanim were sent by Faisal As-Saud as his representatives to the Resident. I have no archives with which to test the accuracy of the Amir's assertions, but I find a Declaration printed on page 156 of Aitchison's Treaties, Volume XII, as No. XXVIII which seems to bear on this transaction.

6. Of late years and particularly during their wars with Italy and the Balkan States Turkish officials have been pressing Abdul Aziz to assist them practically with men and money and to show himself a loyal subject of the Sultan, (a) by sending three of the As-Saud family to Constantinople for education and service in the Ottoman Army, (b) by acknowledging Turkish suzerainty openly in the acceptance of a Turkish title with a firman from the Sultan appointing him Governor of Nejd, and (c) by handing over to them all letters and documents which may have passed at any time between British officials and the As-Saud family, particularly that referred to above. Hitherto he had refused in as polite language as was possible knowing that once the Turks gained any hold over him he would in truth eventually become a Turkish subject, which he did not admit himself to be at present and then there would be no security for himself or his house. He was, however, beginning to feel the pressure, for all the Arab leaders, Ibn Rashid and the like, had rejected similar Turkish overtures with the answer that they were prepared to comply as soon as they saw "Bin Saud" doing so, for they had as little cause to love the Turks as he had himself, and desired to maintain their present independence. Thus it would be seen that Arabia might be said to be awaiting his lead.

7. The Turks besides are convinced that some kind of understanding actually exists between the As-Saud and the British Government and this belief is one of the reasons for their repeated efforts to make him renounce his present complete independence. He himself is willing to make public any definite understanding with us for the fact of its existence would relieve him of the Turkish menace. Unless he is fortified by some understanding with the British Government which, however nebulous it might be, would make the Turks hesitate from attacking him gratuitously, he would always be subject to intrigues; though at present allied to the other important chiefs in Arabia he could not



hope that such alliances will endure for ever and any differences would be exploited to the utmost by the Turks. While he felt able to hold his own against Ibn Rashid or other Rulers and even against combinations among them, he was aware that the addition of Turkish troops to assist his enemies would probably be his undoing. Consequently he was driven either to ask for British protection of some such kind as we had accorded to Kuwait and to other Shaikhs as a result of old friendships and relations or to trust in his own sword and providence. He was determined sooner or later to turn out the Turks from Hasa and Katif and if it could not be managed by diplomacy, it would be done by resort to arms. He could foresee no better opportunity than the present but before proceeding to extremities he wished to obtain some idea of what attitude we should take up. On this I told him at once that if he did proceed against Hasa, I was sure that we should certainly not endanger our relations with Turkey on his behalf for we had not hitherto in any way disputed the Turkish position in Hasa and he must know that we could hardly do so when or after he had brought the matter to a head by an unprovoked attack. Of course it might be possible for him to eject the Turks for the time being since they did not maintain a very large garrison but it would probably mean a severe fight and then he had to contemplate what would be the subsequent course of events. Any action on his part against Hasa would inevitably bring retaliation which might develop into a war like that lately waged in Yemen and finally might lead to a further Turkish advance into Nejd in the course of which he would lose all he now held. There was no denying the fact that he would be trying conclusions with a world-power which could, if it exerted itself, crush him utterly and to me it seemed a foolish enterprise of which every possible advantage was far outweighed by the heavy risk, almost amounting to certainty, of his losing all that he now possessed. As his friend I could not let him labour under so serious a misapprehension of Turkish strength, even though the course of the Balkan war seemed to warrant it, and though it might be unpalatable it was as well he should know how we regarded the matter.

8. From all that I heard in his camp I have no doubt that some day an attempt will certainly be made on Hasa and Katif, most discussions pointing to the fact that the Arabs despised the Turkish troops of the garrisons as quite useless, that they were certain of their immediate success and were mainly concerned as to how it might be brought about in the most complete, and if possible bloodless, manner as they felt that then they might be able to enlist British sympathy. I felt it necessary to point out what seemed to me to be inevitable, *viz.*, severe reprisals from the Turks and the absence of interference on our part in the As-Saud cause, and did so whenever the subject came up.

9. There is no doubt that the Arabs of nearly all Arabia have now come to despise the Turks so much that they consider themselves quite able to deal with them; for this collapse of prestige the two wars are responsible while distrust of and contempt for the Turks has been intensified by the exposure, which every day becomes plainer, that so-called victories were only falsehoods deliberately circulated by the Government to cover their own failures and weakness. The unrest and desire for emancipation from Turkish rule is not confined to Nejd. The press contains accounts of similar movements for self-government in Syria, Beyrout, Baghdad and Basrah. In Basrah I am informed that the new Wali on his arrival a few days ago was bluntly told that unless he fell into line with local notables he had better re-embark at once for Constantinople.

10. I venture to submit this report in the hope that serious attention may be directed to "Bin Saud" and Central Arabian affairs. The man is a ruler of the best Arab type and his personality is one which is likely to lead Arabia should any extensive combination come into being among its tribes, an event which to me seems exceedingly probable in the near future, unless some radical change takes place in Turkish policy towards the Arabs. As soon as some such combination occurs and perhaps even before, I do not think that there is the least doubt that "Bin Saud's" first move will be on Hasa and Katif, and when that happens it seems to me that we shall be forced into relations with the Amir of Nejd, however much we may desire to avoid them. At present he is most friendly and inclined even to bind himself in some degree, for he has already expressed as



much in his letter to me regarding the capture of his arms at Shargah, forwarded with my letter No. C.-7 of the 29th April 1913. How far he would go in putting this desire into the words of a documentary agreement is uncertain but I am inclined to believe that it would be a very long way if he had reason to think that we would assist him in effecting the removal of the Turks from Hasa and Katif. That we would ever find a method to assist him diplomatically in this direction I confess does not seem possible at present, for our success hitherto in a somewhat similar case, *viz.*, the evacuation of the Umr Kasr and other Turkish posts on Kuwait boundaries, where we had far stronger grounds for exerting pressure on the Porte, has been infinitesimal. On the other hand to reject the Amir's overtures will assuredly cause a feeling of resentment which may react upon our interests along the whole Arabian littoral of the Gulf, perhaps not at once, but in the near future as "Bin Saud's" power increases, for increase it will so long as Abdul Aziz and his brothers are alive.

11. Exactly what have been our relations with the As-Saud family in the past, for want of early records I do not know and whether they would warrant any move in the direction desired by the Amir I am not in a position to suggest. I am aware, however, that we had frequently to take punitive measures against the Wahabis for interference with the Trucial Chiefs and Bahrain, but in this connection now I am convinced that "Bin Saud" would be only too glad to furnish us with any undertaking we desired for the maintenance of the "status quo" in the future.

In conclusion I have the honour to solicit your support for a re-consideration of the whole question of our relations with the Amir of Nejd for I cannot avoid the impression that the matter will become an urgent one before long and that it will be to our advantage to have reached beforehand some definite decision in regard to our future relations with "Bin Saud".

No. C.-12, dated Kuwait, the 20th May 1913.

From—CAPTAIN W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR, I.A., Political Agent, Kuwait,
To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

With reference to your Second Assistant's endorsement No. 1502, dated the 13th May 1913, forwarding a report from Bahrain of the occupation of Hasa by "Bin Saud", I have the honour to submit the details of the incident which have now reached Kuwait.

2. The news which was received with the greatest surprise in Kuwait, was first supplied by passengers and letters from Bahrain arriving here by last mail on the 15th May. From this source there were various accounts which it is unnecessary to recapitulate for in the morning of the 17th May special messengers with letters from "Bin Saud" reached Kuwait overland.

3. I saw Shaikh Mubarak in the afternoon and the course of events appears to have been as follows:—"Bin Saud" collected a very large force of Nejd townsmen and marched rapidly from Riyadh accompanied by some, though not many, Bedouin, until he arrived within five hours of Hofuf in the forenoon of the 27th Jamadi-al-Awal (4th May 1913). Here he assembled his head-men and explained to them how, owing to Turkish ineptitude the Bedouin tribes near Hasa were always raiding, how bad characters whom he desired to punish took refuge in the Hasa villages and the Turkish officials were obstructive and shielded them, how he was weary of the want of security in this district and how he had for years received invitations from the Hasa Arabs and now, having arrived within 5 hours of Hofuf, he asked his Shaikhs to state whether they agreed with him that the Turks should be turned out for good and all or not. The headmen and Shaikhs replied that they were prepared to follow him. In the afternoon "Bin Saud" intimated to his Shaikhs that he required only 300 picked men for the actual attack and when these had been selected the party started. On arrival at a spot about an hour or less to the west of Hofuf itself shortly after sunset the camels and horses were left parked, ropes collected and other preparations made; "Bin Saud" and his men then proceeded on foot until



close to the walls. At about two hours after midnight the party proceeded to scale the walls, the ropes were quickly taken to the top by men climbing upon each other's shoulders and as soon as a good number were over the wall a move was made to open the western gate for the remainder. It was not until this moment that the Turkish sentries became alarmed. On the alarm being given some firing took place near the gate, probably with the gate-guard, in which eight Turks and four of "Bin Saud's" men were killed. The Turks all retreated to the central fort known as Kut, while the population came out and welcomed "Bin Saud". "Bin Saud" then sent envoys accompanied by some of the Hasa notable to the Mutassarif and Commandant pointing out the futility of opposition and offering them a safe conduct if they would surrender immediately and agree to remove themselves and their belongings. He also undertook to allow them to keep their arms and to provide them with transport to the coast, but insisted that the troops must leave at once permitting only one or two days' grace to those Turks who had families. The Mutassarif surrendered at noon on the 5th May and so far assisted "Bin Saud" as to send messages to outlying detachments also to surrender. Within the Government buildings in the Kut "Bin Saud" obtained treasure to the extent of 40,000 dollars, 12 guns of different calibres, 2 mitrailleuses and a large quantity of reserve rifles and ammunition.

4. Messengers were also sent to Katif accompanied by Shiah notables and the chief Shiah Mujtahid in Hasa with a letter from the Mutassarif to the Kaimakam ordering him to surrender, with what result has not yet become known. "Bin Saud" has also occupied Ojair, and replaced the Turkish Customs staff by his own men. He appears to have insisted on every Turkish soldier and official leaving at the earliest possible moment.

5. Kuwaitis are surprised at the boldness and success of "Bin Saud's" coup and opinion is divided as to what steps the Turkish Government will take, the general idea being that Turkey will be too occupied with her own affairs in Basrah to be able to spare any troops for Hasa at present but that later on she may be expected to send an expedition by sea against "Bin Saud". Shaikh Mubarak himself seems inclined to think that the Turks will make the best of a bad job and dub "Bin Saud" Mutassarif of Nejd, leaving him to govern alone as he chooses, for the Hasa province has never paid its way, all Customs receipts being swallowed up in doles and subsidies to petty Bedouin Shaikhs in a vain endeavour to make them desist from looting caravans and threatening Turkish detachments.

6. I confess I am surprised at the suddenness of "Bin Saud's" attack, for while I expected it to come sooner or later I gathered the impression that he would wait to see what effect the movements for self-government in other Arab provinces would have on Turkish policy before actually committing himself. From other aspects it seems clear he could hardly have selected a better moment or managed the affair more deftly as he appears to have secured the support of the responsible men of Hasa itself.



Extract from Bahrain diary No. 20 for week ending
26th May 1913.


LOCAL GOVERNMENT.


(HASA & KATIF).


154. Reference para 149, the S.S. "John-O-Scott" is still here. A few Turkish officials arrived from Busreh by the down mail, as well as from Katr. It is understood they will make another attempt on Katif. A separate report is being submitted to the Resident.

155. It is said that Bin Saud sent to the Ajmans of Jubail to go and see him, which they refused to do. The chiefs of Ajman, the Manasir, and the el Morrahs which were formerly not on good terms with each other, are now said to be trying to join against Bin Saud. They liked the Turkish sovereignty as they used to get allowances.

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Telegram. P.

From Resident Bushāre.

To Foreign. Repeated Foreign Office and by post to Busreh.
No. 970.

Dated 30th May 1915.

With reference to my telegram No. 919. I have received the following additional information dated May 26th from Bahrein.

(1). It is alleged that Bin Saud has written to the Ottoman authorities in Busreh saying that the action which was taken was forced on him by the complaints of the inhabitants that they were being oppressed by the Turkish subordinate officials. He added that he would willingly represent the Turks as Wali and that he would undertake responsibility for the tranquility of the district.

(2). Contrary to expectation the steamer "John O'Scott" did not sail from Bahrein but made various excuses for lingering on there. Three officers, 50 men and 2 small guns arrived from Al Bida on the 25th instant, and on the following day Major Nuris Bey with about 500 men and 2 guns set out for Ojair and Katif in native boats giving out that it was proposed to come to an understanding with Bin Saud. The "John O'Scott" is still hanging on at Bahrein, under one excuse or another, and a Turkish Colonel who has arrived from Busreh has her at his disposal.

(3). I have received a report from Fao today to the effect that pending the expected arrival of the Hamidieh from Agen and the Marmaris from Bombay, orders have been issued to the Turkish force at Bahrein to eke out the time. It is reported that the Turkish Consul at Bushire telegraphed to his Minister yesterday saying that Katif had been retaken by the Turkish troops, but I find it difficult to accept this statement as correct. A compromise, however, may possibly have been arrived at.

Cox.



Telegram. P.
From Resident, Bahrain.
To Foreign. Repeated Foreign Office and by post to Bahrain.
No. 976.
Dated 20th May 1918.

With reference to my telegram No. 912. I have received
the following additional information dated 25th May from
Bahrain.
(1). It is alleged that Bin Saud has written to the Ottoman
authorities in Bahrain saying that the action which was
taken was forced on him by the complaints of the inhabitants
that they were being oppressed by the Turkish authorities.
He added that he would willingly represent the
Turks as well as that he would undertake responsibility
for the tranquillity of the district.
(2). Contrary to expectation the steamer "John O'Connell"
did not sail from Bahrain but made various excuses for
lingering on there. Three officers, 30 men and 2 small
guns arrived from Al Bida on the 25th instant, and on the
following day Major Burke Bay with about 500 men and 2
guns set out for Qajar and Kafil in native boats giving
out that it was proposed to come to an understanding with
Bin Saud. The "John O'Connell" is still hanging on at Bahrain,
under one excuse or another, and a Turkish Colonel who has
arrived from Busrah has her at his disposal.
(3). I have received a report from Bas today to the effect
that pending the expected arrival of the Hamidiyah from Aden
and the Hamariz from Bombay, orders have been issued to the
Turkish force at Bahrain to stay out the time. It is reported
that the Turkish General at Basrah telegraphed to his
Minister yesterday saying that Kafil had been retained by
the Turkish troops, but I find it difficult to accept this
statement as correct. A compromise, however, may possibly
have been arrived at.



(A) (X) 30

Extract from Bahrain Diary No. 31 for the week ending
~~xxx~~ 31st May 1913.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT.

HABA & KATIF.

162. Reference para 154, most of the available Turkish soldiers (some) 500) under Major Nuris Bey left by native boats for an expedition against Ojair on Monday the 26th May. S.S. "John-O-Scott" followed on Thursday the 29th, but the party and the ship returned same afternoon, the Turks having been defeated by Bin Saud's men at Ojair. A separate report is being submitted to the Resident.

163. Bin Saud is reported to have ordered to build a Masjid near Ojair and to put the forts at Ojair, Katif, ~~xxx~~ Anak and Damman in order

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CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1783 of 1913.


British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 7th June 1913.

A copy of the undermentioned communication is forwarded with compliments to the Political Agent, Koweit, for information, in continuation of this office endorsement No. 1725 dated 31st May 1913.

✓
14 JUN 1913
C-68

By Order,
P.S. Lock
Lieutenant,
Assistant Resident.

Resident to Foreign. Telegram No. 1015 dated 5th June 1913.





Telegram. P.

From Resident Bushire.

To Foreign, repeated F.O. and Busrah by post.

No. 1015.

Dated 5th June 1913.

With reference to my telegram of May 30th No. 970. I have received a report from the Political Agent Bahrein dated June 1st in which he states that the force under the Turkish Major proceeded not to Katif but to Ojair where the Major landed 110 men and effected the capture of a small fort losing ten men in casualties in the course of the operation. Sixty men were then left in the fort and the Major with the remainder made their way back to the boats to fetch some guns. On arrival at the boats, however, the men declined to go back and the Major was obliged to embark and abandon the sixty men in the fort. The latter subsequently surrendered to Bin Saud who sent them over to Bahrein having first relieved them of their arms. As already reported, the whole force then embarked on the "John O'Scott" and proceeded to Busrah.

It is pointed out by the Political Agent that the use made of Bahrein by the troops as a base for operations and their presence there has been a ~~source~~ source of annoyance and embarrassment to Sheikh Eza, and is calculated to bring him into the dispute. The Political Agent suggests that we should now consider the advisability of lodging a protest and urges that we should, in any case, warn the Turkish Government that if any further operations are contemplated by them, they are not to make use of Bahrein but to carry them out between Busrah and some point on the mainland. This latter intimation will, I trust, be conveyed to them at all events.

Cox.



Telegram, P.
From Resident Bushire.
To Foreign, repeated P.O. and Bushire by post.
No. 1018.
Dated 8th June 1918.
With reference to my telegram of May 30th No. 970.
I have received a report from the Political Agent Bahrain
dated June 1st in which he states that the force under the
Turkish Major proceeded not to Kafil but to Qajar where the
Major landed 110 men and effected the capture of a small
fort losing ten men in casualties in the course of the op-
eration. Sixty men were then left in the fort and the Major
with the remainder made their way back to the boats to fetch
some guns. On arrival at the boats, however, the men decid-
ed to go back and the Major was obliged to embark and aban-
don the sixty men in the fort. The latter subsequently
surrendered to Bin Saud who sent them over to Bahrain having
first relieved them of their arms. As already reported, the
whole force then embarked on the "John O'Scott" and pro-
ceeded to Bushire.
It is pointed out by the Political Agent that the use made
of Bahrain by the troops as a base for operations and their
presence there has been a main source of annoyance and
embarrassment to Sheikh Nasr, and is calculated to bring him
into the dispute. The Political Agent suggests that we
should now consider the advisability of lodging a protest
and wishes that we should, in any case, warn the Turkish
Government that if any further operations are contemplated
by them, they are not to make use of Bahrain but to carry
them out between Bushire and some point on the mainland.
This latter intimation will, I trust, be conveyed to them
at all events.
Gen.



Extract from Bahrain Diary No. 22 for week ending 7th June 1913. 83

LOCAL GOVERNMENT.

(HASA & OJAIR).

170. Bin Saud is reported to have called a meeting of Mullahs and told them that he was their Amir and that they should report all crimes such as drinking wine, adultery, theft etc. to him when he would punish the offenders strictly according to Shera. He warned them of the ill consequences of hiding crime besides their being answerable to God.

(KATIF).


171. Hitherto Bin Saud's interests in Katif have been entrusted to one Abdur Rahman bin Abdullah bin Suweillim. It is said that Bin Saud has dictated the following terms to the residents of Katif :-

1. That the residents should give him in writing that the place belonged to the ancestors of Bin Saud.
2. That 14 nobles of Katif should go and meet Bin Saud and contribute money according to their means.
3. That each village shall give 10 men for help - these to remain in the fort ready to fight.
4. That export of vegetables to Bahrain will be stopped.

The residents are delaying in carrying out these orders, and in the meantime Bin Saud is expected to arrive at Katif shortly with a considerable number of men.

172. Abdullah bin Hassan Dosiri took a letter from Sheikh Isa to Bin Suweillim at Katif for recovering certain runaway divers. The divers hearing of this ran from Katif to Anich and took bast with a negro who belonged to Bin Saud. The negro refused to obey Bin Suweillim's order to surrender the divers, and Abdullah bin Hasan had to return empty handed with a promise made by Bin Suweillim that the latter would refer the matter to Bin Saud.

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(81) (83)
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W 77-28
14 JUL 1913
C-71

Telephonic message.

From - Resident, Bushire.

To - Captain Shakespear, Political Agent, Koweit.

No. 1858.



Dated 11th June 1913.

Following from His Majesty's Government dated
10th June in answer to an enquiry, repeated for
your information; please be guided accordingly:
Begins.

Policy of the British Government at present
is to endeavour to consolidate the dominions of the
Porte in Asia Minor and to refrain as long as
possible from any intervention direct or indirect
in Central Arabia. Should Abdul Aziz bin Saud
make any overtures Resident should communicate
with Government and ask for instructions.
Ends.

Resident.

[Handwritten signature]





Extract from ~~Kx~~ Bahrain News for the week ending 14th

June 1913. No. 23.

LOCAL OFFICIALS.

(HASA & OJAIR).

178. Towards the end of May, Abdul Aziz bin Saud had sent a letter to Sheikh Isa from Ojair, apparently giving him an account of the fight at Ojair (vide para 162). A quarrel arose between two of Bin Saud's messengers Muhammad bin Abdur Rahman and another Bedouin as to which of them should present it to the Sheikh, apparently because they anticipated a handsome present for the bearer. The letter got torn in the dispute and was therefore thrown into the sea and Muhammad bin Abdur Rahman went and informed Bin Saud ~~xxxxxxxx~~ that it was lost on the way. Truth however came out later, and Bin Saud (it is said) sentenced Muhammad bin Abdur Rahman to death, but subsequently commuted the sentence on the intercession of the man's relatives and others to one of 400 strokes. This punishment appears to have been inflicted on the man who was put on a donkey with his face blackened and 180 lbs iron on his neck and taken round the bazars.

179. It is reported that one of the servants of Bin Saud falsely reported to the latter that he was struck by Muhammad bin Saleh el Mulhem - a friend of the el Araifs (referred to in para 185 below). Bin Saud sent for Muhammad bin Saleh and, it is said, pulled out his beard and moustache with his own hands. Bin Saud then ordered his men to strike him with the sheaths of their swords and to put him in chains.

Reports of drastic punishments etc. inflicted by Bin Saud are very rife here, probably there is considerable truth, but some no doubt must be taken "cum grano salis".

180. Bin Saud has married a daughter of Sadun in Hasa.


181. Bin Saud has removed the two most serviceable of the guns he captured from the Turks in Hasa to Riyadh and has also sold by auction everything of the Turkish garrison left there.

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

(HASA).

182. Abdul Aziz bin Saud is said to have seized 4000 camels belonging to Bedouins of Howtha () as the latter re-

-fused





85 86
refused to pay him "Jahad" (a tax levied in time of war) for a second time. It is said the inhabitants had paid the tax only some two months back. Abdul Aziz informed the Beduins (ironically) that they were at liberty to attack caravans if they felt themselves powerful enough to do it.

183. It is said that Bin Saud's ensign will be green with an inscription of "Kalmah" (La ilaha illallah Muhammad ur Rasylallah) and with a quotation from the Koran (Succour is from God and victory at hand-) on the other. X (KATIF).

184. Reference para 172, Bin Saban who refused to give up Abdullah bin Hasan Dosiri's divers at Anich has been dismissed by Bin Saud, and the Dosiri has now received a letter from Bin Suweillam at Katif to go and take charge of his men.


CONDITION OF COUNTRY.

(HASA).

185. Two of the Al Araif tribe - Salman and Fahad - relatives of Bin Saud who were not on good terms with him, visited Sheikh Jasim Al Thani and obtained a letter from him to Bin Saud not to give them any trouble.

x x x x x x

X The Wahabi ensign
نصر الله وفتح منيب
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CONFIDENTIAL

No. 2048, dated Bushire, the 4th (received 14th) July 1913.
From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR PERCY COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

With reference to my telegram No. 1150, dated 27th June 1913, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a translation of the letter from Abdul Aziz bin'Abdur Rahman al Faiysal es Saud, dated 13th June 1913, with regard to his past and future relations with His Majesty's Government.

(Translation.)

Dated 8th Rajab 1331 (13th June 1913).
From—ABDUL AZIZ BIN ABDUL RAHMAN AL FAYSAL ES SAUD,
To—His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Bushire.

After enquiries after your esteemed health.

We beg to address your Honour in consideration of the previous friendship between us and you and of the still earlier treaty belonging to the time of my grand father Faysal—may God forgive him—of the period of which fifty-five years have elapsed and fifty-five years still remain to run. I desire to establish the same in the same manner as it existed between you and my ancestors and this (fact) has prompted me to make this reference. Firstly, I am confident that there will happen nothing to your people to produce causes which may be contrary to friendship and rules. And we have now-a-days conquered the country of our fathers and grand fathers (*via*), El Hasa and El Qatif, as well as their dependencies and spared the soldiers remaining there, sending them over to Bahrain because it was more convenient for them to make their way to Basrah from that place. When they reached Bahrain, however, they were assisted by some one from your side and he afforded them the necessary facilities and encouraged them to stay at Bahrain and to cause trouble in our side. We received the news of this but we did not believe it because your wisdom and justice would not agree to this. After a few days they set out from Bahrain for El Qatif, but they returned in disappointment and remained for several days, having no supporter but your subjects and dependents. A few days afterwards they proceeded towards El Qatif and on their arrival there they experienced such a disaster at the hands of a small party of our dependents as had not crossed their minds and they returned disappointed and repentant. Praise and thanks be to God that we do not attach the least importance or significance to them—or rather to them and to the party to whom they are connected. Yes, we, the Islamic and Mohammedan Arabs, will rise to uphold our honour and will recover our rights with the last drop of our blood and we are doing this with confidence in the One Single God and also in all our Moslem brethren. We all have joined hands and there is no difference between us, we having been joined together by the cause of Islam and by the Arab sense of honour. In view of my friendly feelings I desire to be on the same terms with you as existed between you and my ancestors and (I desire that those terms) should exist between me and you after them, (my ancestors).


If the relations are as before and if it is incumbent upon both the parties to protect the subjects, we bind ourselves to you in regard to those who are in our side and to what concerns your subjects, and we will respect their honour, protect them and be responsible for them—because there remain certain people in our side who are against you and your subjects, and we ask for similar treatment from you. If this be really the case in view of the past friendship and of laws, please give us an intimation accordingly, and if the conditions are changed and the situation is not as we expect, then please warn us, so that we may be cognisant of the same.

And thanks be to God, the Lord of both the Worlds and may his peace be on our Lord, Mohammed, his posterity and companions. Greetings.

C38FD-44-17-7-13-GCBP Simla



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CONFIDENTIAL

No. 2049 of 1913.

British Residency and Consulate-General.

Bushire, 4th July 1913.

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A copy of the undermentioned papers is forwarded,
with compliments, to the Political Agent, Koweit, for
information, in continuation of this office endorsement
No. 1783, dated 7th June 1913.


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Page 81

By Order,

P. G. Dock
Lieutenant,

Assistant Resident.

Letter dated 15th June 1913 from Abdul Aziz bin Abdur
Rahman Al Faysal es Saud, to Resident.
Telegram No. 1150, dated 27th June 1913 from Resident to
Foreign, Simla.
Telegram No. S-206, dated 1st July 1913 from Foreign, Simla,
to Resident.





Telegram - P.

From - Resident, Bushire.

To - Foreign, Simla.

Repeated India Office, London.

No. 1150.

Dated 27th June 1913.

With reference to the telegram on the subject of overtures by Bin Saud, from Secretary of State, dated June 10th.

Bin Saud has addressed letters dated June 15th, in analogous terms, to Political Agent, Bahrein, and myself. These were sent by him to Bahrein by the hand of his former emissary.

Bin Saud commences with a reference to the long-standing friendship which has existed between the British Government and his house, and to the agreement of 55 years ago entered into by his grand father - presumably the declaration dated April 21st, 1866, and given to Colonel Pelly.

He goes on to complain of the facilities which he alleges were afforded to the Turks by the Political Agent in allowing them to use Bahrein as their base of operations.

He is most anxious, he continues, to preserve the long-standing friendship between us and on his part undertakes to ensure that protection and good treatment are accorded to British subjects, and desires that we should give him similar assurances.

If, however, the position has changed and we no longer wish to continue the friendly relations of the past (which he says he is most anxious that we should continue) he asks that he may be warned explicitly in order that he may be able to take steps to safeguard his own interests.

In conclusion he says that he anxiously awaits my reply. The mail for Bahrein, where his envoy is waiting, leaves on July 3rd from Bushire.

Cox.



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223



Telegram - P.

From - H.E. the Viceroy, Simla.

To - Secretary of State for India, London.


Repeated Resident, Bushire.

No. S-206.

Dated 1st received 2nd July 1913.

7 Aug 1913
With reference to Cox's telegram regarding Bin Saud, dated June 27th. Kindly telegraph direct to Cox, if possible, the instructions regarding the nature of the reply which he should send the Amir. While returning a non-committal answer, it would seem desirable to assure Bin Saud that it is not our intention to depart in any way from the friendly relations which have hitherto existed.

Foreign.





CONFIDENTIAL..

No. 2107 of 1913.

British Residency and Consulate-General.

Bushire, // ² July 1913.

W.F.D.S.
17 JUL 1913
C.78

A copy of the undermentioned papers is forwarded, with compliments, to the Political Agent, K u w a i t , for information, in continuation of this office No. 2049, dated 4th July 1913.


2. It is requested that the wishes of His Majesty's Government as set forth in these papers as to the attitude which Political Officers in the Gulf should adopt in reference to Bin Saud, may be carefully observed.

P. Z. Cox

Lieut-Colonel,

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

1. Telegram from Resident to Foreign, No. 1150, dated 27th June 1913.
2. Telegram from Secretary of State for India to Viceroy Foreign-Secret, dated 3rd July 1913.
3. Telegram from Foreign, Simla, to Resident, No. S-221, dated 5th July 1913.
4. Letter from Resident to Bin Saud, No. 278, dated 9th July 1913.





Telegram - P.

From - Secretary of State for India, London.



To - Viceroy, Simla.

FOREIGN-SECRET.

Dated 3rd received 4th July 1913.

71 page 89
71 page 90
With reference to your telegram of July 1st and Cox's telegram of June 27th. You should inform Bin Saud that the Turkish troops have received no assistance from us and that His Majesty's Government while appreciating his friendly sentiments, must maintain the strictest neutrality between the two parties and cannot intervene in the dispute in any way. (End of communication to be made to Bin Saud).

The importance of the Amir is not being overlooked by His Majesty's Government, but they are very anxious above all things that at the present juncture nothing should be said or done, which might arouse the suspicion, in Turkey or elsewhere, that disintegration of Turkish dominion in Asia is desired by them, or that they will encourage it, and they wish great care to be taken to avoid any language or thoughts suggestive of spheres of influence and the like.





Telegram - P.

From - Foreign, Simla.


To - Resident, Bushire.

No. S-231.

Dated & received 5th July 1913.

With reference to telegram dated July 3rd from Secretary of State on the subject of Bin Saud. It is his desire that instructions should be issued to Political Officers to communicate with Bin Saud as little as possible. You are requested to act in accordance with these instructions.

Foreign.





Kunair
CONFIDENTIAL.



No. 2249, dated Bushire, the 20th (received 28th) July 1913.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR PERCY COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

below
In continuation of my letter No. 2048, dated 4th July 1913, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a translation of the reply, which I have addressed to bin Saud explaining to him the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards him.

2. Instructions have been issued to His Majesty's Political Agents on the Arabian littoral to observe the orders of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India conveyed in his telegram, dated 3rd July 1913, to His Excellency the Viceroy, and amplified by your telegram No. 221-S., dated 5th July 1913.

page 88
No. 278, dated Bushire, 9th July 1913.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR PERCY COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—AL AMIR ABDUL AZIZ BIN ABDUR RAHMAN AL FAISAL-AS-SAUD.

A. C.

page 88
I duly received your honoured letter dated 8th *Rajab* 1331 (= 13th June 1913), which was sent on to me from Bahrain by post owing to your envoy Musa'd bin Suweilim being overtaken with sickness in Bahrain.


I am sorry that some days have elapsed before I have been able to reply but the reason was that I could not give you an authoritative answer without reference to the British Government.

I have now received their reply. I am authorised to inform Your Honour that the reports which seem to have reached you to the effect that our Agent at Bahrain, Major Trevor gave facilities to the Turkish Troops while halting at Bahrain, were not true. Their stay at Bahrain on this occasion was unavoidable under the circumstances, but no assistance was given them.

Secondly, I am to explain that your expression of friendly feelings towards them is appreciated by the British Government, but that they do not see their way to intervene in any way in the dispute which has arisen between Your Honour and the Turkish Government. On the contrary, the British Government consider it necessary to observe a strictly neutral attitude towards both sides.

This was the message of Government, and I beg to add an expression of my own appreciation of the friendly sentiments which you evince towards this Residency, and also of the kind hospitality and assistance you have been good enough to accord to English travellers who have passed through the spheres of your tribes.

C.3FD-41-1-8-13-GCBP Simla





Confidential.



21st July 95
913.

My 7/13
30/13

My dear Shakespeare, 93

I feel I ought to
thank you for sending me
the Kuwait diary so regu-
larly. As you probably
know, I send Sir Percy
the Office copy of my monthly
summary, which he sees &
returns. I hope he ~~sends~~
you extracts from it when
there is anything to interest
you; but this seems rare
now-a-days. I cannot



9b.

do more than I am
doing now in the way
of sending round informa-
tion, as there is a great
deal to do here now-a-days
both for me & for my office.

Of course you know
that people here say that
you put Ibn Sa'ad up
to attack Hasa, and that
an account of your tour
appeared ^{I think} before the Hasa
affair) in a Baghdad paper!

I hope you had a good
trip, but it is a pity that


83 97
95

you did not (as I under-
stand) get to Riyadh. These
gentlemen seem very particular
about their capitals; but
perhaps it was you, who,
remembering Pelly's experiences,
thought it better to keep
to the open desert.

Did you find that Hunter's
map & the Gazetteer bore
any resemblance to the reality?


I wonder if you had
any sport by the way.

Yours sincerely
J. G. Lorimer.



C. 24








95
(97) 99

TRANSLATION of a letter dated the 22nd Shaaban 1331,
(16th July 1913) from Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman al Faisal,
"Bin Saud" to Captain W. H. I. Shakespear, Political Agent,
Kuwait.

After Compliments,

and after according to old acquaintance we
used to write and there used to come to us from your honour
letters. After we took up the government of Haqa nothing has
come to us ; we trust that you had good reason . And at
this time we saw our cousin Ahmed ath-Thamian and we learnt
that your honour saw him on board the ship and had certain
conversation with him and therefrom (it appears) that if we
strive to your welfare in certain cases and if we rose for
your rights it is incumbent upon you to assist our side.
You understand that all I had (in my mind) was communicated
to you speaking face to face and I shall not change from it,
nor shall I withdraw from it but our affairs as you know ,
thank God , that I (am) with all the Arabs (so that) there
are none of their chiefs with whom we are not as one hand
(none)
and all of them who has not taken from us the arm of a brother
-er and there are none of our subjects whether Bedouin or
townsman ^{on} ^(not) whom our words are absolute upon them whatever
the circumstances may be. And as to our friendship with
the Precious Imperial Government (British) it is of old from
the time of my grandfather Faisal and we are reliant upon
them in every circumstance. And as to our affairs today you
know we are cramped ^{by} ~~many~~ many things on account of reflection
on the desire of the Precious Imperial Government and with-
-out doubt you know that various circumstances hamper progress
and we shall become oppressed thereby. If the Imperial Gov-
-ernment (British) will regard our affair in the true cir-





98 96
100

circumstances and neither from the point of view of the Government (Turkish) nor from the point of view of any other, then we shall be bound to ~~we~~ agree with them and support them to what ever extent may be necessary . And if there should be to them (the British Government) purpose away from us , you know then that humanity and necessity must force us to seek relief for ourselves from others and we do not desire that we should be friends or have intercourse with any of all the people except your Government and because of my acquaintance with you and your acquaintance with me I wished to show you certain matters and then after that if we may obtain the regard and attention it is the desired graciousness and you see by the Power of God and His might (my) truth and sincerity ; and if we receive the contrary of that then the circumstances Inshallah will be as God wishes to make them to his desire and we shall not distress *(ourselves)*.

This(is what was necessary) and we hope that you will not cut off from us ^{your} news with what may be necessary whether on account of the Government or according to our former friendship .

This is what was necessary and SALAM.

- - - - -



circumstances and neither from the point of view of the
Government (Tehran) nor from the point of view of any other
than we shall be bound to be agree with them and support
them to what extent may be necessary. And if there
should be to them (the British Government) propose away from
us, you know that humanly and necessarily must force us
to make policy for ourselves from above and we do not de-
-sire that we should be forced to have intercourse with any
of all the people except your Government and persons of its
representatives with you and your representatives with us I wish
to show you certain matters and then after that if we may be
-taken the regard and attention it is the desired consideration
and you see by the power of God and His right (my) truth and
clarity: and if we receive the contrary of that then the
circumstances involved will be as God wishes to make them
in his destiny and we shall not discuss (further).
This is what we necessary) and we hope that you will not
and all know what may be necessary without an
account of the Government or according to our former friend-
-ship.
This is what we necessary and SALAM.



From P.A. Kuwait


To Abdul Aziz bin Saud

No 324 d/ 9/8/101
97 1913

من قبطان كبير بولشكلى اجبت الدولة البرية القيصريه الانكليزيه في الكويت
الى جناب الامير الافخم حبيب الله بن الشيخ عبد العزيز بن الامام عبد الرحمن الفيصل
دام بقاءه
عقب سؤالي عن عزير خاطركم لازلتم بخير وعافيه بعضه بالموافقه اخذت
كتابكم المورخ ٢٢ شعبان ١٣٤١ الذي بيده رجالكم محمد بن زيد وكلما
ذكره جنابكم صار عنده ما معلوم منصوص مواجبه مع ابن عمكم احمد
بن ثنيان بالركب وثنيان سألني عن بعض الاشياء وانه اخبر جنابكم
وعن سبب عدم كتابتي لجنابكم من بعد توليتكم على الاحساء جاء
عليها امر من الدولة البرية القيصريه الانكليزيه حسب العاده والقوانين
بين الدول ان تخفض الحياض عن التعصب لاميير نجد ولله والعثمانيه
ولانني بضر الطرفين ولا بد عنه جنابكم اطلاع ان الناس يكونون في
البصر في بغداد ان محكم على الاحساء انه اشارنا ما لكم عنده مواجبه
معكم بالبر وجنابك يعرف ان هذا الكلام ماله صحه ولاكن لو انا الكتب
لجنابك بركات الوقت وتطلع الناس كان يتيقن عندهم ذلك وانا ربيت
ضر على جنابكم بذلك وكلما بينه جنابك عندي وكنت من اول الا الان عرفت عنه
الدولة البرية القيصريه وهو باق في فكرهم كذا ان اود ان اخبرهم عن مضمون مكنونكم
الاخير والامر عندهم وانا اعرف ان الدولة البرية القيصريه استحسنه مما بينته
من صده فتم لها ومن حسن سلوككم ولطفكم معي ايام مواجبه معكم بالبر ولا بد
وصلكم مكنون من جناب الافخم حبيب الله بن الشيخ عبد العزيز بن الامام عبد الرحمن
لا بد صار عندهم معلوم مثل ذكرته في اعلاه هذا ما ارفم بياته مع سلامي على الاخوان
والاولاد وارجوه تال ان يديهم توفيقكم ودمهم سائين محرومين

٦٢ رجب ١٣٤١ مطابق ٩ اوكت ١٩١٣

9/8/13





(100) 98
102

TRANSLATION of a Letter No 324 dated the 9th August
1913 from Capt W.H.I. Shakespear, I.A., Political Agent,
Kuwait to Abdnl Aziz bin Abdur Rahman al Faical "Bin Saud",
Amir of Nejd.

After Compliments,

and after we received with the hand of friend-
ship your letter dated the 22nd Shaaban 1331 which was by
the hand of your man Mahomed bin Zeid and all that your honour
stated became known to us. With regard to our meeting with
your cousin Ahmed bin Thamian in the ship and our explaining
to him various matters he has told your Honour and with reg-
reason for the
ard to the absence of my letters to your Honour after you
assumed the government of Basra, there came to us an order
from the British Government in accordance with the custom
and rules of nations that we should be neutral (Lit:- keep
away from partiality) to the Amir of Nejd and to the Turkish
Government and not purpose harm to either side. And certainly
you will be aware that people talk in Basra and in Baghdad
of your advance on Basra that it was from a hint from us
to you when we met you in the desert and your honour knows
that in such words there is no truth but if I wrote to your
honour at that time and it became known to people it would
make firm their belief in that and I saw harm in that to your
honour. And all that your honour has told me and have writ-
ten to me from the first to now I have informed the British
Government and it remains in their consideration, similar-
ly I shall inform them of your present letter the last and
the order remains with them. I know that the British Govern-
ment appreciates the expression of your friendship to them
and your kind treatment and courtesy to me in the days when
I met you in the desert and it is certain that you will have



TRANSLATION of a letter he had dated the 9th August
1919 from Capt W.H.I. Sheppard, I.A.S., Political Agent,
Rasool to Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman of Najd "Bin Saud",
Amb of H.M.S.


After consideration,
and after we received with the head of the
which your letter dated the 2nd October 1919 which was by
the hand of your son Mahomed bin Saud and all that your son
stated before known to us. With regard to our meeting with
your son bin Abdul Rahman in the city and our explaining
to him various matters he has told your son and with your
son for the
and to the presence of my father in your house after you
assured the government of H.M.S., there came to us an order
from the British Government in accordance with the custom
and rules of nations that we should be notified (little known
to the British
your son Mahomed bin Saud and your son bin Saud
-ment and not persons known to either side. And certainly
you will be aware that people talk in H.M.S. and in Baghdad
of
your son bin Abdul Rahman on H.M.S. that it was from a kind of
to you then we met you in the house and your son bin Saud
that in such words there is no doubt but it is true to you
known at that time and it became known to people it would
make him think that he had and I saw him in that to you
house. And all that your son bin Saud has told us and have writ-
ten to us from the time to now have informed the British
Government and it remains in their consideration, addition
-ly I shall inform them of your present letter the last and
the order remains with them. I know that the British Govern-
ment appreciated the explanation of your friendship to them
and your kind treatment and courtesy to us in the days when
I met you in the desert and it is certain that you will have




99 (101)
103

received before this the letter of His honour the Political
Resident in Basra and from that you will certainly have
learnt the same as I have said above .

This is what was necessary to say and with Salaams to the
brothers and sons and I trust the Almighty may increase your
welfare and may you be preserved, and protected.





DRAFT—(For Approval).

Agency,
POLITICAL RESIDENCY, PERSIAN/GULF,/
Kuwait

No. C.17

Dated 11 August 1913.

To,
Political Resident,
B USHIRE.

Sir,

With reference to the correspondence ending with your endorsement No 2107 dated the 11th July 1913, regarding the affairs of Abdul Aziz bin Saud, ~~the Amir of Nejd~~ I have the honour to forward herewith translations of correspondence which has passed between the Amir of Nejd and myself.


2. It will be seen that the Amir reproaches me for not writing, a ~~natural~~ ^{not an} ~~unfriendly~~ natural attitude considering our personal friendship, but in view of his action in Hasa and the attitude of His Majesty's Government I ~~did~~ was obliged to hold as little communication ^{with him} as possible. He again reiterates his desires and wishes already communicated in my former reports ^{and} his present letter ^{is} ~~has~~ been designed I think to convince us further, if necessary, of his sincerity.

3. In the circumstances and to avoid giving offence or causing resentment I ^{felt} ~~was~~ obliged to reply to ^{this} ~~the~~ letter the terms of my ^{answer} ~~reply~~ will be found ^{unacceptable and} ~~in the~~ ⁱⁿ spirit of the instructions enunciated by His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

I have etc,

My

S 638—12,000-7-08





Confidential

No. 2650 of 1913.

101 (103)
105

British Residency and Consulate-General,

Bushire, 2nd Sept 1913.

W.D. 75
4- SEP. 1913
C.86


A copy of the undermentioned letter is forwarded,
with compliments, to the Political Agent, Kuwait, for
information and guidance.

P. 2. Cox

Lieut-Colonel,

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Letter No. 1828-E.A. dated the 11th August 1913, from
Foreign to Resident.






Copy of a letter No.1828-E.A. dated the 11th August 1913, from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla, to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I am directed to invite a reference to the telegrams from His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, dated respectively the 10th June and 3rd July 1913 and to the telegram from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, No.221-S, dated the 5th July 1913, on the subject of British relations with the Amir of Nejd, and to request that the policy of His Majesty's Government stated therein may be impressed upon, and carefully observed by all concerned.

2. I am further to invite your attention to paragraph 224 in the Persian Gulf Diary for the month of March 1913, in which it is reported that Captain Shakespear was at Majma'a - a town which is apparently nearly 150 miles beyond the limits of Kuwait - when he heard that Bin Saud was in the neighbourhood. His Majesty's Secretary of State for India is of the opinion that Captain Shakespear was ill-advised in proceeding to so great a distance beyond the limits claimed by the Shaikh of Kuwait, and I am to say that it should be clearly understood in future that the tours of the Political Agent must, unless otherwise directed by the Government of India, be confined strictly to the limits eventually assigned to Kuwait under the Anglo-Turkish Convention.





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 2817 of 1913.

British Residency and Consulate-General.

Bushire, 16th September 1913.

W.F.W.S.
18. SEP. 1913
C-94

A copy of the undermentioned papers is forwarded,
with compliments, to the Political Agent, K u w a i t ,
for information, in continuation of this office endorse-
ment No. 2107, dated 11th July 1913.


↓
page 91

By Order,

P.S. Lockth
Lieutenant,

Assistant Resident.

Telegram No. 1337, dated 30th July 1913 to Foreign.
Telegram dated 7th August 1913 to Foreign.
Telegram No. 324-S., dated 24th August 1913 to Resident.
Telegram No. 5010, dated 27th August 1913 to Foreign.
Telegram No. 335-S., dated 28th August 1913 to Resident.
Telegram No. 1503, dated 31st August 1913 to Foreign.
Telegram No. 1504, dated 31st August 1913 to Foreign.
Telegram No. S-365, dated 5th September 1913 to Resident.
Letter No. 338, dated 11th September 1913 to Bin Saud.





104 106
108

Telegram - P.

From - Resident, Bushire.

To - Foreign, Simla.

No. 1337.

Dated 30th July 1913.

During the last few days information has been received about Bin Saud of which a summary is given below.

(1). From Bahrain. He addressed the Shaikh of Qatar, while he was at Qatif, demanding that the Turkish garrison should be driven out from Al Bida'.

(2). From Kuwait. Qasr-as-Subaih has been occupied by him.

(3). From the Residency Agent on the Trucial Coast. A conference has taken place between the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dibai, who are of the same tribe, and the former, whose position has become paramount in Baraimi and the vicinity since the Wahhabis withdrew, considers it certain that the activities of Bin Saud will be directed towards that locality. Fearing this it has been decided by the two Shaikhs that they will mobilise their Bedouins in the Sabakht Matti, (reference is invited to Lorimer's Gazetteer page 1200) and take the initiative against him.

I should not think that Bin Saud would consider it was worth while to alienate His Majesty's Government by taking such a course as there was nothing of an unfriendly nature in our reply to his communication; but at the same time, if he wishes to do so, an extremely favourable opportunity is afforded to him by the present state of Oman.

The Shaikhs are being warned by me that such a development is improbable, and deterred from making the




Telegram - P.
From - Resident, Aden.
To - Foreign Office.
No. 1337.
Dated 20th July 1913.
During the last few days information has been received about Bin Saud of which a summary is given below.
(1). From Bahrain. He addressed the Sheikh of Qatar, while he was at Doha, demanding that the Turkish Garrison should be driven out from Al Bida.
(2). From Kuwait. Ghar-as-Subaihi has been occupied by him.
(3). From the Residency Agent on the Persian Coast. A conference has taken place between the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi and Uqai, who are of the same tribe, and the Persian, whose position has become paramount in Bahrain and the vicinity since the Wahabite withdrawal, considers it certain that the activities of Bin Saud will be directed towards that locality. Hearing this it has been decided by the two Sheikhs that they will mobilise their Bedouins in the Bahrein Muttal. (Reference is invited to Letter's Gazetteer page 1800) and take the initiative against him. I should not think that Bin Saud would consider it was worth while to antagonise His Majesty's Government by taking such a course as there was nothing of an anti-English nature in our reply to his communication; but at the same time, if he wishes to do so, an extremely favourable opportunity is afforded to him by the present state of Oman.
The Sheikhs are being warned by me that such a development is improbable, and deterred from making the



(107) 105.
109
first hostile move, but, if it is feasible, I should
be glad to reassure them as to the attitude towards a
possible enterprise such as this on the part of Bin
Saud which would be adopted by His Majesty's Government.

Cox.





Telegram - P.

From - Resident, Bushire.

To - Foreign, Simla.

Demi-official.


Dated 7th August 1913. (7-40 p.m.).

Letter No. 29150 dated 2nd of July from the Foreign Office to the India Office has been received in blue print.

I note that a more benevolent standpoint is assumed in the Secretary of State's telegram dated 3rd of July, and I appreciate the pertinence of the policy indicated therein to the full; but as regards the Foreign Office letter I venture to urge that adequate cognisance is hardly taken of the fact that no control can be exercised by the Porte over Bin Saud at any rate for a long time to come, and that in the meantime his position affords him an opportunity of causing a very great amount of inconvenience to the Indian Government in Oman, on the Trucial Coast and in Qatar, which would be obviated by a harmless modus vivendi, which could be arranged, if necessary, with the knowledge of the Turkish Government. No question arises of any desire to interfere in Central Arabian politics. Bin Saud is now at the coast, and a new menace threatens our interests in the Gulf sphere; it is necessary for us either to render it harmless or to take steps for our protection against it. Surely no logical reason exists why, because the Turkish Government is incapable of controlling one of her protégés, the interests of ours should suffer severely.

Perhaps His Majesty's Government could be moved to a further consideration of this aspect of the question, if my apprehensions are shared by the Government of India.

Cox.





107 109

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Telegram - P.

From - Foreign, Simla.

To - Resident, Bushire.

No. 324-B.

Dated & received 24th August 1913. (4-50 p.m.)

With reference to your telegram No.1337, dated 30th of July, in regard to Bin Saud; on August 10th the Secretary of State was telegraphed to as follows:-
Begins.

"With reference to your telegram dated 6th of August. Some difficulty is experienced by us in expressing our opinion on the telegram from Cox, dated July 30th in consideration of the policy which has been explicitly laid down by His Majesty's Government regarding Bin Saud. We consider, however, that it is our duty to lay before His Majesty's Government the very strong objections to which, in the changed state of affairs, a rigid adherence to that policy is, in our ~~me~~ opinion, open. From the relations which exist between Bin Saud and the Shaikh of Al Qatar and the recent reports regarding the apprehensions of the Chiefs of the Trucial Coast, it is clear that he is assuming as ever increasing prominence in the politics of the Coast of the Persian Gulf, and has thus brought himself within the sphere in which lie our interests and influence. Bin Saud could be ignored with impunity as long as his operations were confined to Al Hasa. We do not, however, think that it is safe to pursue such a policy now that there is a possibility that he will interfere in Qatar, with the chiefs of the Trucial Coast, and even, it may be, in Oman where an opportunity of encroaching on the territories of the Sultan may be afforded to him by the rebellion. It appears to us, therefore, that his conciliation or estrangement must now be decided upon. The latter effect cannot but be produced if Bin Saud is threatened



Telegram - 7.
From - Foreign Office,
To - Resident, Baghdad.
No. 202-2.
dated & received 20th August 1919. (4-20 P.M.)
With reference to your telegram No. 1907, dated 20th
of July, in regard to Bin Saud; on August 19th the Secre-
tary of State was telegraphed to as follows:-
Baghdad.
"With reference to your telegram dated 20th of August.
Some difficulty is experienced by us in expressing our
opinion on the telegram from Cox, dated July 20th in con-
sideration of the policy which has been explicitly laid
down by His Majesty's Government regarding Bin Saud. We
consider, however, that it is our duty to lay before His
Majesty's Government the very strong objections to which
in the changed state of affairs, a rigid adherence to that
policy is, in our own opinion, open. From the relations
which exist between Bin Saud and the Sheikh of Al Qatif
and the recent reports regarding the apprehensions of
the State of the British Coast, it is clear that he is
assuming an ever increasing prominence in the politics of
the Coast of the Persian Gulf, and has thus brought him-
self within the sphere in which lie our interests and in-
fluences. Bin Saud could be ignored with impunity as long
as his operations were confined to Al Hasa. We do not,
however, think that it is safe to pursue such a policy
now that there is a possibility that he will interfere in
Gulf, with the State of the British Coast, and even, it
may be, in Oman where an opportunity of encroaching on the
territories of the Sultan may be afforded to him by the
rebellion. It appears to us, therefore, that his con-
tinuation or retirement must now be decided upon. The
latter effect cannot but be produced if Bin Saud is
threatened



110 108
112

threatened without further parley with forcible expulsion if he makes any attempt to interfere in the affairs of Al Qatar, while we should be compelled to undertake military operations, a consummation which it is very desirable to avoid, if he were to ignore our threat. Unless some mutual and amicable agreement can be arrived at with the Amir who has up to the present displayed a friendly spirit towards us, it is probable that we shall force him to take up an attitude of permanent hostility which cannot but react on the chiefs of the Gulf Coast in an unfavourable manner. Under these circumstances we strongly advocate, not any definite treaty with Bin Saud, but a friendly interchange of views in the course of which it would be intimated to him that we should expect him to forbear from interference with the territories of chiefs on the Gulf littoral with whom we have treaty or other relations. No reason is apparent to us why we should run any risk of offending Turkish susceptibilities or arousing their suspicions if this were done with the full knowledge of the Turkish Government to whom a clear explanation of our intentions could be given.

The Trucial Chiefs might be seriously warned not to take any provocative action against the Amir; and also be informed that our relations with the Amir are such that they have no grounds for their fears of aggression on his part; we suggest this instead of any assurance of immunity from him which is only likely to encourage them to assume a truculent attitude towards him.

A telegram from Cox which has just been received advocating a policy on similar lines is being repeated to you".

Ends.

The telegram to which reference is made in the last sentence is your semi-official dated 7th of August. The Secretary of State wires as follows in reply.

Begins.



10/4
110v

threatened without further delay with forcible occupation
it is not our attempt to interfere in the affairs of Al
Qatar, while we should be compelled to undertake military
operations, a communication which it is very desirable to
avoid, if we were to ignore our threat. Unless some un-
usual and amicable agreement can be arrived at with the
Emir who has up to the present displayed a friendly spirit
towards us, it is probable that we shall have to take
up an attitude of permanent hostility which cannot but
react on the chiefs of the Gulf Coast in an unfavourable
manner. Under these circumstances we strongly advocate
not any definite treaty with Bin Saud, but a friendly in-
terchange of views in the course of which it would be in-
dicated to him that we should expect him to forebear from
interference with the territories of chiefs on the Gulf
coast with whom we have treaty or other relations. No
reason is apparent to us why we should run any risk of
offending British responsibilities or arousing their sus-
picion if this were done with the full knowledge of the
Turkish Government to whom a clear explanation of our in-
tentions could be given.

The British Chiefs might be seriously worried not to
take any provocative action against the Emir and also
be informed that our relations with the Emir are such that
they have no grounds for their fears of aggression on his
part; we suggest this instead of any assurance of immunity
from him which is only likely to encourage him to assume
a belligerent attitude towards him.

A telegram from the Emir has just been received ad-
vocating a policy on either line is being repeated to

Yours,
Sds.

The telegram to which reference is made in the last
sentence is your semi-official dated 7th of August. The
necessity of stating as follows in reply.

Yours,
Sds.



page III
↑
Begins.


111 109
112

"With reference to your telegram dated August 10th on the subject of Bin Saud. The considerations which you urge have impressed His Majesty's Government who approve of your proposed line of action, but should Bin Saud ask for our support against Turkey in return for compliance with our wishes, it must be clearly explained to him that an attitude of strict neutrality will be maintained by His Majesty's Government though they are willing to use their good offices to bring about a reconciliation between him and the Turkish Government. Hakki has been informed verbally of our intentions and has received them well. When the terms of your communication to Bin Saud are known the Porte will be addressed in writing. You should bear in mind the last sentence but one of Article XI of the Anglo-Turkish Convention in regard to Al Qatar".

Ends.

You are requested to act in this sense. Please telegraph the terms of your communication to Bin Saud for approval before sending it. The new chief of Al Qatar may be informed that the withdrawal of the Turkish garrison is being arranged, and that their departure will be delayed by any precipitate action he may take.

Foreign.





112 110
113

Telegram - P.

From - Resident, Bushire. (Banjam).

To - Foreign, Simla.


Repeated Bushire.

No. 5010.

Dated 26th received 27th August 1913. (10-1 a.m.).

It would be a great convenience and might affect the form of the communication to Bin Saud, if, before entering into any pourparlers with him, some idea could be obtained as to the lines on which the Ottoman Government would be inclined to entertain the alternative of becoming reconciled with Bin Saud in case our good offices were invoked or welcomed by the latter. Could Hakki Pasha possibly be sounded informally in connection with this ?

Cox.





Telegram - P.

From - Foreign, Simla.


To - Resident, Bushire.

No. 335-S.

Dated & received 28th August 1913. (4-31 p.m.).

With reference to your telegram No. 5010, dated August 22nd. No strong reason seems to exist for postponing the communication to Bin Saud pending the reference which you suggest should be made to Hakki Pasha. Some time may elapse before a reply is received from the Porte. It is requested, therefore, that the draft of the proposed communication may be telegraphed.

Foreign.





Telegram - R.

From - Resident, Bushire.

To - Foreign, Simla.

No. 1503.

Dated 31st August 1913. (12-58 p.m.).

→ Page 114
Your telegram No. 335-S. On return to headquarters I find letter from Bin Saud in reply to mine of 9th July. Very friendly in tone; adumbrates widespread inconvenience which must necessarily result from a state of war and apparently seeks a clearer explanation of our attitude. It offers a convenient opening for contemplated communication, and I would suggest my replying on following lines.

Begins.

"I have duly received your esteemed letter and understand from it that you seek a fuller explanation of the attitude of the British Government in regard to your affairs and interests, more explicit than a mere declaration of neutrality in regard to your differences with the Turkish Government.

"It is somewhat difficult to give such explanations without knowing more precisely on what points it is that you desire fuller knowledge, or in what directions you would expect the British Government to evince its friendly regard. If you desire it and my Government permit, I should be happy to have a meeting with you and a friendly exchange of views in this connection; meanwhile speaking for myself, I am sure that any friendly understanding between ^{you} and my Government of a specific



112
112
Telegram - H.
From - President, Washington.
To - Foreign, Cairo.
No. 1002.
Dated 21st August 1919. (12-22 P.M.).
Your telegram No. 1002-2. On return to headquarters
I find letter from Bin Saud in reply to mine of 21st
July. Very friendly in tone; expresses widespread
inconvenience which must necessarily result from a
state of war and apparently seeks a clearer explana-
tion of our attitude. It offers a convenient opening
for contemplated communication, and I would suggest my
replying on following lines.
Begin.
"I have duly received your courteous letter and
understand from it that you seek a fuller expla-
nation of the attitude of the British Government
in regard to your attitude and interests, more ex-
plicit than a mere declaration of neutrality in
regard to your differences with the Turkish Go-
vernment.
"It is somewhat difficult to give such expla-
nation without knowing more precisely on what
points it is that you desire fuller knowledge,
or in what directions you would expect the British
Government to voice its friendly regard. If you
desire it and my Government permit, I should be
happy to have a meeting with you and a friendly
exchange of views in this connection; meanwhile
speaking for myself, I am sure that my friendly
understanding between you and my Government of a
special



115 113


116

"specific nature, or any endeavour on our part to promote a satisfactory adjustment of the differences between you and the Turkish Government, must be preceded by an undertaking on your part to abstain from all action calculated to disturb the status quo or create unrest among the Arab principalities whose rulers are in relations with the British Government, including the principality of Qatar, the independence of which under the Government of Shaikh Jasin and his successors of the Bin Thani family, has ^{recently} been recognised by the British and Turkish Governments."

Ends.

Government's instructions did not contemplate reference to possible good offices with Turkish Government, but if there is no great objection I think above reference would save time and obviate possible misunderstanding.

Cox.





114 (116)
117

Telegram - R.

From - Resident, Bushire.

To - Foreign, Simla.

No. 1504.

Dated 31st August 1913. (3-15 p.m.).

It may be convenient to Government to have the following information concurrently with my immediately preceding telegram.

As I received your telegram 324-S., at Sea, I called at Al Bida to make to Shaikh Abdullah the intimation authorised therein. He had already read in newspapers report of conclusion of Convention and intention to withdraw Turkish garrison but Turkish gunboat had recently arrived with some months' rations for garrison and Captain assured him that there was no truth whatever in statement regarding their withdrawal. I therefore gave him intimation in writing.

According to his account his position as regards Bin Saud is as follows:-

On Jasim's death Bin Saud wrote to Abdullah asking him to come and see him and saying that if friendship was to be maintained he must get rid of Turkish garrison. Abdullah replied that garrison was quite innocuous and that it would only hostile Turkish Government to expel them but that he undertook neither to allow garrison to be increased nor Turks to use Qatar as a base. As regards visit to Ibn Saud, he made excuse of his father's death for postponing it. He continued that his elder half-brother Khalifah had visited Ibn Saud and professed to have spoken in same sense, but Abdullah could not be absolutely sure of him. In any case, Abdullah said that if Ibn Saud seriously intended to occupy Qatar he doubted if they could keep him out even if he and his brothers were all united.

He



Telegram - E.
From - Resident, Riyadh.
To - Foreign, India.
No. 1804.
Dated 21st August 1913. (2-12 p.m.).

It may be convenient to Government to have the following information concerning the immediately preceding telegram.

As I received your telegram 20-8-13, at 10.15, I called at Al Bida to make to Abdullah the information mentioned therein. He had already read in newspapers reports of nomination of Government and intention to withdraw Turkish garrison and Turkish troops had recently arrived with some months' notice for garrison and had been assured him that there was no truth whatever in statement regarding their withdrawal. I therefore gave him information in writing.

According to his account his position as regards his land is as follows:-

On Idris's death his land went to Abdullah asking him to come and see him and saying that if friendship was to be maintained he must get rid of Turkish garrison. Abdullah replied that garrison was quite innocuous and that it would only hasten Turkish Government to occupy them but that he understood neither to allow garrison to be increased nor to use Gata as a base. As regards visit to Ibn Saud, he made excuse of his father's death for postponing it. He continued that his elder half-brother Khalid had visited Ibn Saud and professed to have spoken in some sense, but Abdullah could not be absolutely sure of him. In any case, Abdullah said that if Ibn Saud seriously intended to occupy Gata he doubted if they could keep him out even if he and his brothers were all united.



(117) 115
118

He thought a warning from us might perhaps keep him away from Al Bidaa but would not prevent him from engineering Bedouin raids into Qatar.

(CONFIDENTIAL).

In connection with the conversation to which reference was made in my letter No. 775, dated March 2nd in the last part of the third paragraph, he said that recognition of independence which was now accorded to him was appreciated, and that, if he were allowed facilities for the supply of his own legitimate needs, he would in any case co-operate with us over the traffic in arms, but apart from that he hoped that alterations in the present state of affairs would not be pressed on him in a hurry. The truth of the matter is that he is not quite sure where he stands with regard to the Turks, Bin Saud, and ourselves.

In regard to my letter No. 1983, dated June 22nd, I would only reiterate that we must proceed slowly and with due caution; I do not wish to suggest any modifications in my recommendations.

Cox.



He thought a warning from us might perhaps keep him
away from Al Bida but would not prevent him from engineer-
ing Bedouin raids into Qatar.

(CONFIDENTIAL).

In connection with the conversation to which refer-
ence was made in my letter No. 775, dated March 2nd in
the last part of the third paragraph, he said that re-
cognition of independence which was now accorded to him
was appreciated, and that if he were allowed facilities
for the supply of his own legitimate needs, he would in
any case co-operate with us over the traffic in arms, but
apart from that he hoped that alterations in the present
state of affairs would not be pressed on him in a hurry.
The truth of the matter is that he is not quite sure
where he stands with regard to the Turks, Bin Saud, and
ourselves.

In regard to my letter No. 1065, dated June 22nd,
I would only reiterate that we must proceed slowly and
with due caution; I do not wish to suggest any modifica-
tions in my recommendations.

Box.



Telegram - R.

From - Foreign, Simla.

To - Resident, Bushire.

No. S-365.

Dated 5th received 8th September 1913. (6-30 a.m.).

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118 119
→ page 115
Your telegram 1503, August 31st. Communication to Bin Saud approved, subject to following amendments. We should not on our own initiative raise question of our ~~mediating~~ between Bin Saud and Turkey. In first paragraph of your proposed reply omit the words "more explicit than a mere declaration of neutrality in regard to your differences with the Turkish Government".

For last paragraph substitute following.
Begins.

"If you desire it I should be happy to have a meeting with you and a friendly interchange of views in the connection.

"Meanwhile I have my Government's authority to assure you that provided you undertake on your part to abstain from all action calculated to disturb the status quo or to create unrest among the Arab principalities whose Rulers are in relations with the British Government including the principality of Qatar independence of which under the government of late Shaikh Jasim and his successors of the Bin Thani ^{family} has been recently recognised by the British and Turkish Governments, the British Government will continue to maintain friendly relations which have been sustained in past.

Ends.

Foreign.



Telegram - R.
From - Foreign, India.
To - Resident, Baghdad.
No. 2-222.
Dated 22nd received 23rd September 1912. (2-22 a.m.).
Your telegram 1802, August 21st, communication to
Bin Saud approved, subject to following amendments. We
should not on our own initiative raise question of our
relations between Bin Saud and Turkey. In first paragraph
of your proposed reply omit the words "more explicit than
a mere declaration of neutrality in regard to your differ-
ences with the Turkish Government".
For last paragraph substitute following.
Baghdad.
"If you desire it I should be happy to have a meet-
ing with you and a friendly interchange of views in
the connection.
"Meanwhile I have my Government's authority to
assure you that provided you undertake on your part
to abstain from all action calculated to disturb the
status quo or to create unrest among the Arab prin-
cipalities whose interests are in relations with the
British Government including the principality of Qatar
independence of which under the Government of late
Sheikh Jasim and his successors of the Bin Saud family
has been recently recognised by the British and Turkish
Governments, the British Government will continue to
maintain friendly relations which have been sustained
in past.
India.
Foreign.



C O P Y.

(1A) //7

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No. 338 of 1913.

British Residency and Consulate-General.

Bushire, 11th September 1913.

To

Al Amir Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman bin Faisal as Saud

A. C.

no copy
↑

I have duly received your honoured letter dated 4th Ramazan and understood from it that you seek a fuller explanation of the attitude of the British Government in regard to your affairs and interests.


It is somewhat difficult to give such explanations without knowing more precisely on what points it is that you desire fuller knowledge, or in what directions you would expect the British Government to evince its friendly regard. If you desire it I should be happy to have a meeting with you and a friendly interchange of views in this connection.

Meanwhile I have my Government's authority to assure you that provided you undertake on your part to abstain from all action calculated to disturb the status quo or to create unrest, among the Arab principalities whose rulers are in relation with the British Government, including the principality of Qatar, the independence of which under the Government of the late Shaikh Jasim and his successors of the Bin Thani family, has been recently recognised by the British and Turkish Governments, the British Government will continue to maintain the friendly relations which have been sustained in the past.

(sd). P.Z.Cox, Lieut-Colonel

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Arabic translation follows.
Bm attached





٣٣٨


118 (120)


121

نقل كتاب الصادر الى السيد عبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن بن فيصل المودخي ولا سمن ١٩١٣

بعد اهداء جليل السلام ومزيد التحية والاحترام ومقتصد من صحة ذاتكم لا بجرتم بحالكم
ونتم انه بابرک وقت وصلنا كتابكم المودخي مع رمضان واسرنا حال سلامتكم وقد اتفق
لدينا من ضمنه بان مقصود جنابكم الكتاب المتوضيحات الكاملة من ملك الدولة الهية
الانكليز في خصوص امور ومصالحكم فلا يخفى انه يوجد بعض اشكالات من اخطاء هكذا
توضيحات بدون ان نفهم صراحتا جنابكم في اي النكاهة تطالبون ايضا حاشا لكم اوبائي
فيجئ تنويعون اظهار مراحم وروابط الصداقة من الدولة الهية الانكليز فاذا جنابكم
تحتون الملاحظات اتنا نصير سرورين في المواجهة وتبادل الزكاد بطريق الصداقة مع
جنابكم في هذا الشأن فتمنا اننا ما دونين من دولة متبوعيتنا ان نضمن جنابكم
مشروط الذي جنابكم تعهدون بالتجنب من اي اقدام الذي يظن انه يفتج منه الخلل
في حالة الامور الحالية او انه يكون باعث الفتش في ما بين ممالك العرب الذي
حكاهم لهم ارتباط مع الدولة الهية الانكليز بانضمام مملكة قطر الذي بهذا
القرب تقر استقلالها تحت حكومة المهوم شيخ قاسم واخلافه من آل بن ثاني
من جانب الدولتين العليتين الانكليز والعثماني فالدولة الهية لا يزال قائمة
على روابط الصداقة القائمة في الماضي هذا ما نرى ببيان جنابكم ولا نتم بحسين
حرره في حوال ١٣٣١ موافق ١٢٨١ شهر سبتمبر ١٣٣١

Translation below





No. 2795 (Confidential), dated Bushire, the 14th (received the 22nd) September 1913.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR PERCY COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Simla.

With reference to the correspondence ending with Foreign Department telegram No. 365-S., dated the 6th September 1913, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a translation of the letter which I have addressed to Abdul Aziz bin Saud.

Enclosure.

No. 338, dated Bushire, the 11th September 1913.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR PERCY COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—AL AMIR ABDUL AZIZ BIN ABDUR RAHMAN BIN FAISAL AS SAUD.


After compliments.

I have duly received your honoured letter dated 4th Ramazan and understand from it that you seek a fuller explanation of the attitude of the British Government in regard to your affairs and interests.

It is somewhat difficult to give such explanations without knowing more precisely on what points it is that you desire fuller knowledge, or in what directions you would expect the British Government to evince its friendly regard. If you desire it I should be happy to have a meeting with you and a friendly interchange of views in this connection.

Meanwhile I have my Government's authority to assure you that provided you undertake on your part to abstain from all action calculated to disturb the status quo, or to create unrest, among the Arab principalities whose rulers are in relation with the British Government, including the principality of Qatar, the independence of which under the Government of the late Shaikh Jasim and his successors of the Bin Thani family has been recently recognised by the British and Turkish Governments, the British Government will continue to maintain the friendly relations which have been sustained in the past.

G. M. Press, Simla.—No. C-413 F. D.—11-10-13.—7.—E. A.





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 2975 of 1913.

British Residency and Consulate-General,

Bushire, 30² September 1913.

A copy of the undermentioned letter is forwarded,
with compliments, to the Political Agent, Kuwait, for
information, in continuation of this office endorsement,
No. 2817 dated 17th September 1913.

By order.

P. Shoch
Lieutenant,
Assistant Resident.

Enclosure to Foreign Department endorsement No. 2167-
S.A. dated 18th September 1913.





India Office, (123) 121
Whitehall, 124
London, S.W.,

13th August 1913.

P.3234.


Immediate.

Sir,

With reference to the last paragraph of my letter of the 2nd instant I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of further telegrams that have been received from the Government of India regarding the situation created in the Persian Gulf by the appearance of Bin Saud upon the coast.

The communication to Bin Saud suggested in my letter above mentioned was prompted by a desire to give effect to what the Marquess of Crewe conceived to be the policy of Sir E. Grey. That it might have the effect indicated by the Government of India was obvious, and that His Lordship has all along realised that it is impossible in practice to ignore Bin Saud may be seen from my letter of 4th June, while his preference for friendly relations with the Amir was shown in the draft telegram enclosed in my letter of 2nd July. The case is now so cogently put by Sir P. Cox and the Government of India that he ventures to invite some further consideration of the position in the light of their remarks, with which he entirely concurs.

His Majesty's Government are now under a treaty obligation to Turkey to maintain the rule of the successors of Shaikh Jasim in Al Qatar, and Lord Crewe would suggest that this fact might be made the occasion for a friendly communication to the Turkish Government through Hakkî Pasha. It might be pointed out to His Highness that, owing to the death of Shaikh Jasim and subsequent events, His Majesty's Government, in order to carry





(124) 122
125
carry out that obligation, must make Bin Saud either
their friend or their enemy; that they cannot afford
(for the reasons given by the Government of India) to
make him their enemy; and that they ~~therefore~~ therefore
propose to enter into a friendly exchange of views with
him in order to regularise the position.

It must of course be realised that Bin Saud, in
return for a friendly attitude towards us, may ask for
our support against Turkey. It will be necessary then
to make it clear to him that His Majesty's Government,
while willing to use their good offices to bring about
a reconciliation, cannot undertake to support him, but
must maintain the strictest neutrality.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

Sd/- T. W. Holderness.

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.



152 (190)
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their friend or their enemy; that they cannot afford
(For the reasons given by the Government of India) to
make him their enemy; and that they therefore
propose to enter into a friendly exchange of views with
him in order to regularise the position.
It must of course be realised that Bin Saud, in
return for a friendly attitude towards us, may ask for
our support against Turkey. It will be necessary then
to make it clear to him that his Majesty's Government,
while willing to use their good offices to bring about
a reconciliation, cannot undertake to support him, but
must maintain the strictest neutrality.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

Edw. T. W. Holderness.

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.



123 (125) 126
COPY translation of a letter dated the 25th Shawal 1331
(27th September 1913) from Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman al
Faisal, to Lieut-Col Sir P. A. Cox, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Pol-
-itical Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.


After compliments and enquiry after your health.

124
If you enquire after us, we are keeping well, thanks be
to God, and observing the requirements of concord and frie-
-ndship. In the most fortunate time we had the pleasure
to receive your esteemed letter dated the 9th Shawal (11th
September 1913). We were pleased at the news of your wel-
-fare and what you had written was duly understood. The
receipt of your esteemed letter coincided with our depart-
-ure to the capital of our country, Ar Riyagh, (and this
fact is due) to the difficulty of communication between
us. It is hoped that we will proceed towards Al Hassa aft-
-er one and a half months.

As regards Your Honour's remark that you would be gla
to have a meeting with us if we desired it; your friend
will be still more glad to have such a meeting.

In view of what we have stated above, and of the hope
of a meeting, we have postponed our answer in regard to
o ther matters which will, God willing, be discussed be-
-tween us verbally. Meanwhile we will remain observant of
what will promote friendliness and concord between and the
exalted and imperial government, keeping clear from any-
-thing that may be contrary to their august views. As a
matter of course, we will, on arriving at the said place,
communicate with your Honour in the hope of a meeting.

This is what was necessary to be stated to your Honour
and may you continue to remain preserved.





Telegram P.
from Resident, Bushire.

To Foreign Simla.

No 1791.


Dated 23rd October 1913 (8.45 pm)

My letter No 2795 dated 14th September.

On return I find reply from Bin Saud dated 27th September. He says he will be returning south the second week of November and desires meeting. He continues that as we are going to meet he will defer discussion of details till then and will meanwhile abstain from all action likely to be opposed to views of British Government.

In view of this assurance perhaps Government will consider expediency (with reference to concluding sentence of Foreign Department Telegram No 342-S of 24th August) of pressing Porte to remove Turkish garrison from Qatar. As will be seen from my telegram No 1504 the bona fides of Basrah authorities in this connection cannot be relied upon and if men are still there when meeting with Bin Saud takes place, both he and Shaikh of Qatar will find it difficult to take seriously the intimation I made to the latter in this connection.

COX.





Copy. From Pol: Resdlt-
To Abdul Aziz bin Saud


27th Oct 1913
26th Oct 1384
125 (252)

فأمر
من كثر من ربي كاكس باليوز وفضل جنرال الدولة البرية الانكليزية في جميع
الجناب الاجل الامير الاخير محمد بن عبد العزيز بن الامام عبد الرحمن بن سعود الفيصل
رام بنه
عقب سوانا عن عزيز خاطركم لارتم انجبر هوان به الموده اخذة كتابكم المورخ
شوال ١٣٤١ وصل منكم في القعدة في رجوعنا الى بونهم من مكة كنت مجبور
بالوصول الى مكة من جهة مرض و وفاة حارة السيد فيصل بن تركي من مرض
الاستفاة رحمة الله عليه

جنابكم كتبتم بان تجبونه الملاقاة معنا وتحتن توقيف المحاور مع بيتنا
اليوم الملاقاة ثم كتبتم جنابكم تتوجهون من الرياض بعد عياد الحج محكم منتظر
الملاقات بكمال السرور والموجبه لتحرير هذه الكتاب يعني اذا يمكن جنابكم
تفضلون بالخروج من الرياض اسرر ما يكون بعد العياد وان الملاقات لتضيق
في الصغير من ناليج اوقبل بيوم او عقب بيوم اذا اطلب من جنابكم عدم
التأخير يكون شمس لي بذلك سبب هذه غزوة على المير الى المدن
الكم شهر متوجه من ابوشهر في اوائل محرم وفي نظري احسن اذا الملاقات
تصير بيننا قبل ميري ثانيا رفيقنا قطان شكير بد نكل اجنت
الدولة البرية القيصريه الانكليزية في الكويت التي انشأ الله يتوجه معي وهو
ايضا يبي يسافر الى لندن بعد شهرين الاصل بان جنابكم تستفقون على هذا
الترتيب المذكر عزمي بصير وصولي الى البحرين في ١٨ ناليج الكون منتظر جناب
وصول جنابكم الصغير انشاء الله تفقدون لنا رجال الى البحرين انجبر في عن
جنابكم هذه انالزم بيان مع سلامي على العزيز له بكم ودمتم ساليين محرومين
(٢٦ من القعدة ١٣٤١ مطابق ٢٧ أكتوبر ١٩١٣)

(sd) P.2. Cox

Despatched
by Matti on
29 Nov 1913
WJ





126 (128)

129

TRANSLATION of a letter dated the 27th October 1913
(26th Zu-al-Kada 1351) from Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Percy
Cox, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to Abdul Aziz
bin Abdul Rahman al Faisal Bin Saud, Amir of Nejd.

After compliments,

we received with the hand of friend-
-ship your letter dated the 25th Shawal 1351 (27th September
1913) on the 20th Zu-al-Kada (21st October 1913) on my
return to Bushire from Maskat. I was compelled to go to
Maskat owing to the illness and death of His Highness Sayid
Faisal bin Turki. (he died) from the disease of dropsy,
may God have mercy upon him.

Your Excellency wrote that you were desirous of a meet-
-ing with me and that you considered it better to leave dis-
-cussion between us until the day of meeting: then your ex-
-cellency wrote that you would set out from Riyadh after the
Id-al-Haj; your friend (i.e. the Resident) awaits the meetin
with every happiness and the ~~reason~~ reason for writing this
letter (is) that if it is possible for Your Excellency to be
so good as to make your departure from Riyadh as soon as pos-
-sible after the Id and if the meeting can take place at
Ojair about the 20th Zu-al-Haj (18th November). If I hav
asked from Your Excellency to make no delay perhaps you
will excuse me for the reason is this —I have decided to
go to London for some months (and) start from Bushire on the
1st Moharram and in my opinion it will be better if our meet-
-ing took place before my departure and secondly our friend
Captain Shakespeare, British Political Agent at Kuwait who
Inshallah will set out with me and he also desires to jour-
-ney to London after two months. It is the hope that Your
Excellency will agree to the arrangement above-described.


View on the Qatar Digital Library: http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100036623256.0x000038



(129) 127
130

MY intention is that my arrival shall take place in Bah-
-rain on the 18th Zu-al-Haj (17th November) and I will
await news of your arrival at Ofair . Inshallah you will
send forward to us a man to Bahrain to inform us of Your
Excellency . This is what was necessary to state and with
Salams and may you be preserved.

Dated 26th Zu-al-Kada 1331 (27th October 1913).






From Sheikh Nukrah. (130) 128 131

اسعدنا ارفائلكم بالمرأة
اسم المغرب وصلنا خادمتنا فارس المري من بين
وعد مكاتيب ذاكر توجه الى القصيم فلو اننا نحن
حالا مشينا خادمتنا المذكورة الى المؤمن اليه ينخره
بمقصم وبيننا حسب الوعد عنه لا يتعطل
ودعتم محروسين

May
2/13





CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT—(For Approval).

Agency ~~Political Research~~ ^{K. M. M. K. M. M.}

No. ^{D/10}

Dated 4th Nov 1913.

129 (B)

132


To Pol Resdt-
Busheir.

Dear Sir Percy.

I think I told you that my messenger
with your letter for Bin Saud started on
the 29th Oct.

Since then,
on the 2nd Nov a man (one of Mubarak's
regular postmen) came in from Riyadh
which he had left 10 days before ^(i.e. about the 23rd)
~~carried~~ ^{with letters} ~~from~~ Bin Saud to Mubarak.
From ~~there~~ it appeared that Bin Saud
was contemplating a trip into Kasim.

He may or may not have started before
my man reaches Riyadh ^{on 6th or 7th Nov} but if he has
my man will catch him up in a day or
two after, so I don't think we need worry
that ~~Bin Saud~~ ^{Bin Saud} won't turn up at Ojair as arranged.
To make sure Mubarak (on his own) immediately
despatched an express rider direct to Kasim
to catch Bin Saud & send him back by
Riyadh to Ojair.






(Continuation of Note, Précis or Draft.)

as we gave him the 20th Zu-al-haj al-
Qair & ~~wait~~ can't get there ourselves
until the 22nd at earliest, I shall come
along in the mail of the 19th as arranged
unless I hear otherwise from you before.

Yours sincerely -

A. A. F. S.

S 18—5,000—5-12





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 3639, dated Bushire, the 30th November (received 8th December) 1913.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR PERCY COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Delhi.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the letter marginally cited which has been received from the Political Agent at Kuwait, reporting an overture from the Wali of Basrah to the Shaikh.

It would appear to be an intrigue connected with the negotiations with Bin Saud which Hakki Pasha recently stated to be in progress.

No. C-23, dated Kuwait, the 10th November 1913.

From—CAPTAIN W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR, I.A., Political Agent, Kuwait,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have the honour to report herewith the substance of a conversation which recently took place between Shaikh Sir Mubarak-as-Subah and myself, as it may be of interest in view of the Anglo-Turkish Convention so lately concluded and of the Porte's declarations therein recorded. The Shaikh may perhaps have exaggerated what actually passed, '*pour se faire valoir*', but I see no reason to doubt that the story has a foundation of fact.

2. Some ten days ago the Shaikh's agent in Basrah, Abdul Aziz bin Salim bin Badr, was summoned by the Acting Wali and after much eulogy of Shaikh Mubarak together with adjurations to secrecy, he was requested to inform the Shaikh that the Grand Vizier and the Minister for the Interior desired to discuss some secret matters personally with the Shaikh over the telegraph wire and that if the Shaikh could see his way to fix a day and time when he would be present in either one of the Turkish telegraph offices at Fao or Basrah, the ministers named would converse direct with him from the Porte. Abdul Aziz replied to the Acting Wali that he was sure the Shaikh would be averse to the suggestion unless he could be given some indication beforehand as to the subject of the intended discussion. On this the Acting Wali said the matter was secret but seeing that Abdul Aziz was already in the Shaikh's confidence he supposed he might divulge the outlines of the proposed discussion. The Porte intended to appoint a Wali to Basrah at an early date, and the post might be conferred on the present acting incumbent or another but in any case the Porte particularly desired to obtain the closest co-operation between the Shaikh and the Wali, more especially in matters concerning the desert tribes and Nejd; it was also intended that the Wali should be given orders to consult Shaikh Mubarak in any and every matter likely to cause controversy whether in Basrah itself or in the desert: in short, the Wali would be required to consult the Shaikh of Kuwait in all matters relating to the Basrah Vilayet and the Arabs in Arabia and would be expected to conform to his suggestions. Abdul Aziz is said to have replied that from what he knew of the Shaikh he thought it most improbable that Mubarak would agree to mix himself in matters so far beyond his range, and which might lead to his becoming entangled in serious difficulties with the desert tribes, apart from the tax on his time and resources which an acceptance of the position indicated would entail; he would, however, inform the Shaikh of the conversation. The Acting Wali then closed the interview with more eulogy of the Shaikh's loyalty to and friendly relations with the Porte, pointed out the great honour conferred on the Shaikh by the trust reposed in him and the Sultan's desire to



133(5)

2

obtain his co-operation on so extended a scale and particularly requested that the matter should be kept secret even from the Shaikh's bosom friend, Shaikh Sir Khazal Khan.

3. In relating the story to me Shaikh Mubarak said he had no intention of agreeing for the suggestion seemed obviously a manoeuvre designed to shift to his shoulders the unpleasant burden of controlling the desert tribes, in which the Turks had failed so lamentably, whilst he personally would remain always ready to their hand, should the Turkish authorities require in future an excuse or a scape-goat on which to fasten any further consequences of their own inaptitude. He said he had requested Abdul Aziz bin Salim to convey to the Acting Wali his appreciation of the honour conferred in inviting his co-operation and to say that he regretted he had his time very fully occupied with the administration of his own territories, people and tribes, that he was an old man, and that he could not presume to advise the distinguished officials the Porte might appoint to the charge of the Basra Vilayet, who would naturally be better informed regarding matters in their own province than was possible for the Shaikh, living as he did at a distance.

4. I thanked the Shaikh for his frankness in telling me the story and contented myself with observing that though the scheme theoretically might have advantages for the Porte I could see none in it for the Shaikh of Kuwait, but rather a probability of unending difficulties with the desert tribes, Ibn Rashid and the Amir of Nejd, the almost inevitable result of the equivocal position in which he personally would be placed; that, as he well knew, the prosperity of his port and people depended very largely upon his maintaining good and amicable relations with the chiefs of the interior of Arabia.



CONFIDENTIAL

132 134
11th November 1911.

Dear Sir Percy -

Please excuse type in a hurry, but the Sheikh has just given me a lot of information regarding negotiations between Bin Saud and the Turks. ~~xxxx~~ initiated by the latter and Bin Saud has replied quibbling with them, I imagine to gain time.


I am leaving this afternoon with the State commission in the Spainx and will have an opportunity of giving you the details by this mail. I shall have them all complete for you when I turn up next mail. It is interesting that Mubarak says I need not pretend not having been told by him when we have our interview with Bin Saud, as he won't resent our knowing and might also tell us more.

Very briefly -- the Turks were to recognize Bin Saud in Asma and accept him but want to put troops in all the old places with their men. That Bin Saud can collect the revenues but must pay the Turks a lump sum of £5 000/- per annum. Bin Saud's reply is that he and his people cannot agree to wear Turkish titles, cannot have any troops or Turkish officials inland or on the sea-coast. Bin Saud offers to be responsible for the good government and if left entirely to look after himself without any Turkish interference is willing to pay them an annual sum of £3 000/-

Mubarak thinks there is no doubt that Bin Saud will make all haste to meet you at Ojair and will not be more than a day late or so.

I trust you have no countermanding orders in this mail. !!!

Yours truly
W. H. Murray.





Telegram P.

From Foreign

To Resident

No 502 - 8

Dated 6th and received 7th November 1913 (7 3p)

135

133


135


7/11/13

with reference to your telegram No 1791 dated October 23rd .


If Bin Saud raises the question (of the Qatar garrison) you can inform him that it is expected that the Anglo-Turkish Convention will be ratified by the end of the year ; and the terms of it will be given effect to very shortly afterwards.

FOREIGN .






My dear Shakespeare.
I am rather
sceptical of Bin Saud
keeping the tryst but
intend to go over.
I hope the "Lawrence"
will be here to take
me over. Should you
arrive in time to
come on board do so,
but otherwise go



137
Straight on to Bahrein
we will meet
there.

No more at present

Yours sincerely
P. 2. Cox





CONFIDENTIAL

No C.24 of 1913.

Political Agency,

Kuwait .

18th November 1913.

From,

Captain W.H.L. Shakespeare, I.A.,

Political Agent, KUWAIT .

To,

The political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

BUSHIRE .

Sir,

I have the honour to report for your information that the following rumours are current in connection with the desire of the Turkish authorities to come to terms with Abdal Aziz "Bin Saud"; and, Sheikh Sir Subarak-as-Sabah appears to believe that they are well-founded.


2. It is said that the Porte is prepared to recognize "Bin Saud" as ruler of Nejd and Hassa, to give him a formal appointment to that post, and to allow him to collect the revenue, paying to the Porte a fixed sum per annum for the privilege, but it is understood that two of the primary conditions which they hope to make good as part of the above arrangement are:-


(1) that "Bin Saud" should admit Turkish troops to the coast towns of Uqair, Katif etc as before,

(2) that he should bind himself absolutely to refer all matters of foreign politics to be dealt with by the Porte and to allow no foreign merchants nor agents in his territory as now recognised.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,


W.H.L.
Captain,
Political Agent, Kuwait







بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
 من عبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن الفيصل الى جنابكم
 واهل بيته ايت غنا فقد لنا طائر الكديم والسؤال عن رفاهية المزاج سليم
 طيبين وللملزم المحبنة والصداقة مراعاتي واحولنا جيلان كل فقه الوجه اخذنا بيد المودة كما بكم
 رقيم ٢٧ في نسخة ١٩٢١ موافق ٢٨ أكتوبر ١٩١٤ سننا سلامتكم وبما ذكرتم صار لدي الجي علم
 والمكتوب الذي من مجاميع كوندل سرورين كاكس باليونز وقفل جنرال الدولة البهنية القيصرية
 الانكليزية في ابوشهر وصل واطلعنا على مضمونه وسدنا سلامته لجميع ثم نحن عرفنا
 حفظه باليونز لعدم الاتفاق بوجوب الوعد وترجمينا ه ان يوافقنا بتأخير المرافقة
 ١٠٢١ محرم ١٣٣١ رجاءكم حفظكم ان تساعدونا بذلك لموجب معرفة جنابكم في بعد
 المسافة من القيصم الاحسا وانت محل الودع وبالله ثم فيكم الكفاية وهذا ما لا م بانه
 رسدكم على من لدي غيرة ومننا كل فقه سالك ومردم ١٠ محرم ١٣٣١

From Bin Saud
 To P.A. Kuwait
 10th Zu-al-Haj 1331
 10th Nov. 1913.
 Read at Bahrain.









141 139
141
Translation of a letter dated the 11th Zu-al-Haj 1331

(11th November 1913) from Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman al Faisal to Lieut-Colonel Sir P. A. Cox, K.C.I.B., C.S.I., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

page 129


I received with the hand of friendship your esteemed letter dated 26th Zu-al-Kada (corresponding to 27th October) and was glad to hear of your well-being and understood what you wrote, from beginning to end. With reference to the suggestion in your letter that we should meet at Ojair on 20th Zu-al-Haj and asking me to leave Riyadh as early as possible in view of your intention to proceed to England at an early date your letter reached me in a most propitious hour and the news regarding your coming and our meeting was most welcome. Please God I will derive from it intimacy and gratification. It is indeed ^{un}lucky that at the time of the arrival of your letter I was in Qasim and that your letter only reached me yesterday. In fact I your friend felt very much exercised when he realized that I must inevitably be late for the rendezvous.

I am leaving Qasim for Riyadh forthwith and from thence will proceed to Al Hassa for the meeting, in accordance with your letter and now your friend begs you to pardon him for his inability to do as desired in your letter owing to the great distance to be traversed. Your friend hopes that it will be possible for the meeting to be on the 10th Moharrum and to keep that date will only be possible with exertion and difficulty but trouble in regard to a matter which results in a meeting with you is no trouble.

Now it is on two points that I now wish to write to you; firstly kindly to excuse me for the delay in writing, secondly to beg you to allow the meeting to be on the date which I have suggested.

Then you informed me that our friend Captain Shakespear British Agent at Aweil would come with you and that he also would be leaving for London in the course of a couple of months. It will be the most propitious of hours when we will meet.

This is what had to be explained.





(142) 140
142


TRANSLATION of a letter dated 22nd November 1913 (22nd
Zu-al-Haj 1331) from Lieut-Colonel Sir F. A. Cox, K.C.I.E., C.S.
I., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to Amir Abdul Az-
-iz b: Abdur Rahman bin Faisal alSaud .

After greeting and enquiries after your health. Page 129

I beg to inform you in continuation of my letter dated
26th Zu-al-Qada that, thinking it would not be possible for an
answer to reach me at Bushire before my departure , I came to
Bahrain in the hope that you would be able to come to the Cons
about the time indicated. On my arrival at Bahrain I saw your
messenger Abdur Rahman bin Mahomed and received through his
hands your esteemed letter dated the 11th Zu al-Haj. I have
understood your remarks about it being impossible for you to
arrive before the 10th Mohurram 1332 . I am very sorry that it
will thus not be possible for me personally to have an inter-
view with Your Honour as it is inevitable for me to leave Bu-
-shire by the mail leaving on that date and it is not possible
for me to delay . But it makes no difference. Inshallah an
interview will take place on the date asked for by you, betwee
Your Honour and Major Trevor, British Agent at Bahrain and
Captain Shakespear British Agent Kuwait on my behalf, and the
will be ready at Bahrain about that time , and will await news
from your side from Ojair. Page 141

In conclusion I bid you farewell with regret and trust
that a meeting may take place between us sometime in the fut-
-ure and that your affairs will prosper in the meanwhile.

(Usual ending)





CONFIDENTIAL

No. 3574 of 1913.

British Residency and Consulate-General,

Bushire, 26 November 1913.

141
143

✓✓✓✓✓
28. NOV. 1913
C. 116

Copies of the undermentioned letters are forwarded
with compliments to the Political Agent, Kuwait,
for information, in continuation of this office
endorsement No. 2975 dated 30th September 1913.

page 123

By Order,


P.S. Loch


Lieutenant,

Assistant Resident.

From Foreign Office to India Office No. 39902/13
dated 17th September 1913.

From Foreign Office to India Office No. 39902/13
dated 2nd October 1913.





Foreign Office to India.

39902/13

17th Sept. 1913.

Sir,


I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 29th August transmitting copy of a telegram from the Government of India, dated August 28th respecting Bin Saud and the Turks.

I am to state, for the information of the Secretary of State for India, that on September 15th Mr Parker spoke to Hakki Pasha on the matter referred to in the Viceroy's telegram.

His Highness said that he would refer the question to his Government.

I am etc.,

(Signed) Eyre A. Crowe.





39902/13

Foreign Office,
October 2nd 1913.

Sir,

7 page 144

I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to refer to the letter addressed to you from this department on September 17th respecting Bin Saud and the Turks, and to state, for the information of the Marquess of Crewe, that Mr Parker has now received a communication on this subject from Hakki Pasha.

His Highness expresses the thanks of the Porte for the friendly offer of His Majesty's Government in this connexion. He states that the Porte is actually in negotiation with Bin Saud, and adds that if the necessity arises for recourse of the good offices of His Majesty's Government, the Porte will not fail to avail itself of them.

I am,


Sir,


Your most obedient,


humble servant,

(Signed) Eyre A. Crowe.

The Under Secretary of State,
India Office.









COPY

No M 4006 of 1913.

at sea dated 2nd December 1913.

Under flying seal through Political Agent, Kuwait.

A copy of the undermentioned letter is forwarded to the
Political Agent, Bahrain for information in continuation of
previous correspondence.


By order


(sd) A. T. Wilson, Lieut

Assistant Resident.

From Resident to Foreign No M 4005 dated 2nd Dec 1913.

C.1121-
WMS
3
13





No. 4005-M., dated Bushire, 2nd (received 17th) December 1913.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR PERCY COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department.

In continuation of previous correspondence on the subject, I have the honour to report progress in connection with the proposed meeting with Bin Saud.

2. He having informed me that he would be returning coastwards after the 'Id-ul-Haj (10th November) I wrote to him on the 27th October saying that I intended to be at Bahrain on or about the 18th November and hoped he would make it convenient to meet me at Ojair on or about the 21st, and that I would expect news of his movements on arrival at Bahrain.

The same day that I reached Bahrain however a messenger came in from Bin Saud with a letter saying that my letter had found him in Qasim at too great a distance to admit of the possibility of reaching Ojair by the 21st November, but that he was hurrying in and begged me to meet him on the 10th Muharram at Ojair.

This it is impossible to do without missing the mail by which I have arranged with the permission of Government to proceed on leave, but if this meeting is to take place at all it is urgent that it should be brought off as soon as possible, and I therefore instructed Major Trevor verbally to undertake it in my behalf accompanied by Captain Shakespear.

I beg to attach a copy of my letter in that connection to Bin Saud and of the "sailing directions" which I have handed to Major Trevor, and I trust that higher authority will see nothing in them to which exception can be taken.

3. I also enclose for the information of the Government of India a copy of a report from Captain Shakespear stating according to current rumour, the nature of the terms which the Porte hopes to make with Bin Saud.


It seems to me that the final item, if the report proves well-founded, is one to which we should take exception, if it is contemplated to leave Bin Saud in control of Katif and Ojair, and I therefore venture to recommend that a timely decision be arrived at as to the course we should take for the protection of our interests in case the present report, in regard to this item, is confirmed.

The Government of India will not have forgotten the correspondence which has passed in recent years regarding the representation of our commercial interests at Katif and the continued desire of British Indian traders to settle there. Our right to be represented has been recognized in principle and, apart from the capitulations, there seems no reason we should tolerate and fresh an unfriendly compact between the Porte and Bin Saud, to the continued prejudice of our rights and interests in this connection.

Memorandum setting forth the position as regards Bin Saud for guidance at the time of the contemplated meeting with him.

It is highly important to have in mind to start with a clear understanding the policy of His Majesty's Government towards Turkey resulting from recent developments of the general political situation in Europe and the Middle East; on which policy the attitude of Government towards the question of Bin Saud and his relations with the Turks is based.

The family having been relegated to Central Arabia for the last 40 years odd, the present (Amir?) has lately ejected the Turkish garrisons from the Al Hasa sanjak and coast and descended to the shores of the Persian Gulf where he is in *de facto* control of the ports of Katif, Ojair and other small posts. As long as he continues in that position, practically independent of any control, he



154

2

is a danger to our general interests in the Gulf and to our relations with the Arab Principalities, unless we have a working understanding with him. This is recognised by His Majesty's Government.

Thus the Secretary of State for India addressing the Foreign Office on the subject on 13th August, last wrote " * * they (the Government of India) cannot afford to make him their enemy and they propose to enter into a friendly exchange of views with him in order to regularise the position.

"It must of course be realised that Bin Saud, in return for a friendly attitude towards us, may ask for our support *against the Turks*. It will be necessary then to make it clear to him that His Majesty's Government, while willing to use their good offices to bring about a reconciliation, cannot undertake to support him, but must maintain the strictest neutrality."

A few days later as the result of deliberation between His Majesty's India and Foreign Offices, the following instructions were telegraphed to the Government of India by the Secretary of State (on 21st August) :—

"The Amir must be made clearly to understand, if he asks for our support against Turkey, as a *quid pro quo* for complying with our wishes, that while we are willing to do our best to reconcile him with Turkish Government, we are unable to support him (i.e., against the Turks P. Z. C.) and are bound to keep a strictly neutral attitude".

Later still, this time in connection primarily with the general subject of Railway enterprise within Asiatic Turkey, the Government of India in making comment on certain aspects of the negotiations, telegraphed to the Secretary of State on 8th September, as follows :—


" * * * There can be no doubt from the point of view of Indian interests, that a strong and reformed Turkey in Asia will act as a safeguard to India from interference on the part of Foreign Powers from the west, and might even in an indirect manner result in the maintenance of Persian integrity. Now that His Majesty's Government have come to terms with the Turkish Government, as regards their respective interests in the Persian Gulf, they have nothing to fear from Turks and every advantage to gain from friendly relations with the Porte. * * * The Government of India are therefore strongly of opinion that His Majesty's Government should spare no effort to avoid any measure likely to contribute to the partition of Asiatic Turkey either at the present time or hereafter and that His Majesty's Government should pursue a consistent policy of reforming strengthening and maintaining the Turkish Empire".

The above extracts indicate the policy of Government sufficiently clearly.

As regards Abdul Aziz-bin-Saud and the imminent meeting. It is apparent from the correspondence with him that on his part he is *prima facie* anxious to establish relations with us, but seeks a more definite exposition of our attitude in regard to his relations with the Turks than mere expressions of good-will and the declaration of neutrality. It has been suggested to him that he should explain more fully in what way he would expect us to evince our good-will and in response to this he has replied that he would like to have a meeting with a British representative and discuss the position with him in person.

It seems therefore to rest with Bin Saud to open the discussion by stating frankly in what direction it is that he desires the expression of our good-will or our co-operation.

On our side we have explained to the Porte that now that Bin Saud has come down to the shores of the Gulf and controls certain Gulf Ports, he must be regarded by us as having entered the sphere of Gulf politics and we cannot ignore him but must find a *modus vivendi* with him for the protection of our own interests, while at the same time maintaining a strictly neutral attitude in regard to the estrangement prevailing between Bin Saud and the Porte. It would also appear that we have expressed our willingness to promote a reconciliation if desired to do so.



3

Hakki Pasha to whom the communication was made appeared to be gratified rather than offended by it, and later on, apparently at the beginning of October in thanking His Majesty's Government for their friendly offer, he stated that the Porte was actually in negotiation with Bin Saud and would not fail to avail itself of their help if necessity arose.

It may be taken for granted that the Porte will be anxious to avoid our mediation if possible—meanwhile the meeting between Bin Saud and a British representative will be taking place.

It is probable that in course of discussion Bin Saud, referring to Resident's letter No. 338 of 11th September and to our desire that he should refrain from interfering in the territory or politics of other Arab Principalities on the Coast, and co operate with us for the suppression of piracy and the arms traffic, will revert to his previous suggestion and enquire whether, if he gives us satisfactory undertakings under these heads, we shall be prepared to guarantee him immunity from attack by sea.

Our recent warning to the Porte that they would not be allowed to use Bahrain as a base for attacking Bin Saud, amounts indirectly and practically to a partial substitute for such a guarantee, and if Bin Saud makes a bargain with the Turks by which he is confirmed or left in his present *de facto* position and if we can also reach an understanding with him, with the cognizance of the Porte, providing for ;

- (i) Non-interference in territory or politics of other Arab Principalities in the Gulf including Katar.
- (ii) Co-operation for preservation of Maritime Truce and suppression of piracy.
- (iii) Co-operation for suppression of the illicit arms traffic.
- (iv) Admission of British Indian traders to Katif as of old, and acceptance if necessary of a Residency Agent to look after them,

it is possible that His Majesty's Government might see their way, especially in view of the fact that Bin Saud's co-operation in suppression of arms traffic prevents his arming himself, and of the practical impossibility of the Turks putting troops into Katif without using Bahrain, to obtain an undertaking from them not to take hostile action by sea against the coast left in Bin Saud's control without a previous exchange of views with us, the result of which would probably be that we should be able to compose the quarrel.

Lastly, it is possible that the question of Katar and the status of Bin Thani may come up in course of the discussion. In this connection I think it will be well if the text of a portion of the article of the Anglo-Turkish Convention relating to Katar is translated to Bin Saud :—

"The Imperial Ottoman Government having renounced all claims concerning the Peninsula of El Katar, it is agreed between the two Governments that the said Peninsula shall, as in the past be governed by Shaikh Jasim bin Thani and his successors. His Britannic Majesty's Government declares that it will not permit the Shaikh of Bahrain to interfere in the internal affairs of El Katar nor to encroach upon the autonomy of the country nor to annex it".

It might be added that as the result of this agreement the present Turkish garrison will be withdrawn in due course.

Dated 22nd November 1913 (=22nd Zilhijjah 1331).

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR PERCY COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—AMIR ABDUL AZIZ BIN ABDUR RAHMAN BIN FAISAL AL-SAUD.

After greeting and enquiries after your health.

I beg to inform you in continuation of my letter dated 26th Zilqadeh that, thinking that it would not be possible for an answer for you to reach me at



155
4

Bushire before my departure, I came to Bahrain in the hope that you would be able to come to the coast about the time indicated. On my arrival at Bahrain I saw your messenger Abdur Rahman Bin Muhammad and received through his hands your esteemed letter dated 11th Zilhijjah. I have understood your remarks about it being impossible for you to arrive before 10th Muharram 1332. I am very sorry that it will thus not be possible for me personally to have an interview with Your Honour as it is inevitable for me to leave Bushire by the mail leaving on that date and it is not possible for me to delay. But it makes no difference. *Inshallah* an interview will take place on the date asked for by you, between Your Honour and Major Trevor, British Agent at Bahrain and Captain Shakespear, British Agent at Kuwait on my behalf, and they will be ready at Bahrain about that time, and will await news from your side from Ojair.

In conclusion, I bid you farewell with regret and trust that a meeting may take place between us sometime in future, and that your affairs will prosper in the meanwhile.

(Usual ending).

No. C.-24, dated 18th November 1913.

From—CAPTAIN W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR, Political Agent, Kuwait,

To—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR PERCY COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.


I have the honour to report for your information that the following rumours are current in connection with the desire of the Turkish authorities to come to terms with Abdul Aziz "Bin Saud"; and, Shaikh Sir Mubarak-as-Sabah appears to believe that they are well founded.


2. It is said that the Porte is prepared to recognise "Bin Saud" as ruler of Nejd and Hassa, to give him a formal appointment to that post, and to allow him to collect the revenue, paying to the Porte a fixed sum per annum for the privilege, but it is understood that two of the primary conditions which they hope to make good as part of the above arrangement are:—

- (1) that "Bin Saud" should admit Turkish troops to the coast towns of Ojair, Katif as before;
- (2) that he should bind himself absolutely to refer all matters of foreign politics to be dealt with by the Porte and to allow no foreign merchants nor agents in his territory as now recognised.

CI:5FT-44-22-12-13-GCRP Sims

1332 for meeting for the P.H. Baldwin 78c.





Confidential

No. 3670 of 1913.
British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 2^d December 1913.

150
(151) 157

W. 70-25
23. DEC. 1913



C. 125

A copy of the undermentioned communication is forwarded with compliments to the Political Agent, Kuwait, for information.

By Order,

P. S. Loch
Lieutenant,
Assistant Resident.

Resident to Political Agent, Bahrain, No. 3669 dated 2nd
December 1913.






151
152 158

Copy of a letter No. 3669 dated 2nd December 1913
from Lieut-Colonel Sir P.Z.Cox, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire, to
Major A.P.Trevor, C.I.E., Political Agent, Bahrain.

I have the honour to inform you, in confirmation of
my verbal instructions given you personally, that I wish
you to proceed to Qajar as soon as Bin Saud arrives, to
interview him in my place, as I am unable to keep the tryst.

I enclose a memorandum giving my view of the position which
must be your guide in discussing matters with him.
The fundamental point is to bear in mind that we can make
no arrangement with him which would not stand disclosure to
the Turks.

I have instructed Captain Shakespear to join you by the
mail leaving Kuwait on 4th or by other means, as you will
doubtless find his friendly personal relations with Bin
Saud and his assistance helpful.






(153) 152
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List of enclosures.

- (1). Memorandum setting forth the position as regards Bin Saud for guidance at the time of the contemplated meeting with him.
 - (2). Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman al Faisal, to Resident, dated 27th September 1913.
 - (3). Resident to Foreign. Telegram No. 1791 dated 23rd October 1913.
 - (4). Resident to Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman al Faisal Bin Saud, dated 27th October 1913.
 - (5). Foreign to Resident. Telegram No. 502-S dated 6th November 1913.
 - (6). Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman al Faisal to Resident, dated 11th November 1913.
 - (7). Resident to Amir Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman bin Faisal al-Saud.
 - (8). Political Agent, Kuwait to Resident, No. C.24 dated 18th November 1913.
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MEMORANDUM

setting forth the position as regards Bin Saud for
guidance at the time of the
contemplated meeting
with him


It is highly important to have in mind to start with a clear understanding the policy of His Majesty's Government towards Turkey, resulting from recent developments of the general political situation in Europe and the Middle East; on which policy the attitude of Government towards the question of Bin Saud and his relations with the Turks is based.

The family having been relegated to Central Arabia for the last 40 years odd, the present Amir has lately ejected the Turkish garrisons from the Al Hasa sanjak and coast and descended to the shores of the Persian Gulf, where he is in de facto control of the ports of Qatif, Qajir and other small ports. As long as he continues in that position, practically independent of any control, he is a danger to our general interests in the Gulf and to our relations with the Arab Principalities, unless we have a working understanding with him. This is recognised by His Majesty's Government.

Thus the Secretary of State for India addressing the Foreign Office on the subject on 15th August, last, wrote " x x
"they (the Government of India) cannot afford to make him
"their enemy and they propose to enter into a friendly ex-
"change of views with him in order to regularise the posi-
"tion.

"It must of course be realised that Bin Saud, in return for
"a friendly attitude towards us, may ask for our support
"against the Turks. It will be necessary then to make it
"clear to him that His Majesty's Government, while willing
"to use their good offices to bring about a reconciliation,
"cannot undertake to support him, but must maintain the
"strictest neutrality".

A few days later as the result of/ deliberation between
His Majesty's India and Foreign Offices, the following in-
structions



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MEMORANDUM
setting forth the position as regards Bin Saud for
guidance at the time of the
contemplated meeting
with him

It is highly important to have in mind to start with a
clear understanding the policy of His Majesty's Government
towards Turkey, resulting from recent developments of the
general political situation in Europe and the Middle East;
on which policy the attitude of Government towards the ques-
tion of Bin Saud and his relations with the Turks is based.
The family having been relegated to Central Arabia for
the last 40 years odd, the present Amir has lately ejected
the Turkish garrison from the Al Hasa sanjak and coast and
descended to the shores of the Persian Gulf where he is in
de facto control of the ports of Gattil, Qatif and other
small ports. As long as he continues in that position, prac-
tically independent of any control, he is a danger to our
general interests in the Gulf and to our relations with the
Arab principalities, unless we have a working understanding
with him. This is recognised by His Majesty's Government.
Thus the Secretary of State for India addressing the Foreign
Office on the subject on 12th August, last, wrote " x x
"may (the Government of India) cannot afford to make him
"their enemy and they propose to enter into a friendly un-
"change of views with him in order to regularise the posi-
"tion."
"It must of course be realised that Bin Saud, in return for
"a friendly attitude towards us, may ask for our support
"against the Turks. It will be necessary then to make it
"clear to him that His Majesty's Government, while willing
"to use their good offices to bring about a reconciliation,
"cannot undertake to support him, but must maintain the
"strictest neutrality."
A few days later as the result of deliberation between
His Majesty's India and Foreign Offices, the following in-



154 161
(155)
instructions were telegraphed to the Government of India by the Secretary of State (on 21st August).:-

"The Amir must be made clearly to understand, if he asks for our support against Turkey, as a quid pro quo for complying with our wishes, that while we are willing to do our best to reconcile him with Turkish Government, we are unable to support him (i.e. against the Turks P.Z.C.) and are bound to keep strictly neutral attitude".

Later still, this time in connection primarily with the general subject of Railway enterprise in Asiatic Turkey, the Government of India in making comment on certain aspects of the negotiations, telegraphed to the Secretary of State on 8th September, as follows:-

" x x x There can be no doubt from the point of view of Indian interests, that a strong and reformed Turkey in Asia will act as a safeguard to India from interference on the part of Foreign Powers from the west, and might even in an indirect manner result in the maintenance of Persian integrity. Now that His Majesty's Government have come to terms with the Turkish Government, as regards their respective interests in the Persian Gulf, they have nothing to fear from Turks and every advantage to gain from friendly relations with the Porte. x x x The Government of India are therefore strongly of opinion that His Majesty's Government should spare no effort to avoid any measure likely to contribute to the partition of Asiatic Turkey either at the present time or hereafter and that His Majesty's Government should pursue a consistent policy of reforming strengthening and maintaining the Turkish Empire".

The above extracts indicate the policy of Government sufficiently clearly.

As regards Abdul Aziz bin Saud and the imminent meeting. It is apparent from the correspondence with him that on his part he is prima facie anxious to establish relations with us, but seeks a more definite exposition of our attitude in regard to his relations with the Turks than mere expressions of goodwill and the declaration of neutrality. It has been suggested



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Instructions were telegraphed to the Government of India by
the Secretary of State (on 21st August).-
"The Amir must be made clearly to understand, if he asks for
"our support against Turkey, as a quid pro quo for complying
"with our wishes, that while we are willing to do our best
"to reconcile him with Turkish Government, we are unable to
"support him (i.e. against the Turks P.E.O.) and are bound to
"keep a strictly neutral attitude".
Later still, this time in connection primarily with the
General subject of Railway enterprises in Asia Minor,
the Government of India in making comment on certain aspects
of the negotiations, telegraphed to the Secretary of State
State on 28th September, as follows:-
" x x x There can be no doubt from the point of view
"of Indian interests, that a strong and reformed Turkey in
"Asia will act as a safeguard to India from interference on
"the part of foreign Powers from the west, and might even in
"an indirect manner result in the maintenance of Persian in-
"tegrity. Now that His Majesty's Government have come to terms
"with the Turkish Government, as regards their respective in-
"terests in the Persian Gulf, they have nothing to fear from
"Turks and every advantage to gain from friendly relations with
"the Porte. x x x The Government of India are
"therefore strongly of opinion that His Majesty's Government
"should spare no effort to avoid any measure likely to con-
"tribute to the partition of Asiatic Turkey either at the
"present time or hereafter and that His Majesty's Government
"should pursue a consistent policy of reforming strengthening
"and maintaining the Turkish Empire".
The above extracts indicate the policy of Government suffi-
ciently clearly.
As regards Abdul Aziz bin Saud and the imminent meeting, it
is apparent from the correspondence with him that on his part
he is quite anxious to establish relations with us, but
needs a more definite exposition of our attitude in regard to
his relations with the Turks than his expressions of good-
will and the declaration of neutrality. It has been suggested



156 155 162
suggested to him that he should explain more fully in what way he would expect us to evince our good-will and in response to this he has replied that he would like to have a meeting with a British representative and discuss the position with him in person.

It seems therefore to rest with Bin Saud to open the discussion by stating frankly in what ~~the~~ direction it is that he desires the expression of our good-will or our cooperation.

On our side we have explained to the ~~Bzks~~ Porte that now that Bin Saud has come down to the shores of the Gulf and controls certain Gulf Ports, he must be regarded by us as having entered the sphere of Gulf politics and we cannot ignore him but must find a modus vivendi with him for the protection of our own interests, while at the same time maintaining a strictly neutral attitude in regard to the estrangement prevailing between Bin Saud and the Porte. It would also appear that we have expressed our willingness to promote a reconciliation if desired to do so.

Hakki Paasha to whom the communication was made appeared to be gratified rather than offended by it, and later on,

Enclosure to Foreign Department Endorsement { apparently
No. 2827-E.A. dated 13th November 1913. }
----- at the beginning of October, in thanking His Majesty's Government for their friendly offer, he stated that the Porte was actually in negotiation with Bin Saud and would not fail to avail itself of their help if necessity arose.

It may be taken for granted that the Porte will be anxious to avoid our mediation if possible - meanwhile the meeting between Bin Saud and a British representative will be taking place.

It is probable that in course of discussion Bin Saud, referring to Resident's letter No. 338 of 11th September and to our desire that he should refrain from interfering in the territory or politics of other Arab Principalities on the Coast, and ^{should} cooperate with us for the suppression of piracy



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suggested to him that he should explain more fully in what way he would expect us to advise our good-will and in response to this he has replied that he would like to have a meeting with a British representative and discuss the position with him in person.

It seems therefore to rest with Bin Saud to open the discussion by stating frankly in what his direction it is that he desires the expression of our good-will or our cooperation.

On our side we have explained to the Bin Saud that now that Bin Saud has come down to the shores of the Gulf and controls certain Gulf ports, he must be regarded by us as having entered the sphere of Gulf politics and we cannot ignore him but must find a medium whereby with him for the protection of our own interests, while at the same time maintaining a strictly neutral attitude in regard to the arrangement prevailing between Bin Saud and the Porte. It would also appear that we have expressed our willingness to promote a reconciliation if desired to do so.

His Highness to whom the communication was made appeared to be gratified rather than offended by it, and later on, in a letter to the Foreign Department, dated 18th November 1917, at the time of October, in thanking His Majesty's Government for their friendly offer, he stated that the Porte was actually in negotiation with Bin Saud and would not fail to avail itself of their help if necessary arose.

It may be taken for granted that the Porte will be anxious to avoid our mediation if possible - meanwhile the meeting between Bin Saud and a British representative will be taking place.

It is probable that in course of discussion Bin Saud, referring to Resident's letter No. 358 of 11th September and to our desire that he should refrain from interfering in the territory or politics of other Arab Principalities on the Coast, and cooperate with us for the suppression of piracy



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157 163

piracy and the arms traffic, will revert to his previous suggestion and enquire whether, if he gives us satisfactory undertakings under these heads, we shall be prepared to guarantee him immunity from attack by sea.

Our recent warning to the Porte that they would not be allowed to use Bahrain as a base for attacking Bin Saud amounts indirectly and practically to a partial substitute for such a guarantee, and if Bin Saud makes a bargain with the Turks by which he is confirmed or left in his present de facto position and if we can also reach an understanding with him, with the cognizance of the Porte, providing for;

- (i) Non-interference in territory or politics of other Arab Principalities in the Gulf including Qatar.
- (ii) Co-operation for preservation of Maritime Truce and suppression of piracy.
- (iii) Co-operation for suppression of the illicit arms traffic.
- (iv) Admission of British Indian Traders to Qatif as of old, and acceptance if necessary of a Residency Agent to look after them,

it is possible that His Majesty's Government might see their way,--especially in view of the fact that Bin Saud's co-operation in suppression of arms traffic prevents his arming himself, and of the practical impossibility of the Turks putting troops into Qatif without using Bahrain--to obtain an undertaking from them not to take hostile action by sea against the coast left in Bin Saud's control without a previous exchange of views with us, the result of which would probably be that we should be able to compose the quarrel.

Lastly, it is possible that the question of Qatar and the status of Bin Thani may come up in course of the discussion. In this connection I think it will be well if the text of a portion of the article of the Anglo-Turkish Convention relating to Qatar is translated to Bin Saud:-

"The Imperial Ottoman Government having renounced all claims concerning the Peninsula of El Qatar, it is agreed between the



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piracy and the Arab world, will revert to his previous
suggestion and enquire whether, if he gives an unqualified
or unqualified under those heads, we shall be prepared
to guarantee his security from attack by sea.

Our present warning to the Porte that they would not be
allowed to use Bahrain as a base for attacking our hands
seems indirectly and possibly to a partial understanding
for such a guarantee, and if Bin Saud makes a bargain
with the Turks by which he is confirmed or left in his
present de facto position and if we can also reach an
understanding with him, with the cognizance of the Porte,
providing for:

- (i) Non-interference in territory or politics of other
Arab Principalities in the Gulf including Qatar.
- (ii) Co-operation for preservation of Maritime Trade and
suppression of piracy.
- (iii) Co-operation for suppression of the illicit arms
traffic.
- (iv) Abolition of British Indian Trade to Gulf as of
old, and acceptance if necessary of a Neutrality Agreement
to look after them.

It is possible that His Majesty's Government might see
their way, especially in view of the fact that Bin Saud's
co-operation in suppression of arms traffic prevents his
arming himself, and of the practical impossibility of the
Turks putting troops into Gulf without using Bahrain-
to obtain an undertaking from them not to take hostile
action by sea against the coast left in Bin Saud's control
without a previous exchange of views with us, the result of
which would probably be that we should be able to control
the quarter.

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status of Bin Saud may come up in course of the discussion.
In this connection I think it will be well if the text of a
portion of the article of the Anglo-Turkish Convention re-
lating to Qatar is translated to Bin Saud:-

"The Imperial Ottoman Government hereby renounces all claims
concerning the Peninsula of El Qatar, it is agreed between
the



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"the two Governments that the said Peninsula shall, as in
"the past be governed by Shaikh Jasim bin Thani and his
"successors. His Britannic Majesty's Government declares
"that it will not permit the Shaikh of Bahrain to interfere
"in the internal affairs of El Qatar nor to encroach upon
"the autonomy of the country nor to annex it".

It might be added that as the result of this agreement
the present Turkish garrison will be withdrawn in due course.

Lieut-Colonel,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf



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12
"the two Governments that the said Peninsula shall, as in
"the past be governed by Sheikh Ismail bin Thani and his
"successors. His Britannic Majesty's Government declares
"that it will not permit the Sheikh of Bahrain to interfere
"in the internal affairs of El Qatar nor to encroach upon
"the autonomy of the country nor to annex it."

It might be added that as the result of this agreement
the present Turkish garrison will be withdrawn in due course.

Lieut-Colonel,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf



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159 165

Copy of a letter dated 25th Shawwal 1331 (= 27th September 1913) from Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman al Faisal, to Lieut-Colonel Sir P.Z.Cox, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

After compliments and enquiry after your health.

If you enquire after us, we are keeping well, thanks be to God, and observing the requirements of concord and friendship. In the most fortunate time we had the pleasure to receive your esteemed letter dated the 9th Shawwal (11th September 1913). We were pleased at the news of your welfare and what you had stated was duly understood. The receipt of your esteemed letter coincided with our departure to the capital of our country, Ar Riyadh, (and this fact is due) to the difficulty of communication between us. It is hoped that we will proceed towards Al Hassa after one and a half months.

As regards Your Honour's remark that you would be glad to have a meeting with us if we desired it; your friend will be still more glad to have such a meeting.

In view of what we have stated above, and of the hope of a meeting, we have postponed our answer in regard to other matters which will, God willing, be discussed between us verbally. Meanwhile we will remain observant of what will promote friendliness and concord between us and the exalted and imperial Government, keeping clear from anything that may be contrary to their august views. As a matter of course, we will, on arriving at the said place, communicate with Your Honour in the hope of a meeting.

This is what was necessary to be stated to Your Honour and may you continue to remain preserved.



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Telegram E.

From Resident Bushire.

To Foreign Simla.

No. 1791.

Dated 23rd October 1913. (8.45 p.m.)

My letter No. 2795 dated 14th September.

On return I find reply from Bin Saud dated 27th September. He says he will be returning south the second week of November and desires meeting. He continues that as we are going to meet he will defer discussion of details till then and will meanwhile abstain from all action likely to be opposed to views of British Government.

In view of this assurance perhaps Government will consider expediency (with reference to concluding sentence of Foreign Department Telegram No. 342-3 of 24th August) of pressing Porte to remove Turkish garrison from Qatar. As will be seen from my telegram No. 1804 the bona fides of Basrah authorities in this connection cannot be relied upon and if men are still there when meeting with Bin Saud takes place, both he and Shaikh of Qatar will find it difficult to take seriously the intimation I made to the latter in this connection.

Cox.



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Telegram No. 1701.
From Resident Bushire.
To Foreign Office.
No. 1701.
Dated 28th October 1913. (8.45 p.m.)

My letter No. 1700 dated 14th September.
On return I find reply from Bin Saud dated 27th September.
He says he will be returning south the second week of November
and desires meeting. He continues that as we are going to
meet he will defer discussion of details till then and will
naturally abstain from all action likely to be opposed to
views of British Government.
In view of this assurance perhaps Government will consider
expedient (with reference to concluding sentence of Foreign
Department Telegram No. 168-2 of 24th August) of pressing
force to remove Turkish Garrison from Basra. As will be seen
from my telegram No. 1604 the bona fides of Basrah authorities
in this connection cannot be relied upon and if men are
left there when meeting with Bin Saud takes place, both he
and British of Basrah will find it difficult to take seriously
the intimation I made to the latter in this connection.

Gok.



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Translation of a letter dated the 27th October 1913 (26th
Zilqadeh 1331) from Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P.Z. Cox,
A.C.I.B., U.S.I. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to
Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman al Faisal Bin Saud, Amir of Nejd.

After compliments.

I received with the hand of friendship your letter dated
the 25th Shawwal 1331 (27th September 1913) on the 20th Zil-
qadeh (21st October 1913) on return to Bushire from Masqat.
I had been obliged to proceed to Masqat owing to the illness
and death of His Highness Saiyid Faisal bin Turki from the
disease of dropsy. R.I.P.


You wrote that you were desirous of a meeting with me and
that you considered it better to leave discussion between us
until the day of meeting; and you continued that you would
set out from Riyadh after the Id-al-Haj. Your friend looks
forward to the meeting with much pleasure and the reason for
writing this letter is to ask you if possible to make your
departure from Riyadh immediately after the Id and that the
meeting may be at Ojair about the 20th Zilhaj (20th November).
You will pardon my asking you to lose no time but the reason
for my doing so is to proceed to London for some months and
start from Bushire at the beginning of Muharram, and I think
it would be convenient if our meeting took place before my
departure. Secondly our friend Captain Shakespear, British
Agent at Kuwait, who Inshallah will come with me, likewise
desires to proceed to London in two months' time. It is our
hope therefore that You will agree to the arrangement above
described. I shall be at Bahrain on the 18th Zilhaj (18th
November) and will there expect news of your arrival at Ojair.
Inshallah you will kindly send a man on ahead to Bahrain to
inform me of your movements. This is what was necessary to
state and with salaams and may you be preserved.




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Translation of a letter dated the 27th October 1912 (1332)
Kawak-Kilidash 1331 (from Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. S. Cox,
A.O.S.I., U.S.I. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to
Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman Al Faisal Bin Saud, Amir of Nejd.)

After commencing.

I received with the hand of friendship your letter dated
the 28th Shawwal 1331 (27th September 1912) on the 20th El-
Raghab (21st October 1912) on return to Hushir from Meqat.
I had been obliged to proceed to Meqat owing to the illness
and death of His Highness Sayid Faisal bin Turki from the
disease of dropsy. A.I.P.
You wrote that you were desirous of a meeting with me and
that you considered it better to leave discussion between us
until the day of meeting; and you mentioned that you would
set out from Riyadh after the 14th-15th. Your friend looks
forward to the meeting with much pleasure and the reason for
writing this letter is to ask you if possible to make your
departure from Riyadh immediately after the 14th and that the
meeting may be at Qatif about the 20th Elinal (20th November).
You will pardon my asking you to lose no time but the reason
for my doing so is to proceed to London for some months and
start from Hushir at the beginning of Muharram, and I think
it would be convenient if our meeting took place before my
departure. Secondly our friend Captain Chesapeake, British
Agent at Kuwait, who I shall see with me, likewise
desires to proceed to London in two months' time. It is our
hope therefore that you will agree to the arrangement above
described. I shall be at Bah ain on the 18th Elinal (18th
November) and will there expect news of your arrival at Qatif.
I shall you will kindly send a man on ahead to Bahain to
inform me of your movements. This is what was necessary to
state and with salams and may you be preserved.







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Translation of a letter dated 11th Zilhijjah 1331 = 11th November 1913 from Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman al Faisal, to Lieut-Colonel Sir P. Z. Cox, A.C.I.B., U.S.I. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I received with the hand of friendship your esteemed letter dated 26th Zilqadeh (corresponding to 27th October) and was glad to hear of your well being and understood what you wrote, from beginning to end. With reference to the suggestion in your letter that we should meet at Ojair on 30th Zilhijjah, and asking me to leave Riyadh as early as practicable in view of your intention to proceed to England at an early date, your letter reached me in a most propitious hour and the news regarding your coming and our meeting was most welcome. Please God I shall derive from it intimacy and gratification. It is indeed unlucky that at the time of the arrival of your letter I was in Qasim and that your letter only reached me yesterday. In fact, I your friend felt very much ~~xxxxxxx~~ exercised when I realised that I must inevitably be late for the rendezvous.

I am leaving Qasim for Riyadh forthwith and from thence will proceed to Al Hasa for the meeting, in accordance with your letter and now your friend begs you to pardon him for his inability to do as desired in your letter owing to the great distance to be traversed. Your friend hopes that it will be possible for the meeting to be on 10th Muharram and to keep that date will only be possible with exertion and difficulty, but trouble in regard to a matter which results in a meeting with you is no trouble.

Now it is on two points that I now wish to write to you; firstly kindly to excuse me for the delay in arriving, secondly, to beg you to allow the meeting to be on the date which I have suggested.

Then




Translation of a letter dated 11th Elhijrah 1331 with
November 1913 from Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman Al Faisal,
to Lieut-Colonel Sir P. E. Cox, G.O.I.S., G.O.I.S. Political
Resident in the Persian Gulf, Basra.


I received with the hand of friendship your esteemed letter
dated 28th Elhijrah (corresponding to 27th October) and was
glad to hear of your well being and understood what you
wrote, from beginning to end. With reference to the sugges-
tion in your letter that we should meet at Oufra on 30th
Elhijrah, and asking me to leave Riyadh as early as pos-
sible in view of your intention to proceed to England at
an early date, your letter reached me in a most propitious
hour and the news regarding your coming and our meeting was
most welcome. Please God I shall derive from it intimacy
and gratification. It is indeed whimsy that at the time of
the arrival of your letter I was in Basra and that your
letter only reached me yesterday. In fact, I your friend
felt very much surprised when I realised that I
must inevitably be late for the rendezvous.

I am leaving Basra for Riyadh forthwith and from thence
will proceed to Al Hasa for the meeting, in accordance with
your letter and now your friend begs you to pardon him for
his inability to do as desired in your letter owing to the
great distance to be traversed. Your friend hopes that it
will be possible for the meeting to be on 10th Muharram and
to keep that date will only be possible with exertion and
difficulty, but trouble in regard to a matter which results
in a meeting with you is no trouble.

Now it is on two points that I now wish to write to you:
firstly kindly to excuse me for the delay in arriving,
secondly, to beg you to allow the meeting to be on the
date which I have suggested.

Then







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Translation of a letter dated 22nd November 1913 (=22nd
Zilhiyyeh 1331) from Lieut-Colonel Sir P.Z.Cox, K.C.I.E.,
C.S.I. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to Amir
Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman bin Faisal al-Saud.

After greeting and enquiries after your health.

I beg to inform you in continuation of my letter dated 26th
Zilqadeh that, thinking that it would not be possible for an
answer for you to reach me at Bushire before my departure, I
came to Bahrain in the hope that you would be able to come
to the Coast about the time indicated. On my arrival at Bah-
rain I saw your messenger Abdur Rahman bin Muhammad and re-
ceived through his hands your esteemed letter dated 11th
Zilhiyyah. I have understood your remarks about it being
impossible for you to arrive before 10th Muharram 1332. I
am very sorry that it will thus not be possible for me per-
sonally to have an interview with Your Honour as it is in-
evitable for me to leave Bushire by the mail leaving on that
date and it is not possible for me to delay. But it makes no
difference. Inshallah an interview will take place on the
date asked for by you, between Your Honour and Major Trevor
British Agent at Bahrain and Captain Shakespear British
Agent at Kuwait on my behalf, and they will be ready at
Bahrain about that time, and will await news from your side
from Qajar.

In conclusion, I bid you farewell with regret and trust
that a meeting may take place between us sometime in future,
and that your affairs will prosper in the meanwhile.

(Usual ending).



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Transmission of a letter dated 24th November 1938 (1938-11-24)
Kilnigah (1938) From Messrs. J. E. G. & Co. Ltd.,
O.S.I. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to Amir
Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman bin Faisal al-Saud.

After greeting and enquiries after your health.
I beg to inform you in continuation of my letter dated 28th
November last, thinking that it would not be possible for an
answer for you to reach me at Basra before my departure, I
came to Bahrain in the hope that you would be able to come
to the coast about the time indicated. On my arrival at Bas-
ra I saw your messenger Abdul Rahman bin Muhammad and re-
ceived through his hands your esteemed letter dated 11th
November. I have understood your remarks about it being
impossible for you to arrive before 10th November 1938. I
am very sorry that it will thus not be possible for me per-
sonally to have an interview with your Honour as it is in-
evitable for me to leave Basra by the mail leaving on that
date and it is not possible for me to delay. But it seems no
difference. Inshallah an interview will take place on the
date fixed for by you, between your Honour and Major Trevor
British Agent at Bahrain and Captain W. H. G. G. British
Agent at Basra on my behalf, and they will be ready at
Bahrain about that time, and will await news from your side
from Qala.

In conclusion, I bid you farewell with regret and trust
that a meeting may take place between us sometime in future,
and that your affairs will prosper in the meanwhile.

(Usual ending).



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Copy of a letter No. C.24 dated 18th November 1913,
from Captain W.H.I. Shakespear, Political Agent, Kuwait,
to Lieut-Colonel Sir P.Z. Cox, K.C.I.D., C.S.I., Political
Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have the honour to report for your information that
the following rumours are current in connection with the
desire of the Turkish authorities to come to terms with
Abdul Aziz "Bin Saud"; and, Shaikh Sir Mubarak-as-Sabah
appears to believe that they are well-founded.

2. It is said that the Porte is prepared to recognise "Bin
Saud" as ruler of Najd and Hassa, to give him a formal ap-
pointment to that post, and to allow/him to collect the re-
venue, paying to the Porte a fixed sum per annum for the
privilege, but it is understood that two of the primary con-
ditions which they hope to make good as part of the above
arrangement are:-

(1) that "Bin Saud" should admit Turkish troops to the
coast towns of Qajir, Qatif as before.

(2). that he should bind himself absolutely to refer all
matters of foreign politics to be dealt with by the Porte and
to allow no foreign merchants nor agents in his territory
as now recognised.



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Copy of a letter No. 9.34 dated 18th November 1917.
From Captain W.A.I. Mackenzie, Political Agent, Kuwait,
to Major-General Sir F.S. Cox, G.O.C., G.O.C.I., Political
Resident in the Persian Gulf, Baghdad.

I have the honor to report for your information that
the following rumours are current in connection with the
desire of the Turkish authorities to come to terms with
Abdul Aziz "Bin Saud" and, I think, Sir Sabir-ur-Rahman
appears to believe that they are well-founded.
It is said that the Porte is prepared to recognise "Bin
Saud" as ruler of Najd and Hasa, to give him a formal ap-
pointment to that post, and to allow him to collect the re-
venue, paying to the Porte a fixed sum per annum for the
privilege, but it is understood that two of the primary con-
ditions which they hope to make good as part of the above
arrangement are:-

- (1) That "Bin Saud" should admit Turkish troops to the
coast towns of Qatif, Dammam and Bahrein.
- (2) That he should bind himself absolutely to refer all
matters of foreign policy to be dealt with by the Porte and
to allow no foreign merchants nor agents in his territory
as now recognised.



CONFIDENTIAL

No. 3904 of 1913.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 21st December, 1913.

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W.D.V.
26 DEC 1913
C.131.

A copy of the undermentioned telegram is forwarded
with compliments to the Political Agent, Kuwait, for
information, in continuation of this office endorsement,
No. 3670 dated 2nd December, 1913.


By Order,

P.G. Loch

Lieutenant,
Assistant Resident.

From Foreign, Delhi, to Resident, Bushire, No.D.S.22
dated 18th December, 1913.

D's.





Telegram. P.

From Foreign, Delhi.

To Resident, Bushire.


No.D.S.22.

Dated 18th (received 19th) December, 1913. (8.00 a.m.)

A report has been received from the Ambassador
at Constantinople that by the appointment of Bin Saud
as Mutassarif^{of}/Najd the Turkish Government propose to
accord their recognition of "Faisal" there.

Foreign.

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Amrai

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*Recd 5/1/14
Wf*

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 23 (Conf.), dated Bushire, the 4th (received the 12th) January 1914.

From—J. G. LORIMER, Esq., C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, No. T-806, dated the 20th December 1913. a copy of the letter, marginally noted, which has been received from the Political Agent at Bahrain in regard to a request of Bin Saud for a pass authorising him to procure certain arms and ammunition.

No action seems possible at the present time, but the letter amplifies the remark made in paragraph 11 of the enclosure to my letter No. 24, dated the 4th January 1914, while for an earlier notice of Bin Saud's relation to the arms trade I would refer you to my predecessor's letter No. 1669, dated the 26th May 1913.

No. T-806 (Conf.), dated Bahrain, the 20th December 1913.

From—MAJOR A. P. TREVOR, C.I.E., Political Agent, Bahrain,
To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have the honour to report that in the course of a conversation at Ojair on the 16th instant, Bin Saud asked me if I could give him a pass authorising him to procure from Muskat, for the use of his forces, 4,000 Martini Rifles and Carbines, of which 1,000 should be Martini Metfords, with 400 rounds of ammunition per rifle.

2. In reply, I informed him that I had no power to grant such a pass, but that I would refer the matter to you. Bin Saud enquired when a pass or an answer to his request could be obtained. I replied that as the number of arms applied for was a large one, it was probable that the question might have to be referred to the Government, which would naturally entail some delay in getting a reply. I also added that it was possible that the answer might also be delayed by the question whether such a pass could be granted at the present moment, in view of his difficulties with the Turkish Government, and of the neutrality of the British Government in the dispute—possibly the grant of such a pass might be considered an infringement of neutrality.

3. I am not, of course, in a position to make any useful remarks on this point, but I think that Bin Saud's request shows that he wishes to co-operate with us in respect of the Arms Traffic, and (leaving aside the question of neutrality), I would respectfully suggest that it would be advisable to encourage Bin Saud to obtain his arms in a legitimate manner. Otherwise, he will doubtless attempt to smuggle them by sea or overland from Muskat if he can obtain any there, or he may get them from Jibutl to some port on the Red Sea and thence overland across Arabia.

4. Bin Saud stated, and Captain Shakespear confirmed the statement from personal experience, that modern small bore magazine rifles are useless to Arabs in the desert, as the sand speedily makes the mechanism useless. There is also the objection of the impossibility of re-charging the cartridges for such weapons. For these reasons Bin Saud requires Martinis for his men, and for the same reasons the considerable number of magazine rifles recently captured from the Turks are practically useless to him.

5. I may add that Bin Saud gave me most explicit assurances that the arms were required solely for the use of his armed forces, and were not in any way for trade purposes and would not be sold.

6. If the pass cannot be granted now, I venture to suggest that it might be given when the negotiations between Bin Saud and the Turkish Government are completed, or are in a fair way to settlement.

CG147D



175(a)

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No. 24, dated Bushire, the 4th (received the 12th) January 1914.

From—J. G. LORIMER, Esq., C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Delhi.

In continuation of my predecessor's letter No. 4005-M. of 2nd December 1913,
No. T-805, dated the 20th December 1913. I have the honour to submit a Report by
Major Trevor, Political Agent, Bahrain.

2. In forwarding this report to the Government of India, I would remark that our position between Bin Saud and the Porte is somewhat difficult. On the one hand we have recognised as belonging to Turkey the province of Hasa, which Bin Saud at present governs as an independent ruler, and which he wishes to retain. On the other hand, it would be imprudent to shape our action on the assumption that Bin Saud's retention of Hasa will be permanent or indeed more than temporary. At the same time it is impossible, regard being had to the local interests of British subjects and protégés, that we should continue to treat Hasa as a region politically derelict and having no administrative head with whom we can deal in matters affecting British subjects.

3. Every free bargain has two sides and must contain, if it is to be accepted, some element of advantage to both parties. With due regard to this principle a mutual arrangement seems not impossible, in regard to certain points, between ourselves and Bin Saud; but in respect of the practicability of an accommodation between Bin Saud and the Turks, and the outlook is less promising.

4. Bin Saud is willing that British subjects should reside and do business in Hasa. He would protect them and would, in practice at least, recognise our right to represent their interests. It appears to me that, if our subjects who are desirous of trading in Hasa take advantage of his present disposition, a valuable point will have been gained by us, and that Bin Saud will himself benefit, and will be conscious of benefiting, by the mere fact that subjects of ours whom we trust him to protect reside in his territory. He cannot but be aware that he lays us under an obligation by encouraging them and that we on our part will seek every means of maintaining a situation more favourable to our people than that which existed under the Turkish régime. British subjects who are desirous of proceeding to Hasa are now being permitted to do so, and I am authorising the Political Agent in Bahrain to enter into such correspondence with Bin Saud as their concerns may hereafter necessitate. In this way, perhaps, one part of the Bin Saud problem will be solved without further discussion, and in a manner making it difficult for the Turks, should they subsequently reoccupy Hasa, to resume their former attitude to British subjects there. To consolidate the position, I recommend that a Native Agent be at once posted to Katif to act as medium of communication between the Political Agent in Bahrain and Bin Saud's local governors. The Turks could hardly obtain the removal of this agent if, on recovering Hasa, they found him holding an established position in the province.

5. Other matters which, it seems to me, might be settled directly with Bin Saud at the present time are that of his relations with the Shaikhs of Katar and Trucial Oman and that of the control of refugees from his authority who settle under their protection.

These questions arise from Bin Saud's own position as an Arab Chief and do not concern the Turks. It might be arranged with Bin Saud, on condition of his not entering the territory of the said Shaikhs without our consent, that we should use our influence to induce them to restrain or expel refugees whose conduct in their chosen places of residence was shown to be injurious to Bin Saud's legitimate interests. A reciprocal arrangement of this nature should now, I venture to think, be proposed to Bin Saud through the Political Agent in Bahrain.

6. The crux of the present negotiations is Bin Saud's virtual request that we should intervene between him and the Turks in order to secure to him the government of the province of Hasa on an assured, autonomous, and probably hereditary basis. Here it seems to me that, the views of the Porte and of Bin Saud being at bottom irreconcilable, there is small prospect of our interposing with success, and that we should, therefore, in the interests of good relations both between ourselves and him and between ourselves and the Turks, not be too forward in our interposition. Bin Saud is, from the Turkish point of view, a very recent and only



momentarily successful rebel, and nothing can be offered to the Turks on behalf of Bin Saud, so far as I can see, which would appear in their eyes at the present moment an advantage worth purchasing by the concession to him of a single point. There can be no doubt that the Turks hope and expect to drive Bin Saud out of Hasa by force of arms; if not now, then in the course of a few years. The best line of action for them is undoubtedly to maintain their claim to Hasa as a province of the Ottoman Empire and to postpone attempting to enforce it until they feel themselves stronger,—a line which they will in all probability follow. As time passes, however, if Bin Saud remains in adverse possession of Hasa, the Porte may become disposed to negotiate with him, possibly with our assistance. Three-cornered negotiations may then perhaps take place with some hope of a settlement acceptable to both parties being reached, but at present circumstances are not propitious.

7. In short the most expedient course for His Majesty's Government is, I venture to think, to take in hand at once, as indicated above, the questions which seem capable of direct settlement between their Political representatives and Bin Saud, at the same time informing Bin Saud that his position in Hasa is a question in which they can only mediate between him and the Turks with the consent of both parties, but that they will do their best to support him in this manner. In fulfilment of this promise if authorised an effort might now be made to obtain, in the words of Sir Percy Cox's memorandum enclosed in his letter No. 4005-M., dated 2nd December, 1913 "an undertaking from them (i.e., the Turks) not to take hostile action by sea against the coast left in Bin Saud's control without a previous exchange of views with us."

In making these recommendations, I do not lose sight of the fact that Bin Saud, if left to himself, may conclude with the Turks some arrangement unfavourable to British interests in Hasa; but, should he do so, it will be open to His Majesty's Government to take such action as is required for vindicating the interests threatened.

No. T-805, dated Bahrain, the 20th December 1913.

From—MAJOR A. P. TREVOR, C.I.E., Political Agent, Bahrain,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

I have the honour to invite a reference to Sir Percy Cox's letter No. 3669, dated the 2nd December 1913, instructing me to proceed to Ojair in company with Captain Shakespear, Political Agent at Kuwait, as soon as Bin Saud arrives on the coast, and to interview him there; in reply I beg to submit the following report of our proceedings.

2. As already reported in my diary I had heard (through Shaikh Isa) that Bin Saud would arrive at Hasa about the middle of Moharram, so that when Captain Shakespear arrived on the 7th December, having been kindly given a passage on the flagship by His Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief, I knew that there would be some little delay.

3. On the 12th December a special messenger from Bin Saud arrived with letters for Captain Shakespear and myself, explaining his delay in reaching the coast and saying that he would be at Ojair on Monday, the 16th Moharram (15th December 1913). I at once replied by the same messenger stating that Captain Shakespear and myself were ready waiting in Bahrain and that we would start for Ojair on the morning of Sunday, the 12th December (15th Moharram) and if the weather was favourable would reach there on the same night.

4. Having obtained a "boom" through Abdullah al-Gasebi, Bin Saud's agent at Bahrain, I accordingly left Bahrain on the morning of the 14th December, but, owing to being becalmed for several hours *en route*, we only arrived outside the reef off Ojair about midnight. The next morning (Monday, the 15th December) when making our way into the port a little before sunrise we saw Bin Saud's camp being pitched on the sand-hills about a mile east of the Custom-House and Serai (the only buildings or habitations of any description at Ojair), and gathered that Bin Saud had already arrived. I landed with Captain Shakespear at about 8 A.M., and we were received by Bin Saud with great politeness on the shore outside the



Serai. After a short interview in the Serai Bin Saud called for horses and we rode to the camp with him accompanied by a large crowd of horsemen, who on the way gave us an "ardtha" or welcoming ceremony, which consists in galloping furiously to and fro in front of honoured guests, shouting, brandishing swords, firing off rifles, etc.

5. Bin Saud told us that he had arrived about half-an-hour before we did and was exceedingly cordial and friendly. The friendly personal relations existing between him and Captain Shakespear, resulting from their meetings at Kuwait and in the desert, put us on good terms at once, and made our subsequent interviews easy. On arrival at the camp we found that Bin Saud had caused a very large tent to be pitched for us, and done all he could in other ways to make us comfortable, *inter alia* by getting one of the best cooks in Bahrain over and entertaining us sumptuously in Arab style during the whole of our two days' stay.

6. On the day of our arrival and the greater part of the next day, Tuesday (16th December), we discussed with him the points mentioned in the memorandum attached to Sir Percy Cox's letter under reply. The result of these discussions is set forth in Memorandum I attached to this letter. After we had discussed these points Bin Saud raised the question of the policy of the British Government in Katar and Trucial Oman with special reference to their attitude in regard to enemies of his who might take sanctuary in these states and then use them as a base for intriguing against him, or as a retreat after inciting some Bedouin tribe to revolt against him. He said that of course he had not the slightest objections to fugitives from his wrath taking refuge with the neighbouring Shaikhs in accordance with the usual Arab custom, provided that they did not use their sanctuary as a base for intrigue; but if they did so he would be compelled to take steps for his own safety. The gist of this conversation is recorded in Memorandum II attached to this letter.

7. After business had been concluded at the final interview Bin Saud volunteered to show us in confidence the conditions which had been proposed by the Turkish Government and himself as a basis for settlement of his future position. The document he produced and read out to us was in the form of a draft agreement containing 11 articles, five of which had been suggested by Bin Saud himself and the other six by the Turkish Government. The terms proposed by Bin Saud insisted on complete autonomy for the region actually controlled by him, special reference being made to his right to the coast-line and to the appointment and control of all local officials. The terms proposed by the Turkish Government laid down a partial autonomy for Bin Saud under the suzerainty of the Sultan with the following conditions:—

- (1) The re-instatement of the former Turkish garrisons in the Hasa province.
- (2) Kazis and other judicial officers to be appointed by direct "firman" by the Sultan.
- (3) The exclusion of all foreign merchants and agents of Foreign Powers.
- (4) All communications from Foreign Powers or their representatives to be referred to the Turkish authorities for disposal.
- (5) The payment of an annual revenue of £T.3,000.
- (6) No concessions to be given by Bin Saud to any foreign companies for railways or motor-car services.

8. *A propos* of condition (6) above some conversation took place, from which we gathered that Bin Saud would not be averse to giving concessions under British auspices, should his position be regularized or in some way assured through our good offices.

9. I would add that during the discussions, on more than one occasion, Bin Saud made it clear that he would prefer that any reconciliation between himself and the Turks should be carried through under the auspices of the British Government, because he had no faith in the permanency of any arrangement made directly with that Turkish Government.

10. Before leaving Bin Saud sent instructions to his Deputy at Katij that he should permit British subjects to enter and trade and open shops, should they arrive



at Katif and should protect them; and that he should communicate with the Political Agent at Bahrain regarding them should any questions arise.

11. In all the formal and private discussions which took place Bin Saud was most friendly; he seemed very much in earnest and most anxious to do whatever he could to meet the wishes of Government and to obtain their support. We repeatedly told him that the British Government could not give him any assurance that they would keep the peace, as he expressed it, on the Hrsa coast; this of course is what he wanted, but he realized that it was impossible. The tangible results of our interviews with him were that he at once agreed to accept and protect British traders in Katif (and no doubt in other places on the coast should they want to go there) and to postpone making any settlement with the Turks until he marches north in the spring, i.e., for three months. Bin Saud also stated in a more informal manner that he would not interfere in the politics of Katar and the Trucial Coast states, and I think that Memorandum II shows that he has no desire to act contrary to the wishes of Government in these regions. Further, I am of opinion, and Captain Shakespear shares my view, that there is not the slightest doubt that should His Majesty's Government consider it desirable to use their good offices to effect a settlement between Bin Saud and the Porte, by which he would remain "de jure" ruler under Turkish suzerainty of the territories of which he is at present "de facto" ruler, Bin Saud would be only too glad to make a formal arrangement with the British Government on the remainder of the four points mentioned in Sir Percy Cox's memorandum, viz: to co-operate in the suppression of piracy and the arms traffic; and in the preservation of the Maritime Truce. In connection with the Arms Traffic question I may mention that Bin Saud has made an application to be allowed to import rifles for the use of his troops: this is being dealt with separately in my letter No. 806 of the 20th December 1913, but it shows, I think, that Bin Saud means to work with the British Government in the matter.

12. In the course of our conversations with Bin Saud we gathered indirectly that he would probably accept autonomy under the suzerainty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan with the payment of a trifling revenue (or tribute) to Turkey if necessary, as an acknowledgment of the suzerainty. Should His Majesty's Government see fit to try and effect a settlement between Bin Saud and the Turkish Government, it would seem desirable, I respectfully submit, to take some definite steps within the next two months, i.e.,—say before the 1st March,—of which at least a hint could be communicated by me to Bin Saud before he goes north in the spring in order to save him from making some arrangement with the Turks which might be hostile to our interests. In the meanwhile if one or two British subjects who have been pressing me to allow them to go to Katif are permitted to go there, it will strengthen our position in resisting the conditions regarding the exclusion of foreigners, which the Turks particularly desire to impose upon Bin Saud.

13. In conclusion I would observe that only Bin Saud, Captain Shakespear, and myself were present at any of the interviews at which politics were discussed, and I should like to say that the exceedingly friendly and cordial attitude of Bin Saud at the meeting was due to his friendly feelings towards Captain Shakespear. The latter's knowledge of the language and ways of the Bedouin from Central Arabia was also most helpful and his presence was mainly responsible for any favourable results which may follow from the meeting.

I.—Memorandum of interview with Bin Saud on 15-16th December 1913.

In order to make his position clear Bin Saud began by giving an account of the history of Nejd, from his point of view, of which the following paragraph is a resumé:—

His family, he said, had been in Nejd from time immemorial and had for generations ruled over it without interference from outside. He himself was an Arab Chief whose views on matters of policy naturally differed from those of European Powers. Bedouin tribes are not concerned in weighing the merits of different Governments as they live as nomads, and when oppressed move off to another locality. When Ibn Rashid attacked the Bin Saud family, the latter eventually won



through, in recent years he (Abdul Aziz Bin Saud) himself has been able to consolidate his authority in Central Arabia and has now taken Hasa and Katif. As is well-known these places originally belonged to his family and did not pass into the hands of the Turks by fair conquest, but by stratagem, *viz.*, by fomenting discord between two members of the family, Abdulla and Saud, the sons of Faisal, and by supporting one against the other. Eventually when Abdulla was successful the Turks, in return for their help, retained their garrisons in the Hasa province, and actually took over the government of it, though Abdulla was made titular governor. After a time the Bedouin Arabs finding that the local Turkish Government was weak and impotent took to indiscriminate raiding, thereby causing great chaos and want of security, while the more respectable and responsible portion of the population became dissatisfied with the Government because it was unable to put a stop to the reign of lawlessness. In the meanwhile he (Abdul Aziz Bin Saud) was approached by Arabs, not only of the Hasa province but also of Baghdad, Basra and other places who were equally dissatisfied, and became convinced that the whole Arab world scorned the Turkish rule. Finding that the province of Hasa, "where our word runs," was being oppressed and bled by the Turks, and having been asked several times by the people of the province to intervene, he eventually determined to take the bull by the horns, re-occupy the province and ask for the support of the British Government.

2. At this stage it was pointed out to him that our first object in arranging this personal interview was to find out precisely in what way he wanted the assistance of the British Government, seeing that he was aware of the friendly relations between the British and Turkish Governments and of the neutrality of the former in respect of the differences between him and the latter. In reply Bin Saud stated that what he was concerned with was his honour, the honour of his house, and the preservation of his ancestral rights. He desired to renew and maintain the ancient friendship between his family and the British Government and to have his position secured. He was led to ask the British Government for assistance because he had seen how that Government had dealt with Kuwait, Bahrain and other places and had realized that they were to be trusted. Bin Saud added that he wishes to have nothing to do with any other Power although he has already been approached by the Turkish Government. He feels that he must make some terms with them to safeguard his position, if the British Government disappoint him. He wants to know definitely what their expressions of good will really amount to, in order to be able to secure his own position.

3. At this point he was asked to explain himself rather more clearly. He replied that all he wants is to be left in peace, and he sees that the British Government keeps the peace all along the coasts of the Persian Gulf except in this small section—the coast of the Hasa province. If he could get an assurance that the British Government would maintain the Maritime Peace on this strip of coast and recognise his position as "defacto" ruler, he would be satisfied; if not he would have "to trust in his own sword." He feels convinced that the British Government could secure this result by diplomatic means if they so desired.

4. At this point it was explained to Bin Saud that we could give him no such assurance, and moreover we were convinced that the British Government, in view of their friendship with the Turkish Government, could not do so either, as any such assurance at the present time would obviously be directed against the Turks.

5. He said that the Turkish authorities had written to him proposing that he should come to terms; the draft conditions laid down that the "status quo ante" should practically be restored, that he should not accept any representatives nor subjects of Foreign Powers in his territory, and that he should not hold any communication with any Foreign Power except through the Turkish authorities. He said that he thought the Turks would be ready to drop all the conditions in the proposed agreement except the questions of the conduct of foreign policy and of the admission of foreign agents and foreign subjects. These, he thought, were their principal demands, and if he conceded them, the Porte would probably agree to leave him in peace as "de facto" ruler—how would the British Government view such an agreement?

6. It was pointed out that if he continues to be the "de facto" ruler of the Hasa coast, it would be absolutely necessary for the local British authorities to



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have direct communication with him and his local officers for the settlement of various commercial, pearling and other disputes, which constantly arise, not to mention the apprehension of fugitive offenders and absconding divers. The British Government, therefore, would in all probability have to take up the question of the prejudice to their rights and interests which the existence of any clause excluding their representatives and subjects would entail.

7. In the discussion which followed Bin Saud said he would be glad to co-operate with the British Government in the suppression of piracy and the illicit arms traffic, and in the maintenance of the Maritime Truce, and would also agree not to interfere in the politics of Katar and the Trucial Coast, and to admit British subjects and representatives in his territory, provided that the British Government would give him the assurance mentioned above. In fact, he went further than this, and said he would be willing to consult the British Government in all important matters if he received these assurances. We again repeated to him that it was quite impossible to give him any such assurance.

8. In the course of his remarks Bin Saud pointed out that, though he claimed the Trucial Oman and Katar as part of his ancestral dominions and could make his power felt there, he was quite willing to meet the wishes of Government in regard to them. He hinted that the only reason which restrained him from overrunning Katar, and possibly Trucial Oman, after he had occupied Hasa and Katif was his desire not to alienate the sympathy of the British Government.

9. Bin Saud pressed the urgency of making a definite reply to the Turkish proposals at an early date, and said that correspondence had already been going on since Ramzan last (August 1913), but that he had delayed doing so in the hope that the proposed meeting with the Resident might result in some understanding.

10. It was then suggested to him that, as we were not in a position to state the attitude of His Majesty's Government in regard to the proposals made to him by the Turkish Government, it might be still possible for him to delay a definite answer until His Majesty's Government have had an opportunity of considering the report of our meeting. Bin Saud pointed out that the mere fact of the meeting would draw upon him a certain amount of opprobrium from the Turks and thereby prejudice the progress of the negotiations already instituted by them. We explained that this meeting was necessary in order to find a basis for a working arrangement to settle local disputes and questions arising between his officers on the coast and local British officials. In fact, we informed him, the necessity of such a meeting is recognised and so far back as the middle of September (Shawal) last His Majesty's Government had informed the Turkish Government (through Hakki Pasha) that as he (Bin Saud) had reached the shores of the Persian Gulf, the British Government would be unable to ignore him indefinitely, and for the protection of their own interests would be compelled to find a *modus vivendi* with him, while at the same time maintaining a strictly neutral attitude and desiring a speedy reconciliation between him and the Turks.

11. *Second day.*—Bin Saud reverted to the concluding portion of the previous day's discussion, and we further explained that the primary object of our visit was to ascertain his views with the object of enabling the British Government to find a *modus vivendi* with him on the lines already suggested. It was further pointed out to him that the commercial and pearling relations between Bahrain and the coast of the Hasa province were very intimate, and that British subjects who had previously been in Katif had several times pressed the Political Agent, Bahrain, to allow them to return, but that he had refused to agree, pending the regularisation of Bin Saud's position or a clearer idea of his probable attitude towards them. Bin Saud then said that he had no objection to British subjects coming to Katif provided that their claims against local people received adequate investigation before settlement, and that, subject to this proviso, he would afford them every protection. He appeared to be under the impression that British officials might perhaps uphold and press all claims of their nationals, irrespective of the correctness of such claims. We reassured him on this point, and he then said he would gladly admit and protect British traders.

12. Bin Saud then reverted to the question of replying to the overtures of the Turkish Government. He said that he realised that the entire exclusion of foreign enterprise and commerce from the Hasa coast was impossible at the present time,



178(a)

8

in fact it has already existed for years. Accordingly he proposed to reply to the Turkish overtures that the questions between him and the Turkish Government appeared to him to be matters which could be better discussed at a personal interview, that he would be moving to the northern end of his territory in the spring after two or three months, and that he suggested that the Wali should meet him then somewhere in the neighbourhood of Basra. He would add (and would also inform his agents in Basra and Baghdad) that his recent meeting with British officers at Ojair had its *raison d'être* in the necessity for making some arrangement to facilitate communication between his officials on the coast and the neighbouring British officials in regard to the settlement of commercial and pearling claims and cases arising between British subjects (and protégés) and the local people; the apprehension of fugitive offenders; and the co-operation of his local officials in cases of piracy.

13. As Bin Saud was frank enough to tell us the lines of his proposed reply, we ventured to say that its terms seemed to us unobjectionable and asked him whether he had any objection to our communicating its general tenour in our report; to this he replied that he had no objection, but that he hoped that the British Government would see therein an earnest of his sincere desire to arrive at a *modus vivendi* with them, and would exercise their benevolent good offices on his behalf.

18th December 1913.

AT SEA.

A. P. TREVOR, Major,
Political Agent, Bahrain.W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR, Captain,
Political Agent, Kuwait.

Note.—In order to prevent any misapprehension the note of our interviews from which this memorandum has been compiled were translated to Bin Saud, and he agreed that they were an accurate resumé of our discussions.

CONFIDENTIAL.

II.—*Memorandum of questions raised by Bin Saud regarding Katar and Trucial Oman.*

After the discussion on the subject of arranging a *modus vivendi* with Bin Saud had been finished, he said that he had another matter to discuss with us. He then asked us what was the policy of the British Government in regard to Katar and the Trucial Oman states. We said that we could not make any definite pronouncement on the subject, but that as a general rule, as far as we were aware, the policy of the Government was one of non-interference in internal matters; in the case of the Trucial Chiefs we had certain agreements of long-standing regarding the Maritime Truce, the Slave Trade and Arms Traffic to which we held the Shaikhs, but we did not as a rule interfere with their rule on shore. As regards Katar we translated to him the clause referring to that region in the recent Anglo-Turkish Convention, and said that we presumed the British policy there would also be one of non-interference.

Bin Saud said that there was a possibility that enemies of his might take refuge in some of these states and plot against him and foment trouble—he instanced the case of his relatives, the Araif, who are now in Katar—and asked what the

C.f., Bahrain and Kuwait Diaries, 1912-13. attitude of the Government would be in regard to such cases. We said that we were unable to state definitely but would be glad to refer the matter to higher authority with a view to getting the point settled as soon as possible. He was apparently satisfied with this, but urged that the matter was important to him as affecting his authority over the adjacent Bedouin tribes. At any time in order to check the intrigues of such people it might be necessary for him to take reprisals and this might involve him with the British Government, which he was anxious to avoid.

18th December 1913.

AT SEA.

A. P. TREVOR, Major,
Political Agent, Bahrain.W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR, Captain,
Political Agent, Kuwait.

G. M. Press, Simla.—No. C. 614 F. D.—21-1-14.—12.—C.W.M.



Confidential.

No. 425 of 1914.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 12 February, 1914.


A copy of the undermentioned communication is forwarded
with compliments to the Political Agent, Kuwait, for
information.

By Order,

P.G. Loch
Lieutenant,
Assistant Resident.

Consul Basrah to Resident, No. 8 dated 6th February, 1914.

R.F.





Kinnis

173

174

180

No. 429, dated Bushire, the 12th (received 24th) February 1914 (Confidential).

From—CAPTAIN L. BIRDWOOD, First Assistant Resident in the Persian Gulf (in charge current duties),

To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department.

In connection with previous correspondence in regard to Bin Sa'ud, I have the honour to forward, for the

No. 8, dated the 6th February 1914.

information of the Government of India, a copy of the letter noted in the margin, which has been received from His Majesty's Consul at Basrah.

No. 8, dated the 6th February 1914.

From—F. E. CROW, Esq., C.M.G., His Majesty's Consul, Basrah,


To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

With reference to your endorsement No. 283 of the 31st ultimo, I have the honour to inform you that, according to a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to-day, the Russian steamer "Saratoff" was to have sailed for Basrah on the 4th instant with 1,700 troops and 40 officers, but that departure has been indefinitely postponed in consequence of lack of funds.

It was reported here that this vessel was also bringing ammunition for the Turkish Government. The agent of the vessel, Mr. Konoff, informs me that the "Saratoff" is not coming to Basrah.

The Ambassador also says that General Sulaiman Pasha, former Governor of Assir, is about to leave for Basrah, and that a certain Sami Bey has been appointed Mutassarif of Nejd. It is stated here that Sulaiman Pasha is coming to Basrah as Vali and that both the acting Vali, Izzet Pasha, and Momtaz Bey, the newly-arrived Commodore, have been placed on the pension list.

*This replaces
the typed copy
originally sent
1/4 10
3.*





Confidential.

No. 768 of 1914.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 15 March 1914.


A copy of the undermentioned communications is forwarded with compliments to the Political Agent, Kuwait, for information, in continuation of this office endorsement No. 425 dated 12th March 1914.

By Order,

P. G. Loch
Lieutenant,
Assistant Resident.

-
- (1). Political Agent, Bahrain, to Resident, letter No. 255 dated 8th March 1914.
 - (2). -----do-----do-----do-----do-----No. 258 dated 9th March 1914.
 - (3). Resident to Foreign. Telegram No. 298 dated 12th March 1914.

R.F.





175 (176)

182

A copy of a letter No.255 dated 8th March 1914 from the Political Agent, Bahrain, to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to invite a reference to my letter No.T-805 dated the 20th December 1913 on the subject of my meeting with Bin Sa'ud at Qajar, and especially to para 12 thereof in which I asked that I might receive orders by March the 1st, if there was anything to communicate to Bin Sa'ud before he goes North in the spring.

I intended to write about this matter last mail, but it escaped my memory, but I had already begun a letter this week when I received yesterday afternoon a reminder from Bin Sa'ud a copy of which is annexed together with a copy

From Shaikh 'Abdul 'Aziz Bin Sa'ud to the	:	of my reply
Political Agent dated 1 Rabi II.	:	
From the Political Agent to Shaikh 'Abdul	:	thereto.
'Aziz Bin Sa'ud dated 7th March	:	
10th Rabi II	:	I hear a rumour

that Bin Sa'ud is coming to Hasa, in any case he will probably start to the North West in a very short time now, and cannot then postpone his negotiations with the Turkish authorities any longer; if therefore Government have anything for me to communicate to Bin Sa'ud it is imperative that I should receive instructions at once so that I can communicate with him before he gets out of touch.



181
A copy of a letter No. 285 dated 8th March 1914 from the
Political Agent, Bahrain, to the Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to advise a reference to my letter
No. T-208 dated the 20th December 1913 on the subject of my
meeting with Bin Saud at Qatif, and especially to para 12
thereof in which I asked that I might receive orders by March
the 1st if there was anything to communicate to Bin Saud
before he goes North in the spring.

I intended to write about this matter last week, but
it escaped my memory, but I had already begun a letter this
week when I received yesterday afternoon a reminder from
Bin Saud a copy of which is annexed together with a copy
of my reply.

From Sheikh 'Abdullah Bin Saud to the :
Political Agent dated 1st March 1914. :
From the Political Agent to Sheikh 'Abdullah :
Bin Saud dated 28th March :
I have a honour :
that Bin Saud is coming to Basra, in any case he will probab-
ly start to the North West in a very short time now, and
cannot then postpone his negotiations with the Turkish
authorities any longer; if therefore Government have anything
for me to communicate to Bin Saud it is imperative that I
should receive instructions at once so that I can communi-
cate with him before he gets out of town.



176 (17)
183

Translation of a letter dated 1st Rabi-att-Thani 1332
28th February 1914
from Shaikh 'Abdul'Aziz bin'Abdur Rahman al Faisal to Major
A.P.Trevor, C.I.E., Political Agent, Bahrain.

After Compliments,

I have the honour to inform you that since
my departure from you from Qajar I did not receive any letter
from you. I hope some good cause kept you from writing. After
this I have to let you know that in these days negotiations
have taken place between myself and the Government and the
time of 3 months that had been fixed between myself and your
honour is coming to a close. I request you to write what is
required because it is not possible for me to keep them off for
more than the known time, so that I may be on foresight (i.e.
look after my interests).



177
361
Translation of a letter dated 1st Rabi-ul-Thani 1332
from Sheikh 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdur Rahman al Faisal to Major
A.F. Trevor, C.I.E., Political Agent, Bahrain.

After Compliments,

I have the honour to inform you that since
my departure from you from Qatif I did not receive any letter
from you. I hope some good cause kept you from writing. After
this I have to let you know that in these days negotiations
have taken place between myself and the Government and the
time of 3 months that had been fixed between myself and your
honour is coming to a close. I request you to write what is
required because it is not possible for me to keep them off for
more than the known time, so that I may be on fore-sight (i.e.).
Look after my interests.



177 (n8)
184

Copy of a letter dated 7th March 1914 from Political Agent, Bahrain, to Shaikh 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdur Rahman bin Sa'ud.

I have received your honoured letter dated the 1st Rabi II this day, and understood its contents. I have to say that I did not write because I had not got anything special to write about and have not yet heard anything from the Resident, Bushire. I intended in any case to send a letter to Bushire by this mail to remind the Resident that the 3 months time which was mentioned is drawing to a close: now I have received your letter I shall communicate its contents and request an early reply. As soon as I get it I shall, inshallah, let you know about the matter. I have heard a rumour that you are coming to Hasa in these days and should like to know if that is correct. If so we shall be near neighbours again and shall be able to communicate quickly. May you be preserved and salams.



177
181

Copy of a letter dated 7th March 1914 from Political
Agent, Bahrain, to Shaikh 'Abdull 'Aziz bin 'Abdur Rahman bin
Sa'ud.

I have received your honoured letter dated the 1st Rabi
II this day, and understood its contents. I have to say that I
did not write because I had not got anything special to write
about and have not yet heard anything from the Resident.
Bashire. I intended in any case to send a letter to Bashire by
this mail to remind the Resident that the 3 months time which
was mentioned is drawing to a close: now I have received your
letter I shall communicate its contents and request an early
reply. As soon as I get it I shall, inshallah, let you know
about the matter. I have heard a rumour that you are coming
to Haas in these days and should like to know if that is
correct. If so we shall be near neighbours again and shall be
able to communicate quickly. May you be preserved and remain.




178 (18)
185

A copy of a letter No.258 dated 9th March 1914 from the Political Agent,Bahrain,to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,Bushire.

In continuation of my letter No.255 dated 8th March, 1914,on the subject of Bin Sa'ud, I have the honour to invite a reference to Mr.Lorimer's letter No.24 dated the 4th January 1914 on the subject and especially to the concluding portion of para 4.

In view of the probability of early negotiations between Bin Sa'ud and the Turks and the possibility of some settlement being arrived at which might include a clause excluding foreign merchants and Agents of Foreign powers (vide para 7 sub section (3) of my letter No.T-805 dated the 20th December 1913),I would observe that,if the proposal to appoint a Native Agent at Qatif is approved,it would appear advisable to expedite the matter and send the selected man to Qatif without delay.



182
172 (7)
A copy of a letter No. 288 dated 25th March 1914 from
the Political Agent, Bahrain, to the Political Resident in
the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

In continuation of my letter No. 288 dated 25th March
1914, on the subject of Bin Saud, I have the honour to
invite a reference to Mr. Portman's letter No. 24 dated the
4th January 1914 on the subject and especially to the con-
cluding portion of para 4.
In view of the probability of early negotiations
between Bin Saud and the Turks and the possibility of some
settlement being arrived at which might include a clause
excluding foreign merchants and Agents of foreign powers
(vide para 7 and section (3) of my letter No. T-808 dated the
20th December 1913), I would observe that, if the proposal to
appoint a Native Agent at Qatif is approved, it would appear
advisable to expedite the matter and send the selected man
to Qatif without delay.



Telegram.R.

From Major S.G.Knox, Resident Bushire.

To Foreign Delhi.

No. 298.

Dated 12-3-14(3.10 p.m.)

My predecessor's letter No.24 of January 4th.

Political Agent, Bahrain writes regarding Bin Sa'ud.

Bin Sa'ud has addressed Political Agent saying that the three months, during which he agreed to postpone any settlement with the Turks (vide paragraph 11 of the Political Agent's letter No.805 T. of December 20th 1913), have nearly expired, and that it is not possible for him to "keep them off for more than the known time, so that I may look after my interests".


Political Agent has replied that he has no news but will communicate with the Political Resident and request an early reply.

Here please refer to the correspondence ending with my telegram No.256 of March 1st; 800 troops have by now reached Basrah; also Basrah local press has made many comments on the recent meeting of our officers with Bin Sa'ud.

It would be most useful if Trevor and myself could know the intentions of Government as soon as possible. Otherwise Bin Sa'ud will probably commit himself with the Turks to some agreement hostile to our interests.

(End of R) The fourth paragraph of my predecessor's letter, mentioned above, is quoted by the Political Agent in this connection, and he urges that, should the appointment be approved, the despatch of the selected Agent should take place without delay. This view has my concurrence. Reference is also invited to letter No.4005 M of December 2nd, 1913, from Sir Percy Cox.


Knox.



180/1019

Telegram R.
From Major S.G. Knox, Resident Bushire.
To Foreign Dept.
No. 298.
Dated 12-2-14 (2.10 p.m.).

My predecessor's letter No. 24 of January 4th.
Political Agent, Bahrain writes regarding Bin Sa'ud.
Bin Sa'ud has addressed Political Agent saying that the
three months, during which he agreed to postpone any settle-
ment with the Turks (vide paragraph 11 of the Political
Agent's letter No. 208 T. of December 20th 1913), have nearly
expired, and that it is not possible for him to "keep them off"
for more than the known time, so that I may look after my
interests".
Political Agent has replied that he has no news but
will communicate with the Political Resident and request an
early reply.
Here please refer to the correspondence ending with
my telegram No. 256 of March 1st; 800 troops have by now
reached Basrah; also Basrah local press has made many
comments on the recent meeting of our officers with Bin
Sa'ud.
It would be most useful if Trevor and myself could
know the intentions of Government as soon as possible.
Otherwise Bin Sa'ud will probably commit himself with the
Turks to some agreement hostile to our interests.
(End of R) The fourth paragraph of my predecessor's
letter, mentioned above, is quoted by the Political Agent in
this connection, and he urges that, should the appointment be
approved, the despatch of the selected Agent should take place
without delay. This view has my concurrence. Reference is
also invited to letter No. 4005 M of December 2nd, 1913, from
Sir Percy Cox.
Knox.



180
187 (121)
Confidential.

No. 827 of 1914.
British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 18 March 1914.



A copy of the undermentioned telegram is forwarded, with compliments, to the Political Agent, Kuwait, for information, in continuation of this office endorsement No. 768 dated 15th March 1914.

By Order,

P. G. Lock
Lieutenant,
Assistant Resident.

Foreign Department to Resident, No. D.S.166 dated 17th March 1914.

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Hadd*
R.F.





181 (182)
188
Telegram. P.

From Foreign.

To Major S.G. Knox, Resident Bushire.

No. D.S. 166.

Dated and received 17th March 1914 (9.45 p.m.)

Please refer to your telegram No. 298 dated March 12th.
Secretary of State telegraphs as follows:-


"We are now discussing Bin Sa'ud's position with Hakki Pasha to whom our requirements have been communicated informally, and who is awaiting the views of the Turkish Government. Bin Sa'ud should be told that endeavours are being made by His Majesty's Government to effect an arrangement with the Turkish Government, and a warning against independent action should be given to him.

Pending negotiations it is regarded as impossible by His Majesty's Government to send a British Agent to Qatif.

It has been impressed on Hakki Pasha that neither Bahrain nor its waters can be allowed to be made use of for military purposes against Bin Sa'ud. Information in regard to the movements of Turkish troops should be telegraphed as early as possible".

Action should be taken in this sense and His Majesty's Consul at Basrah should be informed.

Foreign.








182 189
Extract from Kuwait News for the week ending 18th March
1914. (183)

x x x x x x x

FOREIGN INTERESTS.

67. At an interview which the Political Agent had with the Shaikh at Mohammerah Sir Mubarak informed him that the new Wali of Basrah exchanged visits with him when passing through Mohammerah and enquired from him anxiously regarding the relations of His Majesty's Government with Bin Saud and their objects and intentions in the Arab country on the shore of the Persian Gulf. The Shaikh returned diplomatic replies. He said that it was quite a mistake to think that Bin Saud had received or would receive any assistance from the British in his rebellion against the Turks and that His Majesty's Government had no objects in E. Arabia so far as he knew beyond the protection of their nationals and protégés and the encouragement of their interests, and the preservation of law and order generally. The Wali also questioned Sir Mubarak regarding his relations with England and was told in reply that the friendship which had existed between His Excellency and the British Government for generations was a source of strength and satisfaction to the Ruler of Kuwait. To this the Wali is said to have returned no answer.






183
190
184
Extract from Bahrain Diary for the week ending 14th
March 1914.

CONDITION OF COUNTRY.

85. Bin Saud is said to have written to Shaikh Mubarak; some say he told the latter that he may agree on his behalf to all the conditions laid down by the Turkish Government if they will allow him to retain Hasa and Katif; others say that he authorised Shaikh Mubarak to say that if Turkish Government will increase his allowance and not interfere with him in Nejd he is prepared to give back Hasa and Katif to the Turks.

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184
191
(185)

Extract from Kuwait News for the week ending 25th March
1914.

x x x x x x x


FOREIGN INTERESTS,


74. At an interview which the Political Agent had with Shaikh Mubarak on 20th March the latter informed him that a Binbashi had arrived from the Turkish War Department in Constantinople with orders to try and induce Shaikh Mubarak to arrange an interview between him and Bin Saud if possible at Kuwait. The Shaikh told the Binbashi plainly that this was out of the question. The latter then asked him for a letter to take into Nejd introducing and recommending him to Bin Saud. Sir Mubarak replied that all he could give would be a brief note devoid of recommendation of any sort. The envoy replied that such a communication would be of no use. (He has since had other interviews with Sir Mubarak but so far as the Political Agent has information has received the same answers.)

Sir Mubarak asked the Political Agent on the 20th instant whether he approved of the replies given to the Binbashi and was told that in the opinion of H.M.'s Representative he was wise in declining to be mixed up in matters which did not concern him. The Binbashi is to return to Basra via Fao with Shaikh Khazal whose departure is at present being delayed from day to day by the absence of sufficient water at high tide to enable Sir Mubarak's launch to make her exit.

There does not appear to be any truth in the reports which have reached the Political Agent, Bahrain, vide para 85 of his diary for the week ending 14th March 1914. Sir Mubarak who has received no recent communication from Bin Saud is strongly of opinion that the anti-Turkish feeling among the Arabs of Nejd is so strong that Bin Saud will not find it possible to make any compromise with the Ottoman Government even if he wished to do so.

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OFFICE NOTE.

185 192
(186)
Abdullah bin Jasim called upon me
this morning with certain information
upon which the Dfo below was written.

27/3/14

My dear Knox

I hear on good authority that
a Turkish force of 1000 men with 5
guns is encamped outside Zubair,
and that the Turks have written to
Ibn Rashid asking him to assist
them in a forward movement against
Bin Saud, to be made without delay.


It is believed that this invitation
will not be accepted by Ibn Rashid.

In Foreign Telegram No 166 of
17th inst you are instructed to warn
Bin Saud against taking inde-
pendent action. In case you are
acting upon this at once you may
think, as I do, that the Turks
should also be dissuaded from
action pending the result of the
present negotiations, and might
wire our view to India accordingly.

Yours sincerely

W. H. D. S.

(N.B. Sent by launch of 20/3 latest
mail at Fav.) H.





DRAFT—(For Approval).

POLITICAL RESIDENCY, PERSIAN GULF.

No. _____

Dated 2 April 1914.

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193
(187)

Sir,
I have the honour to forward for the information of the Govt of India copy translations of the marginally noted letters which have recently been received by the Shaikh of Kuwait in connection with the present state of affairs in hejd. Saïgid Arif, the writer of enclosure nos. 1, was formerly wali of Basrah and is well acquainted with Sir Imbarak and his family. Saïgid 'Umar his son, the writer of no 2. arrived in Kuwait about 15th March and left by the mail of the 25th idem. While here he spent much time in discussion with the Shaikh, he and his Secretary having been closeted with him for an hour of or two daily, but he did not obtain the access to Bin Saud which was the object of his visit; Sir Imbarak declining either to give him any letter of recommendation or to take any steps to arrange the desired meeting. Enclosures 4 and 5

1. Letter from H.E. Saïgid M. Arif bin Yusef wali of Basrah
2. Letter from Amir Saïgid 'Umar Fauzi bin Arif 2.
3. Letter from H.E. Anwar Pasha. War Minister of the Ottoman Govt.
4. Letter from H.E. Salamin Shafiq wali of Basrah.
5. Letter from Saïgid Taher of Basrah

9,000-3-10



arrived from Basra two days ago,
and they will receive ~~the~~ ^{the} reply to the effect that
that Sir Mubarak does not see
his way to assist either side
and must decline to be drawn
into the matter or to give any
advice, as although he
sympathises with the desire of
both sides to avoid bloodshed or
anything which would produce
enmity among Muslims he must
be faithful to his longstanding
friendship with Bin Saud.

3. ~~Secret Service~~ It appears that a
Turkish force of 1000 men with 5
guns has recently been encamped
at Gobais, and that the Basra
authorities had written to Ibn
Rashid calling for his help on
receipt of which they intended to
proceed against Bin Saud. Sir
Mubarak informed me yesterday
that this force had returned to
Basrah, a satisfactory reply not
having come from Ibn Rashid.
The latter is said to have accepted
with thanks three thousand rifles
which had been sent to arm his
men, and to have replied with
promises of future help when he
should have the power which he
does not possess at present.

4. Referring to Foreign Dept telegram
No D.S. 166 of 17th March to your
address, it may perhaps be



187

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(188)


OFFICE NOTE.

observed that Bin Saud will be more likely to accept with gratitude and readiness any arrangement which we may make on his behalf with the Turks if they, as well as he, are asked to defer action pending the result of the negotiations. Capt Shakespeare, who was at Riyadh on the 10th inst, informs me that Bin Saud had then already heard of the Turkish attempts at mobilisation, and it will naturally be more difficult to restrain him unless such preparations on their part are suspended.

Jm

W

S 1918-5,000-3-06





188


195

(189)

٩

الى حضرة و جناب امير الامراء الكرام كبير الكبراء الفخيم صاحب القدر والاحتمال المحفوف بضوء
 عواطف الملك العلامة الشيخ الوكيل في السعادة مباركة باشا الصباح المبجل دام علاه ومنعنا بقاء
 امين بعد هذا اوفا التحية واذكى السلام بمراسم الاعزاز والاكرام وبيت الاشواق الى لقاءكم على الدوام
 فالبارئ التحية تحية الوفا ان حائل هذه الكتاب ولدنا البيت باشا السيد عمر فوزي مرسل اليكم من طرف
 صاحب الدولة البطل المشهور والشهيد الغيور انور باشا صهر المحضر السيد السلطانيه وناظر
 امور حربية الدولة العثمانية للمذكركه معكم فيما يتعلق بخير البلاد والعباد ومنكم شيا حصل
 الى عبد العزيز بن سعود فالحمد لله الذي رده بنصا الحكم وترفعوه بكتاب من سعادتكم لثا راليه
 وتعرفوه ان ولدنا المعز اليه هو معتمدنا ظلال راليه ووكيل المفوظ للمذكركه والمذكركه
 في جميع الامور المتعلقة بتلك الجهات ووجهه وجهنا واما امان الدولة والناظر لثا راليه
 اليه واسئل الله ان يجعل التوفيق والنجاح على يديه يكم فتننا لونه الكبر العظم والثناء
 العظيم ورضا جلالة مولانا امير المؤمنين وخليفة رب العالمين وبلغونا من يد السلام الى انجا لكم الكرام
 وعرفونا عن احوالكم والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته ١٢٠٠ ربيع اول ١٢٢٠
 اخوكم
 والي ولاية سورية

المحية عارفين
 بن يوسف





1.

189
196

OFFICE NOTE.


(190)

Letter from ^{H.E.} Saïyid Muhammad 'Arif bin
Yusuf, Wali of Suriya (Syria) to H.E.
Shaikh Si Mubarak As Sabah, dated
12 Rabi-ul-Awwal 1332 (9th Feby 1914).

After Compliments,

The bearer of this letter is my son
Bimbashi Saïyid Umar Fauzi, who is
sent to you by H.E. Anwar Pasha the
War Minister of the Ottoman Government
to discuss with you that which concerns
the welfare of the countries & peoples,
and, by your means, to come in touch
with Abd-ul-Aziz bin Saud.
So it is hoped that you will furnish
him with your advice and supply
him with a letter to the person referred
to, saying that this my son is the
confidential agent of the Minister
alluded to for the discussion of all
matters relating to those parts (hejz):
also that meeting him is meeting
me, and to trust him is to trust
the Government and the Minister
above mentioned. And I pray that
God will give you (Mubarak) prosperity
and success in what lies before you,
you will then gain from this affair
great future reward, universal praise,
and the approval of the Sultan. Please
give my regards to your sons and Salams.

3,200-3-10





2. 9

190
197

حضرة الهمام الأفخم صاحب العادة عمن الشيخ مبارك باشا الصباح المفخ دام وجوده
بعده هذه السلام ومزيد الاحترام اعرضه فضلاً على ما احاط به علمكم الشريف من المكاتب
التي قد شرفنا بحضرتكم عنقه قدومي لهذه الاطراف والتشرف بمشاهدة ثم وايضاً المأمورية
الخاصة التي تعينه لها مرمه قبل حضرة البطل الشريفة الغيور على خدمة الاسلام النور باعته
ناظر الحربية بانه اتقابل مع حضرة الامير الجليل عبد العزيز السعدي واتذكر معه
بصورة الودية المخصوصة على حرم المائل الخاطرة التي ليست خافية على حضرتكم
والمرجوع من عادتكم انه تحررون كتاب كحضرة المشار اليه في التقرب من هذه الاطراف
في المحل الذي ترونه مناسب للاجتماع والمذاكره ويكون قريباً لمخارجنا المشار اليه
بواسطة التعارف خاتمة ولنا الامل بالله تعالى انه نتوفق بنيت الخالصه فتكون
سبب لعدم غفك ومانا اخواننا المسلمين وبذلك تتلون الاجر من الله والفتاة
من اخواننا المسلمين والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته (٢١ ربيع آخر ١٣٢٢)

المخلص

معتد ناظر امور حربية الدولة العثمانية

بيكباشي

الكسبي فوزي بن عارف






2.
OFFICE NOTE.

191 192
198
Letter from Berimbashi Sa'iid 'Amas
Fauzi bin 'Arif, representative of the
Ottoman War Minister to H.E. Sir
Mubarak As Sabah dated 21 Rabi-ul-
Akhir 1332 (19th March 1914).

After compliments,

In addition to what Your Excellency
has learned from the letters which I
placed before you when I arrived here
and that which I have represented to you
verbally, I beg to lay before you (in writing)
the special mission in which I am
employed by the Minister for War
Anwar Pasha, namely that I should
meet H.E. the Amir Abd-ul-Aziz
As Saud and discuss with him in
a friendly manner measures to
terminate the present difficulties which
are not hidden from Your Excellency:
and my hope from you is that you will
write a letter to the aforesaid Amir asking
him to come to some place which you
consider suitable for our meeting and
conference, which may be done at hand
to enable me to communicate with the
War Minister by telegraph. I have hopes
that you and I may agree in this matter
so that through us the shedding of
~~Muslim~~ Muslim blood may be avoided, and
thereby you will gain future reward
from Heaven and praise from our
Muhammadian brethren, and Salaam.


5,200-3-10





الحمد لله الواحد الاحد والصلوة والسلام على الرعية المهديات المنزل عليه وعقوصو جليل الله
 جميعاً ولا تغفون قبل الفرد الصمد احمد الموجود اذ وفرة عين الكائنات المرام مدنا بحد
 ووجه كلمتنا به امره وسنته من العاجز بنفسه الفقير الغني بالله القوي باعتماده
 على القوي المتين الموقف نفسه وكل دائرته على خد ملة الاسلام والدين الحنيفي الازهر
 العبد المعترف بالتقصير انور الاجناب ذر النفس الابيه والحمد الطليه والاخلاق
 المرضيه والشراية العربية والعزة الاسلاميه المطبوع على الهدى والصلاح والموقف
 بصانته الله الى كل ما فيه النجاة والفلاح محبنا في الله خضع مبارك بن صباح
 السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته تعكم تحاته اما بعد فاعلم ايها الاربعة في الله ان العالم
 الاسلامي في هذه الزمان قد هجعت عليه اعداء الله من كل جهة ومكان وبقي بينهم قريبا
 بلا ناصر ولا معين وقد خذ الله اهلهم ومكنونهم ومنه اعداء له لمجرد الاختلاف
 لخصارف العدو والكذب والميلين والعاجز ورفقاء امتثالاً لامر الله تعالى وخدمة
 دينه المبين قد وقفنا انفسنا على حفظ الحاشية الباقية للاسلام وجمع
 كلمة الموحدين من امة خير الانام راجين من كل ذي غيرة وحمية ومنه ينين بلاديانية
 الاسلاميه ان يمد لنا يده المصونة والوفاء والخدمة آمنه ودينه ووصفه الاسما وعماله
 بقدر المرشد الاعظم صل الله عليه وسلم المؤمنون في تواددهم وتراحمهم وتعاكفهم
 مثل الجسد الواحد اذا اشتكا عضو منه تداعا له سائر اعضاءه بالشكر والحمد وحيث انكم
 من عباد رجال الاسلام اعلمناكم بربنا افكتموا بالما ص لتكونوا من ذاك على بال
 والله شاهد وراقب ليس لنا قرض في رياسته ولا في مال ولا في شيء من هذه الغرض
 الفاني بل اريد بالفصد بذلك كله رضائه واعلا كلمة الله في ملك الله وان يعلم الله
 في قلوبكم خير يؤتكم خيراً مما احدث منكم السلام اولاً وآخر عظيمكم على كل من يجوبه ناديتكم
 صهر الخضر السلطانية
 وناظر الحرسيه العمانية
 انور باشه

3.





3.

193

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(44)

OFFICE NOTE.


Letter from H.E. Anwar Pasha Ottoman
War Minister to H.E. Sir Mubarak
As Sabah - undated.

After compliments,
Know oh brother that the Muslim
world is at the present time attacked
by enemies from all sides and places
and that it stands among them all
practically without a helper or supporter.
Moreover her own people have deserted
her, and the enemies have come in
between her and them by means of
tricks, lies, and deceptions. Now we,
her friends, in obedience to the Divine
Command and the incumbent service
of the revealed religion have decided
upon guarding zealously what is left
to Islam and collecting those who
profess the unity of God as proclaimed
by the prophet, hoping that every
zealous and religious Muslim will
extend to us the hand of help and
faithful service in the cause of
religion and will act according to
the saying of the great guide (Muhammad)
"The Faithful in their mutual
affection, sympathy, and cohesion are
like a human body all parts of which
cry out if any limb complains" And
since you are numbered among
Muslims we call upon you by this
letter to take these matters to heart:
and God is the witness & Onlooker

S 1918 -5,000-3-00




There is certainly no permanent
value in government, property, or
anything of these perishable objects
the ~~old~~ object of all is ~~to~~ to do the
will of Heaven and to exalt the
Divine creed in Divine territory
"if there is ^{God} knowledge of God in
your heart good will come to you
even from what is taken away
from you" (Koran) and Salaam.



المحترم
 حضرت الرجل الرفيع حبيب الكرام ولشيم صاحب العظوة الشيخ مبارك باشا الصبا
 بعد تقديم انكس النجيات واسنا السليمات هوانه قد وردنا السبع عمر فوزي بك
 البينباشي من الكويت شاكر الطافكم جده صرخ ممنون فيما اجرتموه في حق
 من الانسانيه والحرمة والموى اليه قد نقين بر فافقه مخلصكم اركان حرب فيلق
 البصر نسل الله التوفيق فلا يخفى حضرتم ان الدولة العلية قد رجعت حل وعقه
 مسئلة نجه مقام الولاية واجل مقاصد الدولة اعزها الله هو عدم سفل
 الدماء وحده في الضعائ بين افراد المسلمين ولا بد لنا طلب المعاونه من
 الذوات المحترمة خصوصا مثل حضرتم وان تكن لهذه المشرع يد واحد
 مستعين من اللطاف الربانية ان يقرن ماعيشا بالتوفيق والنجاح
 فنرجوا انكم الصائبه ومعا ونتم الجديته حسبما تقضيه شيمكم وحسنكم
 ونأمل ان توضحونا الدخول في اساس الكيفية الذي يكون بها نجاح العمل
 وافكاركم الصائبه وعنه المواجهه نتذكر شفاها فيما يقتضي هذه ارجوكم
 الاشعار لجدي ولي سلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته (١١ جمادى الثاني ١٢٩٢)

والي ولاية البصر
 وقائدها







4.


195 (No) 202

OFFICE NOTE.

Letter from ^{H.E.} Sulaiman Shafiq, wali
of Basrah to H.E. bin Mubarak As
Sabah dated 1 Jamadi-ul-Awwal
1332 (March 28, 1914).

After compliments,
Saidid Umar Fauzi Beg Bimbashi
has returned from Kuwait, deeply
grateful for your kindness to him
and obliged for all the friendliness
you showed him. He has been appointed
as my Staff Officer in Basrah, and
we hope for success (in our affairs).
It is not hidden from you Ex^t that
the exalted Government is occupied
with the settlement of local matters,
and their chief object is to avoid
bloodshed and the rise of hatred
among Muslims, and we have to ask
help from honoured persons, such as
yourself, especially, as we ought to be
working together in this matter, seeking
for Divine favour that our efforts may
be crowned with success. We hope for
your valuable opinion and profitable
help according to what you see to be
advisable, and trust that you will
disclose how best to get to the root of
the matter so that we may succeed
in the affair. When I see you I will
speak upon the subject, meanwhile I
hope for an answer from you, and
Salaam.

5.200-3-10






5. 4 196 203 (١٩٦)

حضرة جناب الرجل الامير الافخم حميد الكارم والشم صاحب العظوفة الواله
 الشيخ مبارك باشه الصبايح المحترم حفظه الله تعالى
 غيب تقديم واجبات الاحترام والسؤال عن تلك الذاة العلية والاخلاق المرضيه
 هوانه ورونا السيد عمر فزري البينباشي واخبرنا بما جرى شاكراً الطافكم
 وعلوانا فيكم وهذا هو المأمول من شيمكم وحضرتكم بمقام الواله فتفتكم
 الابويه ومحبكم الصميميه بحق ولديكم في مسلة ربنا بمتفتنا بجهاتك وعرض
 لوضرتكم عن مسلة نجه تودع حلها وعقد هالعهده حضرة عظوفة الوالي
 وحرر بجانكم كتاب وها هو بطير العريضه حيث ان حضرتكم اول من يستفاد
 من ارادة الصائبه ذي اللحم العاليه ان تشر وساعده الجهد والمعاونه لهذا
 الامر المستروع ليشتم العمل بالنتيجه الحسنه وتفضلوا بما يلزم اتخاذ به من هذا التا
 ودمتم سالمين محروسين والسلم عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته (اجمار اول ١٤٢٢)
 نقيب نراه

(الطالب)





5.
197 (A2)
204
OFFICE NOTE.


Letter from Saiyid Talib, Basrah,
to Sir Hamarck to As Sabah
dated 1 Jamadi-ul-Awwal
(March 28th 1914).

C.C.

Saiyid 'Umar Fauzi Buntashi
has returned grateful for your
favours, and this is only what
is expected from your noble qualities
as your Excellency is ~~so~~ is as a
father whose fatherly kindness to,
and deep affection for, his children
is generally admitted. May Heaven
prolong your life!

The settlement of Hajid affairs has
been committed to H.E. The Wali
who has written to you by a
letter which I enclose, and since
you are of the first of those whose
opinions are profitable, you are
requested to help energetically in
this important matter so that it
may be carried through with fresh
success. Please point out what
should be done in the matter,
and Salaam.

S 1918-5,000-3-06





Confidential.

No. 916 of 1914.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 29 March 1914.


A copy of the undermentioned communications is forwarded with compliments to the Political Agent, Kuwait, for information, in continuation of this office endorsement No. 827 dated 18th March 1914.

By Order,

J. G. Lock
Lieutenant,
Assistant Resident.

-
- (1). Political Agent, Bahrain, to Resident, letter No. 314 dated 21st March 1914, with enclosure.
- (2). Consul Basrah to Embassy Constantinople, repeated Resident Bushire, telegram No. 20 dated 23rd March 1914.
- (3). Resident to Foreign. Telegram No. 345 dated 24th March 1914.

R.F.





(200) 199
206

A copy of a letter No. 314 dated 21st March 1914, from Major A.P. Trevor, C.I.E., Political Agent, Bahrain, to Major S.G. Knox, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

With reference to your office endorsement No. 886 dated the 18th March 1914 which was delivered to me early this morning by the Officer Commanding R.I.M.S. "Lawrence", I have the honour to forward, herewith, for your information a copy of the letter which I have addressed to Shaikh 'Abdul Aziz bin Sa'ud and have this day handed to his Agent in Bahrain with the request that it may be despatched by a sure messenger as quickly as possible.

The telegram is not quite clear as to whether it is intended to repeat to Bin Sa'ud the intimation given to the Turkish Government regarding Bahrain. I laid stress on this point when I interviewed Bin Sa'ud in December last, but as I reported at the time, it did not make much impression on him. In fact, from his point of view I do not think it amounts to much, having regard to the frequent visits of the "Marmaris" to Qatar and the ease with which a flotilla of native boats could be conveyed direct from Basrah in the fair season. In the circumstances therefore I have not mentioned it again.



200
177
A copy of a letter No. 214 dated 21st March 1914, from
Major A.P. Trevor, O.I.E., Political Agent, Bahrain, to
Major S.G. Knox, O.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian
Gulf, Bushire.

With reference to your office endorsement No. 228 dated
the 18th March 1914 which was delivered to me early this
morning by the Officer Commanding R.I.M.S. "Lawrence", I
have the honour to forward, herewith, for your information
a copy of the letter which I have addressed to Shaikh 'Abdull
Aziz bin Saud and have this day handed to his Agent in
Bahrain with the request that it may be despatched by a sure
messenger as quickly as possible.

The telegram is not quite clear as to whether it is intend-
ed to repeat to Bin Saud the information given to the Turk-
ish Government regarding Bahrain. I laid stress on this
point when I interviewed Bin Saud in December last, but
as I reported at the time, it did not make much impression on
him. In fact, from his point of view I do not think it amounts
to much, having regard to the frequent visits of the "Mar-
maria" to Qatar and the ease with which a flotilla of native
boats could be conveyed direct from Bahrah in the fair season.

In the circumstances therefore I have not mentioned it
again.



200
(200) 207

A copy of a letter No. 512 dated the 21st March 1914
from the Political Agent, Bahrain, to Shaikh 'Abdul Aziz
bin 'Abdul Rahman bin Sa'ud, Amir of Nejd.

In continuation of my letter of the 10th Rabi' II 1332 (= 7th March 1914) and in reply to your letter of 1st Rabi' II 1332 (= 26th February 1914) I have received instructions to inform you that endeavours are being made by the High British Government to effect an arrangement with the Turkish Government and discussions are in progress. It would therefore not be advisable for you to take independent action in the matter.

I hope you are enjoying good health. This is what had to be said and may you be preserved and salaam.



207
A copy of a letter No. 812 dated the 21st March 1914
from the Political Agent, Bahrain, to Sheikh 'Abdul Aziz
bin 'Abdul Rahman bin Sa'ud, Amir of Nejd.

In continuation of my letter of the 10th Rabi' II 1332 (= 7th March 1914) and in reply to your letter of 1st Rabi' II 1332 (= 28th February 1914) I have received instructions to inform you that endeavours are being made by the High British Government to effect an arrangement with the Turkish Government and discussions are in progress. It would therefore not be advisable for you to take independent action in the matter.
I hope you are enjoying good health. This is what had to be said and may you be preserved and blessed.



201 (202)
208

Telegram. P.

From Mr F.E. Crow, C.M.G., H.M.'s Consul, Basrah.

To Embassy Constantinople, Repeated Knox, Resident, Bushire.

No. 20.

Dated and received 23rd March 1914. (7. pm)

Please refer to telegram No. 2 of March 16th from the Foreign Office.

Information has reached me of the recent arrival here of Major Muhammad Zaki, son of a former Wali of Basrah named Arif Bey, and of his departure last week, after an interview with the Wali, to Zubair and Kuwait in disguise. Possibly his journey may be connected with the rumoured expedition to Hasa.

Regular drill is being carried on by the troops and the artillery are exercised on the desert every day. More troops are rumoured to be coming from Baghdad. A relief of ten men were sent to Qatar on March 14th.

Crow.

Telegram. P.

From Major S.G. Knox, Resident Bushire.

To Foreign.

No. 345.


Dated 24th March 1914 (9 a.m.)

I repeat telegram No. 20 of March 23rd from Basrah.

"Please.....

.....March 14th".

Knox.





DRAFT—(For Approval).

POLITICAL RESIDENCY, PERSIAN GULF.

No. C12

Dated April 7th 1914.

Sir,

- In continuation of my letter No C11 dated 2nd inst. I have the honor to report further on the subject of Bin Saud and the Turkish Government.
2. Yesterday Sir Hamarack received a letter from Bin Saud enclosing a copy of that recently addressed to him by the Political Agent at Bahrain and asking for advice. The Shaikh asked me what reply he should give. I said that Bin Saud should be told to continue to act in conformity with the advice given him by Major Tennant, and to abstain from further action for the present. His Excellency then told me clearly that what Bin Saud desired was the same position as that assured to the Shaikh of Kuwait under the recent Anglo Turkish Agreement; viz, autonomy with British protection under Turkish suzerainty, and added that, in his opinion, any other arrangement would result in endless trouble ^{in the future} for the Arabs, for the Turks, and for ourselves. I replied that the question had been referred to His

9,000-3-10



- Majesty's Government, and that Bin Saud's best chance of obtaining a solution which would be satisfactory to himself would be implicitly to adhere to the instructions which he had received. To this Sir Mubarak agreed.
3. Further letters also arrived yesterday from the Wali of Basrah and Saïjid Talib in which Sir Mubarak was informed that the Ottoman Government had signified their intention of conferring upon him and upon Si Khazal Khan of Muhammarah the decoration of the Osmanieh in the first class, and the Wali expressed a wish to come to Kuwait for the purpose of investing Sir Mubarak with the insignia thereof. His Excellency asked me what I thought of this. I replied that as he had already expressed to the Turks his regret at not being able to act as an intermediary in their negotiations with Bin Saud he need feel no awkwardness in accepting this mark of favour at their hands. He remarked that the presence of the Wali of Basrah in Kuwait at the present moment would be likely to lead to misunderstandings, as his object would certainly be to use this place as a base from whence to carry on negotiations with Bin Saud, and asked whether it would not be better for him to borrow my launch - his own being hors de combat at present - and



203

204

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OFFICE NOTE.

proceed to Fao for the investiture, explaining to the wali that this course would save him trouble and the inconvenience of prolonging his journey. I can see nothing objectionable in this ~~course~~^{proposal} from the local point of view, but it appears better that I should ask you to telegraph to the Government of India asking whether for any reason it would be well to allow the wali to come to Kuwait, and if you see no objection I hope you will do this and ask for a reply at their earliest convenience.

4. I append a translation of a letter recently written by Bin Saud to Saïid Talib from which it will be seen that he has no intention at present of entering into any agreement with the Turks. He is now some distance north of Riyadh, but his advance is not intended as a hostile demonstration.
5. In letter No 39902/13 dated 2^d October last from His Majesty's Foreign Office to India Office it is stated that Hakkî Pasha, in thanking His Majesty's Government on behalf of the Pate for their friendly offer of good offices in the difficulty with Bin Saud, adds that if the necessity arises the

S 1918-5,000-3-06



Porte will not fail to avail itself
of them. Sir P. Cox, in his
"memorandum of guidance" for
Major Parn at his meeting with
Bin Saud in December last,
observes that "it may be taken
for granted that the Porte will be
anxious to avoid our mediation
if possible"; and the local state
of affairs at the moment leads
me to fear that, notwithstanding
Hakki Pasha's apparent readiness
to ~~formulate~~ frankly to exchange
views at the discussions which
have recently taken place in London,
the replies of the Porte to the
representations of His Majesty's
Government may be purposely
delayed pending the result of
the efforts which are being made
locally to effect a settlement with
Bin Saud, a settlement which,
whatever its exact terms may be,
will certainly be opposed to our
interests, and fatal to the future
peace and prosperity of certain
regions adjoining the Persian Gulf.

Jr

W



OFFICE NOTE.

Abd. ul. Azis
Translation of letter from Bin
Saud to Saïyid Talib of Basrah.
undated.

After compliments.

I was very pleased to receive your
letter signifying your devotion to
the Exalted Government (Porte),
which devotion I share, as you
know brother that I am the first
in wishing well to that Government
and Country. And it is with
great grief that I have to ask you
to represent the persons charged
with the business that although
I do not waver in allegiance
to Islam or turn from obedience
to the Porte there are things that
I cannot do. Please present my
good wishes to Anwar Pasha the
present War Minister and assure
him that I also desire the
union of Islam and the binding
together of separated hearts, and
moreover that I am grateful to
him for having sent H. E. Saïyid Umar
Fauzi Beg for the establishment
of friendly relations and for the
latter having brought a valuable
present in the shape of the
Turbe Koon.

S 1918 -5,000-3-06



But it is not hidden from you
that the affairs of our country
at the present moment are in
a very strange condition, of
which indeed the description
is impossible, and that I am
not responsible for this. If the
Government's intentions are really
to protect the country from various
dangers and to gather Islam
together in obedience to the Khalifat.
Then this can only be done by
diplomatic measures followed
by a proclamation, and it is
for the Pate to accomplish this
with those people whose good
qualities cause the countries of
the world to remain in repose,
whom we know and on whom
we depend and do not wish
to displease by actions contrary
to our promises to them.

Please give my respects to
Saïyid Umar Faïzi Beg and
give assurances of my friendship
in all necessary places. And
as for the valuable present, I
accept it, and hope you will
convey my excuses, and salams.

—
* H. M's Government is meant
here.



DRAFT—(For Approval).

POLITICAL RESIDENCY, PERSIAN GULF.

No. *5/0*

Dated *8/4* 1914.

205 (206)
212

My dear Knox,

My official No C 12
of yesterday.


I don't want the wali of
Basrah here just now & he
does Imbarak; but in view
of the friendly negotiations
which are at present taking
place in London it may
perhaps be better to allow him
to come; hence my proposed
WTelegram.

Could you let me have the
reply as soon as you get it.

Yr friend

W. H. S.

9,000-3-10





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 972 of 1914.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 2nd April 1914.

206 (207)

213


A copy of the undermentioned telegrams is forwarded,
with compliments, to the Political Agent, Kuwait, for information, in continuation of this office endorsement No. 916, dated 29th March 1914.

By Order,

P.S. Lock
Lieutenant,
Assistant Resident.

No. 21, dated 24th, received 29th March, 1914, from His Majesty's
Consul, Basrah, to Embassy, Constantinople, repeated Resident,
Bushire.

No. 368, dated 29th March 1914, from Resident, Bushire, to
Foreign.





207 (208)

214

Telegram. P.

From Crow Basrah.

To Embassy Constantinople, repeated Knox Resident.

No. 21.

Dated 24th March 1914 (received 29th March 1914)

Please refer to my telegram No. 20.

"Omar Fauzi" is, I hear, the real name of the officer in question.

One officer with 13 men was sent by the Budrie on March 8th as well as the stores; none were despatched on March 14th.

Crow.

Telegram. P.

From Major S.G. Knox, Resident Bushire.

To Foreign.

No. 368.

Dated 29th March 1914 (5.15 p.m.)

I received on March 29th and repeat telegram No. 21 dated March 24th from Basrah.

"Please.....

.....March 14th".

Knox.




507 (208)


414

Telegram. P.
From Gbow Bahrain.
To Embassy Constantinople, repeated Knox Resident.
No. 21.
Dated 24th March 1914 (received 28th March 1914)

Please refer to my telegram No. 20.
"Omar Fawzi" is, I hear, the real name of the officer in
question.
One officer with 15 men was sent by the British on March
8th as well as the others; none were despatched on March 14th.
Gbow.

Telegram. P.
From Major H.G. Knox, Resident Bushire.
To Foreign.
No. 208.
Dated 28th March 1914 (8.15 p.m.)
I received on March 28th and repeat telegram No. 21
dated March 24th from Bahrain.
"Please....."
"March 14th".
Knox.











210
216

A copy of a demi-official letter No. 11 dated March 28th 1914 from F.E. Crow, Esquire, ^{G.M.G.} His Majesty's Consul, Basrah, to Major S.G. Knox, C.I.E. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Your confidential 869 of March 24th about Bin Sa'ud. I have got standing orders to repeat to Bushire all communications on this subject as well as on that of the bar buoys, lights and navigation at the entrance of the Shatt.


My telegrams 20 and 21 of March 23rd and 24th to Embassy were repeated to you and I have no more information at present but will of course keep you informed of all developments.

I do not at present see signs of preparation for an expedition to Hasa. The troops at Basrah, including the 796 (of whom 17 were officers) who came in the Saratow, number under 1200. About 150 of these are in hospital. The artillery consists of 4 Pompoms, 2 machine guns, 2 field pieces and a mule battery of 4 guns. These are regularly exercised on the desert but no guns fired to my knowledge. The troops are also exercised and drilled daily.

Orders were received in February to send a force to Hasa but no steps taken to carry them out. The matter was left over till the new Wali arrived and since I have seen no indications of movement. Officers formerly stationed here have been removed or pensioned and many of the officers of the Hasa garrison have been sent to Baghdad to be court martialled. I asked Erskine on March 20th to keep me informed of any troops despatched here from Baghdad but he has reported no movement. It was rumoured here that more were coming. Erskine writes to say there is nothing in it. He does not think there are 1200 in Baghdad all told.

If a force goes to Hasa it will have to be a large one,

a



210
211
A copy of a semi-official letter No. 11 dated March
1884 from F.E. Knox, Esquire, His Majesty's Consul,
Bahrain, to Major E.G. Knox, O.I.E. Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Your confidential 883 of March 24th about Bin Saud. I
have got standing orders to repeat to Bushire all com-
munications on this subject as well as on that of the per-
petrators, lights and navigation at the entrance of the Gulf.
My telegram 80 and 81 of March 23rd and 24th to Bushire
were repeated to you and I have no more information at
present but will of course keep you informed of all devel-
opments.

I do not at present see signs of preparation for an ex-
pedition to Haas. The troops at Haas, including the 788
(of whom 14 were officers) who came in the Bahrain, number
under 1800. About 180 of these are in hospital. The ar-
tillery consists of 4 pom-poms, 2 machine guns, 2 field
pieces and a mule battery of 4 guns. These are regularly
exercised on the desert but no guns fired to my knowledge.
The troops are also exercised and drilled daily.
Orders were received in February to send a force to Haas
but no steps taken to carry them out. The matter was left
over till the new Wall arrived and since I have seen no
indications of movement. Officers formerly stationed here
have been removed or pensioned and many of the officers
of the Haas Garrison have been sent to Baghdad to be court-
martialled. I asked Erskine on March 20th to keep me in-
formed of any troops despatched here from Baghdad but he
has reported no movement. It was rumoured here that more
were coming. Erskine writes to say there is nothing in it.
He does not think there are 1800 in Baghdad all told.
If a force goes to Haas it will have to be a large one.



211
212 217
a brigade at least I suppose. They will not take on the
job with the 1200 men here, many of whom would not be
available. Besides they would not entirely denude Basrah.



212 (S.S.)
a brigade at least I suppose. They will not take on the
job with the 1200 men here, many of whom would not be
available. Besides they would not entirely demoralise Basrah.



Very Confidential.




212 (213)
219
7th April 1914.


My dear Colonel,


I am directed to send for your confidential information a copy of a memorandum in regard to the Bin Sa'ud question, which has been communicated to Hakki Pasha.

*Yours sincerely
P.S. Loch*

Lieut-Colonel W.G. Grey,
Political Agent,
Kuwait.









Turkey.

Confidential.

March 9.

Section 1.

(10569).

No. 1.

Memorandum communicated to Hakki Pasha, March 9, 1914

BIN SA'UD.

The subject being a complicated one it has seemed more convenient to draw up an informal memorandum for the personal information and use of His Highness Hakki Pasha.

In August last it was explained to His Highness that Bin Sa'ud, by the fact of his assumption of control at Qatif and 'Oqair and the coast-line of the Hasa province, had now entered specifically into the sphere of Gulf politics and commerce; and that important British interests and obligations in the Gulf (e.g. in connection with the maintenance of the maritime peace, the suppression of piracy, and the arms traffic; the settlement of pearling and slavery disputes) made it impossible for us to ignore Bin Sa'ud and pretend to treat the province and coast of Hasa as politically derelict. We must necessarily have relations with some one in de facto authority, and the Turks having evacuated the region we must deal with Bin Sa'ud and were glad to explain the position to them.

The above communication was an obviously frank and friendly act prompted by our desire to act with them in a spirit of mutual confidence and co-operation.

Hakki Pasha received the communication very favourably and ^{pleased} received that the Porte was already in negotiation with Bin Sa'ud and that if occasion for our mediation arose it would be taken advantage of.

In spite of this friendly response by His Highness we
know



220

Turkey.
Confidential.
March 9.
Section I.

(10863).

No. I.

Memorandum communicated to Hakkı Pasha, March 9, 1914

BIN SA'UD.

The subject being a complicated one it has seemed more convenient to draw up an informal memorandum for the personal information and use of His Highness Hakkı Pasha.

In August last it was explained to His Highness that Bin Sa'ud, by the fact of his assumption of control at Dair and Qadair and the coast-line of the Hasa province, had now entered specifically into the sphere of Gulf politics and commerce; and that important British interests and obligations in the Gulf (e.g. in connection with the maintenance of the maritime peace, the suppression of piracy, and the arms traffic) the settlement of passing and, always disputed) made it impossible for us to ignore Bin Sa'ud and pretend to treat the province and coast of Hasa as politically detached. We must necessarily have relations with some one in de facto authority, and the Turks having evacuated the region we must deal with Bin Sa'ud and were glad to explain the position to them.

The above communication was an obviously frank and friendly one, and was prompted by our desire to act with them in a spirit of mutual confidence and co-operation.

Hakkı Pasha received the communication very favourably and received that the Porte was already in negotiation with Bin Sa'ud and that it seemed for our mediation arose it would be taken advantage of.

In spite of this friendly response by His Highness we know



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216 221

know from reliable local information that just after this exchange of communications, or conceivably just before it, the Ottoman Government were endeavouring to arrange terms with Bin Sa'ud, some of which were clearly directed against the British Government and British interests. Thus, according to our information, the following are the conditions which the Porte are endeavouring to impose on Bin Sa'ud as the price of his partial autonomy:-

1. The readmission of the Turkish garrisons to the province and coast of Hasa as formerly.
2. The appointment of Qazis and other judicial officers by direct "farmans" issued by the Sultan.
3. The payment by Bin Sa'ud of annual revenue of £ T 3,000.
4. The reference of all communications from foreign Powers or their representatives to the Turkish authorities for disposal.
5. The exclusion of all foreign merchants and agents from the province.
6. An undertaking from Bin Sa'ud not to give concessions to any foreign companies for railways or motor-car services.

Incidentally, the Minister of the Interior has since informed His Majesty's Ambassador (1st December 1913) that the Ottoman Government had decided to recognise the recent fait accompli in Najd (Hasa) by nominating Bin Sa'ud as Mutessarif of that district.

The first three of the six conditions above quoted refer to matters with which we are not immediately concerned, but considering the frank communication made to Hakki Pasha in August by His Majesty's Foreign Office, it would not be unnatural that His Majesty's Government should be greatly surprised at the terms of the latter three, especially 4 and 5 and, if the information proved to be correct, should feel constrained to protest strongly against them.

The only explanation of such conditions would appear to be



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know from reliable local information that just after this
exchange of communications, or conceivably just before it,
the Ottoman Government were endeavouring to arrange terms
with Bin Sa'ud, some of which were clearly directed against
the British Government and British interests. Thus, according
to our information, the following are the conditions which the
Porte are endeavouring to impose on Bin Sa'ud as the price
of his partial autonomy:-

1. The reduction of the Turkish garrisons to the province
and coast of Haas as formerly.
2. The appointment of Gazis and other judicial officers by
direct "farmans" issued by the Sultan.
3. The payment by Bin Sa'ud of annual revenue of £ 5,000.
4. The renunciation of all communications from foreign Powers
or their representatives to the Turkish authorities for
disposal.
5. The exclusion of all foreign merchants and agents from the
province.
6. An undertaking from Bin Sa'ud not to give concessions to
any foreign companies for railways or motor-carriage-ways.

Incidentally, the Minister of the Interior has since in-
formed His Majesty's Ambassador (at December 1913) that the
Ottoman Government had decided to recognize the recent fall
accomplish in Kaja (Haas) by nominating Bin Sa'ud as Ambassador
of that district.

The first three of the six conditions above quoted refer to
matters with which we are not immediately concerned, but
considering the frank communication made to Haki Pasha in
August by His Majesty's Foreign Office, it would not be
unnatural that His Majesty's Government should be greatly
surprised at the terms of the latter three, especially 4 and
5 and, if the information proved to be correct, should feel
constrained to protest strongly against them.

The only explanation of such conditions would appear to
be



216
(217) 222

be that the Porte mistrust the assurances already offered of our readiness to co-operate, and that they fail to appreciate the difficulties in which we are placed by the continuance of the present unsatisfactory state of affairs between themselves and Bin Sa'ud.

We fully recognise that Najd is an Ottoman province, and have no desire to interfere in it, but for the reasons already given we cannot ignore Bin Sa'ud now that he is in occupation of the coast-line. There is no secret regarding our requirements. What we require of him, for the maintenance and protection of our interests is:-

1. That he should not meddle in the territory or politics of Arab principalities in the Gulf, including Trucial Coast and Qatar.
2. That like other Shaikhs on the Arab side of the Gulf he should co-operate for the observation and maintenance of the maritime truce, i.e. the suppression of piracy and the pursuit of inter-tribal hostilities by the passage of armed dhows at sea.
3. That he should co-operate for the suppression of the arms traffic.
4. That British traders should be freely admitted to Qatif, and properly treated while there.

There is nothing in these conditions to which either Bin Sa'ud or the Porte can take the least legitimate objection; at the same time it is only natural that while expressing his readiness to accept the obligations involved, Bin Sa'ud should in turn desire the friendly offices of the British Government in the composition of his quarrel with the Turkish authorities, and should ask us to deter Shaikhs in relations with us from harbouring tribal enemies of his.

We had no wish to intrude ourselves, but the terms of the conditions which, as we hear, the Porte now seek to impose on Bin Sa'ud, show so little friendliness toward ourselves, and
are



217
218

be that the Porte mistrust the assurances already offered of
our readiness to co-operate, and that they fail to ap-
preciate the difficulties in which we are placed by the
continuance of the present unsatisfactory state of affairs
between themselves and Bin Sa'ud.

We fully recognize that Najd is an Ottoman province,
and have no desire to interfere in it, but for the reasons
already given we cannot ignore Bin Sa'ud now that he is in
occupation of the coast-line. There is no secret regarding
our requirements. What we require of him, for the maintenance
and protection of our interests in-
1. That he should not meddle in the territory or politics of
Arab principalities in the Gulf, including Trucial Coast and
Qatar.

2. That like other Sheikhs on the Arab side of the Gulf he
should co-operate for the observation and maintenance of the
maritime truce, i.e. the suppression of piracy and the pursuit
of inter-tribal hostilities by the passage of armed troops at
sea.

3. That he should co-operate for the suppression of the arms
traffic.

4. That British traders should be freely admitted to Qatar,
and properly treated while there.

There is nothing in these conditions to which either Bin
Sa'ud or the Porte can take the least legitimate objection; at
the same time it is only natural that while expressing his
readiness to accept the obligations involved, Bin Sa'ud should
in turn desire the friendly offices of the British Government
in the composition of his quarrel with the Turkish authorities,
and should ask us to deter Sheikhs in relations with us from
harbouring tribal enemies of his.

We had no wish to intrude ourselves, but the terms of the
conditions which, as we hear, the Porte now seek to impose on
Bin Sa'ud, show so little friendliness toward ourselves, and

219



(217) 217
223

are so impossible of acquiescence, that we are obliged to return to the subject.

We are primarily concerned to see the last three conditions withdrawn, but we should also be glad to see a satisfactory arrangement come to with Bin Sa'ud by the Porte, under which as a corollary of their decision to regard Bin Sa'ud as ex-officio Mutessarif of Hasa, they should approve and take cognizance of his undertaking to comply locally without four desiderata above detailed, and, while reserving the right to take in the last resort whatever action they may deem necessary, should, by way of friendly co-operation with the British Government for the preservation of peace and good order in the Gulf, agree to refrain from hostile action by sea against the Hasa coast, without first consulting us, and giving us an opportunity of friendly mediation if such be possible.

Foreign Office,
March 9, 1914.



are so impossible of acquiescence, that we are obliged to
return to the subject.
We are primarily concerned to see the last three condi-
tions withdrawn, but we should also be glad to see a satis-
factory arrangement come to with Bin Saud by the Porte,
under which as a corollary of their decision to regard Bin
Saud as ex-officio Mussulim of Haas, they should approve
and take cognizance of his undertaking to comply locally
with our desiderata above detailed, and, while reserving
the right to take in the last resort whatever action they
may deem necessary, should, by way of friendly co-opera-
tion with the British Government for the preservation of
peace and good order in the Gulf, agree to refrain from
hostile action by sea against the Haas coast, without first
consulting us, and giving us an opportunity of friendly
mediation if such be possible.

Foreign Office,
March 9, 1914.



(2A) 218
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A copy of a letter dated the 10th March 1914 at Camp
XXVIII at Riyadh, from Captain W.H.I. Shakespear, to the
Political Resident Bushire.

Please observe the address above! I got here yesterday
with my camels nearly done out owing to want of grazing as
the whole of my route was through country which had had no
rain before I reached it. My trip so far has been full of
interest geographically. From Kuwait to Rigai, thence along
the whole course of the Batin until Ajibba (not in map) but)
on the Buraidah road. I shall be able to tell you all about
the Wadi ar-Ruma connection with the Batin now - then south
and east to Zilfi. So far this route has not been travelled
before. From Zilfi to Majma'a along an untravelled route, from
Majma'a the ordinary route through the Sadair villages to
Hasi thence unexplored via Baubem to Riyadh, where I camped
by the Shaikh's gardens to the north of the town. I am having
a sort of Royal Duke's progress and if the present state of
affairs continues I shall soon be able to set up as a Bedouin
Chief on my own with quite a respectable flock of sheep!

The Bin Sa'ud are overwhelming in their kindness, fore-
thought and friendliness. I had not been camped an hour before
two huge buck-niggers stationed as police to drive off inqui-
sitive small boys etc; loads of firewood, green stuff for
camels, sheep, rice etc for the men all ~~arrived~~ arrived in
about another hour with a mare for me to ride. After a wash
and change I rode in in the moonlight into the town by the
big East Gate and got as warm a welcome from 'Abdul Aziz and
his brothers as I could possibly have wished. This morning I
was taken to call on Bin Sa'ud's father, the Imam 'Abdur
Rahman whom I found a delightfully courteous and friendly old
gentleman, rather a surprise as he ^{was} supposed to be a very
austere and severe type of Archbishop.

It is bad luck but I can't attempt anything further south
and



282 (28) 219
A copy of a letter dated the 10th March 1914 at Camp
XXVII at Riyadh, from Captain W.H.I. Shakespear, to the
Political Resident Bahrain.

Please observe the address above! I got here yesterday
with my camera nearly gone out owing to frost as
the whole of my route was through country which had no
rain before I reached it. My trip so far has been full of
interest geographically. From Kuwait to Hail, thence along
the whole course of the Hail well (not in map) but
on the Buraidah road. I shall be able to tell you all about
the Hadl ar-Ramadh connection with the Hail now - then south
and east to Hail. So far this route has not been travelled
before. From Hail to Najma's along an untravelled route, from
Najma's the ordinary route through the Bahari villages to
Hail thence unexplored via Bahari to Hail, where I camped
by the Bahari's gardens to the north of the town. I am having
a sort of Royal Duke's progress and if the present state of
affairs continues I shall soon be able to set up as a Bedouin
Chief on my own with quite a respectable flock of sheep!
The Bin Saud are overwhelming in their kindness, fore-
thought and friendliness. I had not been camped an hour before
two huge bush-niggers stationed as police to drive off indus-
trious small boys shot loads of live wood, green stuff for
camels, sheep, rice etc for the men all which arrived in
about another hour with a mare for me to ride. After a wash
and change I rode in the moonlight into the town by the
big East Gate and got as warm a welcome from 'Abdul Aziz and
his brothers as I could possibly have wished. This morning I
was taken to call on Bin Saud's father, the Imam 'Abdur-
Rahman whom I found a delightfully courteous and friendly old
gentleman, rather a surprise as he was supposed to be a very
severe and severe type of Arabist.
It is bad luck but I can't attempt anything further south
and



220 219
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and shall go north again by the Dariyah Tharmidah, Shaqra, Wadi-as-Sirr, road to Anisizah and Buraidah; most of the road through Washm is unexplored I believe.

Why I can't go south is (a) my camels are so done out that they must have 4 or 6 ^{days}/complete rest with high feeding and then only short marches until I can either change them in Qasim or strike good grazing there, (b) Bin Sa'ud has called out all his southern raiding contingents (c) Bin Sa'ud himself is leaving on the 12th March to join the whole of his forces in the desert east and north, somewhere in the Bahana near Judah, and (d) the desert south in Hawtah and Afraj has had no rain and is as bare as one's hand. It is bad luck but can't be helped and I must try and make up for it by exploring elsewhere - as it is I have a heap of new material.

Bin Sa'ud has called out his raiding parties, ostensibly for his usual Spring raids on Bedouin, but really as he told me in confidence because he does not want to be caught napping by the Turks at Qatif or 'Oqair. The reason is that he has had information (a fortnight after I left Kuwait) that a Russian steamer which must have arrived in Basrah now was bringing out 1500 European Turkish troops with the new Wali Suliman Nathif - that these troops ~~will~~ may be intended for a dash on Qatif and Hasa. I pity them if they do land and are not covered by a man-of-war's guns as Bin Sa'ud has about 5000 or 6000 more or less trained men, besides clouds of Bedouins and he will probably pin them to the coast and then suddenly wipe them out. Anyway he is taking no chances.

He is awaiting an answer from Government most anxiously anent the conference we had at 'Oqair in December, and if I may venture to suggest it, it will be well worth our while to give him some sort of reassuring hint as soon as possible. He tried to pump me as to what would be our line, were he to agree to the Turkish request for the exclusion of foreigners and all direct relations with them or their Governments. I told him I was on leave and knew nothing of our probable attitude



and shall go north again by the Darjeh Tharishah, Shagra,
Wadi-as-Sirt, road to Anishah and Buraidah; most of the
road through Wadi is unexplored I believe.
Why I can't go south is (a) my camels are so done out that
they must have 4 or 5 complete rest with high feeding and then
only short marches until I can either change them in Gassah
or strike good grazing there. (b) Bin Sa'ud has called out
all his southern raiding contingents (c) Bin Sa'ud himself
is leaving on the 12th March to join the whole of his forces
in the desert east and north, somewhere in the Baharna near
Jubah, and (d) the desert south in Hedjaz and Atiq has had
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information (a fortnight after I left Kuwait) that a Russian
steamer which must have arrived in Basrah now was bringing out
1500 European Turkish troops with the new Wali Sulaiman Khatib -
that these troops were intended for a dash on Gatif
and Hama. I pity them if they do land and are not covered by
a man-of-war's guns as Bin Sa'ud has about 5000 or 6000 more
or less trained men, besides clouds of Bedouin and he will
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He tried to pump me as to what would be our line, were he to
agree to the Turkish request for the exclusion of foreigners
and all direct relations with them or their Governments. I
told him I was on leave and knew nothing of our probable at-
titude



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
attitude, but as a pal it seemed to me unwise on his part to bind himself so irrevocably, because should he agree to this or similar conditions, presumably as an honest man, he would be bound to adhere to it; moreover the Turkish Government would probably inform us officially of it and request us to correspond with their Basrah authorities in all matters touching the Hasa Coast, a request with which, in the circumstances we should be compelled to conform. Supposing this situation to have been created we would be no forwarder in the matters Trevor and I discussed with him than at any time while the Turks held Hasa and he himself would probably have stifled any chance he had of freeing himself from Turkish interference. I suggested that he had no cause for hurry or impatience at present, and certainly I could see no reason why he need bind himself until at least he was seriously threatened by the Turks. In any case, should he give the undertaking required by the Turks I failed to see how in the natural course of affairs it could have any real permanence or how it would bring him the peace and security from interference which he desired to much. I trust this will not be disapproved altogether, but if so our position is correct enough as I told him repeatedly I had no authority even to discuss these things being on leave and out to see the world and all I said would be open to disavowal by our Government.


One suggestion which I venture to make privately owing to my own liking and opinion of Bin Sa'ud and perhaps because of my distance from the Coast! is that, should there be any truth in the rumours of a Turkish descent on Qatif and Ojair, could we not send a man-of-war or two to Bahrain at the psychological moments, ostensibly to see that the troops did not use Bahrain as a base and really with the hope that it might have the same effect as the despatch to ships to Kuwait did at the time (was it 1894?) when Ibn Rashid said to be supported by Turkish troops from Basrah contemplated an attack on Kuwait -

viz



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attitude, but as a pal it seemed to me unlikely on his part to
bind himself so irrevocably, because should he agree to this
or similar conditions, presumably as an honest man, he would
be bound to adhere to it; moreover the Turkish Government
would probably inform us officially of it and request us to
correspond with their Persian authorities in all matters touch-
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we should be compelled to conform. Supposing this situation
to have been created we would be no forwarder in the matter
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Turks held Hasa and he himself would probably have attested any
change he had of treating himself from Turkish interference. I
suggested that he had no cause for hurry or impatience at
present, and certainly I could see no reason why he need bind
himself well at least he was seriously threatened by the
Turks. In any case, should he give the undertaking required
by the Turks I failed to see how in the natural course of
affairs it could have any real permanence or how it would
bring him the peace and security from interference which he
desired so much. I trust this will not be disapproved also-
gether, but it is our position is correct enough as I told
him repeatedly I had no authority even to discuss these things
being on leave and out to see the world and all I said would
be open to disavowal by our Government.
One suggestion which I venture to make privately owing to
my own liking and opinion of Bin Saud and perhaps because of
my distance from the Coast is that, should there be any truth
in the rumour of a Turkish descent on Qatif and Qajar, could
we not send a man-of-war or two to Bahrain at the physico-
gical moment, ostensibly to see that the troops did not use
Bahrain as a base and really with the hope that it might have
the same effect as the despatch to ships to Kuwait did at the
time (was it 1904?) when Ibn Rashid said to be supported by
Turkish troops from Basrah contemplated an attack on Kuwait -
viz







CONFIDENTIAL



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
7th April 1914.


Dear Sir,

Many thanks for your demi-official letter of 27th March 1914 about Ibn Rashid and Turkish troops at Zubair. I think this must be the exercising in the desert to which Crow refers in the demi-official correspondence of 4th March which went to you by last mail. I don't read quite the same meaning into the words "independent action" in Foreign Department telegram No. 186 D.S. dated 17th March. The general trend of the correspondence shows, I think, that what Foreign feared was not so much warlike operations as that Bin Sa'ud should be entangled into some agreement with the Turks wherein our interests might suffer. With both parties engaged in preparations for war and the Turkish preparations apparently the least efficient, I hope we need have no apprehensions on that score. As Crow is nearer Zubair and his news is a day later than yours, I have not wired to Foreign. Your report No.C.11 dated 2nd April will, of course, go on.

Lieut-Colonel W.G. Grey,
Political Agent,
Kuwait.

Yours sincerely
J. M. Wood







Reply dated 14th April.

"Yours of 7th re Bin Saud. The point is that there is not much use in warning a man in Bin Saud's position unless we are at the same time giving him some encouragement of a tangible description.

"Independent Action" of course refers to the making of an agreement on his own account, but the Turks are trying to bluff, coerce, or coax him into this as they may be able, and if we could ask them to desist from all action pending the negotiations it would be some encouragement which to maintain his present attitude.

Yr S^{vt}

W^h



DRAFT—(For Approval).

POLITICAL RESIDENCY, PERSIAN GULF.

No. C/3

Dated April 14th 1914.

224 (225)
231

Sir,

In continuation of my letter
No C 12 dated 7th inst: I have
the honour to report further on the
subject of Bin Saud and the
Turkish Government.

2. The Turkish plans in regard to
the negotiations have again
changed. A letter of which a
translation is attached was
received on the 12th inst: from
Said Talib. It intimates
that the management of these
affairs has now been entrusted
to him: that he is coming to
~~Kowait~~ ^{Kowait} in company with the
Bimbashi Said Umar Fauzi
Beg and the Chief of the
Baghdad Staff: and that they
hope to meet Bin Saud when
he arrives in the immediate
neighbourhood. Sir Mubarak
has promised to inform Said
Talib of the arrival of Bin
Saud at Subaiyah some 20
miles south of Kowait where he

9,000-3-10



is expected to be in about ten days time; the party will then come to Kuwait, and if Bin Saud is still in the neighbourhood when they arrive the meeting may take place, but it is doubtful whether Bin Saud will consent to an interview as he is said to be determined to give no reply other than that contained in his letter to Saïyid Talib, the enclosure to my letter no C 12 dated 9th inst:

3. Possibly the position of affairs may change when the and if the deputation have found that a personal discussion fails to modify the attitude of Bin Saud in regard to the negotiations, but it would apparently be advisable to press the Turkish Government for an early reply to the Foreign Office Memorandum of March 9th last, and, if possible, to induce them to abstain from further attempts to arrange matters without our assistance pending the consideration of such reply by His Majesty's Government.

In W.



صورت كتاب السيد طالب الذي جانا منه

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امين

حقة الرجل الا فخر حميد المكارم والشيخ سيد الموالدي العظوف شيخ مبارك باشا الصباح المحترم دام علاه
 عيب تقديم بفضيلة الدلائق الاحداث الفايقة بناء على امر نظارة الداخلية بلقننا العوام
 الجليل بان حل الخلاف الموجود بهذا الطرف وهي المسئلة، المعاشة بين الحكومة والامير بن سعود
 تتحول لعمدة ولدكم وتحت رياسته وطلبت ان يكون ذلك هيئة مخصوصة فتقرر على
 طلبة تعيين رئيس اركان حربية بغداد القاطن بها الذي بك الذي شانهوه وبه
 عنا بل اخينا السيد عمر فوزي بك البليالي الذي هو حالاً رئيس اركان حرب فرقة
 البحر وقصر فيران السابق فتحن حاضرين للمواجبة مع الامير المشاري وقد
 اذبح عبد العزيز اخنذ ما عليكم المشورة بهذا الخصوص وان الامير بناء على طلبكم تقرب
 لاطراف الكويت فنرجو ان تكون تلك المشورة ويصير في ملك او محل مناسب
 لتسهيل المذاكرة والمخارة وتعرفونا عن ذلك في صورة مناسبة اما تظفروا فيا
 من الفاو او مع أي مخصوص فذلك محول لرايكم والنيتان العالي تحمل مفا
 ونقدمه لخدمتكم هذا وارجو الجواب عاجل ودام ام بقاءكم سيد
 طالب

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OFFICE NOTE.

226 (227)
233

~~Translation of a letter dated~~
Letter from Saïyid Talib of
Basrah to H.E. I. R. Sir
Munbarak As Sabah, dated
15th Janadi - al - awal 1332,
(11 April 1914).

After compliments.
According to the orders of the Home
Department the solution of the
present local difficulty, i.e. that
between the Government and the
Amir Bin Saud has been
entrusted to me, and I have
asked for a special arrangement.
In compliance with my request
the Chief of the Staff at Baghdad,
he whom you have already
interviewed Saïyid Umar Fauzi
Beg the Basra Chief of Staff &
formerly Mutasarrif of Firan,
(and I), we three are to
interview the aforesaid Amir,
who, according to your
invitation is shortly to be in the
neighbourhood of Kuwait. So we
hope you will complete this
memorable deed and that
it (the meeting) may be at
Malak x or in some suitable

S 1918-5,000-3706



place favourable for a
Conference; and that you will
inform us of that by telegraphing
to Fao or by a special messenger,
it is for you to decide.
And I will bring the decoration
with me and present it to
your Excellency. We hope for
an early reply, and Salaam.

* Some 10 miles S of Kuwait.



Confidential.

No. 1041 of 1914.


British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 11 April 1914.

A copy of the undermentioned communications is forwarded with compliments to the Political Agent, Kuwait, for information, in continuation of this office endorsement No. 972 dated 2nd April 1914.

By Order,

Pg. Lock
Lieutenant,
Assistant Resident.

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- (1). Resident to Foreign. Letter No. 1036 dated 9th April 1914.
- (2). Consul Basrah to Resident. No. 12 dated 30th March 1914, with enclosures.





8/c
Confidential.

No. 1036 of 1914.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 8 April 1914.

From

Major S.G. Knox, C.I.E.,
Offg: Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf.

To

The Hon'ble Mr. A.H. Grant, C.I.E., I.C.S.
Offg: Foreign Secretary to the Government of India
In the Foreign and Political Department,
S I M L A.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith, for information,

No. C.11 dated 2nd April 1914. the copy of an interesting

letter from the Political Agent, Kuwait, enclosing copies
of correspondence between various Turkish notables and
Shaikh Sir Mubarak bin Subah of Kuwait on the subject of
Bin Sa'ud.

2. I am not inclined to share the views expressed by the
Political Agent, Kuwait, in the last portion of his letter
regarding the advisability of asking the Porte to defer
action pending the result of the discussion of Bin Sa'ud's
position with His Excellency Hakki Pasha. The fact that
such a communication was made could not well be conveyed
to Bin Sa'ud, and would not therefore earn his gratitude,
and, from the general trend of the correspondence, I gather
that the "independent action" against which the Secretary
of State desires Bin Sa'ud should be warned is not so much
warlike preparations to repel a possible invasion as some
form of entangling alliance which might injuriously affect

British



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Confidential.
No. 1036 of 1914.
British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bahrain, 8 April 1914.

From
Major E.G. Knox, O.I.E.,
Offg. Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf.

To
The Hon'ble Mr. A.H. Buxton, O.I.E., I.O.E.,
Offg. Foreign Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign and Political Department,
S.I.M.I.A.

Sir,
I have the honour to forward herewith, for information,
No. 1036 of 1914, the copy of an interesting
letter from the Political Agent, Kuwait, enclosing copies
of correspondence between various Turkish notables and
Sheikh Sir Abdurrahman bin Sabah of Kuwait on the subject of
Bin Saud.
I am not inclined to share the view expressed by the
Political Agent, Kuwait, in the last portion of his letter
regarding the advisability of asking the Porte to defer
action pending the result of the discussion of Bin Saud's
position with His Excellency Hakim Pasha. The fact that
such a communication was made could not well be conveyed
to Bin Saud, and would not therefore earn his gratitude,
and, from the general trend of the correspondence, I gather
that the "independent action" against which the Secretary
of State desires Bin Saud should be warned is not so much
warlike preparations to repel a possible invasion as some
form of entangling alliance which might injuriously affect
British



229 237 (230)
British interests. With both sides engaged in warlike preparations, which, from recent reports, seem unlikely to lead to active operations, it may be hoped that the possibility of ^{such} an understanding between Bin Sa'ud and the Turks is a remote one and, so long as active hostilities do not result and this eventuality is being ~~un~~carefully watched, it would seem, from our point of view, that both parties could not be better employed.

I have the honour to be

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

Major,

Offg: Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.



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235
No.12 Forwarded to British Resident Bushire with the (231)
compliments of the undersigned with reference to his No.
869 of March 24.

Basra March 30, 1914.

(sd) F.E. Crow.

Telegram. His Majesty's Ambassador Constantinople to His
Majesty's Consul, Basrah, No. 20 dated March 27, 1914.

Very Confidential. I have received your telegram No.
20. But what I learn here leads me to believe that no imme-
diate military operations are contemplated by the Turks
against Sa'ud. I received confidential information from the
Minister of the Interior on the 24th instant that arrangements
were being made through the Shaikhs of Kuwait and Muhammareh
and Saiyid Talib Bey in order to arrive at a peaceful solu-
tion. The Minister said terms had been made with the Arabs.
If you have any confirmation of this please telegraph.
Foreign Office have been informed.

Telegram. His Majesty's Consul Basrah to Embassy Constanti-
nople. No 22 dated March 30, 1914.

I had a visit from Talib Bey yesterday. His accounts tends
to confirm the information conveyed in Your Excellency's
telegram 20. He says Mubarak and he are trying to reach an
arrangement for the Turks with Bin Sa'ud. The latter desires
to be an independent Amir and declines to receive Turkish
troops. My informant anticipated a peaceful solution of the
matter. As regards Major 'Omar Fauzi who went to Kuwait. He
took presents from Enver Pasha for Mubarak, Khazal and Bin
Sa'ud and has since returned. I have informed Bushire.



231r
No. 12 Forwarded to British Resident Hashim with the
compliments of the undersigned with reference to his No.
239 of March 24.
Rasid March 30, 1914.
(ad) P. H. Goss.
Telegrams. His Majesty's Ambassador Constantinople to His
Majesty's Consul, Basra, No. 30 dated March 27, 1914.
Very Confidential. I have received your telegram No.
30. But what I learn here leads me to believe that no im-
mediate military operations are contemplated by the Turks
against Basra. I received confidential information from the
Minister of the Interior on the 24th instant that arrangements
were being made through the Sheikh of Kuwait and Hamud
and Salih Talib Bey in order to arrive at a peaceful solu-
tion. The Minister said there had been made with the Arabs.
If you have any confirmation of this please telegraph.
Foreign Office have been informed.
Telegrams. His Majesty's Consul Basra to Embassy Constantin-
ople. No 28 dated March 30, 1914.
I had a visit from Salih Bey yesterday. His account tends
to confirm the information conveyed in your Excellency's
telegram No. 30. He says Hamud and he are trying to reach an
arrangement for the Turks with him. The latter desires
to be an independent Emir and declines to receive British
troops. He informed Salih a peaceful solution of the
matter. As regards Major 'Omar Fawzi who went to Kuwait. He
took provisions from Basra for Hamud, Khalid and his
band and had since returned. I have informed Hashim.



Confidential.

No. 1088 of 1914.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, /4 April 1914.

A copy of the undermentioned communications is forwarded with compliments to the Political Agent, Kuwait, for information, in continuation of this office endorsement No. 1041 dated 11th April 1914.

By Order,


P. S. Loch

Lieutenant,
Assistant Resident.

(1). Resident to Foreign. Telegram No. 433 dated 10th April 1914.

(2).....do.....do.....No. 440 dated 11th April 1914.

R.F.





Telegram. R.

From Major S.G. Knox, Resident Bushire.

To Foreign.

No. 453.


Dated 10th April 1914 (7.28 p.m.)

232
239 (233)

Your telegram No. 202-S of April 9th.

It is clear from report by Political Kuwait dated April 2nd going to you by next mail that an attempt was made by Bimbashi Saiyid 'Umar Fauzi bin 'Arif to enter into communication with 'Abd-al-'Aziz through Shaikh of Kuwait but attempt failed and emissary left Kuwait and returned for Basrah March 25th. Later letters from Wali and Saiyid Talib of Basrah show that renewed attempts are being made by the Wali of Basrah and Shaikh of Kuwait urged to give advice. Shaikh refuses to commit himself. No mention made of terms or their nature. Politicals Kuwait and Muhammareh are being requested to report but Haworth will not return to Muhammareh before April 17th and it takes time to communicate with Kuwait.

Knox.





Telegram. R.

From Major S.G. Knox, Resident Bushire.

To Foreign.

No. 440.

Dated 11th April 1914 (11. p.m.)

233 (234)

240

Negotiations 'Abd-al-Aziz. Political Agent reports:-


"Wali of Basrah informing Shaikh of Kuwait that Government bestows upon him the Order of Osmanieh First Class intimates desire to visit Kuwait for investiture. Shaikh would rather Wali did not come to Kuwait and suggests going to Fao for investiture. Do you see any objection to this or in view of negotiations in progress regarding 'Abd-al-'Aziz would it be better to allow Wali to carry out his plan. Shaikh fears that he may use Kuwait as base to communicate with 'Abd-al-'Aziz and objects to that".

I am inclined to think that it would be better to allow the Wali to come to Kuwait, as we shall then stand better chance of ascertaining Turkish plans. A letter from 'Abd-al-'Aziz to Saiyid Talib of Basrah sends message to Anwar Bay expressing 'Abd-al-'Aziz's inability to enter into negotiations. 'Abd-al-'Aziz continues:-

"If the Porte really wishes to protect the country and unite Islam, this can only be done by diplomatic measures, followed by a proclamation, with those people whose good qualities cause the countries of the world to remain in repose, whom we know and on whom we depend and do not wish to displease by actions contrary to our promises to them".

Full text by mail. Negotiations look rather hopeless and if Wali comes to Kuwait and gets a rebuff, it might help matters in London.

Knox.





14



234 (235)

241

14th April 1914.

My dear Sir,

It is desirable that Major Trevor should get your reports on the Bin Sa'ud question as early as possible, so would you kindly send copy of letters on this subject to him direct.

The usual extra copy for Bushire should be sent as well.


I have asked Major Trevor to send you a copy of his reports in the same way.

Yours sincerely

J. M. R.

Lieut-Colonel W.G. Grey,
Political Agent,
Kuwait.

Letter for Mr
Fisher.
14/4





Confidential.

No. 1120 of 1914.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, /8 April 1914.

A copy of the undermentioned letters is forwarded with
compliments to the Political Agent, Kuwait, for information,
in continuation of this office endorsement No. 1088 dated
14th April 1914.


By Order,

J. S. Lock

Lieutenant,
Assistant Resident.

-
- (1). P.A. Bahrain to Resident, No. 383 dated 6th April 1914,
with enclosure.
- (2).do.....do..... No. 404 dated 10th April 1914,
with enclosure.

R.F.





Confidential.

No. ³⁸³ of 1914

236

(237)

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From

Major A. P. Trevor, C.I.E.

Political Agent,

B A H R E I N.

To,

Major S. G. Knox, C. I. E.

Offg. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

B U S H I R E.

Political Agency,

Bahrein, the 6th April 1914


Sir,


In continuation of the correspondence ending with my letter No.314 dated the 21st March 1914, I have the honour to forward herewith, a copy of a letter which I have received today by special messenger from Bin Saud from which it will be seen that he expects to meet a Turkish Envoy somewhere round about Kowait at an early date.


His messenger is coming to discuss the matter with me to-morrow, but I shall not be able to give him any information which will be acceptable to Bin Saud. In fact it looks probable that unless something definite can be communicated to him very soon, Bin Saud will make his own arrangements with the Turkish Government, and such arrangements may very likely be hostile to our interests.

As the mail steamer has been delayed till to-morrow by a shamal I hope to catch her with this letter which is written in haste, and the translation of Bin Saud's letter has also been done somewhat hastily.

Should you have any news to communicate to Bin Saud after next mail for Bahrein leaves it would probably be









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239

245

Translation of a letter dated the 6th Jamadi I 1332 from
2nd April 1914.

Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman al Faisal Amir of Hejd to
Major A. P. Trevor, C.I.E., Political Agent, Bahrein.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your esteemed letter No.512 of 1914 and to say that I have understood what you mentioned there, specially you inform me that instructions have reached you to let me know that the British Government is making efforts so as to make arrangements with the Turkish Government and the discussions are progressing, it is therefore not advisable that I should take independent action in the matter. I beg to say that I am obliged for that and it is the very object of mine and that I would not change from what I spoke to you verbally Inshaalla presently I expect continuous negotiations from the British Government about what may please the heart.

I have further to inform you that on 11th of the current month I will reach to the desecation of Jubail and this time I received information from the Turkish plenipotentiary who has come from Constantinople directly and his name is Sunbashi Syed Omer Fozi Beg Mardini formerly Vali at Basra now Vali of Suria. He has with him some message and letters and intends to settle between myself and themselves. He has arrived at Basra and apparently will come to Koweit or might have come already. He is bound to see me and I will meet him very soon at the direction of Koweit if God decrees so. I did not like to see him till I had informed ^{you} so that may let me know what is required and in what form it should be. You know of course that I adhere to my word and am firm on the matter that my near me towards the friendship of the British Government and may check my nearing the Turks except in case I can not help, then I will tread a way good for myself. Now Inshaalla you may let me know whatever is necessary, though your first word I had taken by the eye of acceptance, but you know that a man of business desires to know the reality and to settle his case and intention is known to




238
242


Translation of a letter dated the 23rd January 1914 from
2nd April 1914.

Shaykh Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman al Faisal Amir of Nejd to
Major A. P. Trevor, C.I.E., Political Agent, Bahrain.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your esteemed
letter No. 212 of 1914 and to say that I have understood what you
mentioned there, especially you inform me that insurrection have
resisted you to let me know that the British Government is making
efforts so as to make arrangements with the Turkish Government
and the discussions are progressing, it is therefore not advise
able that I should take independent action in the matter. I beg
to say that I am obliged for that and it is the very object of
mine and that I would not change from what I spoke to you verbally
Iraqis. Presently I expect continuous negotiations from the
British Government about what may please the heart.

I have further to inform you that on 11th of the current
month I will reach to the desertion of Jubail and this time I
received information from the Turkish plenipotentiary who has
come from Constantinople directly and his name is Eyub Pasha
Omer Pasha Bag Wardini formerly Wali of Basra now Wali of Suria.
He has with him some message and letters and intends to settle
between myself and themselves. He has arrived at Basra and
apparently will come to Kuwait or might have come already. He
is bound to see me and I will meet him very soon at the discretion
of Kuwait if God desires so. I did not like to see him till I
had informed you so that may let me know what is required and
in what form it should be. You know of course that I adhere
to my word and am firm on the matter that may near me towards
the friendship of the British Government and may check my hear-
ing the Turks except in case I can not help, then I will tread
a way good for myself. Now Iraqis you may let me know what
ever is necessary, though your first word I had taken by the eye
of appearance, but you know that a man of business desires to
know the reality and to settle his case and intention is known







Confidential

240 (240)

No. 404 of 14

From,

Major A. P. Trevor, C. I. E.

Political Agent,

BAHREIN.

To,

Major S. G. KNOX, C. I. E.

Offg. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

BUSHIRE,

POLITICAL AGENCY,

Dated Bahrein, the 10th APRIL 14


Sir,

In continuation of my letter No.383 dated the 6th April 1914 (which did not, after all, catch the last mail steamer before she left and will reach you with this letter) I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of my reply to Bin Saud's letter.

Bin Saud sent a confidential messenger with this letter who had an interview with me. He said that Bin Saud would like to have another meeting with me, and asked if I could arrange it. I replied that I should like very much to see Bin Saud again, but I did not think it would be advisable for me to go and meet him now, without sanction from Superior authority, as possibly, in view of the pour parlars going on in London, such action might be open to objection.

In any case I could not add anything to what I had said at the former interview and in my letter No.514 as I knew nothing further.

The messenger said that Bin Saud had received a letter from





241 242
247

from Shaiikh Mubarak suggesting a meeting with Binbashi Syed Omer Beg at Koweit. I said that,as far as I was aware there did not appear to be any immediate necessity to arrive at a settlement,and recommended delay. The messenger however,seemed to think that Bin Saud would feel called upon to go if he received another letter. My impression is that Bin Saud intends to go and have a meeting in any case,and is naturally very anxious to know first whether the British Government has been able to do anything for him.

I beg to enquire whether I should comply with Bin Saud's wishes and meet him somewhere on the coast. If so, provided I receive permission at an early date,I could no doubt,make the trip either in the R.I.M.S."Palinurus" or on the S.L."Bahrein". If it is not possible to communicate with me soon I do not suppose the meeting will be possible as I think Bin Saud will soon go on towards Koweit. If so,no doubt he will have an interview with the Political Agent there.


I am attempting to send you the gist of this letter by telegram from Henjam,but the mail is late and possibly you will not get it much sooner.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant.

Sd/- A. P. Trevor, Major,
Political Agent, Bahrein.





(243) 242 248

Copy of a letter No.614 from the Political Agent,
Bahrein to Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman bin Saud,
Amir of Nejd.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 6th Jamadi I 1332 (2nd April 1914) and in reply I have to say that am afraid I have no further information which I can give you, as I have heard nothing further since my letter No, 514 was written.

Your letter under reply has unfortunately just missed the mail to Bushire but I will communicate with the Resident at the first opportunity. Should I receive any further news I will communicate with you.

In the meanwhile there does not seem to me to be any very pressing hurry, and I would advise you to wait.

If you are going up towards Koweit I beg to suggest that you might communicate with the Political Agent there before actually having the meeting. I have had a talk over the whole subject with your messenger Yusuf.



Copy of a letter No. 514 from the Political Agent,
Bahrain to Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman bin Saud,
Amir of Najd.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your
letter dated 25th January 1922 (2nd April 1341) and in
reply I have to say that as far as I have no further
information which I can give you, as I have heard nothing
further since my letter No. 514 was written.
Your letter under reply has unfortunately just
missed the mail to Muscat but I will communicate with
the Resident at the first opportunity should I receive
any further news I will communicate with you.
In the meanwhile there does not seem to me to be any
very pressing hurry, and I would advise you to wait.
If you are going up towards Kowait I beg to suggest
that you might communicate with the Political Agent
there before actually leaving the meeting. I have had a
talk over the whole subject with your messenger here.



DRAFT—(For Approval).

POLITICAL RESIDENCY, PERSIAN GULF.

No. C 15

Dated April 22 1914

243

(244)

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Sir,

In continuation of my letter
No. C. 13. dated 14th inst. I have
the honour to report further on the
subject of Bin Saud and the
Turkish Government.

2. The persons mentioned as
having been deputed to interview
Bin Saud on behalf of the
Turks ^{are to arrive} ~~arrived~~ in Kuwait
this morning in ^{the Anglo-Persian oil co's} ~~the Anglo-Persian oil co's~~
^{which is expected today} ~~the Anglo-Persian oil co's~~
"Fennar". Bin Saud has
not yet reached Subaihiyah
but is expected there any day
this week. Meanwhile the
deputation will be entertained
by Shaikh ^{Sul} Mubarak in
Kuwait, he having returned
from Camp, and his inter-
-view with the Ottoman
will take place tomorrow or
next day.
3. I attach a translation of a

9,000-3-10



have letter from Bin Saud to
Sir Imbarak which the latter
handed to me during an
interview on Monday. It
represents an interesting
piece of oriental diplomacy,
the original document will
be shown to the deputation by the
thai with the remark that he
has done what little he can
but this is Bin Saud's reply:
his face will thus be saved
vis-à-vis of his guests while the
attitude of Bin Saud remains
unaltered.

4 I hope to meet Bin Saud prior
to his interview with the
deputation.

R

lh



244

250

(245)

ملحق خير و سرور ادام الله وجودكم من قبل التقرب نحن امتثلنا
امركم لاجل الطاعة لله ولقنا واما الامور التي اجبروها معي مأمورين
الدولة من الاحتار والاهانة والاذية انت مطلع عليها وصبري
كل هالمستفيد على كل وبتت منهم طاعة لاني ما شئت منهم
شي الذي اجبراني طرانا لاله الحمد مقته على امور كبر راجعها
حتى في العراق لاني ما قبلت اصبر سبب لاحتلال الحكومة
وثورت العرب وانا الذي قبضته اديري الي انت يا مباركا
نشره فيها وانت مع العسكر الذي راح للرحا اول
دخلوها حفاظنا فاحرها مكرة بنا انت واهم وانا
اسلك باله بكلما شاهدة منا من الطاعة والصبر والذية
جرس علينا من المشاق من المأمورين هل هو صبح املا فاما اخرضك
على من طرف السمع والطاعة لله وله فلا عصيت اول حتى اعصا ثالي
فاذا حصل الاموال في يدي يخضع حقيقي واصير منقوض على احوالي
فالسمع والطاعة واجب مني بكل حال ورجوا الله يد يميننا بنافهم
(٢٠ جمادى اول ١٢٤٤)





245
251
(246)
OFFICE NOTE.

Letter from Abd-ul-Aziz Bin
Saud to Shaikh bin Mubarak
As-Sabah dated 20th Jamadi
- al. annual 1332) 16 April 1914.

After compliments,
In agreeing to approach (lowest)
I have obeyed your instructions
as regards obedience & submission
to our Government, but you know
well with what contempt and
disdain the officials of Govt
have treated me, and you have
seen the patience with which I
have submitted to their conduct
all these years notwithstanding
that I never once ^{experienced} ~~felt~~ anything
from them which could enrage
me. And now, Heaven be
praised, I am in a position
to do great things even as far
as Iraq, were it not that I
do not wish to be the cause
of (further) decline to the
Government and (additional)
revolt on the part of the
Arabs.

S 1918-5,000-3-06



Now I have recovered my own
country as you are witness oh
Maharajah; and it was you
who went to Haer with a force
to protect me and afterwards
betrayed me, you and the
soldiers! I ask you, is it or
is it not correct what I say
about all the difficulties which
have been brought upon me by
the officials and the submission
and patience which I have
shown. As to your urging
me now to submission to the
Government — I did not
disobey you formerly that I
should do so now, so if the
matter which will guard my
rights is granted and I and
my affairs secure protection
— then submission will
certainly be incumbent upon
me.
May Heaven preserve you to
us.



Confidential.

No. 1173 of 1914.

British Residency and Consulate-General,


Bushire, 21st April 1914.

A copy of the undermentioned telegrams is forwarded with compliments to the Political Agent, Kuwait, for information, in continuation of this office endorsement No. 1120 dated 18th April 1914.

By Order,

P. G. Lock
Lieutenant,
Assistant Resident.

-
- (1). Resident to Foreign. No. 467 dated 18th April 1914.
 - (2). Resident to Foreign. No. 480 dated 20th April 1914.
 - (3). Consul Basrah to Embassy Constantinople, repeated
Resident, No. 28 dated 20th April 1914.
 - (4). Resident to Foreign. No. 481-Secret dated 20th April
1914.
 - (5). Foreign to Resident. No. 241-S dated 20th April 1914.





(248) 247
253

Telegram. R.
From Major S.G. Knox, Resident Buhaira.
To Foreign.
No. 467. No.
Dated 18th April 1914 (5.20 p.m.)

Your telegram No. 440 of April 11th.

Bahrain reports 'Abd-al-'Aziz' intention to proceed to Kuwait interview 'Omar Fauzi Beg but wishes see Trevor first. Trevor has replied he cannot see him without instructions and that he has no further news give him but advises him to wait. I have tried to get Trevor through the Senior Naval Officer. Begins."Could you inform our friend that individual he proposes to meet left Kuwait March 25th? If so, please do so". Ends. Hope in this way make 'Abd-al-'Aziz pause. Trust action may be approved.

Knox.



Telegram. R.
From Major S.G. Knox, Resident Bahrein.
To Foreign.
No. 457.
Dated 18th April 1914 (8.20 p.m.)

Your telegram No. 440 of April 11th.
Bahrein reports 'Abd-al-'Aziz' intention to proceed to
Kuwait interview 'Omar Faisal Beg but wishes see Trevor
first. Trevor has replied he cannot see him without
instructions and that he has no further news give him
but advise him to wait. I have tried to get Trevor through
the Senior Naval Officer. Begins "Could you inform our
friend that individual he proposes to meet left Kuwait
March 28th? If so, please do so". Ends. Hope in this way
make 'Abd-al-'Aziz pause. Trust action may be approved.
Knox.



Telegram. R.

From Major S.G. Knox, Resident Bushire.

To Foreign.

No. 480.

Dated 20th April 1914 (4.30 p.m.)


My telegram No. 440 of April 11th.

Kuwait and Bahrain reports combined show 'Abd-al-'Aziz left Qatif for Kuwait April 16th and that Saiyid Talib is coming to Kuwait with Bimbashi 'Omar Fauzi and the Chief of the Staff, Baghdad. He brings with him Turkish decoration for the Shaikh of Kuwait. Bahrain reports 'Abd-al-'Aziz willing to treat. Kuwait reports that he will give unfavourable reply but I fear Bahrain theory better founded. Probable date of meeting April 22nd or later.

Knox.



Telegram. R.
From Major G.G. Knox, Resident Bushire.
To Foreign.
No. 490.
Dated 20th April 1914 (4.30 p.m.)
My telegram No. 490 of April 11th.
Kuwait and Bahrain reports combined show 'Abd-al-'Aziz
left Gulf for Kuwait April 18th and that Salim Talib
is coming to Kuwait with Bimbashi 'Omar Wazir and the
Chief of the Staff, Baghdad. He brings with him Turkish
decoration for the Emirate of Kuwait. Bahrain reports
'Abd-al-'Aziz willing to treat. Kuwait reports that he will
give unfavourable reply but I fear Bahrain theory better
founded. Probable date of meeting April 22nd or later.
Knox.



Telegram. "p".

From F.E.Crow, Esquire, H.M's Consul, Basrah.

To Embassy Constantinople, repeated Major S.G.Knox, Resident,
Bushire.

No. 28.

Dated and received 20th April 1914 (6.30p.m.)

Following is secret and has reference to your
telegram No. 21.

I am trying to get confirmation of the following private
and confidential information which I have received:- That
a commission has been formed of the following - Chief of
Staff at Basrah, Chief of Staff at Baghdad and Mutassarif
of Hasa, with Talib Bey as President. Next week they will
be sent to Hasa and Talib is to arrange to hand over the
place to the Turkish Government.

Crow.



Telegram. "p".
From F.E.Grow, Baghdad, R.M.'s Consul, Basrah.
To Embassy Constantinople, repeated Major S.G.Knox, Resident,
Baghdad.

No. 28.

Dated and received 20th April 1914 (8.30p.m.).

Following is secret and has reference to your

telegram No. 21.

I am trying to get confirmation of the following private

and confidential information which I have received:- That

a commission has been formed of the following - Chief of


Staff at Basrah, Chief of Staff at Baghdad and Mutassarif

of Hama, with Talib Bey as President. Next week they will

be sent to Hama and Talib is to arrange to hand over the

place to the Turkish Government.

Grow.



250
(251) 256

Telegram. "P".

From Major S.G. Knox, Resident Bushire.


To Foreign Simla.

No. 481 Secret.



Dated 20th April 1914 (7.40 p.m.)


My telegram No. 480 is confirmed today by His Majesty's Consul at Basrah who adds "Talib Bey is to arrange to hand over the place to the Turks".

Knox.



222 (251)
Telegram. "p".
From Major S.G. Knox, Resident Bushire.
To Foreign Office.
No. 481 Secret.
Dated 20th April 1914 (7.40 p.m.)
My telegram No. 480 is confirmed today by His
Majesty's Consul at Bushire who adds "Talib Bey is to arrange
to hand over the place to the Turks".
Knox.





252
252
Telegram. "p".
From Foreign.
To Major S.D. Knox, Resident Bahrein.
No. 241-S.
Dated 20th, received 21st April 1914 (8.48 p.m.).
Reference your telegram of 18th April No. 437.
Your action is approved in regard to 'Abd-al-'Aziz'.
Foreign.



*Original
Copy* Forwarded for favour of necessary action with
Bushire endorsement. No 1200 dated 25-4-14.
S. Z.

252

W 258

(252)

Telegram. P.

From Foreign.

To Knox, Resident Bushire.

No. 256-S.

Dated and received 25th April 1914 (4.45 p.m.)

Bin Sa'ud.

Please refer to your telegram No. 497 and previous telegraphic correspondence.


His Majesty's Ambassador has been informed by the Turkish Government that they have strong hopes that they will themselves reach a satisfactory settlement with 'Abd-al-'Aziz, and His Majesty's Government have decided on ground of general policy that they will not press mediation. In this His Majesty's Government were influenced by the belief that the Shaikhs of Kuwait and Muhammareh, in whom they have so much confidence, would be the medium for negotiations.


Authority is now given you to inform Bin Sa'ud through the Political Agent that there is no objection to direct negotiations taking place between himself and the Turks, and that the views of His Majesty's Government have been conveyed to the Porte.


Mubarak should be informed at the same time that we do not object to his good offices being afforded to assist the negotiations. The four British desiderata, which are set forth in the memorandum of March 9th to Hakki Pasha, should also be brought to his notice: i.e.



- (1) That Bin Sa'ud should not interfere in the territory and politics of Arab rulers on the Gulf, including Qatar.
- (2). That his co-operation is required in the suppression of piracy - and generally in the maintenance of the maritime truce.
- (3). That ~~he~~ he should co-operate in the suppression of arms traffic.
- (4). That the admission of British traders to Qatif should


be













DRAFT—(For Approval).

POLITICAL RESIDENCY, PERSIAN GULF.

No. C16. - C17 copy 672

Dated April 29th 1914.

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(256)

Sir,

In continuation of my letter No C15 dated 22nd inst. I have the honor to report further on the subject of Bin Saud and the Turkish Government.

2. The Turkish representatives did not come to Kuwait last week as had been arranged. By the mail of the 22nd inst. Sheikh Sir Mubarak received a letter from Saïid Talib stating that he had written to Constantinople for more precise instructions in regard to the exact terms which he was to make with Bin Saud, and that he had heard in reply that the question was still under discussion but that instructions would be furnished to him. The party had arrived this morning in Sir Mubarak's steam launch "Mishrif" which has been for the last month or so lying at Muhammerah.
3. On the evening of the 26th inst Bin Saud arrived at Subaihiyah with a large following, and early on the morning of the 27th the Sheikh
sent

9,000-3-10



Sent his secretary to inform me that he had written asking the Amir to come to Malak, which is about half way between Koweit and Subashiyah, for the purpose of meeting me there. During the day the R. I. S. Lawrence arrived with your endorsement ~~for~~ forwarding for necessary action by the telegram No 256 S from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, and I ~~discussed~~ ^{explained to} with Shaikh ^{Shihab} Misbarak in the afternoon that portion of its contents which concerned himself. Late in the evening came a reply from Bin Saud to the effect that he would be at Malak on the following morning and hoped that I could come out then as he was anxious for a meeting as soon as possible. I accordingly went out yesterday taking with me the telegram above referred to.

4. After the usual polite enquiries I commenced the interview, at which nobody else was present, with explaining to the Amir that portion of the ^{telegram} ~~instructions~~ of the Government of India which was intended for his information. I could see that he was disappointed, and at first inclined to think that he had been allowed to foster hopes which were not to be realised, but I had no difficulty in removing this view by the explanation that it was the Turkish Government who had declined our offer of mediation and that His Majesty's Government obviously



2.

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(257)

OFFICE NOTE.

could not force upon them assistance which they did not desire. I informed him as instructed that there was now no objection to direct negotiations taking place between him and the Turks, and that the views of His Majesty's Government had been conveyed to the Porte.

5. In reply, the Amir said that he did not intend to make an independent arrangement with the Turks unless he were forced to do so because they were never faithful to their engagements and in a very short time, it might not be more than two months, things would be as bad as ever in Hassa. He asked me what were the views of His Majesty's Government which had been conveyed to the Porte. I replied that they concerned the ^{provisional} ~~undertakings~~ ^{entirely light} ~~promises~~ which he had made to our officers at Bahrain. He remarked that he had no further information regarding the conditions which the Turks would demand of him, but that they would never allow the presence of foreigners at Katif and that, in the event of an agreement being arrived at between him and themselves, they would undoubtedly compel him to keep such persons out.

6. I then thought it best to tell the Amir plainly that I had no

S 1918-5,000-3-06



authority lay over the old ground again
 neither had I come out to persuade
 him to take a course contrary to his
 inclination, but that my duty
 was merely to carry out the
 instructions which I had received.
 He then asked me whether, should
 he persevere with the answer already
 given to Sa'id Talib (vide the en-
 closure to my letter No C 12 dated
 9th April), there would be any
 chance eventually of securing the
 mediation of His Majesty's Government.
 I replied that probably in that
 case the Turks would ask for
 that mediation which they had
 now declined in the hope of
 securing an agreement without
 it; but Bin Saud appeared to
 think that they would prefer
 war to that and went on to
 question me regarding the pre-
 paredness or unpreparedness
 of Turkey for war from which I
 saw that he was carefully
 considering this alternative. Before
 our interview closed he asked
 me whether His Majesty's Govt.
 would give him an assurance
 that the Turks would never be
 allowed to take hostile action by
 sea against the Persian coast
 between Kuwait and Bahrain, as,
 he said, with that assurance he
 was prepared to defy them
 indefinitely, but I replied that I
 had no information on the subject



3.

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(257)

OFFICE NOTE.

beyond that already given to him
in regard to Bahrain and its
waters.

7. I confess that I returned to
Koweit without a clear idea of
what course Bin Saud was
likely to take, in fact I doubt
whether he has himself come as
yet to a definite decision. That
he would prefer to persevere in his
refusal to accept any arrange-
ment which has not guaranteed
in some form or another by His
Majesty's Government I am
convinced of, and that Shaikh
Sir Mubarak and other friends
have inspired him with that
confidence in us which he
lacks, in the Turks is certain;
but he seems to fear that in
default of a definite promise
such as that referred to above
he might be left to face attacks
by sea as well as by land which
would be more than he could
repel; and he may on this
account feel obliged to make
the best terms possible for
himself at the approaching
conference. In the latter case

S 1918-5,000-3-06



I regard it as in the highest degree ~~probable~~ probable that he will use every possible means to draw His Majesty's Government into the negotiations e.g. by accepting, under the plea of compulsion, conditions from the Turks which he knows we will be loth to recognise owing to the interests assailed.

8. I hope to be able to report further within the next few days, and in view of the interesting position which now exists here am sending a copy of this letter direct to the Government of India in the Foreign Department. We are true.

[Signature]

[Signature]



مجمع
٧١-١٤


258
264
(259)

من كرن و ك كربي بونظف اجنت الدولة البرية القصرية الانكليزية في الكويت
الجناب بالرجل الوجيه الافرهم حميد الشيم المحب عمدة الاصحاب بالشيخ سريار ك الصباغ ك س
آسي اي حاكم الكويت ادام بقاءه
غيا السلام والسؤال عن عزيز خاطركم لازلتم بغير وسرور ثم المبهى لحضرتكم اني مامور
من الدولة البرية القصرية الانكليزية ان اخبر جنابكم بانه اذا كان حضرتكم
تجشدهون في تصليح الامور واقامة المعاهد بين الامير عبد العزيز السعود
والدولة العثمانية فلا يكون عندهم اعتراض وانما اعرف جنابكم بمقاصد دولتنا
المختلفة بهذه المسئلة وهذه ١ اولاً ان لاتبه اخل بن اسعود في امور
ممالك الحكام العربية المقيمين على البحر في الخليج الفارسي ولا في سياستهم وان
بله قطر مشتملة في تلك الممالك ٢ ان تجشده بن اسعود معنا لاعداد
التعدي في البحر ٣ ان تجشده كذا لك لاعداد تجارة الاسلحة ٤ ان
يكون اجازة عامة للتجار من رعايانا ان يكون في بلدة القطيف ويستغلون
بتجارهم هناك بغير ممانعة وان يكون يملكونهم ملوكا طيب لان رجال
دولتنا قد عرفوا الدولة العثمانية بهذه المقاصد هذا ما لزم رفعه لجنابكم وتتم
سالمين محروسين ٥ جمادى آخر عام ١٢٢٢ مطابق ٣٠ ابريل عام ١٩١٤

30/4
W. H. Murray

Intd. On 30th April his Subark sent for the
Mulla and asked him what he knew that
the Turkish deputatin wanted him to go out with
them to see Bin Saud, and that he was afraid
they would be vexed if he did not. I therefore
sent him the above letter to put his mind
at rest.

W. H. Murray 30/4/14





I

(Continuation of Note, Précis or Draft.)

Letter from the Political Agent,
Koweit to Shaikh bin Imbarak-as-
-Sabah dated 5th Jamadi. ul. Akhri
1332 (30 April 1914).

After compliments,

I am instructed by my Government
to inform your Honour that they
do not object to your efforts being
employed to settle matters and
establish an agreement between
the Amir Bin Saud and the
Turkish Government; and I inform
you regarding the following
desiderata of His Government
in connection with this matter:-

(1) That Bin Saud should not
interfere in the territory and
politics of Arab rulers on the
shores of the Gulf - Qatar is
included.


(2) That his cooperation is
required in the suppression
of piracy and in keeping
peace at sea generally.

(3) That he should cooperate in
the suppression of arms traffic.

(4) That the admission of
British traders to Qatif should
be permitted and that proper
treatment should be accorded
them there.

And His Govt have already
informed the Turkish Govt of these
desiderata. This is what was
required and may you be in perfect safety

6,400-3-10





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(261)

البريطانية

سبائك الصباح حاكم الكويت الاحقة عالي الجاه المبكر لعل ذلك كرين بولنكل اجنت الدولة البريمية

في الكويت دام بقاءه =

عقب السؤال عن عزيز خاطركم دعمت بحيد وسرور هو ان يد الوداد اخذت كتابكم المورخ ه جاد

وبما امرتم صار معلوم منصوص رسولين الترك للمرافاة بن سعود ها الآن عندنا =

ويتوجهون للمرافاة المشار اليه وطلبوني اني اوجه معكم للمرافاة بن سعود وتعد رستم

واما التوسط بينهم وبين بن سعود فانا قطعاً ما اندخل بينهم وانني قبل هذا بينت

لهم ذلك .. واما مطالب الدولة البريمية على بن سعود لعدم تدخلهم ببلدان العرب التي على

الساحل وقطر منها فحفظتكم العاليه بلفظه وايضاً تجارة رعية الدولة البريمية الذين

يتصلون الى القطيف ويمكن يتصلون الى الاحساء ايضاً بلفظه شفاهاً عن ذلك فاني

اتبع ارادة الدولة البريمية واجاب امركم ايضاً انا بلفظه كما امرتم فاني اقول انا متبع

جميع ارادة الدولة البريمية وبن سعود اذا ارشد نفسه يتبع ارادة الدولة البريمية

بحسب ما بلفظه خفيتم العاليه وانا ايضاً ابلغه ويمكن بن سعود يزورنا وانا احضر

مع خفيتم العاليه وجميعنا بلفظه حسبما امرتم واما التدخل بين بن سعود ودولة الترك


انا قطعاً متجنبينها ولفظه رسولين الترك في ذلك هذا ما لزم ودعمت المصالح المحروسين

١٤٤٢
هـ جاد

Received 1st May.

Translation below.

Wheeler





II

OFFICE NOTE.

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(262)

Letter from Sheikh Si Mubarak
- As - Sabah to the Political Agent
Koweit dated 6th Jamadi-ul-
- Akhir 1332 (1 May 1914).

After compliments


I have received your letter of the
5th Jamadi-ul-Akhir, and understand
what you direct. With regard to the
Turkish deputation to interview Bin Saud
they are at present with me and will
go to meet him. And they have requested
me to go with them to the meeting with
Bin Saud and I have asked them
to excuse me. As to mediation between
them I have positively declined it as
I explained to them before.

Regarding the desiderata of the
Glorious Government from Bin Saud,
that he should not interfere in the
Arab states on the shores of the Gulf
including Qatar, and that the
subjects of Government should trade
in Qatif and go even to Haasa, your
officers have informed him verbally
regarding them, and I will follow
the wishes of Government & inform him
regarding them also as you direct.
I am, as I say, obedient to all the
desires of Government and if Bin
Saud takes the right course he will
also follow the wishes of Government
in what you have asked of him.

S 1918-5,000-3-06



and I will also tell him that, &
perhaps Bin Saud will visit me &
will come to you and we will inform
him together. But as to mediation
between him & the Turkish Government
I must positively keep away from
that and have informed the
deputation accordingly.
This is what is necessary and
may you be in peace and safety.





Confidential

No. 459 of 1914.

Political Agency, Bahrain.
BAHREIN, the 25th April 1914.

Copy forwarded, with compliments of the
undersigned, to the Political Agent, Kuwait for infor-
mation.

To,
Major,
Political Agent,
Bahrain.
Dated Bahrain, the 25th April 1914

Sir,
In continuation of the correspondence ending with
my letter No. 404 dated the 10th April 1914, I have the hon-
our to forward, for your information, a copy of the reply
which I have received from Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Saud and
of my answer thereto.
Now that Bin Saud has left this part of the world
and gone up to Kuwait it is unlikely that I shall have
anything further of much interest to send you in the subject.
A copy of this is being sent to the Political Agent,

Kuwait.
I have the honour to be,
Your most obedient servant,
Sd/- W. P. Trevor
Political Agent, Bahrain.



263
(264) 269

Translation of a letter dated the 22nd Jamadi al Awwal 1332
18th April 1914

from Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman al Faisal to
Major A. P. Trevor, C. I. E. Political Agent, Bahrein.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your esteemed letter dated the 11th instant brought by my servant yusuf and that of your last letter dated the 21st Rabi att Thani ¹³³² and to say that I have understood what you mentioned therein. And God willing I will act just as you informed. Presently In-sha-allah I am proceeding towards Koweit as I informed you before. Ofcourse I will refer the Consul at Koweit either personally or by letter and I shall not be able to do without necessary information from you.

Please send your letters through the Consul at Koweit. After doing the needful I shall, God willing let you know what is required.



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262
Translation of a letter dated the 11th April 1914
from Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman Al Faisal to
Major A. P. Trevor, C. I. E. Political Agent, Bahrain.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your
enforced letter dated the 11th instant brought by my as-
sistant and that of your last letter dated the 11th
1914
Rabi' al-Thani and to say that I have understood what
you mentioned therein. And God willing I will not just
as you informed. Presently in-sha-Allah I am proceeding
towards Kuwait as I informed you before. Of course I will
refer the Council at Kuwait either personally or by letter
and I shall not be able to do without necessary information
from you.

Please send your letter through the Council at
Kuwait. After doing the needful I shall, God willing, let
you know what is required.



264 270
(265)

Copy of letter No. 732 dated the 25th April 1914
from the Political Agent, Bahrein to Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin
Abdur Rahman al Faisal.

I have received your honoured letter dated the 22nd Jamadi
1332
Al Awwal and understood its contents. When you are in the
neighbourhood of Koweit, any information which I could give
you will be given by the Political Agent there.

I hope you are in good health; may you be preserved and
salam.



Copy of letter No. 7 dated the 28th April 1914
from the Political Agent, Bahrain to Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin
Abdur Rahman al Faisal.

I have received your honoured letter dated the 28th January
1914
Al Faisal and understood its contents. When you are in the
neighbourhood of Kuwait, any information which I could give
you will be given by the Political Agent there.
I hope you are in good health; may you be preserved and
salam.



Confidential.

265 271

No. 1207 of 1914.

(265)

British Residency and Consulate-General,

Bushire, 26 April 1914.


A copy of the undermentioned telegrams is forwarded with compliments, to the Political Agent, Kuwait, for information, in continuation of this office endorsement No. 1175 of 21st April 1914.

By Order,

J. G. Loch

Lieutenant,
Assistant Resident.

-
- (1) No. 30, dated 23rd April 1914 from Consul Basrah, to Ambassador Constantinople, repeated Resident Bushire.
 - (2) No. 497, dated 24th April 1914 from Resident Bushire, to Foreign Simla.





Telegram. R.

From Mr. F. E. Crow, C.M.G., His Majesty's Consul, Basrah.
To Ambassador Constantinople, repeated Major S. G. Knox,
C.I.E., Resident Bushire.

No. 30.

Dated 23-4-14. Received 24-4-14 (6.45 a.m.)

Your telegram No. 25.

Talib says no arrangement is being made but he is in communication with the Porte who are considering what terms to make in respect to Hana. He says he has not yet communicated with Bin Sa'ud and is awaiting instructions from Constantinople.


According to information from other sources Talib has already been told to make the best arrangement he can and is in communication with Bin Sa'ud through the Shaikh of Kuwait. I hear also that Bin Sa'ud is expected in Kuwait today or tomorrow and that Talib is awaiting the Shaikh's steamer in order to proceed to Kuwait with commission mentioned in my telegram No. 28 and make arrangements amicably.

Crow.



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Telegram, R.
From Mr. F. E. Crow, C.W.O., His Majesty's Consul, Basrah.
To Ambassador Constantinople, repeated Major G. S. Knox,
G.I.E., Resident Basrah.
No. 20.
Dated 22-4-14. Received 24-4-14 (6.45 a.m.).
Your telegram No. 22.
Talib says no arrangement is being made but he is
in communication with the Porte who are considering what
terms to make in respect to Haas. He says he has not yet
communicated with Bin Sa'ud and is awaiting instructions
from Constantinople.
According to information from other sources Talib
has already been told to make the best arrangement he can and
is in communication with Bin Sa'ud through the Sheikh of
Kuwait. I hear also that Bin Sa'ud is expected in Kuwait
today or tomorrow and that Talib is waiting the Sheikh's
orders in order to proceed to Kuwait with communication men-
tioned in my telegram No. 22 and make arrangements accordingly.
Crow.



Telegram. R.

From Major S.G. Knox, C.I.E., Resident Bushire.

To Foreign Simla.

No. 497.


Dated 24-4-14 (12.40 p.m.)

Following from Consul Basrah³⁰ of April 23rd.

Re: " Your telegram
.....amicably.

Ends.

Knox.





Confidential.

No. 1235⁵ of 1914.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 26th April 1914.

A copy of the undermentioned telegram is forwarded with compliments to the Political Agent, Kuwait, for information, in continuation of this office endorsement No. 1200-S.Z. dated 25th April 1914.


By Order,


P. S. Lock

Lieutenant,

Assistant Resident.

Resident to Foreign. No. 505 dated 26th April 1914.





Telegram. R.

From Major S.G. Knox, Resident, Bushire.

To Foreign.


No. 505.

Dated 26th April 1914 (9 a.m.)

Your telegram No. 256-S. 'Abd-al-'Aziz.

Lawrence sails 10 a.m. deliver your message to Political Agent, Kuwait, for necessary action. She has instructions not to wait Kuwait longer than necessary.

Knox.





Confidential.

No. 1245 of 1914.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 28th April 1914.


A copy of the undermentioned telegrams is forwarded with compliments to the Political Agent, Kuwait, for information, in continuation of this office endorsement No. 1235 dated 26th April 1914.

By Order,

J. G. Lock
Lieutenant,
Assistant Resident.

-
- (1). Consul Basrah to Embassy Constantinople, repeated
Resident Bushire No. 32 dated 27th April 1914.
- (2). Resident to Foreign. No. 513 dated 28th April 1914.

R.F.





Telegram. R.

From F.E. Crow, Esquire, H.M.'s Consul, Basrah.

To Embassy Constantinople, repeated/^{Major S.G.}Knox, Resident, Bushire.

No. 32.

Dated and received 27th April 1914 (2.10 p.m.)

My telegram No. 30.

I have seen Wali today who has just returned from an interview with Bin Rashid in Muntafik. He confirmed information that I had received, that Talib was about to go to Kuwait, in order to try to make an amicable settlement with Bin Sa'ud as instructed by Constantinople.

Shaikh of Kuwait's steamer arrived here some days ago and commission will probably leave soon.

In view of misleading reports in the press I took an opportunity to remind Wali that our policy was to do our best to maintain integrity of Turkish Empire and we should be glad to hear that Hasa question had been satisfactorily settled. Wali said he quite appreciated this point of view which was in accordance with his information from Constantinople.

Crow.



272
272
Telegram. R.
From F.E. Crow, Resident, H.M.'s Consulate, Bahrain.
To Embassy Constantinople, repeated, (next, Resident, Bahrain).
No. 38.
Dated and received 27th April 1914 (8.10 p.m.)

My telegram No. 30.
I have seen Wail today who has just returned from an
interview with Bin Rashid in Muscat. He confirmed infor-
mation that I had received, that Wail was about to go to
Kuwait, in order to try to make an amicable settlement with
Bin Saud as instructed by Constantinople.
Bin Rashid of Kuwait's steamer arrived here some days ago and
communication will probably leave soon.
In view of misleading reports in the press I took an op-
portunity to remind Wail that our policy was to do our best
to maintain integrity of Turkish Empire and we should be
glad to hear that Hara's question had been satisfactorily
settled. Wail said he quite appreciated this point of view
which was in accordance with his information from Constantin-
ople.

Crow.



Telegram. R.
Major S.G.
From/Knox, Resident, Bushire.

To Foreign.

No. 513.


Dated 28th April 1914 (12.15 p.m.)

Following from Basrah No. 32 of April 27th:-

"My.....Constantinople".

Knox.

272 278
(273)





No.C 19 of 1914.

Political Agency,
Kuwait.

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From

Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Grey, I.A.,
Political Agent, Kuwait.

To

The Foreign Secretary to the Government
of India in the Foreign & Political
Department, Simla.

May
Dated Kuwait, the 6th ~~April~~ 1914.

Sir,


I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a
letter No. C.18 dated 6th May 1914 which I have addressed to
the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

W. G. Grey Lieut-Colonel,
Political Agent, Kuwait.





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(275)

DRAFT—(For Approval).

POLITICAL RESIDENCY, PERSIAN GULF.

No. C18 - C19.

Dated 6th May 1914.

Sir,
In continuation of my letter
No C16 dated 29th April I have the
honour to report further on the subject
of Bin Saud and the Turkish
Government.

2. As stated in my last letter the
Turkish deputation headed by
Said Talib ~~of~~ son of the Hagib
of Basrah and Said Umar
Fauzi Beg Chief of the Staff at
Basrah arrived in Kuwait on
the 29th ult^o in Shaikh Si
Mubarak's launch "Mishrif"
which had been placed at their
disposal. During the morning
of the 30th idem ~~Si Mubarak~~ ^{the Shaikh}
sent for my Agency Mullah
and asked him to ^{let} inform me
^{know} that the deputation were pressing
him to accompany them on the
occasion of their visit to Bin
Saud. I replied through the
Mullah that, as I had already
informed him, His Majesty's
Government had no objection to
his good offices being afforded
to

The same day
the order of
the Command
was presented
to Shaikh Si
Mubarak
without ceremony
in the presence
of a few
persons only.

9,000-3-10



to assist ⁱⁿ the negotiations; and, to put his mind at rest, addressed him the official letter which forms enclosure (1) to this report. The Shaikh in replied to me the following day as given in enclosure (2).

3. During the whole of April 30th and May 1st the deputation were engaged in discussing the terms which were before him, and on the morning of the 2nd inst they proceeded to Subaihiyah thence they returned on the 4th.
4. I called on Sir Imbarak yesterday & he informed me of what had taken place. His version, which is confirmed generally by reports which have reached me from other sources, is probably substantially correct. The Turks first announced to Bin Saud their scheme for settlement, which was that he must first of all accept the repositing of Turkish garrisons in Qatif & Hajir, and their reinforcement by additional posts in Hasa: that all the forts in Hajir and Hasa must be surrendered to them: that all cannon and ^{small} arms captured must



2/.

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(276)

(Continuation of Note, Précis or Draft.)

must be made over to the Turkish
troops: and that he is to have
no connection whatever with any
foreigners or Foreign Power. In
return for these conditions they
agreed to recognise his autonomy:
to allow him to collect all taxes
&c: and to give him verbal,
though not written, permission
to retake Qatar and Trucial
Oman when he chose. Bin
Saud's scheme was then stated
to them; it was that he should
retain Qatif, Ujair & Haasan
under Turkish suzerainty:
should pay them £T3000 per
annum as tribute money: and
should be at the disposal of
Turkey, with his men, in the
event of armed assistance
being required. The subsequent
discussions turned upon the
reinstatement of the Turkish
garrisons; the deputation
insisted upon this condition
and Bin Saud refused to give
way. After some time harsh
words passed between him and
Saïyid Umar, the latter was
rash enough to say that if Bin
Saud would not accept this
condition he would be compelled
to

S 18—5,000—5-12



to do so, whereupon the Amir
started up and half drawing
his sword ordered Saïyid Umar
to leave the assembly, and
any possibility of successful
negociations appears to have
been at an end from that
moment. The Turkish deputation
returned to Basrah in the
Akkas's launch on the night
of the 4th inst, and are to
report to Constantinople the
failure of their negociations.

5. Sir Imbarak has from time
to time made some explanations
of his position, ^{in connection with this matter} and summed
them ~~all~~ up during our
interview yesterday. He regrets
not having been able to accept
the invitation of His Majesty's
Government to take part in the
negociations, but informs me
that in any case nothing could
have induced Bin Saud to
accept the condition regarding
the return of Turkish troops
to what he regards as his
ancestral domains. He adds
moreover that he has had
experience of the Turks all
his life, and that he cannot
seriously urge Bin Saud to
submit to them without a
guarantee from us. He regards



3/.

(Continuation of Note, Précis or Draft.)

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28th/6,


(27)

to the Turkish deputation he felt obliged to assist Saïyid Umar Fauzi Bey to a certain extent, first because he was the representative of a Foreign Power with whom his relations are friendly, secondly because he was his guest on the occasion of his first visit to Koweit, and thirdly because of the friendships which exist between himself and Saïyid Umar's father. He did not want the Wali of Basrah in Koweit as it might have been difficult to refuse him that which he could decline to do for Saïyid Talib, and he had felt all along that he could not help in the negotiations. I received in silence this statement, with part of which at least it was impossible not to feel sympathy.

6. I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosures direct to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to save time.

JR
W.

S 18-3,000-5-12





Kuwait

CONFIDENTIAL.

(82)

No. 1036, dated Bushire, the 8th (received the 20th) April 1914.

From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political
Department, Simla.

I have the honour to forward herewith, for information, the copy of an interesting letter from the Political Agent, Kuwait, enclosing copies of correspondence between various Turkish notables and Shaikh Sir Mubarak bin Sabah of Kuwait on the subject of Bin Sa'ud.

2. I am not inclined to share the views expressed by the Political Agent, Kuwait, in the last portion of his letter regarding the advisability of asking the Porte to defer action pending the result of the discussion of Bin Sa'ud's position with His Excellency Hakki Pasha. The fact that such a communication was made could not well be conveyed to Bin Sa'ud, and would not therefore earn him his gratitude, and, from the general trend of the correspondence, I gather that the "independent action" against which the Secretary of State desires Bin Sa'ud should be warned is not so much warlike preparations to repel a possible invasion as some form of entangling alliance which might injuriously affect British interests. With both sides engaged in warlike preparations, which, from recent reports, seem unlikely to lead to active operations, it may be hoped that the possibility of such an understanding between Bin Sa'ud and the Turks is a remote one and, so long as active hostilities do not result, and this eventuality is being carefully watched, it would seem, from our point of view, that both parties could not be better employed.

No. C-11 (Confidential), dated Kuwait, the 2nd April 1914.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. G. GREY, I.A., Political Agent, Kuwait,
To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

1. Letter from His Excellency Saiyid M. 'Arif bin Yusuf, Wali of Suriya.
2. Letter from Binbashi Saiyid 'Umar Fauzi bin 'Arif.
3. Letter from His Excellency Anwar Pasha, War Minister of the Ottoman Government.
4. Letter from His Excellency Sulaiman Shaikh, Wali of Basrah.
5. Letter from Sayid Talib of Basrah.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, translations of the marginally noted letters which have recently been received by the Shaikh of Kuwait in connection with the present state of affairs in Nejd.

2. Saiyid 'Arif, the writer of enclosure No. 1, was formerly Wali of Basrah and is well acquainted with Sir Mubarak and his family. Saiyid 'Umar, his son, the writer of No. 2, arrived in Kuwait about 15th March and left by the mail of the 25th idem. While here he spent much time in discussion with the Shaikh, he and his secretary having been closeted with him for an hour or two daily, but he did not obtain the access to Bin Sa'ud which was the object of his visit, Sir Mubarak declining either to give him any letter of recommendation or to take any steps to arrange the desired meeting. Enclosures 4 and 5 arrived from Basrah two days ago, and they will receive replies to the effect that Sir Mubarak does not see his way to assist either side and must decline to be drawn into the matter or to give any advice, as although he sympathises with the desire of both sides to avoid bloodshed or anything which would produce enmity among Muslims he must be faithful to his longstanding friendship with Bin Sa'ud.

3. It appears that a Turkish force of 1,000 men with five guns has recently been encamped at Zobair, and that the Basrah authorities had written to Ibn Rashid calling for his help on receipt of which they intended to proceed against Bin Sa'ud. Sir Mubarak informed me yesterday that this force had returned to Basrah, a satisfactory reply not having come from Ibn Rashid. The latter is said to have accepted with thanks three thousand rifles which had been sent to arm his men, and

1636



to have replied with promises of future help when he should have the power which he does not possess at present.

4. Referring to Foreign Department telegram No. D.S.-166 of 17th March to your address, it may perhaps be observed that Bin Sa'ud will be more likely to accept with gratitude and readiness any arrangement which we may make on his behalf with the Turks if they, as well as he, are asked to defer action pending the result of the negotiations. Captain Shakespear, who was at Riadh on the 10th ultimo, informs me that Bin Sa'ud had then already heard of the Turkish attempts at mobilisation, and it will naturally be more difficult to restrain him unless such preparations on their part are suspended.

Letter from His Excellency Saiyid Muhammad 'Arif bin Yusuf, Wali of Suriya (Syria), to His Excellency Shaikh Sir Mubarak as Sabah, dated 12 Rabi-ul-Awwal 1332 (9th February 1914).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS,

The bearer of this letter is my son, Binbashi Saiyid 'Umar Fauzi, who is sent to you by His Excellency Anwar Pasha, the War Minister of the Ottoman Government, to discuss with you that which concerns the welfare of the countries and peoples, and, by your means, to come in touch with Abd-ul-Aziz bin Sa'ud.

So it is hoped that you will furnish him with your advice and supply him with a letter to the person referred to, saying that this, my son, is the confidential agent of the Minister alluded to for the discussion of all matters relating to those parts (Nejd): also that meeting him is meeting me, and to trust him is to trust the Government and the Minister above-mentioned. And I pray that God will give you (Mubarak) prosperity and success in what lies before you, you will then gain from this affair great future reward, universal praise, and the approval of the Sultan. Please give my regards to your sons, and salaam.

Letter from Binbashi Saiyid 'Umar Fauzi bin 'Arif, representative of the Ottoman War Minister, to His Excellency Sir Mubarak as Sabah, dated 21 Rabi-al-Akhir 1332 (19th March 1914).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS,

In addition to what Your Excellency has learned from the letters which I placed before you when I arrived here and that which I have represented to you verbally, I beg to lay before you (in writing) the special mission in which I am employed by the Minister for War, Anwar Pasha, namely, that I should meet His Excellency the Amir Abd-ul-Aziz as Sa'ud and discuss with him in a friendly manner measures to terminate the present difficulties which are not hidden from Your Excellency: and my hope from you is that you will write a letter to the aforesaid Amir asking him to come to some place which you consider suitable for our meeting and conference, which may be close at hand to enable me to communicate with the War Minister by telegraph. I have hopes that you and I may agree in this matter, so that through us the shedding of Muslim blood may be avoided, and thereby you will gain future reward from Heaven and praise from our Muhammadan brethren, and salaam.

Letter from His Excellency Anwar Pasha, Ottoman War Minister, to His Excellency Sir Mubarak as Sabah—undated.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS,

Know, oh brother, that the Moslem world is at the present time attacked by enemies from all sides and places and that it stands among them all practically without a helper or supporter. Moreover her own people have deserted her, and the enemies have come in between her and them by means of tricks, lies, and deceptions. Now we, her friends, in obedience to the Divine command and the incumbent service of the revealed religion, have decided upon guarding zealously what is left to Islam and collecting those who profess the unity of God as proclaimed by



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the prophet, hoping that every zealous and religious Muslim will extend to us the hand of help and faithful service in the cause of religion and will act according to the saying of the great guide (Muhammad) "The Faithful in their mutual affection, sympathy, and cohesion, are like a human body all parts of which cry out if any limb complains". And since you are numbered among Muslims we call upon you by this letter to take these matters to heart! and God is the witness and onlooker: there is certainly no permanent value in Government, property, or anything of these perishable things, the object of all is to do the will of Heaven and to exalt the Divine creed in Divine territory "if there is good knowledge of God in your heart good will come to you even from what is taken away from you" (Koran), and salaam.

Letter from His Excellency Sulaiman Shafiq, Wali of Basrah, to His Excellency Sir Mubarak as Sabah, dated 1 Jamadi-ul-Awwal 1332 (March 28, 1914).

AFTER COMPLIMENTS,

Saiyid 'Umar Fauzi Beg Binbashi has returned from Kuwait deeply grateful for your kindness to him and obliged for all the friendliness you showed him. He has been appointed as my Staff Officer in Basrah, and we hope for success (in our affairs). It is not hidden from Your Excellency that the exalted Government is occupied with the settlement of Nejd matters, and their chief object is to avoid bloodshed and the rise of hatred among Muslims, and we have to ask help from honoured persons, such as yourself especially, as we ought to be working together in this matter, seeking for Divine favour that our efforts may be crowned with success. We hope for your valuable opinion and profitable help according to what you see to be advisable, and trust that you will disclose to us how to get to the root of the matter so that we may succeed in the affair. When I see you I will speak upon the subject, meanwhile I hope for an answer from you, and salaam.

Letter from Saiyid Talib, Basrah, to Sir Mubarak as Sabah, dated 1 Jamadi-ul-Awwal (March 28th, 1914).


AFTER COMPLIMENTS,

Saiyid 'Umar Fauzi Binbashi has returned grateful for your favours, and this is only what is expected from your noble qualities, as Your Excellency is as a father whose fatherly kindness to, and deep affection for, his children is generally admitted. May Heaven prolong your life!

The settlement of Nejd affairs has been committed to His Excellency the Wali who has written to Your Excellency a letter which I enclose, and since you are of the first of those whose opinions are profitable, you are requested to help energetically in this important matter so that it may be carried through with great success. Please point out what should be done in the matter, and salaam.

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No. 1070 (Confidential), dated Bushire, the 11th (received the 20th) April, 1914.

From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

In continuation of my telegram No. 440, dated 11th April, 1914, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of letter No. C.-12, dated 7th April, 1914, from the Political Agent at Kuwait, to my address, which is of interest in regard to the attempt of the Ottoman authorities at Basrah to enter into negotiation with Bin Sa'ud.

No. C.-12 (Confidential), dated Kuwait, the 7th April, 1914.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. G. GREY, I.A., Political Agent, Kuwait,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

In continuation of my letter No. C.-11, dated 2nd instant, I have the honour to report further on the subject of Bin Sa'ud and the Turkish Government.

2. Yesterday Sir Mubarak received a letter from Bin Sa'ud enclosing a copy of that recently addressed to him by the Political Agent at Bahrain and asking for advice. The Shaikh asked me what reply he should give. I said that Bin Sa'ud should be told to continue to act in conformity with the advice given to him by Major Trevor, and to abstain from further action for the present.

His Excellency then told me clearly that what Bin Sa'ud desired was the same position as that assured to the Shaikh of Kuwait under the recent Anglo-Turkish Agreement, viz., autonomy with British protection under Turkish suzerainty, and added that, in his opinion, any other arrangement would result in endless trouble in the future for the Arabs, for the Turks, and for ourselves. I replied that the question had been referred to His Majesty's Government, and that Bin Sa'ud's best chance of obtaining a solution which would be satisfactory to himself would be implicitly to adhere to the instructions which he had received. To this Sir Mubarak agreed.

3. Further letters also arrived yesterday from the Wali of Basrah and Saiyid Talib in which Sir Mubarak was informed that the Ottoman Government had signified their intention of conferring upon him and upon Sir Khazal Khan of Muhammerah the decoration of the Osmanieh in the first class, and the Wali expressed a wish to come to Kuwait for the purpose of investing Sir Mubarak with the insignia thereof. His Excellency asked me what I thought of this. I replied that as he had already expressed to the Turks his regret at not being able to act as an intermediary in their negotiations with Bin Sa'ud he need feel no awkwardness in accepting this mark of favour at their hands. He remarked that the presence of the Wali of Basrah in Kuwait at the present moment would be likely to lead to misunderstandings, as his object would certainly be to use this place as a base from whence to carry on negotiations with Bin Sa'ud, and asked whether it would not be better for him to borrow my launch—his own being *hors de combat* at present—and proceed to Fao for the investiture, explaining to the Wali that this course would save him trouble and the inconvenience of prolonging his journey. I can see nothing objectionable in this proposal from the local point of view, but it appears better that I should ask you to telegraph to the Government of India asking whether for any reason it would be well to allow the Wali to come to Kuwait, and if you see no objection I hope you will do this and ask for a reply at their earliest convenience.

4. I append a translation of a letter recently written by Bin Sa'ud to Saiyid Talib from which it will be seen that he has no intention at present of entering into any agreement with the Turks. He is now some distance north of Riyadh, but his advance is not intended as a hostile demonstration.

5. In letter No. 39902-13, dated 2nd October last, from His Majesty's Foreign Office to India Office, it is stated that Hakki Pasha, in thanking His Majesty's Government on behalf of the Porte for their friendly offer of good offices in the



difficulty with Bin Sa'ud, adds that if the necessity arises the Porte will not fail to avail itself of them. Sir P. Cox, in his "memorandum of guidance", for Major Trevor at his meeting with Bin Sa'ud in December last, observes that "it may be taken for granted that the Porte will be anxious to avoid our mediation if possible"; and the local state of affairs at the moment leads me to fear that, notwithstanding Hakki Pasha's apparent readiness frankly to exchange views at the discussions which have recently taken place in London, the replies of the Porte to the representations of His Majesty's Government may be purposely delayed pending the result of the efforts which are being made locally to effect a settlement with Bin Sa'ud, a settlement which, whatever its exact terms may be, will certainly be opposed to our interests, and fatal to the future peace and prosperity of certain regions adjoining the Persian Gulf.

Translation of a letter from Abd-ul-Aziz Bin Sa'ud to Saiyid Talib of Basrah, undated.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS,

I was very pleased to receive your letter signifying your devotion to the Exalted Government (Porte), which devotion I share, as you know, brother, that I am the first in wishing well to that Government and country. And it is with great grief that I have to ask you to represent to the persons charged with the business that although I do not waver in allegiance to Islam or turn from obedience to the Porte there are things that I cannot do. Please present my good wishes to Anwar Pasha, the present war minister, and assure him that I also desire the union of Islam and the binding together of separated hearts, and moreover that I am grateful to him for having sent His Excellency Saiyid 'Umar Fauzi Beg for the establishment of friendly relations and for the latter having brought a valuable present in the shape of the noble Koran.

But it is not hidden from you that the affairs of our country at the present moment are in a very strange condition, of which indeed the description is impossible, and that I am not responsible for this. If the Government's intentions are really to protect the country from various dangers and to gather Islam together in obedience to the Khalifate then this can only be done by diplomatic measures followed

*His Majesty's Government is meant here.

by a proclamation, and it is for the Porte to accomplish this with those people* whose good qualities cause the countries of the world to remain in repose, whom we know and on whom we depend and do not wish to displease by actions contrary to our promises to them. Please give my respects to Saiyid 'Umar Fauzi Beg and give assurances of my friendship in all necessary places. And as for the valuable present, I accept it, and hope you will convey my excuses, and salaam.



Confidential.

No. 1305 of 1914.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 3rd May 1914.


A copy of the undermentioned communications is forwarded with compliments to the Political Agent, Kuwait, for information, in continuation of this office endorsement No. 1245 dated 28th April 1914.


By Order,

P. S. Loch
Lieutenant,
Assistant Resident.

-
- (1). Resident Bushire to Foreign Simla. Telegram No. 516 dated 28th April 1914.
 - (2). Consul Basrah to Embassy Constantinople, repeated Resident Bushire, telegram No. 35 dated 28th April 1914.
 - (3). Resident Bushire to Foreign Simla. Telegram No. 525 dated 30th April 1914.
 - (4). Enclosure to Foreign Department Endorsement No. 313-E.A. dated 22nd April 1914.

R.F.





Telegram.

From Major S.G. Knox, Resident, Bushire.


To Foreign Simla.


No. 516.


Dated 28th April 1914 (9.45 p.m.)


It is reported from Fao April 28th that Shaikh
Mubarak's launch with Deputy Wali Basrah and Saiyid Talib
aboard sailed presumably for Kuwait.

Knox.









Telegram. R.

From Major S.G. Knox, Resident, Bushire.

To Foreign.

No. 525.


Dated 30th April 1914 (4. p.m.)

Following from Basrah 35 April 28th.

"Commission.....

.....steamer".

Knox.





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(Received on the 30th March 1914 with Political Secretary's letter No. 11, dated the 13th March 1914.)

TURKEY.

[7th March.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

10244

No. 1.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Foreign Office,

7th March 1914.

Sir,

With reference to previous correspondence respecting Bin Saud and his relations with the Ottoman and British Governments, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for India, the accompanying copy of a minute by Mr. Parker recording a conversation with Hakki Pasha.

I am to state that, in the opinion of Sir E. Grey, the fact that information regarding the recent meeting between British officers and Bin Saud has come to the knowledge of the Ottoman Government renders it necessary that the utmost care should be exercised in regard to any future communications with that chief, as it is clear from the language of Hakki Pasha that such communications do in fact tend to give rise to grave suspicion on the part of the Ottoman Government.

Sir E. Grey is further of opinion that, in view of the language of His Highness, the utmost caution should be observed at the interviews which are to take place with Hakki Pasha next week, in order that the Ottoman Government may be reassured as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government. Sir E. Grey believes that the Ottoman Government, if treated with frankness, will show themselves prepared to meet the reasonable requirements of His Majesty's Government, but he is anxious to dispel any erroneous impression which may have arisen that British policy is directed towards weakening the Ottoman authority in Nejd, as such a policy would be inconsistent with that of upholding the integrity of the Ottoman Empire to which reference is made in your letter of the 13th September 1913.

I am, &c.,

W. LANGLEY.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Minute by Mr. Parker.

I called on Hakki Pasha to-day with reference to the Turco-German negotiations, and he took the opportunity of saying to me, under instructions, that it was persistently reported at Basra that His Majesty's Government had, through their agents in the Persian Gulf, entered into direct relations with Bin Saud. This had created a very painful impression at Constantinople, for the British Government had solemnly recognised that west of the blue line attached to the Convention signed on the 29th July 1913, and to the north of that line, excepting Kuwait, the territory was Turkish, and formed part of an Ottoman province; the Turkish Government was, therefore, greatly concerned to hear that such communication had been made by us direct to an Ottoman subject in territory recognised as Ottoman, and that any communication should not have been addressed to the Ottoman Government.

I said that curiously enough this was the very subject about which I wished to speak to him, and that the appointments I had already fixed for him at the Foreign Office on Monday and Wednesday were in order that he might have a full and frank interchange of views with Sir Percy Cox who was shortly going to India, and with Sir A. Hirtzel and myself. We felt that it would be of great value for such an exchange to take place about our mutual interests in the Gulf, and about Bin Saud in particular.



2

The meeting to which he had referred had in fact taken place. Hakki Pasha would recollect that some months ago I had spoken to him about His Majesty's Government being able to use their good offices in order to effect a reconciliation between him and the Turkish Government, and His Highness had, after reference to Constantinople, expressed his Government's appreciation of our offer, which, if later need should arise, they would be glad to avail themselves of, but that they were themselves in negotiation with Bin Saud and they hoped soon to reach a satisfactory settlement.

Now, however, no substantial progress seemed to have been made with Bin Saud by the Ottoman Government, and meanwhile there had been great unrest on the Trucial Coast and near Maskat, there were fears that Bin Saud, if His Majesty's Government treated him with coldness, would retaliate by forcible action against the tribes under our protection, and we could not face with equanimity the prospect of having to send a large expedition to quell any disturbances which might arise. This, and the fact that our merchants were damaged in their interests by being excluded from El Katif, made it necessary for us, from the force of circumstances, to address some communications to Bin Saud; but we were so far from wishing to undermine the Ottoman authority, or depart from an attitude of strict neutrality to which His Majesty's Government intended to adhere, that we had already arranged with Sir P. Cox to meet Hakki Pasha in order to have a full discussion.

Hakki Pasha said he had no authority to discuss the position with Sir P. Cox, but he would agree to meet him provided it was understood that the discussion should be tentative and non-committal. The Ottoman Government meant to re-establish their garrisons in El Hasa, and they would deeply resent it if Bin Saud received any encouragement from us. I repeated that we were and would remain neutral, but we had certain interests to protect on the Trucial Coast, and we must also insist upon our merchants having access to El Katif as to every other portion of the Ottoman Empire: we had, however, heard it stated that the Turks wished to exclude us from El Katif even for purposes of trade. Hakki Pasha said he could not think that this was really the case, but he impressed upon me that the Ottoman Government attached great value to our formal and binding recognition of the Ottoman province of Nejd, for Parliament was soon meeting and they would have to make full use of this in justifying the many concessions they had made to us, with regard to El Katif, the Aden delimitation up to the Ruba Al Khali, and the Turco-Persian frontier; and if now they found that we did not in fact recognise Turkish authority in Nejd the agreements with us would be most unpopular: in fact, the Ottoman Government would be bound by their engagements to us, and we should evade our own to them.

I impressed upon him very clearly and repeatedly that there was no question of any such evasion—a situation of fact had arisen and must be faced, and for this purpose we wished to meet him in friendly discussion. If we had not wished to deal with the matter in this open and friendly way, we should not have proposed to him in the summer to use our good offices to effect a reconciliation.

The discussion was quite friendly, but I feel that the situation is delicate, and that unless it is carefully handled the Turks may make difficulties.

Foreign Office, 7th March 1914.

A. P.



(Received on the 30th March 1914 with Political Secretary's letter No. 11, dated the 13th March 1914.)

TURKEY.

[9th March.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

10569

No. 1.

Memorandum communicated to Hakki Pasha, 9th March 1914.

BIN SAUD.

The subject being a complicated one it has seemed more convenient to draw up an informal memorandum for the personal information and use of His Highness Hakki Pasha.

In August last it was explained to His Highness that Bin Saud, by the fact of his assumption of control at Katif and Ojair and the coast-line of the El Hassa province, had now entered specifically into the sphere of Gulf politics and commerce; and that important British interests and obligations in the Gulf (*e.g.*, in connection with the maintenance of the maritime peace, the suppression of piracy, and the arms traffic; the settlement of pearling and slavery disputes) made it impossible for us to ignore Bin Saud and pretend to treat the province and coast of Hassa as politically derelict. We must necessarily have relations with someone in *de facto* authority, and the Turks having evacuated the region we must deal with Bin Saud and were glad to explain the position to them.

The above communication was an obviously frank and friendly act prompted by our desire to act with them in a spirit of mutual confidence and co-operation.

Hakki Pasha received the communication very favourably, and replied that the Porte was already in negotiation with Bin Saud and that if occasion for our mediation arose it would be taken advantage of.

In spite of this friendly response by His Highness we know from reliable local information that just after this exchange of communications, or conceivably just before it, the Ottoman Government were endeavouring to arrange terms with Bin Saud, some of which were clearly directed against the British Government and British interests. Thus, according to our information, the following are the conditions which the Porte are endeavouring to impose on Bin Saud as the price of his partial autonomy:—

1. The re-admission of the Turkish garrisons to the province and coast of Hassa, as formerly.
2. The appointment of Kazis and other judicial officers by direct "farmans" issued by the Sultan.
3. The payment by Bin Saud of annual revenue of £ T. 3,000.
4. The reference of all communications from foreign Powers or their representatives to the Turkish authorities for disposal.
5. The exclusion of all foreign merchants and agents from the province.
6. An undertaking from Bin Saud not to give concessions to any foreign companies for railways or motor car services.

Incidentally, the Minister of the Interior has since informed His Majesty's Ambassador (1st December 1913) that the Ottoman Government had decided to recognise the recent *fait accompli* in Nejd (El Hassa) by nominating Ibn Saud as Mutessarif of that district.

The first three of the six conditions above quoted refer to matters with which we are not immediately concerned, but considering the frank communication made to Hakki Pasha in August by His Majesty's Foreign Office, it would not be unnatural that His Majesty's Government should be



greatly surprised at the terms of the latter three, especially 4 and 5, and, if the information proved to be correct, should feel constrained to protest strongly against them.

The only explanation of such conditions would appear to be that the Porte mistrust the assurances already offered of our readiness to co-operate, and that they fail to appreciate the difficulties in which we are placed by the continuance of the present unsatisfactory state of affairs between themselves and Bin Saud.

We fully recognise that Nejd is an Ottoman province, and have no desire to interfere in it, but for the reasons already given we cannot ignore Bin Saud now that he is in occupation of the coast-line. There is no secret regarding our requirements. What we require of him, for the maintenance and protection of our interests, is—

1. That he should not meddle in the territory or politics of Arab principalities in the Gulf, including Trucial Coast and Katar.
2. That like other Shaikhs on the Arab side of the Gulf he should co-operate for the observation and maintenance of the maritime truce; *i.e.*, the suppression of piracy and the pursuit of inter-tribal hostilities by the passage of armed dhows at sea.
3. That he should co-operate for the suppression of the arms traffic.
4. That British traders should be freely admitted to Katif, and properly treated while there.

There is nothing in these conditions to which either Bin Saud or the Porte can take the least legitimate objection; at the same time it is only natural that while expressing his readiness to accept the obligations involved, Bin Saud should in return desire the friendly offices of the British Government in the composition of his quarrel with the Turkish authorities and should ask us to deter Shaikhs in relations with us from harbouring tribal enemies of his.

We had no wish to intrude ourselves, but the terms of the conditions which, as we hear, the Porte now seek to impose on Bin Saud, show so little friendliness toward ourselves, and are so impossible of acquiescence, that we are obliged to return to the subject.

We are primarily concerned to see the last three conditions withdrawn, but we should also be glad to see a satisfactory arrangement come to with Bin Saud by the Porte, under which as a corollary of their decision to regard Bin Saud as *ex officio* Mutessarif of El Hassa, they should approve and take cognisance of his undertaking to comply locally with our four desiderata above detailed, and, while reserving the right to take in the last resort whatever action they may deem necessary, should, by way of friendly co-operation with the British Government for the preservation of peace and good order in the Gulf, agree to refrain from hostile action by sea against the El Hassa coast, without first consulting us, and giving us an opportunity of friendly mediation if such be possible.

The Foreign Office, 9th March 1914.



CONFIDENTIAL

No. C 20 of 1914.

Political Agency,
Kuwait.

286 291
(287)

From

Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Grey, I.A.,
Political Agent, Kuwait.

To

The Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Dated Kuwait, the 16th May 1914.

Sir,


In continuation of my letter No. C.18 dated 6th instant on the subject of the Turks and Bin Saud, I have the honour to state that no further news has reached me regarding Turkish projects, and it is not likely that any will do so for some days at least.

2. Bin Saud has not visited Kuwait, and is at present encamped at Jahra 21 miles out, whence he intends to set off for his own country almost immediately. I have not seen him again, nor have we had held any correspondence.

3. In the opinion of Shaikh Sir Mubarak the Turks will be more likely to declare war upon Bin Saud than to reopen the subject of mediation on the part of His Majesty's Government. Should the latter proposal again come to the fore a difficulty will be encountered in connection with the return of Turkish garrisons to Hassa, which appears to be the principal condition of settlement in the eyes of the Turks, and, at the same time the point which Bin Saud is least inclined to concede.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,

W. G. Grey
Lieut.-Colonel,
Political Agent, Kuwait.





CONFIDENTIAL.

96

(95)

No. 1171, dated Bushire, the 19th April 1914.

From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political
Department, Simla.

In continuation of my telegram No. 467, dated 18th April 1914, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the letters, noted in the margin, which have been received from the Political Agent at Bahrain, in regard to the question of Bin Sa'ud and the Turkish authorities.

(1) Political Agent, Bahrain, to Resident, No. 383, dated the 6th April 1914, with enclosure.
(2) Political Agent, Bahrain, to Resident, No. 404, dated the 10th April 1914, with enclosure.

No. 383, dated the 6th April 1914.

From—MAJOR A. P. TREVOR, C.I.E., Political Agent, Bahrain,
To—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

In continuation of the correspondence ending with my letter No. 314, dated the 21st March 1914, I have the honour to forward, herewith, a copy of a letter which I have received to-day by special messenger from Bin Sa'ud from which it will be seen that he expects to meet a Turkish Envoy somewhere round about Kuwait at an early date.

His messenger is coming to discuss the matter with me to-morrow, but I shall not be able to give him any information which will be acceptable to Bin Sa'ud. In fact it looks probable that unless something definite can be communicated to him very soon, Bin Sa'ud will make his own arrangements with the Turkish Government, and such arrangements may very likely be hostile to our interests.

As the mail steamer has been delayed till to-morrow by a shamal, I hope to catch her with this letter which is written in haste, and the translation of Bin Sa'ud's letter has also been done somewhat hastily.

Should you have any news to communicate to Bin Sa'ud after next mail for Bahrain leaves it would probably be easier to communicate with him through Kuwait.

Translation of a letter, dated the 6th Jamadi I, 1332 (2nd April 1914) from Shaikh 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdur Rahman al Faisal, 'Amir of Najd, to Major A. P. Trevor, C.I.E., Political Agent, Bahrain.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your esteemed letter No. 512 of 1914 and to say that I have understood what you mentioned there, specially you inform me that instructions have reached you to let me know that the British Government is making efforts so as to make arrangements with the Turkish Government and the discussions are progressing, it is, therefore, not advisable that I should take independent action in the matter. I beg to say that I am obliged for that and it is the very object of mine and that I would not change from what I spoke to you verbally. Inshallah presently I expect continuous negotiations from the British Government about what may please the heart.

I have further to inform you that on 11th of the current month I will reach to the desecation of Jubail and this time I received information from the Turkish plenipotentiary who has come from Constantinople directly and his name is Binbashi Saiyid 'Omar Fauzi Beg Mardini, formerly Vali at Basrah, now Vali of Suria. He has with him some message and letters and intends to settle between myself and themselves. He has arrived at Basrah and apparently will come to Kuwait or might have come already. He is bound to see me and I will meet him very soon at the direction of Kuwait if God decrees so. I did not like to see him till I had informed you, so that you may let me know what is required and in



what form it should be. You know of course that I adhere to my word and am firm on the matter that may near me towards the freindship of the British Government and may check my nearing the Turks except in case I cannot help, then I will tread a way good for myself. Now Inshallah you may let me know whatever is necessary, though your first word I had taken by the eye of acceptance, but you know that a man of business desires to know the reality and to settle his case and intention is known to you. I request you to let me know through my protégé Yusuf whom I have trusted in order to negotiate with your honour so that I may (be able to) look after my interests. May you be preserved and salaam.

No. 404, dated the 10th April 1914.

From—MAJOR A. P. TREVOR, C.I.E., Political, Agent, Bahrain,

To—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

In continuation of my letter No. 383, dated the 6th April 1914 (which did not after all catch the last mail steamer before she left and will reach you with this letter), I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of my reply to Bin Sa'ud's letter.

Bin Sa'ud sent a confidential messenger with this letter who had an interview with me. He said that Bin Sa'ud would like to have another meeting with me, and asked if I could arrange it. I replied that I should like very much to see Bin Sa'ud again, but I did not think it would be advisable for me to go and meet him now, without sanction from superior authority, as possibly, in view of the pourparlers going on in London, such action might be open to objection.

In any case I could not add anything to what I had said at the former interview and in my letter No. 514 as I knew nothing further.

The messenger said that Bin Sa'ud had received a letter from Shaikh Mubarak suggesting a meeting with Binbashi Saiyid 'Omar Beg at Kuwait. I said that, as far as I was aware, there did not appear to be any immediate necessity to arrive at a settlement, and recommended delay. The messenger, however, seemed to think that Bin Sa'ud would feel called upon to go if he received another letter. My impression is that Bin Sa'ud intends to go and have a meeting in any case, and is naturally very anxious to know first whether the British Government has been able to do anything for him.

I beg to enquire whether I should comply with Bin Sa'ud's wishes and meet him somewhere on the coast. If so, provided I receive permission at an early date, I could, no doubt, make the trip either in the R. I. M. S. "Palinurus" or on the S. L. "Bahrain". If it is not possible to communicate with me soon I do not suppose the meeting will be possible as I think Bin Sa'ud will soon go on towards Kuwait. If so, no doubt he will have an interview with the Political Agent there.

I am attempting to send you the gist of this letter by telegram from Henjam, but the mail is late and possibly you will not get it much sooner.

Translation of a letter No. 614, from the Political Agent, Bahrain, to Shaikh 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdur Rahman bin Sa'ud, Amir of Najd.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter, dated 6th Jamadi I, 1332= (2nd April 1914) and in reply I have to say that am afraid I have no further information which I can give you, as I have heard nothing further since my letter No. 514 was written.

Your letter under reply has unfortunately just missed the mail to Bushire, but I will communicate with the Resident at the first opportunity. Should I receive any further news I will communicate with you.

In the meanwhile there does not seem to me to be any very pressing hurry, and I would advise you to wait.

If you are going up towards Kuwait, I beg to suggest that you might communicate with the Political Agent there before actually having the meeting. I have had a talk over the whole subject with your messenger Yusuf.

G. M. Press, Simla.—No. C. 73 F. D.—30-4-14—30—B. A.



288 293

(288)

Docket Telegram.

From Loch, Assistant Resident Bushire.

To Grey, P.A. Kuwait.

No. 1352


Dated 10th May 1914.

For information in continuation of our endorsement
No. 1305, dated 3rd May 1914.

By Order,

P. G. Loch

Extract from letter No. 28 dated 2nd May 1914 from Consul, Basrah,
to Ambassador, Constantinople.





289 254
290
Extract from a letter No. 28 dated 2nd May 1914 from F.E. Crow, Esquire, C.M.G., His Majesty's Consul, Basrah, to His Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.

As reported in my telegram 35 of April 28th last, the Commission appointed to effect a settlement of the Hassa question with Bin Sa'ud left Basrah in the Shaikh of Kuwait's launch for Kuwait on the morning of the 28th ultimo. The Commission consisting of Saiyid Talib Bey Naqibzadah as President, Major Beha ad Din Bey Chief of the Baghdad Staff, Major 'Omar Fauzi Bey Chief of the Basrah Staff, who had previously visited Kuwait and Sami Effendi Mutassarif of Hassa, was accompanied by Eumer Bey a Basrah lawyer Muhammad al Na'ma, Arab notable and landed proprietor and 'Abdul Wahab Mandil and 'Abdul Latif Mandil; the latter are Arab notables and landed proprietors and represent Bin Sa'ud at Basrah as agents.

I understand that the instructions to the Commission are to settle the question in a friendly way and that they will meet Bin Sa'ud at Kuwait. The 1st class of the Osmanieh has been conferred on Shaikh Mubarak by the Sultan and, as the decoration had not arrived at Basrah, an order was borrowed from Saiyid Talib Bey, presumably the same, and sent to the Shaikh by the hands of Barhan ad Din Bey, Public Prosecutor of the Basrah Appeal Court and Hilmi Effendi Director of Public Instruction. These gentlemen travelled with the Commission on board the Shaikh's launch. On receipt of the decoration from Constantinople it is to be handed to Saiyid Talib in return for the one he lent. The judicial authorities were very loth to part with the Public Prosecutor, whose services are required in the Courts where much business awaits him. A letter addressed by the President of the Court to the Vali pointing out the inconvenience caused by the Public Prosecutor's absence from his post and the consequent



Extract from a letter No. 28 dated 2nd May 1914 from P.E.
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
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Court to the Veli pointing out the inconvenience caused
by the Public Prosecutor's absence from his post and the
consequent



(291) 290 295
consequent delay to the business of the courts was not well
received and the Vali explained that it was only fair to
the Public Prosecutor to give him the chance of making a
little money. Some irritation seems to have been caused in
the Serai by this observation.

* * * * *

For information to the
Hon. Secy. of State for India





Confidential.

Docket Telegram.

From Loch, Assistant Resident, Bushire.

To Grey, P.A. Kuwait.

No. 1388

Dated 10. 5.14.

For information in continuation of our No. 1352
of 10.5.14.

By Order,

D. Loch


Consul Basrah to Embassy Constantinople No. 38 of 8.5.14.

Resident to Foreign. No. 557 of 9.5.14.

" " " No. 563 of 11.5.14

Enclosure to Foreign Department No. 355-E.A. of 30.4.14.

Secretary of State for India to Foreign, dated 11.5.14.





Telegram. "R".

From F.E. Crow, Esquire, C.M.G., H.M.'s Consul, Basrah.

To Embassy Constantinople, repeated Major S.G. Knox,
Resident, Bushire.


No. 38.

Dated and received 8.5.14. (7.20 p.m.)

My telegram 35. Turkish Commission returned in
Shaikh's launch from Kuwait on evening May 5th.

According to information no settlement was effected but
Bin Sa'ud's claim for internal independence under the Tur-
kish flag has been submitted to the Porte. Turks remark
that British representative at Kuwait visited Bin Sa'ud
twice during negotiations.

Crow.





(294) 293 298

Telegram. "R".

From Major S.G. Knox, Resident Bushire.

To Foreign Simla.

No. 557.


Dated 9.5.14 (4. p.m.)

Following from Basrah 38 May 8th.

"My.....

..... negotiations".

Knox.





Telegram "R".

295

From Major S.G.Knox, Resident Bushire.

To Foreign, repeated Lieut-Colonel Grey Kuwait by post,
also Mr. Crow Basrah.


No. 563.

Dated 11.5.1914 (11.40 a.m.)

My 557 May 9th.

Kuwait reports meeting posted to you direct do
not bear out Turkish statement reported by Crow. Grey
asked to report and hope he will be able to deny it.

Knox.





290 295 300
ved on the 22nd April 1914 with Political Secretary's
letter No. 14, dated the 3rd April 1914.)

Foreign Office,
April 1st, 1914.

Mr.

On the 13th September last, as you are aware, a letter was addressed to this Department by the direction of the Secretary of State for India, enclosing a telegram from the Viceroy, which contained the following passages :-

"There can be no doubt, so far as India's interests are concerned, that the existence in Asia of a strong Turkish power, friendly and reformed, will be a safeguard against interference with India from the west; it might even be the indirect means of Persia's integrity being maintained. We have nothing to fear from Turkey, now that we have reached agreement with her in the Persian Gulf, whereas we have everything to gain by keeping our relations with her friendly.

"India's interests cannot, as we are fully aware, directly govern policy of His Majesty's Government towards Turkey, but it would be a serious prospect for India if partition of Turkey eventuated. Our responsibilities would be increased thereby, and Great Britain, it may be observed, would have to bear a share of the increase.

"It is our strong opinion, therefore, that every effort should be made to avoid action likely to lead to the partition, either now or in the future, of Turkey's Asiatic possessions, and that His Majesty's Government should pursue consistently the policy of maintaining the Turkish Empire while reforming and strengthening it".

I am to request that the despatch No.193 of March 18th from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople of which a copy was sent to you on the 30th ultimo, may be read in the light of the above statement of policy; and I am to observe



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297 296 301
that, in view of the importance of a successful settlement being reached of the negotiations now taking place between the Ottoman Government and Bin Saud through the Sheikh of Koweit, Sir E. Grey on consideration has grave doubts as to the wisdom of conveying to Bin Saud a warning, as proposed in the telegram of March 16th to the Viceroy, against acting independently of His Majesty's Government.

It is true that ~~direct~~ negotiations have, in a very informal manner, taken place between His Majesty's Government and the Ottoman Government; but Sir E. Grey feels that this ~~is~~ does not, in existing conditions afford sufficient justification for an intimation being conveyed to a Turkish subject that he should not negotiate with his own Government, especially having regard to the terms of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of so recent a date as July 29th, 1913.

If, as the Government of India may apprehend, terms are agreed between the Ottoman Government and Bin Saud which are ^cinconsistent with British rights, or unfair to British commercial interests, or opposed to the political duties of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf, the remedy, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, would lie in direct negotiation with the Ottoman Government. The adoption of this procedure, and the discontinuance of direct communications of a questionable nature with Bin Saud may possibly, Sir E. Grey holds, cause some minor local inconvenience in the Persian Gulf; but such inconvenience would in probability be of short duration and it is desirable to incur it rather than to run the risk of the graver dangers so forcibly portrayed in the Viceroy's telegram of last September.

I am, etc.,

Sd/- Eyre A. Crowe.

The Under Secretary of State,
India Office.



that, in view of the importance of a successful settlement
being reached of the negotiations now taking place between
the Ottoman Government and Bin Saud through the Sheikh of
Koweit, Sir E. Grey on consideration has grave doubts as
to the wisdom of conveying to Bin Saud a warning, as propo-
sed in the telegram of March 18th to the Viceroy, against
acting independently of His Majesty's Government.
It is true that direct negotiations have, in a very
informal manner, taken place between His Majesty's Govern-
ment and the Ottoman Government; but Sir E. Grey feels
that this it does not, in existing conditions afford
sufficient justification for an intimation being conveyed
to a Turkish subject that he should not negotiate with his
own Government, especially having regard to the terms of
the Anglo-Turkish Convention of so recent a date as July
29th, 1913.
It, as the Government of India may apprehend, seems to
arise between the Ottoman Government and Bin Saud which
is inconsistent with British rights, or unfair to British
commercial interests, or exposed to the political duties of
Great Britain in the Persian Gulf, the remedy, in Sir E.
Grey's opinion, would lie in direct negotiation with the
Ottoman Government. The adoption of this procedure, and
the discontinuance of direct communications of a question-
able nature with Bin Saud may possibly, Sir E. Grey holds,
cause some minor local inconvenience in the Persian Gulf;
but such inconvenience would in probability be of short
duration and is desirable so incur it rather than to run
the risk of the ever dangerous so forcibly portrayed in the
Viceroy's telegram of last September.
I am, etc.,
Edw. A. Crowe.
The Under Secretary of State,
India Office.



(298) 297 302

Telegram. P.


From Secretary of State for India.

To Foreign, repeated Knox, Resident, Bushire.

No. Nil.

Dated 11.5.14. Received 12.5.14 (6.30 a.m.)

With reference to telegram dated 9th May from Mallet regarding 'Abd-al-'Aziz, it is requested that you will inform me as soon as possible whether the latter was visited by the Political Agent at Kuwait during the negotiations. If so, how often did he visit him and for what purpose?






(Continuation of Note, Précis or Draft.)

298 303
(24)

Docket Telegram -
From Grey P. a. Kadhut
To Knox Offg Rest. Boshin
no - his (C. 24).
Dated 16-5-14. (20/5)

Telegram from Secretary of
State dated 11th inst. Turkish
accusation is absolutely false:
the only visit I paid to Bin
Saud was before deputation
arrived and its purpose was
communication Whim, according
to instructions, of information
contained in Foreign Dept.
letter telegram no 256 S
dated 25th April. This interview
was reported in my letter no C16
dated 29th April. (I had no other
interview with him whatever).
Grey.

S 18-3,000-5-12





Kinnaird

299 304

No. 774, dated Bushire, the 15th (received the 23rd) March 1914.

From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—THE HON'BLE MR. A. H. GRANT, C.I.E., I.C.S., Officiating Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi.

In amplification of my telegram No. 298, dated 12th March 1914. I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the letters noted in the margin, which have been received from the Political Agent, Bahrain, in regard to the desirability of communicating the intentions of His Majesty's Government to Bin Saud before the latter moves north and enters into negotiations with the Turks.

No. 255, dated Bahrain, the 8th March 1914.

From—The Political Agent, Bahrain,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to invite a reference to my letter No. T.-805, dated the 20th December 1913, on the subject of my meeting with Bin Saud at Ojair, and especially to paragraph 12 thereof in which I asked that I might receive orders by March the 1st, if there was anything to communicate to Bin Saud before he goes north in the spring.

I intended to write about this matter last mail, but it escaped my memory, but I had already begun a letter this week when I received yesterday afternoon a reminder from Bin Saud, a copy of which is annexed together with a copy of my reply thereto. I hear a rumour that Bin Saud is coming to Hasa, in any case he will probably start to the north-west in a very short time now, and cannot then postpone his negotiations with the Turkish authorities any longer; if, therefore, Government have anything for me to communicate to Bin Saud it is imperative that I should receive instructions at once, so that I can communicate with him before he gets out of touch.

From Shaikh 'Abdul 'Aziz Bin Saud to the Political Agent, dated 1 Rabi II.
From the Political Agent to Shaikh 'Abdul 'Aziz Bin Saud, dated the 7th March (10th Rabi II.)

I have the honour to inform you that since my departure from you from Ojair I did not receive any letter from you. I hope some good cause kept you from writing. After this I have to let you know that in these days negotiations have taken place between myself and the Government and the time of three months that had been fixed between myself and your honour is coming to a close. I request you to write what is required because it is not possible for me to keep them off for more than the known time, so that I may be on foresight (i.e., look after my interests).

Translation of a letter, dated the ^{1st Rabi-ul-Thani 1333} 29th February 1914 from Shaikh 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdur Rahman al Faisal to Major A. P. Trevor, C.I.E., Political Agent, Bahrain.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS,

I have the honour to inform you that since my departure from you from Ojair I did not receive any letter from you. I hope some good cause kept you from writing. After this I have to let you know that in these days negotiations have taken place between myself and the Government and the time of three months that had been fixed between myself and your honour is coming to a close. I request you to write what is required because it is not possible for me to keep them off for more than the known time, so that I may be on foresight (i.e., look after my interests).

Dated Bahrain, the 7th March 1914.

From—The Political Agent, Bahrain,

To—SHAIKH 'ABDUL 'AZIZ BIN 'ABDUR RAHMAN BIN SAUD.

I have received your honoured letter dated the 1st Rabi II, this day, and understood its contents; I have to say that I did not write because I had not got anything special to write about and have not yet heard anything from the Resident, Bushire. I intended in any case to send a letter to Bushire by this mail to remind the Resident that the three months time which was mentioned is drawing to a close; now I have received your letter, I shall communicate its contents and request an



2

early reply. As soon as I get it I shall, Inshallah, let you know about the matter. I have heard a rumour that you are coming to Hasa in these days and should like to know if that is correct. If so, we shall be near neighbours again and shall be able to communicate quickly. May you be preserved, and salaam.

No. 258, dated Bahrain, the 9th March 1914.

From—The Political Agent, Bahrain,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

In continuation of my letter No. 255, dated the 8th March 1914, on the subject of Bin Saud, I have the honour to invite a reference to Mr. Lorimer's letter No. 24, dated the 4th January 1914, on the subject and especially to the concluding portion of paragraph 4.

In view of the probability of early negotiations between Bin Saud and the Turks and the possibility of some settlement being arrived at which might include a clause excluding foreign merchants and agents of foreign powers (*vide* paragraph 7, sub-section (3) of my letter No. T-805, dated the 20th December 1913), I would observe that, if the proposal to appoint a Native Agent at Katif is approved, it would appear advisable to expedite the matter and send the selected man to Katif without delay.



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(301)

No. 915 (Confidential), dated Bushire, the 29th March (received the 6th April) 1914.

From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The HON'BLE MR. A. H. GRANT, C.I.E., I.C.S., Officiating Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the letter, noted in the margin, which has been received from the Political

No. 314, dated the 21st March 1914.

Agent at Baharin, giving cover to the communication made to Bin Saud in pursuance of the instructions conveyed in your telegram No. 166-D.S., dated 17th March 1914.

2. His Majesty's Consul at Basrah has been requested kindly to keep this Residency informed of any movements of troops, news of which will at once be telegraphed.

No. 314, dated Bahrain, the 21st March 1914.

From—MAJOR P. A. TREVOR, C.I.E., Political Agent, Bahrain,

To—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, C.I.E., Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

With reference to your office endorsement No. 826, dated the 18th March 1914, which was delivered to me early this morning by the Officer Commanding R. I. M. S. "Lawrence", I have the honour to forward, herewith, for your information a copy of the letter which I have addressed to Shaikh 'Abdul Aziz bin Saud and have this day handed to his Agent in Bahrain with the request that it may be despatched by a sure messenger as quickly as possible.

The telegram is not quite clear as to whether it is intended to repeat to Bin Saud the intimation given to the Turkish Government regarding Bahrain. I laid stress on this point when I interviewed Bin Saud in December last, but as I reported at the time, it did not make much impression on him. In fact, from his point of view I do not think it amounts to much, having regard to the frequent visits of the "Marmaris" to Qatar and the ease with which a flotilla of native boats could be conveyed direct from Basrah in the fair season. In the circumstances, therefore, I have not mentioned it again.


No. 512, dated Bahrain, the 21st March 1914.

From—The Political Agent,

To—SHAikh 'ABDUL 'AZIZ BIN 'ABDUL RAHMAN BIN SAUD, Amir of Nejd.

In continuation of my letter of the 10th Rabi' II 1332 (=7th March 1914) and in reply to your letter of 1st Rabi' II 1332 (=26th February 1914) I have received instructions to inform you that endeavours are being made by the High British Government to effect an arrangement with the Turkish Government and discussions are in progress. It would therefore not be advisable for you to take independent action in the matter.

I hope you are enjoying good health. This is what had to be said and may you be preserved and salaam.





Urgent & Confidential.

301

(302)

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Docket Telegram.

From Loch, Assistant Resident Bushire.

To Grey, P.A. Kuwait.

No. 1424

Dated 16th May 1914.


For information and favour of early report in
sense of last sentence, reference our docket telegram No. 1388
of 12-5-14.

By order,

PG. Loch

Telegram No. 300-S., dated 13th May 1914 from Foreign Simla, to
Resident Bushire.

*In reply I sent them a copy
of my DP d 16/5/14. As C24 d/prop
WY ²⁰/₅ adding. "I had
— as this interview with
him whatever?"*





302 (303)
307

Telegram.P.

From Foreign Simla.


To Major S.G.Knox, Resident Bushire.

No. 300-S.

Dated and received 13-5-14(6 p.m.)

It is requested that you will enquire from Grey and report by telegraph whether, after the interview which took place on April 28th described in his letter No.16 C, he had any other interview with 'Abd-al-'Aziz. If he had, please inform me for what purpose and on what dates.

Foreign.





Confidential.

303

308

(304)

Docket Telegram.

From Knox, Resident Bushire.

To Grey, P.A. Kuwait.

No. 1495



Dated 19 May 1914.


Letter No. 1494 dated 19 May 1914 from Resident, Bushire, to Foreign, Simla.

For information.

D.O.

Please don't think that I am trying to crib your language and pass it off as my own. The reason for this strange drafting is that I have received orders to suppress interlocu^{tony} letters, where there is no divergence of opinion. Foreign wants one letter instead of two.





Confidential.

No. 1494 of 1914.

(305) 304 309

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 19th May 1914.

From

Major S.G.Knox, C.I.E.,

Offg: Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

To

The Hon'ble Lieut-Colonel Sir P.Z.Cox, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.,

Foreign Secretary to the Government of India,

In the Foreign and Political Department,


S i m l a .

Sir,

In continuation of my letter No.1350 dated 10th May on the subject of the Turks and Bin Sa'ud, I have the honour to state that the Political Agent, Kuwait, reports on the 10th May that no further news has reached him regarding Turkish project and that he does not expect any for some days.

2. Bin Sa'ud has not visited Kuwait, and is at present encamped at Jahra 21 miles out, whence he intends to set off for his own country almost immediately. The Political Agent has not seen him again nor has there been any correspondence between them. He further reports that in the opinion of Shaikh Sir Mubarak, the Turks will be more likely to declare war upon Bin Sa'ud than to reopen the subject of mediation on the part of His Majesty's Government. Should the latter proposal again come to the fore, a difficulty will, the Political Agent considers, be encountered in connection with the return of Turkish garrison to Hasa, which appears to be the principal condition of settlement in the eyes of the Turks, and, at the same time, the point which Bin Sa'ud is least inclined to concede.

3. I am not inclined to share Shaikh Mubarak's fears of war by the Turks upon Bin Sa'ud but I agree with the Political Agent in thinking that, should we be asked to mediate, we should find the greatest difficulty in inducing the 'Amir to accept the presence of Turkish troops at Hasa, and I would venture
to



202 304 (202) No. 444 of 1914. Confidential.
British Residency and Consulate-General,
Rushdie, 19 May 1914.

From
Major S. S. Knox, C.I.E.,
Offg. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.


To
The Hon'ble Lieut-Colonel Sir P. E. Cox, K.C.I.E., C.B.E.,
Foreign Secretary to the Government of India,
in the Persian and Political Department,
Simla.

Sir,

In continuation of my letter No. 1870 dated 10th May on
the subject of the Turkish and Bin Saud, I have the honor to
state that the Political Agent, Kuwait, reports on the 10th May
that no further news has reached him regarding Turkish project
and that he does not expect any for some days.

2. Bin Saud has not visited Kuwait, and is at present
employed at Jafra. He writes out, whence he intends to set off
for his own country almost immediately. The Political Agent
has not seen him again nor has there been any correspondence
between them. He further reports that in the opinion of Sheikh
Sir Mubarak, the Turks will be more likely to declare war upon
Bin Saud than to reopen the subject of mediation on the part
of His Majesty's Government. Should the latter proposal again
come to the fore, a difficulty will, the Political Agent
considers, be encountered in connection with the return of
Turkish Garrison to Haifa, which appears to be the principal
condition of settlement in the eyes of the Turks, and at the
same time, the point which Bin Saud is least inclined to
concede.

3. I am not inclined to share Sheikh Mubarak's fears of
war by the Turks upon Bin Saud but I agree with the Political
Agent in thinking that, should we be asked to mediate, we should
find the greatest difficulty in inducing the 'Amir to accept
the presence of Turkish troops at Haifa, and I would venture
to



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306 310

to suggest that we should do our utmost to dissuade the Turks from insisting on any such proposal. Even if we succeeded in persuading the 'Amir to accept Turkish troops, the possibilities of future friction would be considerable. The payment of revenue, flying the Turkish flag over Hasa boats, and the 'Amir's Hofuf residence or his tents while in the Sa'ijah, and perhaps the presence of a Turkish Civil Adviser with a small escort of Turkish infantry for his personal protection and as a badge of rank and dignity, so to speak, would appear to be far more acceptable indications of Turkish suzerainty from the Arab point of view.


I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

Major,

Offg: Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.



Confidential.

306

311

(307)

Docket Telegram.

From Loch, Assistant Resident Bushire.

To Grey, P.A. Kuwait.

No. 1593

Dated 26th May 1914.



Telegram from Resident Bushire to Foreign, Simla,
No. 597 of 19-5-14, repeated Consul, Basrah.

Enclosures to F.D. No. 402-E.A. of 12-5-14.

For information in continuation of this office
endorsement 1495 of 19-5-14.

By Order,

J.S. Dock





Telegram.R.

From Major S.G.Knox, Resident Bushire.

To Foreign, Simla, repeated Crow, Consul, Basrah.

No. 597.

Dated 19-5-14(7.30 p.m.)



Your telegram No.300-S. of May 13th.

Following from Political Kuwait.

"Telegram from Secretary of State for India May 11th.

Turkish accusation is absolutely false ! The only visit I paid to 'Abd-al-'Aziz was before deputation's arrival and its purpose was communication to him, according to instructions, of the information contained in Simla telegram No.256-S. of April 25th. This interview was reported in my letter No.C-16 of April 29th."

Knox.





(COPY).

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14632/14.

Foreign Office,

April 3rd, 1914.

Immediate.

Sir,

With reference to my letter of the 1st instant regarding the relations between Bin Saud and the Turkish Government, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to invite the attention of the Secretary of State for India to the telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the same subject, No.214 of April 2nd, of which a copy was sent to your Office on the same day.

In view of Talaat Bey's statement, as reported in that telegram, that a direct understanding between the Sublime Porte and Bin Saud is expected, it appears to Sir E. Grey essential that the intimation which it had been proposed to convey to Bin Saud, warning him against acting independently of His Majesty's Government, should be held back, if not cancelled.

I am, etc.,

Sd/- Eyre A. Crowe.

The Under Secretary of State,
India Office.



(COPY).
14/3/1914.
Immediate.
Sir,
With reference to my letter of the 1st instant
regarding the relations between Bin Saud and the
Turkish Government, I am directed by Secretary Sir
E. Grey to invite the attention of the Secretary of
State for India to the telegram from His Majesty's
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had been proposed to convey to Bin Saud, warning him
against acting independently of His Majesty's Govern-
ment, should be held back, if not cancelled.
I am, etc.,
Edw. A. Crowe.
The Under Secretary of State,
India Office.



(COPY).

310 309
3/4

P. 1278.

Immediate.


India Office,
Whitehall,
London, S.W.
4th April 1914.

Sir,

I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No.12320 of the 1st instant regarding the relations of Bin Saud with the Ottoman Government.

The Marquess of Crewe fully appreciates the force of the considerations stated in the telegram from the Government of India which was quoted therein, but saw nothing inconsistent with them in the policy of endeavouring to effect between the de facto ruler of Nejd and the Ottoman Government an arrangement that should be consistent with the interests of all parties. His view was that the integrity of Turkey was more likely to suffer if Bin Saud were left to negotiate uncontrolled by His Majesty's Government, for if the negotiations took the form (as was likely) of an attempt to coerce him, they would almost certainly result in calling into being the Arab Confederacy to which Sir L. Mallet has referred.

Lord



(COPY).
India Office,
Whitehall,
London, S.W.
4th April 1914. Immediate.
P. 1278.
Sir,
I am directed by the Secretary of State for
India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 12320
of the 1st instant regarding the relations of Bin Saud
with the Ottoman Government.
The Marquess of Crewe fully appreciates the
force of the considerations stated in the telegram from
the Government of India which was quoted therein, but
saw nothing inconsistent with them in the policy of
endeavouring to effect between the de facto ruler of
Nejd and the Ottoman Government an arrangement that
should be consistent with the interests of all parties.
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likely to suffer if Bin Saud were left to negotiate
uncontrolled by His Majesty's Government, for if the
negotiations took the form (as was likely) of an attempt
to coerce him, they would almost certainly result in
calling into being the Arab Confederacy to which Sir
L. Mallet has referred.
Yours faithfully,
Lord



(311) 310
3/5

Lord Crewe was further anxious to prevent an inconvenient situation from arising. He believed that if Bin Saud, disappointed of our good offices, were to throw himself into the arms of Turkey, and to adopt a hostile attitude to British interests - whether by placing obstacles in the way of trade or by intriguing with, or even attacking the Trucial Chiefs - the inconvenience that would result could not be localised in the Persian Gulf, but would certainly lead to serious friction with the Ottoman Government itself. And, judging from the past, he felt sure that it would not be of short duration. In fact, the same reasons that have led to the conclusion of a convention with Turkey safeguarding British interests in those regions appeared to him to indicate that His Majesty's Government should by some means be a party to the negotiations between the Ottoman Government and Bin Saud, though the position of the latter as a rebel might make formal British participation impossible; and these were, His Lordship understood, the reasons for the opening of informal discussions with Hakki Pasha.

When once those discussions had begun it seemed to Lord Crewe dangerous if Bin Saud were to negotiate independently



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position of the latter as a rebel might make formal
British participation impossible; and these were, His
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informal discussions with Hakkî Pasha.
When once those discussions had begun it seemed
to Lord Crewe dangerous if Bin Saud were to negotiate
independently



(312) 311
3/6

independently with local Turkish authorities who might not be cognisant of what was taking place in London, and he therefore sent his telegram of the 16th March.

Since that date, however, the discussions with Hakki Pasha have made no progress, and it appears that the Ottoman Government are approaching Bin Saud through the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammera, both of whom are sensible men, friendly to British interests. His Lordship is therefore disposed, with Sir E. Grey's concurrence to instruct the Government of India that, if this is true, there is no objection to Bin Saud negotiating on his own account, and that His Majesty's Government have made the Ottoman Government aware of the nature of the settlement that they favour. But Lord Crewe would prefer that the Sheikh should not be encouraged actually to conclude a settlement until His Majesty's Government have satisfied themselves - whether through him or through the Ottoman Government - that its terms do not conflict with their interests.

In the meantime His Lordship is of opinion that if the Turkish authorities at Basra make any preparations for the actual despatch of troops, one of His Majesty's ships should be sent to ensure that the territorial



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Since that date, however, the discussions with
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that they favour. But Lord Grey would prefer that the
Sheikh should not be encouraged actually to conclude a
settlement until His Majesty's Government have notified
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sitions for the actual despatch of troops, one of His
Majesty's ships should be sent to ensure that the
territorial



(313) 312 317

territorial waters of the Bahrein islands are not entered.
He regards the reef of Fasht al Yarim, to the ~~Marshall~~
north-west of Bahrein harbour, as forming part of the
islands, and the territorial waters, therefore, as
extending three miles north of the northernmost point
of the reef.

I am to enclose, for Sir E. Gray's concurrence,
draft of a telegram which Lord Crewe proposes to address
to the Government of India.

I have, etc.,

Sd/- Lionel Abrahams.

The Under Secretary of State,

Foreign Office.



territorial waters of the Bahrain Islands are not entered.

He regards the reef of Rasht al Yasin, to the westward

north-west of Bahrain harbour, as forming part of the

Islands, and the territorial waters, therefore, as

extending three miles north of the northernmost point

of the reef.

I am to enclose, for Sir E. Grey's concurrence,

draft of a telegram which Lord Crewe proposes to address

to the Government of India.

I have, etc.,

Edw. Lionel Abraham.

The Under Secretary of State,

Foreign Office.



(COPY).

3/3 318

15023/14.

Foreign Office,

April 6th, 1914.

Immediate.

Sir,

I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th instant P.1278 regarding the relations of Bin Saud with the Ottoman Government.

With regard to the draft of the telegram which the Marquess of Crewe proposes to address to the Government of India, I am to state that in Sir E. Grey's opinion it would be judicious to substitute at the end of the first paragraph for the words "he may now negotiate" some such words as "he is free to negotiate" in order to avoid the risk of creating in the mind of the Turkish Government the impression that His Majesty's Government have hitherto actually prevented Bin Saud from negotiating with the Porte.

With reference to the second paragraph of the telegram Sir E. Grey considers that it should be omitted, but as regards the alternative suggested in the enclosure to your letter under reply, Sir E. Grey fears that, in the present suspicious state of mind of the Turkish

Government,



(COPY).
15033/14.
Immediate.
Foreign Office,
April 6th, 1914.
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acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th
instant P.1278 regarding the relations of Bin Saud with
the Ottoman Government.
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it would be judicious to substitute at the end of the
first paragraph for the words "he may now negotiate"
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telegram Sir E. Grey considers that it should be omitted,
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the present suspicious state of mind of the Turkish
Government,



(315) 314 319


Government, it would have a very bad effect on Anglo-Turkish relations if His Majesty's Government were to put forward a demand implying that they have a right to be consulted as to the terms of any agreement between the Porte and Bin Saud.

The circumstances would in Sir E. Grey's opinion, be met if the Turkish Government were informed that if they enter into any stipulations with Bin Saud affecting British subjects or interests, His Majesty's Government will expect to be advised of their terms in good time. It will then be open to them, if there be occasion, to make representations to the Turkish Government on the subject.

I am, etc.,

Sd/- Eyre A. Crowe.

The Under Secretary of State,
India Office.



24274 (3) *Bin Saud in the
Persian Gulf*
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Turkish relations if His Majesty's Government were to
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
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will expect to be advised of their terms in good time.
It will then be open to them, if there be occasion, to
make representations to the Turkish Government on the
subject.

I am, etc.,

Sd/- E. A. Crowe.

The Under Secretary of State,

India Office.



316 315 320
Confidential.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet (Constantinople).
(No. 164) R. Foreign Office, March 26, 1914.

Your telegram No. 183 of 24th March.

Your Excellency is aware of recent discussions with Hakki Pasha regarding Bin Saud. I leave it to Your Excellency's discretion whether to express to Ottoman Government the hope that they will not precipitate any military operations against him without first allowing His Majesty's Government to use their good offices in order to promote a settlement satisfactory to both parties. We wish not to secure any political advantage against Turkey, but merely to prevent disturbances and bloodshed, which would be likely to affect seriously the security of the coast districts, where we have special rights, and which could in all probability be easily averted by judicious and unofficial mediation. If Turkey takes forcible action against Bin Saud there will be widespread unrest throughout Eastern Arabia.

We learn that armed motor-launches have been shipped to Basra by Thornycroft for Ottoman Government.



Confidential.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet (Constantinople).
(No. 164) R. Foreign Office, March 26, 1914.

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Your Excellency is aware of recent discussions with Haki Pasha regarding Bin Saud. I leave it to Your Excellency's discretion whether to express to Ottoman Government the hope that they will not precipitate any military operations against him without first allowing His Majesty's Government to use their good offices in order to promote a settlement satisfactory to both parties. We wish not to secure any political advantage against Turkey, but merely to prevent disturbances and bloodshed, which would be likely to reflect seriously the security of the coast districts, where we have special rights, and which could in all probability be easily averted by judicious and unofficial mediation. If Turkey takes forcible action against Bin Saud there will be widespread unrest throughout Eastern Arabia.

We learn that armed motor-launches have been shipped to Basra by Thornycroft for Ottoman Government.



P. 1473.

Immediate.

INDIA OFFICE,
WHITEHALL,
LONDON, S.W.

16th April 1914.

Sir,

With reference to your letter No. 15023 of the 6th April, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegrams that

to Govt. of India, 7th April.	} have been exchanged with
From do. 9th, 11th and 14th April.	

regarding the relations between the Ottoman Government and Bin Saud.

Sir E. Grey is aware of the reasons for which the Marquess of Crewe is very unwilling to create in Bin Saud's mind the impression that His Majesty's Government are indifferent to him, and, as will have been seen from Mr. Abrahams' letter of the 4th instant, it is only the supposed fact that the Turks are acting through such tried friends of His Majesty's Government as the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammara, that has seemed to His Lordship to justify the policy of leaving him to negotiate direct. If the Government of India's enquiries should show that there is no foundation for this supposition - and it would appear from their telegram of the 11th instant that the Sheikh of Koweit is unwilling to commit himself - Lord Crewe is of opinion that before any further communication is made to Bin Saud, Hakki Pasha should be asked informally if he has yet received the views of his Government. It will be remembered that the conversation with His Highness was interrupted in order that he might obtain them, and the apparent loss of interest

in

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.



INDIA OFFICE,
WHITEHALL,
LONDON, S.W.
18th April 1914.

P. 1473.
Immediate.

Sir,


With reference to your letter No. 12083 of the 8th April, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegram that have been exchanged with the Government of India.

From Govt. of India, 7th April.
do. do. 9th, 11th and 14th April.

regarding the relations between the Ottoman Government and Bin Saud.

Sir E. Grey is aware of the reasons for which the Marquess of Crewe is very unwilling to create in Bin Saud's mind the impression that His Majesty's Government are indifferent to him, and, as will have been seen from Mr. Abraham's letter of the 4th instant, it is only the supposed fact that the Turks are acting through such tried friends of His Majesty's Government as the Sherifs of Koweit and Mowarra, that has seemed to His Lordship to justify the policy of leaving him to negotiate direct. If the Government of India's enquiries should show that there is no foundation for this supposition - and it would appear from their telegram of the 11th instant that the Sherif of Koweit is unwilling to commit himself - Lord Crewe is of opinion that before any further communication is made to Bin Saud, Haidi Pasha should be asked informally if he has yet received the views of his Government. It will be remembered that the conversation with His Highness was interrupted in order that he might obtain them, and the apparent loss of interest in

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.



(318) 317 322


in the subject on the part of His Majesty's Government may even have produced a stiffening in the attitude of the Ottoman Government towards Bin Saud.

With reference to the Government of India's telegram of the 14th instant, His Lordship is inclined to doubt whether any purpose would be served by making representations to Hakki Pasha, and to allow matters to take their course. But he would suggest that if a Turkish decoration is conferred on the Sheikh of Koweit the bestowal of the British decorations approved in your letter No. 41531 of 15th September last should not necessarily be postponed until the King's birthday.

As regards the last sentence of this telegram it seems desirable that the Sheikh should be acquainted with the British requirements, the innocent nature of which will disabuse his mind of any idea that His Majesty's Government contemplate a forward or anti-Turkish policy.

I am to enclose for Sir E. Grey's concurrence draft of a telegram which Lord Crewe proposes to address to the Government of India on the subject.

I have, etc.,
Sd. T. W. Holderness.



25 Sept 1914
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may even have produced a softening in the attitude of
the Ottoman Government towards Bin Saud.

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telegram of the 14th instant, His Lordship is inclined
to doubt whether any purpose would be served by making
representations to Hakkı Pasha, and to allow matters
to take their course. But he would suggest that if a
Turkish decoration is conferred on the Sheikh of Kuwait
the bestowal of the British decorations approved in
your letter No. 4131 of 14th September last should not
necessarily be postponed until the King's birthday.

As regards the last sentence of this telegram it
seems desirable that the Sheikh should be acquainted
with the British requirements, the innocent nature of
which will dispense his mind of any idea that His
Majesty's Government contemplate a forward or anti-
Turkish policy.

I am to enclose for Sir E. Grey's concurrence
draft of a telegram which Lord Greve proposes to
address to the Government of India on the subject.

I have, etc.,
T. W. Holderness. Sd.



Kuwait

318
319 323

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. C-17, dated Kuwait, the 29th April 1914.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. G. GREY, I.A., Political Agent, Kuwait,

To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a letter No. C-16, dated the 29th April 1914, which I have addressed to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure.

No. C-16 (Confidential), dated Kuwait, the 29th April 1914.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. G. GREY, I.A., Political Agent, Kuwait,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

In continuation of my letter No. C-15, dated the 22nd instant, I have the honour to report further on the subject of Bin Sa'ud and the Turkish Government.

2. The Turkish representatives did not come to Kuwait last week as had been arranged. By the mail of the 22nd instant Shaikh Sir Mubarak received a letter from Saiyid Talib stating that he had written to Constantinople for more precise instructions in regard to the terms which he was to make with Bin Sa'ud, and that he had heard in reply that the question was still under discussion but that instructions would be furnished to him. The party has arrived this morning in Sir Mubarak's steam launch "Mishrif" which has been for the last month or so lying at Mohammerah.

3. On the evening of the 26th instant Bin Sa'ud arrived at Subaihiyah with a large following, and early on the morning of the 27th the Shaikh sent his Secretary to inform me that he had written asking the Amir to come to Malah, which is about half way between Kuwait and Subaihiyah, for the purpose of meeting me there. During the day the R. I. M. S. "Lawrence" arrived with your endorsement forwarding for necessary action by me telegram No. 256-S. from the Government of India in the Foreign Department, and I explained to Shaikh Sir Mubarak in the afternoon that portion of its contents which concerned himself. Late in the evening came a reply from Bin Sa'ud to the effect that he would be at Malah on the following morning and hoped that I could come out then as he was anxious for a meeting as soon as possible. I accordingly went out yesterday taking with me the telegram above referred to.

4. After the usual polite enquiries I commenced the interview, at which nobody else was present, with explaining to the Amir that portion of the telegram of the Government of India which was intended for his information. I could see that he was disappointed, and at first inclined to think that he had been allowed to foster hopes which were not to be realised, but I had no difficulty in removing this view by the explanation that it was the Turkish Government who had declined our offer of mediation and that His Majesty's Government obviously could not force upon them assistance which they did not desire. I informed him as instructed that there was now no objection to direct negotiations taking place between him and the Turks, and that the views of His Majesty's Government had been conveyed to the Porte.

5. In reply, the Amir said that he did not intend to make an independent arrangement with the Turks unless he were forced to do so because they were never faithful to their engagements and in a very short time, it might not be more than two months, things would be as bad as ever in Hassa. He asked me what were the views of His Majesty's Government which had been conveyed to the Porte. I replied that they concerned the provisional undertakings into which he had entered



2

with our officers at Bahrain. He remarked that he had no further information regarding the conditions which the Turks would demand of him, but that they would never allow the presence of foreigners at Katif and that, in the event of an agreement being arrived at between him and themselves, they would undoubtedly compel him to keep such persons out.

6. I here thought it best to tell the Amir plainly that I had no authority to go over the old ground again, neither had I come out to persuade him to take a course contrary to his inclinations, but that my duty was merely to carry out the instructions which I had received. He then asked me whether, should he persevere with the answer already given to Saiyid Talib (*vide* the enclosure to my letter No. C.-12, dated 7th April), there would be any chance eventually of securing the mediation of His Majesty's Government. I replied that probably in that case the Turks would ask for that mediation which they had now declined in the hope of securing an agreement without it; but Bin Sa'ud appeared to think that they would prefer war to that and went on to question me regarding the preparedness or unpreparedness of Turkey for war from which I saw that he was carefully considering this alternative. Before our interview closed he asked me whether His Majesty's Government would give him an assurance that the Turks would never be allowed to take hostile action by sea against the coast between Kuwait and Bahrain, as, he said, with that assurance he was prepared to defy them indefinitely, but I replied that I had no information on the subject beyond that already given to him in regard to Bahrain and its waters.

7. I confess that I returned to Kuwait without a clear idea of what course Bin Sa'ud was likely to take, in fact I doubt whether he has himself come as yet to a definite decision. That he would prefer to persevere in his refusal to accept any arrangement which was not guaranteed in some form or another by His Majesty's Government I am convinced, and that Shaikh Sir Mubarak and other friends have inspired him with that confidence in us which he lacks in the Turks is certain; but he seems to fear that in default of a definite promise such as that referred to above he might be left to face attacks by sea as well as by land which would be more than he could repel; and he may on this account feel obliged to make the best terms possible for himself at the approaching conference. In the latter case I regard it as in the highest degree probable that he will use every possible means to draw His Majesty's Government into the negotiations, *e.g.*, by accepting, under the plea of compulsion, conditions from the Turks which he knows we will be loth to recognise owing to the interests assailed.

8. I hope to be able to report further within the next few days, and in view of the interesting position which now exists here am sending a copy of this letter direct to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to save time.



CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 1296 (Confidential), dated Bushire, the 3rd May 1914.

From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—THE HON'BLE LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR P. Z. COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

With reference to the correspondence ending with my telegram No. 525, dated the 30th April 1914, in regard to the Bin Sa'ud question, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the letters, noted in the margin, which have been exchanged between Bin Sa'ud and the Political Agent at Bahrain.

(1) Shaikh 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdur Rahman al Faisal to Political Agent, Bahrain, dated the 18th April 1914.

(2) Political Agent, Bahrain, to Shaikh 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdur Rahman al Faisal, No. 732, dated the 25th April 1914.

I further have the honour to enclose a copy of a letter from the Political Agent at Kuwait in regard to the Turkish deputation to meet Bin Sa'ud.

No. C-15, dated the 22nd April 1914.

Enclosure No. 1.

Translation of a letter dated the 22nd Jamadi al Awwal 1332 from Shaikh 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdur Rahman al Faisal to Major A. P. Trevor, C.I.E., Political Agent, Bahrain.
18th April 1914

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your esteemed letter, dated the 11th instant, brought by my servant Yusuf and that of your last letter, dated the 21st Rabi att Thani 1332, and to say that I have understood what you mentioned therein. And God willing I will act just as you informed. Presently, In-sha-Allah. I am proceeding towards Kuwait as I informed you before. Of course I will refer the Consul at Kuwait either personally or by letter and I shall not be able to do without necessary information from you.

Please send your letters through the Consul at Kuwait. After doing the needful I shall, God willing, let you know what is required.

Enclosure No. 2.

No. 732, dated the 25th April 1914.

From—The Political Agent, Bahrain,

To—SHAikh 'ABDUL 'AZIZ BIN 'ABDUR RAHMAN AL FAISAL.

I have received your honoured letter, dated the 22nd Jamadi al Awwal 1332, and understood its contents. When you are in the neighbourhood of Kuwait, any information which I could give you will be given by the Political Agent there.

I hope you are in good health; may you be preserved and salam.

Enclosure No. 3.

No. C-15 (Confidential), dated Kuwait, the 22nd April 1914.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. G. GREY, I.A., Political Agent, Kuwait,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

In continuation of my letter No. C-13, dated 14th instant, I have the honour to report further on the subject of Bin Sa'ud and the Turkish Government.

2. The persons mentioned as having been deputed to interview Bin Sa'ud on behalf of the Turks are to arrive in Kuwait in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's SS. "Ferrara" which is expected to-day. Bin Sa'ud has not yet reached Subaihiyah, but is expected there any day this week. Meanwhile the deputation will be entertained by Shaikh Sir Mubarak in Kuwait, he having returned from camp, and his investiture with the Osmanieh will take place to-morrow or next day.



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3. I attach a translation of a letter from Bin Sa'ud to Sir Mubarak which the latter handed to me during an interview on Monday. It represents an interesting piece of oriental diplomacy, the original document will be shewn to the deputation by the Shaikh with the remark that he has done what little he can but this is Bin Sa'ud's reply; his face will thus be saved *vis-à-vis* of his guests while the attitude of Bin Sa'ud remains unaltered.

4. I hope to meet Bin Sa'ud prior to his interview with the deputation.

Sub-Enclosure in Enclosure No. 3.

Dated the 20th Jamadi al Awwal 1332 (16th April 1914).

From—'ABDUL 'AZIZ BIN SA'UD,

To—SHAIKH SIR MUBARAK-AS-SABAH.

AFTER COMPLIMENTS.

In agreeing to approach (Kuwait) I have obeyed your instructions as regards obedience and submission to our Government, but you know well with what contempt and disdain the officials of Government have treated me, and you have seen the patience with which I have submitted to their conduct all these years not withstanding that I never once experienced anything from them which could console me. And now, Heaven be praised, I am in a position to do great things even as far as Iraq, were it not that I do not wish to be the cause of (further) decline to the Government and (additional) revolt on the part of the Arabs.

Now I have recovered my own country as you are witness Oh Mubarak; and it was you who went to Hassa with a force to protect me and afterwards betrayed me, you and the soldiers! I ask you, is it or is it not correct what I say about all the difficulties which have been brought upon me by the officials and the submission and patience which I have shewn. As to your urging me now to submission to the Government—I did not disobey you formerly that I should do so now, so if the matter which will guard my rights is granted and I and my affairs secure protection—then submission will certainly be incumbent upon me.

May Heaven preserve you to us.



CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 1300 (Confidential), dated Bushire, the 3rd May 1914.

From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The HON'BLE LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR P. Z. COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

In continuation of the correspondence ending with my telegram No. 525, dated 30th April 1914, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the telegram, noted in the margin, which has been

No. 23-C, dated the 2nd May 1914. received from His Majesty's Consul at Mohammerah, in reply to an enquiry as to whether the Shaikh of Mohammerah had been requested by the Turks to act as negociator between them and Bin Sa'ud.

Enclosure.


Telegram P., No. 23-C, dated the 2nd (received the 3rd) May 1914 (5 p. m.),

From—MAJOR L. B. HAWORTH, His Majesty's Consul, Mohammerah,

To—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, Resident Bushire,

I repeat telegram from V.C., Ahwaz, with reference to your telegram No. 466 :—

"Please refer to your despatch No. 25-C. Khaz'al says that the Turks asked him, but that he refused, giving as his reason that he (Khaz'al) is a Persian subject and that as such Bin Sa'ud is no concern of his. He adds that the Turks also asked Mubarak, who answered that Bin Sa'ud will be advised by him to make terms with the Turks, and that he is prepared to send an agent with who is to proceed to Bin Sa'ud as the Turkish representative."





Kuwait

321
322 326

No. C.—19, dated Kuwait, the 6th (received 18th) May 1914 (Confidential).

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. G. GREY, Political Agent, Kuwait,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department.

I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a letter No. C.—18, dated 6th May 1914, which I have addressed to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure.

No. C.—18, dated Kuwait, the 6th May 1914 (Confidential).

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. G. GREY, Political Agent, Kuwait,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

In continuation of my letter No. C.—16, dated 29th April, I have the honour to report further on the subject of Bin Saud and the Turkish Government.

2. As stated in my last letter, the Turkish deputation headed by Saiyid Talib, son of the Nakib of Basrah and Saiyid Umar Fauzi Beg, Chief of the Staff

Enclosure No. 2.

at Basrah, arrived in Kuwait on the 29th ultimo in Shaikh Sir Mubarak's launch "Mishrif" which had been placed at their disposal. The same day the Order of the Osmanieh was presented to Shaikh Sir Mubarak without ceremony and in the presence of a few persons only. During the morning of the 30th *idem* the Shaikh sent for my Agency Mulla and asked him to let me know that the deputation were pressing him to accompany them on the occasion of their visit to Bin Saud. I replied through the Mulla that, as I had already informed him, His Majesty's Government had no objection to his good offices being afforded to assist in the negotiations; and, to put his mind at rest, addressed to him the official letter which forms enclosure (1) to this report. The Shaikh replied to me the following day as given in enclosure (2).

3. During the whole of 30th April and 1st May the deputation were engaged in discussing the terms which were to be put before Bin Saud, and on the morning of the 2nd instant they proceeded to Subaihiyah whence they returned on the 4th.

4. I called on Sir Mubarak yesterday and he informed me of what had taken place. His version, which is confirmed generally by reports which have reached me from other sources, is probably substantially correct. The Turks first announced to Bin Saud their scheme for settlement, which was that he must first of all accept the reposting of Turkish garrisons in Katif and Ujair and their reinforcement by additional posts in Hassa: that all the forts in Ujair and Hassa must be surrendered to them; that all cannon and small arms captured must be made over to the Turkish troops; and that he is to have no connection whatever with any foreigners or foreign Power. In return for these conditions they agreed to recognise his autonomy; to allow him to collect all taxes, &c., and to give him verbal, though not written, permission to retake Katar and Trucial Oman when he chose. Bin Saud's scheme was then stated to them; it was that he should retain Katif, Ujair, and Hassa under Turkish suzerainty: should pay them £T3,000 per annum as tribute money; and should be at the disposal of Turkey, with his men, in the event of armed assistance being required. The subsequent discussions turned upon the reinstatement of the Turkish garrisons: the deputation insisted upon this condition and Bin Saud refused to give way. After some time harsh words passed between him and Saiyid Umar, the latter was rash enough to say that if Bin Saud would not accept this condition he would be compelled to do so, whereupon the Amir started up and half drawing his sword ordered Saiyid Umar to leave the assembly, and any possibility of successful negotiations appears to have been at an end from that moment. The Turkish deputation returned to Basrah in the Shaikh's launch on the night of the 4th instant, and are to report to Constantinople the failure of their negotiations.



2

5. Sir Mubarak has from time to time made to me explanations of his position in connection with this matter, and summed them up during our interview yesterday. He regrets not having been able to accept the invitation of His Majesty's Government to take part in the negotiations, but informs me that in any case nothing could have induced Bin Saud to accept the condition regarding the return of Turkish troops to what he regards as his ancestral domains. He adds moreover that he has had experience of the Turks all his life, and that he cannot seriously urge Bin Saud to submit to them without a guarantee from us. In regard to the Turkish deputation he felt obliged to assist Saiyid Umar Fauzi Beg to a certain extent, first because he was the representative of a foreign Power with whom his relations are friendly, secondly, because he was his guest on the occasion of his visit to Kuwait, and thirdly, because of the friendship which exists between himself and Saiyid Umar's father. He did not want the Vali of Basrah in Kuwait as it might have been difficult to refuse to him that which he could decline to do for Saiyid Talib, and he had felt all along that he could not help in the negotiations. I received in silence this statement, with part of which at least it was impossible not to feel sympathy.

6. I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosures direct to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to save time.

I

Dated the 5th Jamadi-ul-Akhir 1332 (30th April 1914).

From—The Political Agent, Kuwait,

To—SHAIKH SIR MUBARAK-AS-SUBAH.

After compliments.—I am instructed by my Government to inform Your Honour that they do not object to your efforts being employed to settle matters and establish an agreement between the Amir Bin Saud and the Turkish Government; and I inform you regarding the following desiderata of His Majesty's Government in connection with this matter:—

- (1) That Bin Saud should not interfere in the territory and politics of Arab rulers on the shores of the Gulf—Katar is included;
- (2) that his co-operation is required in the suppression of piracy and in keeping peace at sea generally;
- (3) that he should co-operate in the suppression of arms traffic;
- (4) that the admission of British traders to Katif should be permitted and that proper treatment should be accorded them there.

And His Majesty's Government has already informed the Turkish Government of these desiderata. This is what was requisite and may you be in peace and safety.

II


Dated the 6th Jamadi-ul-Akhir 1332 (1st May 1914).


From—SHAIKH SIR MUBARAK-AS-SUBAH,

To—The Political Agent, Kuwait.

After compliments.—I have received your letter of the 5th Jamadi-ul-Akhir and understand what you direct. With regard to the Turkish deputation to interview Bin Saud, they are at present with me and will go to meet him. And they have requested me to go with them to the meeting with Bin Saud and I have asked them to excuse me. As to mediation between them, I have positively declined it as I explained to them before.

Regarding the desiderata of the Glorious Government from Bin Saud that he should not interfere in the Arab States on the shores of the Gulf including Katar, and that the subjects of Government should trade in Katif and go even







Kuwait

323
(224) 328

No. 1350, dated Bushire, the 10th (received 18th) May 1914.

From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

In continuation of the correspondence ending with my letter No. 1296, dated the 3rd May 1914, I have the honour to forward an extract from the

From Consul, Basrah, to Ambassador, Constantinople, No. 28, dated 2nd May 1914. despatch, noted in the margin, a copy of which has been received from His Majesty's Consul at Basrah under cover of his endorsement No. 13, dated 2nd May 1914, in regard to the Turkish deputation to Bin Saud.


Enclosure.

Extract from a letter from F. E. Crow, Esq., C.M.G., His Majesty's Consul, Basrah, to His Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople, No. 28, dated the 2nd May 1914.

As reported in my telegram 35 of 28th April last, the Commission appointed to effect a settlement of the Hasa question with Bin Saud left Basrah in the Shaikh of Kuwait's launch for Kuwait on the morning of the 28th ultimo. The Commission consisting of Saiyid Talib Bey Naqibzadah as President, Major Beha ad Din Bey, Chief of the Baghdad Staff, Major Omar Fauzi Bey, Chief of the Basrah Staff, who had previously visited Kuwait, and Sami Effendi Mutassarif of Hasa, was accompanied by Eumer Bey, a Basrah lawyer. Muhammad al Nama, Arab notable and landed proprietor, and Abdul Wahab Mandil and Abdul Latif Mandil; the latter are Arab notables and landed proprietors and represent Bin Saud at Basrah as agents.

I understand that the instructions to the Commission are to settle the question in a friendly way and that they will meet Bin Saud at Kuwait. The 1st class of the Osmanieh has been conferred on Shaikh Mubarak by the Sultan and, as the decoration had not arrived at Basrah, an order was borrowed from Saiyid Talib Bey, presumably the same, and sent to the Shaikh by the hands of Barhan ad Din Bey, Public Prosecutor of the Basrah Appeal Court, and Hilmi Effendi, Director of Public Instruction. These gentlemen travelled with the Commission on board the Shaikh's launch. On receipt of the decoration from Constantinople, it is to be handed to Saiyid Talib in return for the one he lent. The judicial authorities were very loth to part with the Public Prosecutor, whose services are required in the Courts where much business awaits him. A letter addressed by the President of the Court to the Vali pointing out the inconvenience caused by the Public Prosecutor's absence from his post and the consequent delay to the business of the courts was not well received and the Vali explained that it was only fair to the Public Prosecutor to give him the chance of making a little money. Some irritation seems to have been caused in the Serai by this observation.

* * * * *





Confidential.

Docket Telegram.

From Loch, A.R. Bushire.

To Grey, P.A. Kuwait.

No. 1713


Dated 6. 6.14.

Copy of Resident's telegram No. 650 of 1.6.14 to
Foreign.

For information, continuation our docket telegram 1595
of 26.5.14.

By Order,

FG Loch





Telegram. R.

From Knox, Resident Bushire.

To Foreign, Simla.

No. 650.

Dated 1.6.14 (2.30 p.m.)

(326)

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Consul Basrah writes Embassy. Reported good authority that Wali telegraphed Minister of Interior that 'Abd-al-'Aziz is negotiating with other Arab Shaikhs bring them under Turkish Flag. Wali urges Government take no further action against 'Abd-al-'Aziz for present and adds that it will be possible to regain Haas amicably soon.

Telegram believed inspired by Saiyid Talib who has wired in similar sense Constantinople.

Knox.



330
332
Telegram. R.
From Knox, Resident Bushire.
To Foreign, Simla.
No. 650.
Dated 1.8.14 (2.30 p.m.)

Gonawi Basrah writes Embassy. Reported good authority
that Wali telegraphed Minister of Interior that 'Abd-al-
'Aziz is negotiating with other Arab Shakhhs bring them
under Turkish flag. Wali urges Government take no further
action against 'Abd-al-'Aziz for present and adds that it
will be possible to regain Haas amicably soon.
Telegram believed inspired by Salih Tahir who has wired
in similar sense Constantinople.

Knox.



Confidential.

Docket Telegram.

From Knox, P.R. Bushire.

To Grey, P.A. Kuwait.

No. 1789


Dated 11. 6.14.

326 (327)

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For information.

Please enquire and let me know whether Kuwait information at all substantiates this story which appears improbable and unlikely.





CONFIDENTIAL.

Docket Telegram.

From Grey, P.A. Kuwait.

To Knox, Resident, Bushire.


Demi-Official.

Dated 16-6-'14

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331

Further correspondence has undoubtedly
taken place between the Turks & Bin
Saud but Shaikh Mubarak
professes that it is hidden from him
a report here says that the Turk
have agreed to leave Bin Saud in
possession of Hasa & Qatif on
payment of a yearly sum, but I
hear no mention of other terms &
Mubarak does not know whether
this much is true or not.
Perhaps he will be more com-
-municative when Shaikh Khayal
has gone.

W. G.





Report.

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333

Yesterday, when I went on board S.S. "Baroda" I met Hajji Mujbil one of the distinguished merchants of Bahrain and my acquaintance. In the course of conversation Hajji Mujbil told me that he had gone from Bahrain to Kuwait to have an interview with 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Sa'ud who came near Kuwait a distance of about 3 farsakhs (i.e. $10\frac{1}{2}$ miles and Hajji Mujbil had a long interview with him.

Hajji Mujbil told me that when 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Sa'ud was settled near Kuwait several Turkish officers came from Basrah and delivered a mandate from the Turkish Government to him appointing him as 'Amir, Chief of Qatif, Al Hasa and 'Qair and in the meantime the Turkish Officers made an arrangement with 'Abdul 'Aziz to let five Turkish soldiers be stationed at each of the places mentioned above to look after the Turkish Flag.

22nd May 1914.



333

Report.

Yesterday, when I went on board S.S. "Baroda" I met
Hajji Mujib one of the distinguished merchants of
Bahrain and my acquaintance. In the course of conversation
Hajji Mujib told me that he had gone from Bahrain to
Kuwait to have an interview with 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Sa'ud
who came near Kuwait a distance of about 3 farsakhs (i.e.
10½ miles and Hajji Mujib had a long interview with
him.

Hajji Mujib told me that when 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Sa'ud
was settled near Kuwait several Turkish officers came from
Bahrain and delivered a mandate from the Turkish Government
to him appointing him as 'Amir, Chief of Qatif, Al Hasa
and 'Oqair and in the meantime the Turkish Officers made
an arrangement with 'Abdul 'Aziz to let five Turkish sol-
diers be stationed at each of the places mentioned above
to look after the Turkish flag.

22nd May 1914.



Confidential

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No. 2-C of 1914

From,

Captain T. Keyes, I. A.
Political Agent,

BAHREIN.

To,

Major S. G. KNOX, C. I. E.

Offg. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
BUSHIRE.

Political Agency,

Bahrein, the 16th June 1914

Sir,


I have the honour to report that Shaikh Mujbil, Najdi whose brother's daughter was recently married to 'Bin Saud' has informed me that he was in Fowit during the negotiations between the Turkish representatives and 'Bin Saud'.

He states that he had interviews with 'Bin Saud' and the 'Turkish Military Officer' and that they both informed him that they had, in the end, come to an arrangement. He did not see the text of the agreement, but understood that Turkey was to station not more than 5 soldiers at each of the following places, 'Qair, Qatif and Jubail for the purpose of keeping the Turkish flag flying, but that no other Turkish garrisons would be placed in Hasa or Najd.

'Bin Saud' was to collect the Customs duty in these three ports, and, after deducting the expenses of administration, was to pay Turkey one tenth of the profit. Turkey was to give him an allowance of 27-250/- a month as Ruler of Hasa.

Apparently his status in Najd was to remain vague, but he

was





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335

was to be allowed to fly his own flag. He has now heard that the Porte has sanctioned this arrangement and is sending a high order for 'Bin Saud'.

Shaikh Mujbil says that the latest reports show that 'Bin Saud' is in Riyadh preparing to attack 'Ibn Rashid'.

I have, of course, no means of gauging the truth of Shaikh Mujbil's account, but he has apparently always borne a high character in Bahrein.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the Political Agent, Koweit.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant.

Sd/- T. Keyes

Captain,

Political Agent,

Bahrein.

No., 638 of 1914.

Political Agency, Bahrein.

B a h r e i n, the 16th June 1914.


Copy forwarded with compliments of the undersigned, to the Political Agent, Koweit for information.

T. Keyes

Captain,

Political Agent,

Bahrein.





Confidential.

Docket Telegram.

From ... Grey, P.A., Kuwait.

To Knox, Resident, Bushire.


No. ~~Web~~. *WAS O/o*.

Dated 17. 6. 14.

Your D.T. No.1739 dated 11.6.14. I have never
heard any such story here. It is evidently merely a garbl-
-ed version of what took place and has been already re-
-ported.

W¹⁷/₆

o/c





Confidential

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Docket Telegram

From Keyes, P. A. Bahrein

To, Knox, P. R. Bushire

No. 5-C

Dated 20th June 1914.

Yours 1790. Matter reported by letter on 16th. Have since learnt that all Najdis here including Shaikh's guests who come from Qatr, Masa and different parts of Najd believe this version.

They have vague ideas that Porte insists on exclusion of foreign traders and agents and has given Bin Saud carte blanche against Qatr. Bin Saud's prestige appears to be much increased by this rumour. I am trying to ascertain effect of report in Qatr.

Copy sent to Koweit.

(Ed) T. Keyes

No. 65/ of 1914


Political Agency, Bahrein.

B a h r e i n, the 20th June 1914.

Copy forwarded, with Compliments of the undersigned, to the Political Agent, Koweit for information.

Keyes Captain,
Political Agent,

J. J. J. Bahrein.





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337

Confidential.

Docket Telegram.

From Loch, A.R. Bushire.

To Grey, P.A. Kuwait.



No. 1958

Dated 23.6.14.

Copy of Foreign's telegram No. 355-S dated 8.6.14 to
Resident, continuation our D.T. 1713 of 6.6.14.
For information and guidance.

By Order,

J.S. Loch





334 (335)
338

Telegram. P.

From Foreign Simla.

To Major S.G. Knox, Resident Bushire.

No. 355-S.


Dated and received 8th June 1914 (7.15 pm)


Reference your telegram No. 650 dated 1.6.1914.

Informal suggestion has been made to Hakki Pasha that he should be authorised to discuss in London question of Bin Sa'ud. Please instruct local officers in the meantime to abstain, except when unavoidable, from independent communications with Bin Sa'ud.

Secondly. Reference is made to "other Arab Shaikhs". Do you know to whom this expression alludes?

Foreign.





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Confidential.

Docket Telegram.

From Noel A.R. Bushire.

To Grey P.A., Kuwait.


No. 1961

Dated 24.6.14.

Copy of telegram dated 23rd June 1914 from Consul,
Basrah to P.R.
For information.

By Order,

E. Noel





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340 (337)

Telegram. R.

From Bullard Basrah.

To Resident Bushire.

Dated and received 23rd June 1914.

Following sent to Embassy by telegraph yesterday.

Bin Sa'ud has accepted the position of Wali and commandant of the whole of Najd directly dependent on Constantinople. He acknowledges^{he}/is Ottoman subject and will hoist Turkish flag. I understand that he will decide whether there shall be Turkish troops in his Vilayet or not, but as to that and other conditions I hope to telegraph more fully in a few days.

Sultan has telegraphed to Talib congratulating him on his success in that connection.

Bullard.



340
Telegram. R.
From Bulard Bazarah.
To Resident Bushire.
Dated and received 28th June 1914.
Following sent to Embassy by telegram yesterday.
Bin Sa'ud has accepted the position of Wali and commander
of the whole of Najd directly dependent on Constantinople.
He acknowledges Ottoman suzerainty and will hoist Turkish
flag. I understand that he will decide whether there shall
be Turkish troops in his Vilayet or not, but as to that and
other conditions I hope to telegraph more fully in a few
days.
Sultan has telegraphed to Talib congratulating him on his
success in that connection.
Bulard.



CONFIDENTIAL

57C

No. C 23 of 1914.

Political Agency,
Kuwait.

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From

Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Grey, I.A.,
Political Agent, Kuwait.

To

The Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf, Bushire.

Dated Kuwait, the 26th June 1914.


Sir,

In continuation of my letter No. C 20 dated 20th May last I have the honour to report further regarding Bin Sa'ud and the Turks.

2. Yesterday Sir Mubarak received a communication from a Turkish friend at Basrah giving details of an agreement which is said to have been arrived at between Bin Sa'ud and Abd-ul-Latif Mandil, a former agent of his at Basrah acting on behalf of the Turkish Government. I attach a translation of this document and also a translation of a congratulatory telegram which accompanied it. This telegram is supposed to have been sent by Anwar Pasha the Minister of War to Bin Sa'ud. It will be observed that no mention whatever is made in the terms of the agreement of foreign interests of the interests of Foreign Powers.

3. It is known that Abd-ul-Latif Mandil has recently visited Bin Sa'ud in Riyadh, but this solution cannot be accepted until some confirmation of the report has arrived from Bin Sa'ud himself. Sir Mubarak is much disturbed at the thought that Bin Sa'ud could have concluded a formal agreement without consulting him, and has sent off a messenger to Riyadh to ask for details.

-tail:





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details. Unfortunately he cannot return for some ten or twelve days, but I will inform you as early as possible of the reply.

4. I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosures direct to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to save time.

I have the honour to be,


Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

W^c

Lieut-Colonel,

Political Agent, Kuwait.






سيد
 به سعد خلة مثله مع الحكوم واتفقت معوا مثلاً اذرت
 فحصل تسوية بين الطرفين وتحققت دعاء للملك
 فوجد حار والي نجد وقائد العام مع رتبة الوزارة
 ولا يعارضه في داخلية وجميع الرسومات والاعشار
 في يده يسد فيلا نواقص البلد والذين يريدون
 العمل ويضع مقدار عمل كاف في نظاميه في العمل
 ويطلب مدافع واسلم عند الحاجم ومخارطة اساء
 مع الداخلية والحربية ليس يتوسط الدولي ويضع
 امبارق العشائرية في كل محلات نجد اقصادها
 وادائها ويعين من يشاء ويعينه يشاء وهو
 القائل النظار والفرمان بهذه المدة يطوع من
 الاستانة وامس وردت لفرمان من نظارات الحربية
 بتدليك واصلح صورته والفرمان يروح له في
 حرمه مع مزينة ودربه الى التقطيف هذا
 اخبر جميع به

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 (340)

صورة تلفاز

مرفق والي ولاية نجد وقائد فيلق العام صاحب الدولة
 الامير عبد العزيز باس السعد

اهنيكم واعرض التبريكات بمنزلة السور العظيم وادعوا الله تعالى
 ان يقرن اعمالكم العظمى بالفضل لتأييده الدين المبين الاسلامي
 وحدهم كدولة العثمانية العظيمة الشان واتمنى لكم الخير والسعادة
 في جميع الامور والامر لكم على كل حال سيد
 ناظر الحربية
 انور





340
(341) 344

Translation of a letter received by Shaikh Sir Mubarak from
Basrah on June 28th - undated and unsigned.

Sir,

Bin Sa'ud. His affair with the Government is settled according to her desires, ~~and~~ peace is established between the two, and shedding of Muslim blood is averted. He is appointed Wali and Commander-in-Chief of Nejd without interference, and (the collection of) all rates and taxes are to be in his hands; he is to pay from them the expenses of the country and what is over will send to the proper place: he will place upon the coast regular troops as required, and will call for cannon and small arms from Government when required. He will correspond direct with the Home and War Departments and not through the Wali of Basrah and will place Turkish flags on every town in Nejd both far and near: he will appoint whom he likes, and dismiss whom he likes, he is the agent to whom choice is delegated, and a Firman to this effect will issue from Constantinople.

Yesterday a telegram came from the War Minister, I enclose a copy of it, and the Firman will go to Bin Sa'ud in the "Mar-saris" to Qatif - This is the news in Basrah today.

1. i.e. will render an account to Constantinople.
2. This apparently gives Bin Sa'ud the opportunity to require no Turkish troops.



Translation of a letter received by H.E. Sir Herbert
Baker on June 25th - unopened and unopened.

Sir,
His Excellency. His Excellency with the Government is notified
according to her desire, that peace is established between the
two, and shedding of human blood is avoided. He is appointed
well and Commander-in-Chief of Hajj without interference, and
(the collection of) all taxes and taxes are to be in his hands.
He is to pay from the expenses of the country and what is
over will send to the proper place: he will place upon the road
regular troops as required, and will call for cannon and mail
arms from Government when required. He will correspond direct
with the Home and War Departments and not through the Viceroy
Baker and will place British flags on every town in Hajj both
for and near: he will appoint when he likes, and dismiss when
he likes, he is the agent to whom choice is delegated, and a
pleasure to this effect will issue from Constantinople.
Yesterday a telegram came from the War Minister, I enclose
a copy of it, and the Viceroy will go to Sir H.E. in the "Hajj"
- "Hajj" to Cairo - This is the news in Hajj today.

1. I.E. will render an account to Constantinople.
2. This agreement gives Sir H.E. the opportunity to require
no Turkish troops.



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345T
Translation of telegram.


To

His Excellency the Governor and Commander-in-Chief
of Nejd, the Amir Abd-ul-Azis Pasha as Sa'ud.

With great joy I congratulate and felicitate you, and I
pray that God may crown all your deeds with success for strength-
-ening the revealed Muslim religion and in the service of the
great Ottoman government; and I wish you happiness and prosperity
in all matters, and you may command me in everything.

Ed/- Anwar

War Minister.





No. C 28 of 1914.

Political Agency,
Kuwait.

From

Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Grey, I.A.,
Political Agent, Kuwait.

To

The Foreign Secretary to the Government
of India in the Foreign & Political
Department, Simla.

Dated Kuwait, the 26th June 1914.

Sir,


I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a letter
No. C 28 dated 26th June 1914 which I have addressed to the Political
Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

Lieut-Colonel,
Political Agent, Kuwait.





Confidential

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Docket.

From Keyes, P.A. Bahrein.
To Knox, P.R. Bushire.
No. 5-C
Dated, 28th June 1914.

Shaikh Mujbil has shown me letters received yesterday from Bin Saud saying that the agreement with Turkey has been confirmed by Royal firman and that he has been granted full powers over Najd and Hassa. Bin Saud states that he is very pleased with result.

Abdul Latif al Mendal, an Arab of Basrah, who took firman and high order to Bin Saud also arrived here yesterday from Riyadh. He states that Bin Saud is styled Wali and Commander of Najd and Hassa in the firman and has been ordered to communicate direct with Minister of War.

Bin Saud is expected at Qatif in a few days. I have received letter for him from Shakespeare thanking him for arrangements made. I will send it as soon as I hear of his arrival. Copy sent to Koweit.

Sd/- T. Keyes

No. 683 of 1914.

P O L I T I C A L A G E N C Y .


B A H R E I N , the 28th J u n e 1914.

Copy forwarded, with compliments of the undersigned, to the Political Agent, Koweit, for information.

T. Keyes

Captain,
Political Agent, Bahrein.

J. Knox





Confidential.

Docket Telegram.

From Noel, A.R. Bushire.

To Grey, P.A. Kuwait.

No. 2054

Dated 28.6.14.


Copy of P.R's letter No.2057 of 28.6.14 to Foreign.
For information.

By Order,

E. Noel.

344 (345)

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Confidential.

No. 2051 of 1914.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 28th June 1914.

From

Major S.G. Knox, C.I.E.,
Offg: Political Resident in the
Persian Gulf.

To


The Hon'ble Lieut-Colonel Sir P.Z.Cox, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.
Foreign Secretary to the Government of India
Foreign and Political Department,
S I M L A.

Sir,

In amplification of my telegram No. 725 dated 23rd June 1914, repeating to you the telegram dated 23rd June sent by His Majesty's Consul, Basrah, to the Embassy at Constantinople, on the subject of Turkish negotiations with Bin Sa'ud, I have the honour to report that news has been received from the Political Agent, Bahrain, to the effect that Shaikh Mujbil ath Thakari, an influential Najdi merchant, resident in Bahrain, whose brother's daughter was recently married to Bin Sa'ud, has informed the Political Agent, Bahrain, that he had interviews with both the Turkish representative and Bin Sa'ud. Both parties informed him that an arrangement was eventually arrived at.

2. Shaikh Mujbil did not see the text of the agreement but he understands that the Porte was allowed to station 5 soldiers at each of the following places, 'Oqair, Qatif and Jubail to keep the Turkish flag flying but that no other

Turkish





346 (347)
357
Turkish garrisons would be placed in Hasa or Najd.

Bin Sa'ud receives a monthly allowance of £ T 250 as ruler of Hasa. He collects customs dues, deducts expenses of administration and pays Turkey 1/10th of the balance. He flies his own flag.

Bin Sa'ud's prestige in Bahrain has been greatly enhanced by these rumours. It is thought that he has ~~been~~ agreed to exclude foreign traders and has been given "carte blanche" against Qatr.

On the other hand, the Political Agent, Kuwait has never heard any such story and apparently discredits it; I was myself inclined to do so on first hearing it, as I did indirectly before Shaikh Mubail reached Bahrain, when he was on his way from Kuwait.

However the Political Agent, Kuwait, writing on the 16th June, agrees that further correspondence has undoubtedly taken place between the Turki and Bin Sa'ud but Shaikh Sir Mubarak professes that he knows nothing on the subject.

A Kuwait report says that the Turks have agreed to leave Bin Sa'ud in possession of Hasa and Qatif on payment of a yearly sum of money.

As far as one can venture to make any prophecy on these conflicting rumours, it would seem that the Turkish envoys have failed to arrive at any definite understanding with the 'Amir but have patched up some vague truce with Bin Sa'ud, which the latter will be free to abide by or neglect as he pleases and which they have misrepresented to Constantinople as a binding agreement.

The next few weeks should show whether the 'Amir will show any hostility to British traders and the only matter that affords me any concern lest the "status quo" should be altered to the detriment of British interests is that Shaikh Sir Mubarak bin Subah is not very communicative.

I have



327

Turkish Gertrude would be placed in hands of Saud.
Bin Saud receives a monthly allowance of £ 500 as
ruler of Haifa. He collects customs dues, domestic expenses
of administration and pays Turkey 1/10th of the balance.
He flies his own flag.
Bin Saud's prestige in Bahrain has been greatly enhanced
by these rumours. It is thought that he has been agreed to
exclude foreign troops and has been given "sacred islands"
against Qatar.
On the other hand, the Political Agent, Kuwait has never
heard any such story and apparently disbelieves it. I was
myself inclined to do so on first hearing it, as I did in-
directly before Khalid bin Khalid bin Saud, when he was
on his way from Kuwait.
However the Political Agent, Kuwait, writing on the 18th
June, agrees that further correspondence has undoubtedly
taken place between the Turk and Bin Saud but Khalid bin
Saud professes that he knows nothing on the subject.
A Kuwait report says that the Turks have agreed to leave
Bin Saud in possession of Haifa and Qatif on payment of a
yearly sum of money.
As far as one can venture to make any prophecy on these
conflicting rumours, it would seem that the Turkish envoy
have failed to arrive at any definite understanding with the
Turks but have reached up some vague terms with Bin Saud,
which the latter will be free to abide by or neglect as he
pleases and which they have misrepresented to Constantinople
as a binding agreement.
The next few weeks should show whether the 'story' will show
any hostility to British troops and the only matter that
affects us any concern is the "status quo" should be
altered to the detriment of British interests in that Khalid
bin Saud bin Saud is not very communicative.
I have



347 (348)

352


I have the honour to be

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(sd) S. G. Knox Major,

Offg: Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.





348 (349)

353

Docket.

From Keyes, P.A. Bahrein.

To Knox, P.R. Bushire.


No. 6 c

Dated. 4th July 1914.

Abdul Latif informs me that he was only a messenger and took to Bin Saud firman which contained modification of terms originally offered at Koweit. An order has been conferred on Bin Saud but not yet sent. He says Bin Saud is very well satisfied. Abdul Latif leaves for Basrah on 5th.

Cop. forwarded to Political Agent Kuwait

J. Keyes





(350) 349
359

CONFIDENTIAL.

Docket Telegram.

From Grey, P.A. Kuwait.

To Knox, Resident, Bushire.

Semi-Official.


Dated 9 July 1914.


Bin Saud and the Turks.


No news has ~~as~~^{yet} arrived from Bin Saud regarding his agreement with Turkey, but it is expected daily.

The Sheikh of Kuwait is not pleased with Bin Saud, and it is now clear that the latter's desire to seek British protection was very largely due to Sir Mubarak's advice, and the ^{Sheikh} is disappointed that his scheme has failed. I think he was ^{no doubt} actuated by hatred of the Turks in addition to ~~an~~^{an} appreciation of the advantages to be derived from British protection, in the course he took.

W. Grey Jc









Telegram. P.

From Foreign.

To Resident.

No. 414-S.

Dated 8th: received 9.7.14.

351 (352)

356

Your telegram of June 30th last No. 741.
Following telegram from Secretary of State. Begins. "Bin
Sa'ud. H.M's Ambassador at Constantinople reports that he
was informed by Turkish Minister of Interior on June 28th
that agreement had been reached with Bin Sa'ud whom Porte
are appointing Wali of Najd. They will not accept tribute
from him. Bin Sa'ud agrees to establishment of small
Turkish garrison at 'Oqair and Qatif". Ends.

Foreign.



352

Telegram. P.
From Foreign.
To Resident.
No. 414-S.

Dated 8th: received 2.7.14.

Your telegram of June 28th last No. 741.
Following telegram from Secretary of State. Begins "Bin
Saud. H.M.'s Ambassador at Constantinople reports that he
was informed by Turkish Minister of Interior on June 28th
that agreement had been reached with Bin Saud whom Porte
are appointing Wali of Hejd. They will not accept tribute
from him. Bin Saud agrees to establishment of small
Turkish garrison at 'Odeir and Gatif'. Ends.

Foreign.



352 (353)

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Docket telegram.

From - Knox, P.R. Bushire.

To - Gray, Political Agent, Kuwait.

No. 2164


Dated 17th July 1914.

Reference Loch's Docket No. 1958 of 23rd June to your address. Have you any information tending to throw light on "Secondly" in Foreign Department telegram No. 355-S. dated 8th June 1914, forwarded therewith?

Please treat this communication as urgent and reply at your earliest convenience.

J. R. R.

WOM





CONFIDENTIAL

353 (354)

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Docket Telegram

From Keyes, Pol. Agent, Bahrein.

To, Knox, Resident, Bushire.

No. 9-C

Dated 25th July 1914

Yusuf Kanoo reports that Bin Saud drew on Abdullah Qasaibi for about £.20,000/- which sum Abdul Latif Mendel took to Basrah for Saiyid Talib. This in addition to £.40,000/- said to have been given to Saiyid Talib in Kuwait.

Dr. Harrison confirms Kanoo's report that Saiyid Talib handed Bin Saud Abdul Hussain bin Juma's letters to Turkish authorities on account of which Bin Saud had him killed. Dr. Harrison is enthusiastic about improvements in Qatif since Bin Saud took possession. Several old springs have been re-opened and cultivation increased. Bin Saud has put off his visit ^{to Qatif} till after Ramzan and Dr. Harrison has not received an answer to a letter in which he asked permission to travel in Najd. He appears to have been enthusiastically received in Qatif.

I am not sending Bin Saud Shakespeare's letter for ^{the} present.

S/- T. Keyes

No. 765 of 1914


Political Agency, Bahrein.

B A H R E I N, the 25th July 1914

Copy is forwarded, with compliments of the undersigned, to the Political Agent, Kuwait.

Keyes

Captain,
Political Agent, Bahrein





Confidential.

Docket Telegram.

From Noel, A.R. Bushire.

To Grey, P.A. Kuwait.

No. Cf. 42


Dated 19.7.14.

Copy of enclosure to F.D's endorsement No. 671-E.A.
of 9.7.14 is forwarded for information and future guidance/.

By Order,

E. Noel

354 (355)
359





Confidential.

25. Apr 1914 355
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(356)

No. 1.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey. - (Received May 18).
(No. 335).

Constantinople, May 12th, 1914.

Sir,

In his telegram dated the 8th May, which I repeated to you in my telegram No. 281 of the 9th instant, His Majesty's consul at Basra reported the return from Koweit of the Turkish mission charged with the negotiations with Bin Saud. The moment appears to me an opportune one at which to review the question of His Majesty's Government's relations with Nejd from the Turkish Government's point of view.

The policy of His Majesty's Government, as I understand it, has been directed to three ends only, namely, (1) to secure to British subjects free access to and proper treatment in Nejd, and more especially in the coastal regions; (2) to avert developments in that region which would disturb the general peace of the Gulf and the performance of British duties there; and (3) to prevent, or at least postpone, anything which might lead to a general Arab outbreak, and so endanger the integrity of the Turkish dominions in Asia.

His Majesty's Government having, by the agreement of the 29th July last, recognised the entirely Ottoman character of Nejd and the El Hassa coast, it appears to me that the three aims just described can only be pursued consistently with that agreement by allowing the Porte to impose on Bin Saud, in fact, in so far as the El Hassa is concerned, the position which, as between ourselves and the Turkish Government, he is admitted to occupy in theory; in other words, to require either that he shall administer El Hassa as a Turkish officer, or allow the Turks to administer it themselves. So far as the first aim is concerned, Bin Saud might or might not, as an autonomous potentate, treat British subjects more favourably than the Turkish

View on the Qatar Digital Library: http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100036623259.0x00006f



356 361 (357)

Turkish Government would do. As for the second, there may be rival advantages in both alternatives, but I consider that there is something to be said in favour of having to deal with a Government which has now recognised our special position in the Gulf, should that Government be able to assert effective control over El Hassa.

Turning to the third object, it is obviously impossible to foresee the course of events in the Ottoman Arab world generally, but I think, on the whole, that the chances of an upheaval might be increased rather than diminished if an influential and centrally placed chief like Bin Saud were to ⁵consolidate his power and extend it permanently to the seaboard.

I have analysed what I conceive to be the objects of the general policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to Nejd, because it appears to me that recent British action may give rise to apprehension in the minds of the Turkish Ministers that His Majesty's Government are in reality pursuing another object^f, namely, that of establishing relations with Bin Saud which will in some sort reduce him to a state of semi-dependency on Great Britain.

It must be remembered that a series of coincidences have occurred which might encourage this suspicion in the Turkish mind. A month before Bin Saud's descent on El Has the British agent at Koweit visited him in the interior. Early in the present year he was visited by other British officers, with the result that Hakki Pasha was instructed to make a complaint in London.

In March an endeavour of the Porte to enter into direct negotiations with Bin Saud through the emissary Omar Fauz' was foiled owing to the coldness ^{of} the Sheikh of Koweil British protege. At the beginning of April the commercial interests of the British India Company made it seem desirable that the British agent at Bahrein should give them a written recommendation to Bin Saud, a step which, however innocent



357
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be rival advantages in both alternatives, but I consider
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357 362 (358)
innocent the objects of the mission, was again open to
misconstruction. Finally, when Bin Saud eventually agreed
to meet the Turkish Commission, it was arranged that the
meeting should take place at Koweit, and he was visited
twice by the British agent there while the negotiations
were in progress. When to these is added the lively
interest which His Majesty's Government have openly
expressed, the contents of their memorandum of the 9th
March to Hakki Pasha, in which, inter alia, the Porte was
reproached with asking Bin Saud to conduct all foreign
relations through the Turkish authorities, and the repeated
suggestions of mediation, it can only be expected that our
attitude will be viewed with ~~no~~ no little misgiving.

It is not forme to say how well founded the Turkish
suspicions may be, even if they exist, but it appears to
me that, having concluded the agreement of ~~July~~ July last,
which secures us solid advantages in return for certain
definite concessions to the Porte, we are for the time
debarred from doing anything which may be calculated to
uphold Bin Saud as against the Ottoman Government. I think
that, so long as there is any prospect whatever of the
Turkish Government arranging matters with him by the
dilatatory and obscure methods of Oriental diplomacy, we
should leave both sides severely alone, at any rate in
appearances, and should only intervene diplomatically if it
became clear that the Porte are contemplating military
measures, which ~~Talaat~~ Talaat Bey assures me is not the case.
As a matter of fact, I believe the Porte will strain every
diplomatic resource in order to secure a settlement on the
lines of practically recognising Bin Saud's independence
in the interior while regaining control of the El Hassa,
coast.

So far as I myself am concerned, my principal reason
for urging the desirability of refraining from further
intervention of any kind for the present is that I consider
it impossible to expect the Turkish Government to believe
in



innocent the objects of the mission, was again open to
misconstruction. Finally, when Bin Saud eventually agreed
to meet the Turkish Commission, it was arranged that the
meeting should take place at Koweit, and he was visited
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attitude will be viewed with at no little misgiving.
It is not for me to say how well founded the Turkish
suspicions may be, even if they exist, but it appears to
me that, having concluded the agreement of 18th July last,
which secures us solid advantages in return for certain
definite concessions to the Porte, we are for the time
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Turkish Government arranging matters with him by the
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should leave both sides severely alone, at any rate in
appearance, and should only intervene diplomatically if it
became clear that the Porte are contemplating military
measures, which Khalîf Talaat Bey assures me is not the case.
As a matter of fact, I believe the Porte will strain every
diplomatic resource in order to secure a settlement on the
lines of practically recognising Bin Saud's independence
in the interior while retaining control of the El Hassa
coast.
So far as I myself am concerned, my principal reason
for urging the desirability of refraining from further
intervention of any kind for the present is that I consider
it impossible to expect the Turkish Government to believe
in



(358) 358 363

in the innocence of our motives^s and intentions. If we speak to them of a new situation of fact they will say that the new situation dates from before our agreement with them of July last. If we say that our only desire is to promote peace in Arabia and the integrity of the Empire, they will say, or rather, think, without saying it, that for us^e to treat Bin Saud in a way which he and all his neighbours will construe as a sort of recognition of his de facto independence is a ^singular way of helping them to keep their Empire together. If we say that we have axes to grind in the Ottoman world in Turkey, and foresee no profit to ourselves in an upheaval, they will receive our assurances with the politest in^credulity.

Other events have recently occurred which, taken in connection with the affairs of the Gulf, may have increased the Turkish suspicions of the trend of British policy.

The Aziz Ali agitation, which moved Arab opinion over a wide area, and in connection with which my action was purely humanitarian, was rendered liable to misconstruction by the indis^cret violence and partisanship of the "Times". It was the conviction of the Grand Vizier that Aziz Ali had been employed by the Khedive in connection with his endeavours to ^apersuade the Sheikh of the Senoussi to make peace with the Italians, and it is not impossible that the Turkish Government may have some sort of evidence to support this supposition. Being at peace with Italy, they could not object openly to such ^action on the part of Aziz Ali, but they have certainly resented the Khedive's intrigues with the Senoussi if the violence of the Grand Vizier's language respecting His Highness is any index of his feelings in regard to them.

It is permissible to assume that some members of the Turkish Government suspect that His Majesty's Government or, at any rate, the Egyptian Government, were privy to His Highness's activities, which they may regard as a further indication of British interference in Arab politics.

I



in the innocence of our motives and intentions. If we speak to them of a new situation of fact they will say that the new situation dates from before our agreement with them of July last. If we say that our only desire is to promote peace in Arabia and the integrity of the Empire, they will say, or rather, think, without saying it, that for us to treat Bin Saud in a way which he and all his neighbours will construe as a sort of recognition of his de facto independence is a singular way of helping them to keep their Empire together. If we say that we have axes to grind in the Ottoman world in Turkey, and foresee no profit to ourselves in an upheaval, they will receive our assurances with the politest indifference.

Other events have recently occurred which, taken in connection with the affairs of the Gulf, may have increased the Turkish suspicions of the trend of British policy.

The Asia Ait agitation, which moved Arab opinion over a wide area, and in connection with which my action was purely humanitarian, was rendered liable to misconception by the indirect violence and partisanship of the "Times". It was the conviction of the Grand Vizier that Asia Ait had been employed by the Khedive in connection with his endeavours to persuade the Sheikh of the Senoussi to make peace with the Italians, and it is not impossible that the Turkish Government may have some sort of evidence to support this supposition. Being at peace with Italy, they could not object openly to such action on the part of Asia Ait, but they have certainly resented the Khedive's intrigues with the Senoussi at the violence of the Grand Vizier's language respecting His Highness's any index of his feelings in regard to them.

It is permissible to assume that some members of the Turkish Government suspect that His Majesty's Government or, at any rate, the Egyptian Government, were privy to His Highness's activities, which they may regard as a further indication of British interference in Arab politics.



359
360 364

I do not wish to exaggerate the risk of arousing Turkish suspicions, but it must not be forgotten that there are people here whose interest lies in maintaining an atmosphere of distrust between Great Britain and Turkey which makes it additionally important to avoid any cause of offence.

I have, etc.,

Sd/- Louis Mallet.



360r
I do not wish to exaggerate the risk of arousing
Turkish suspicions, but it must not be forgotten that there
are people here whose interest lies in maintaining an
atmosphere of distrust between Great Britain and Turkey
which makes it additionally important to avoid any cause
of offence.

I have, etc.,
Edw. Louis Waller.



(361) 360
365

Confidential.

Docket Telegram.

From Noel, A.R. Bushire.

To Grey, P.A. Kuwait.

No. Cf. 54.

Dated 23. 7.14.


F.D's telegram No. 428-S of 16.7.14. Bin Sa'ud.
For information.

61

Please see below
HJ

By Order,

Envel





361 (362)

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Telegram. P.
From Foreign.
To Resident Bushire.
No. 428-S.
Dated 16.7.14.

'Abdul 'Aziz.

Secretary of State telegraphs as follows:-

Following official communication has been made by Halki Pasha.

"Ibn Sa'ud is nominated Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Najd by Imperial Firman. He is invested with powers of a Wali, and for the ensurance of public security and order in Najd, he has the right to raise local militia. The strength of the garrisons to be established on the coast may be increased at the request of Ibn Sa'ud. The right to conclude treaty and contract engagements with Foreign Powers will not accrue to Ibn Sa'ud. All treaties between Ottoman Empire and other States must be respected by him. In his capacity of Vali, Ibn Rashid may receive applications from foreigners in Najd, made, in regard to their business and in accordance with treaty provisions, to him or to local authorities". Ends.


Our telegram 355-S of 8th June 1914, 2nd para. When may we expect a reply?

Foreign.

x Said I
suppose?

W
Ker. This was
a clerical
error.

20. 2
31 14





Confidential.

Docket Telegram.

From - Grey, P.A., Kuwait.

To - Knox, Resident, Bushire.

No. C.33.

Dated 28. 7. 1914.

362 (363)

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Your D.T. No. 3164 dated 17th received 25th July and previous correspondence re Bin Saud. Correspondence has apparently taken place between Bin Saud and the Sharif of Makkah and Ibn Rashid, in which the object is said to be merely the establishment of friendly relations among themselves. This may have led to the supposition that Bin Saud was trying to persuade other Arab Shaikhs to submit to Turkish rule or the latter explanation may have been added by Turkish officials in order to emphasize the extent to which they had induced Bin Saud to fall in with their wishes. It is not believed here that Bin Sa'ud has suddenly become an ardent pro-Turk or that he has ceased to regard his own interests as paramount.

Referring to Foreign Department telegram No. 428 S dated 16th July the settlement therein detailed does not conflict with that reported in my letter No. C 28 dated 26th June last, and appears to be consistent with the interests of all parties. The messengers sent from here to Riyadh, vide my letter above quoted, have gone to Shaikh Sir Mubarak via Muhammarah, but he has not held and declines to hold further direct communication with Bin Saud on the subject of his arrangement with Turkey. He denies the existence of coldness between himself and Bin Sa'ud, but is obviously disappointed at the solution arrived at; and complained to me at the last interview we had before he left Kuwait that Bin Sa'ud had deceived him in coming to terms without his knowledge.

This is all the information we have here on this subject.

W.H.C.



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37

Confidential.
Docket Telegram.
From - Gray, P.A., Kuwait.
To - Knox, Resident, Baghdad.
No. 22.
Dated 28. 7. 1914.

Your D.E. No. 1751 dated 17th received 28th July and previous correspondence re Bin Saud. Correspondence has apparently taken place between Bin Saud and the Sharif of Mecca and Ibn Rashid, in which the object is said to be merely the establishment of friendly relations among themselves. This may have led to the supposition that Bin Saud was trying to persuade other Arab States to unite to Turkish rule and the latter explanation may have been added by Turkish officials in order to emphasize the extent to which they had induced Bin Saud to fall in with their wishes. It is not believed here that Bin Saud has suddenly become an avowed pro-Turk or that he has ceased to regard his own interests as paramount.

Referring to Foreign Department Telegram No. 428 B dated 18th July the settlement therein described does not conflict with that reported in my letter No. 23 dated 20th June last, and appears to be consistent with the interests of all parties. The messengers sent from here to Mecca, vide my letter above quoted, have gone to Mecca via Baghdad via Basra, but he has not held and declines to hold further direct communication with Bin Saud on the subject of his arrangements with Turkey. He denies the existence of cordiness between himself and Bin Saud, but is obviously disappointed as the mission arrived at; and complains to me as the last interview we had before he left Kuwait that Bin Saud had deceived him in coming to terms without his knowledge.

This is all the information we have here on this subject.

W.H.



(364) 363
368

Confidential.

Docket telegram .

From - Noel, A.R., Bushire.

To - Grey, P.A., Kuwait.


No. Cf. 69

Dated 26. 7.14.

Copy of Consul Basrah's telegram dated 28-7-14.
For information and favour of further report in case any-
thing further transpires in this connection.

By order,

A. Noel





(365) 364
369

Telegram. R.


From- Consul, Basrah.


Addressed- Embassy, Constantinople.


Repeated - Bushire.

Dated and received 28-7-1914.

I learn a company of Gendarmes is to be sent to Hassa
shortly accompanied by a few soldiers.









(Copy)

366 371

P. 2022.

India Office,
Whitehall.
London, S.W.
27th May 1914.

Immediate.

Sir,

With reference to previous correspondence on the subject of the relations of Sheikh Bin Saud of Nejd with the Ottoman Government, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward for the information the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs copy of a telegram that has been received from the Government of India reporting the result of the negotiations.

*
Dated 23rd
May.

Whether or not this report is accurate in every detail, it is probably as near an approach to the truth as will be obtained; and item (d) of the demands made to Bin Saud, and the oral permission alleged to have been given to him to retake trucidial Oman and El Katr illustrate the injury to British interests which would ensue if the Ottoman Government should succeed in making their own terms. On the other hand Bin Saud's offer to lend armed assistance when required by Turkey would most probably be fruitful of trouble for His Majesty's Government in the absence of a friendly understanding with him such as clause (d) of the Turkish terms is intended to preclude.

Lord Crewe fully appreciates the desire of Sir E. Grey to avoid any course of action that will arouse the suspicions of the Ottoman Government; but he observes no corresponding desire on the part of that Government, and he would suggest that as an amicable settlement with Bin Saud has not been reached by direct negotiation, the Ottoman Government should now be urged to accept the mediation of His Majesty's Government, on the ground mentioned in Sir E. Grey's telegram No. 175 of 1st April to Sir L. Mallet.

With



India Office,
Whitehall,
London, S.W.
27th May 1914.

P. 2022.

Immediate.

Sir,

With reference to previous correspondence on the subject of the relations of Sheikh Bin Saud of Nejd with the Ottoman Government, I am directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to forward for the information the Secretary of State for the Government of India reporting the result of the negotiations. Whether or not this report is accurate in every detail, it is probably as near an approach to the truth as will be obtained and (4) of the demands made to Bin Saud, and the oral permission alleged to have been given to him to retake Irbid Oman and El Katr illustrate the injury to British interests which would ensue if the Ottoman Government should succeed in making their own terms. On the other hand Bin Saud's offer to lend armed assistance when required by Turkey would most probably be fruitful of trouble for His Majesty's Government in the absence of a friendly understanding with him such as (4) of the Turkish terms is intended to provide. Lord Grey fully appreciated the desire of Sir R. Grey to avoid any course of action that will arouse the suspicions of the Ottoman Government; but he observed no corresponding desire on the part of that Government, and he would suggest that as an amicable settlement with Bin Saud has not been reached by direct negotiation, the Ottoman Government should now be urged to accept the mediation of His Majesty's Government, on the ground mentioned in Sir R. Grey's telegram No. 175 of 1st April to Sir L. Halliday.

With

Yours faithfully,
John Grey



367 372
(368)

With reference to the last sentence of the Government of India's telegram His Lordship would now propose that honorary K. C. S. I. 's should be conferred on the Sheikhs of Koweit and Mohammera and an honorary C. S. I. and C. I. E. on the Sheikh of Bahrein and Haji Rais respectively, on the occasion of His Majesty's birthday.

I have, etc.,
Sd/ T. W. Holderness.

To

The Under Secretary of State,

Foreign Office.



368r
372

With reference to the last sentence of the Government
of India's telegram His Lordship would now propose that honorary
K. C. S. I. 's should be conferred on the Sheikhs of Kuwait and
Mohammed and an honorary C. S. I. and C. I. R. on the Sheikh
of Bahrain and Hajj Naim respectively, on the occasion of His
Majesty's birthday.

I have, etc.,
Sd/- T. W. Hodgkinson.

To
The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.



(Copy)
23753/14.

Immediate.

368
373
Foreign Office.
June 4th 1914.

Sir,

I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter P. 2022 of the 27th ultimo on the subject of the relations of Sheikh Bin Saud of Nejd with the Ottoman Government. I am to state in reply that recent despatches from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople have impressed him with the importance of avoiding at this particular juncture any action of a ^{native} ~~native~~ likely to lend colour to the suspicions already strongly entertained at Constantinople that His Majesty's Government are supporting Bin Saud's policy of making himself independent. It seems to him essential that His Majesty's Government should proceed very cautiously. ~~the~~

The situation has been informally but carefully explained to Hakki Pasha, and it has been suggested by His Highness to his Government that he should be authorised to discuss the question here with the view to a satisfactory arrangement being arrived at here. In these circumstances Sir E. Grey considers that nothing should be done until the result of Hakki Pasha's suggestion is known.

I am to add that point 'd' in the Viceroy's telegram of May 23rd to which your letter calls special attention does not appear to Sir E. Grey to be open necessarily to the interpretation that the Turkish conditions definitely preclude any connexion or intercourse between Bin Saud and foreigners; the condition would seem merely to provide that any communication between Bin Saud and foreign powers or their agents should take place through the ^{Ottoman} authorities, a view which appears to Sir E. Grey entirely correct, and one in regard to which His Majesty's Government would not be justified in encouraging resistance on the part of Bin Saud, a Turkish subject, and specifically recognised as such by the Anglo-Turkish Convention of July 29th, 1913. Sir E. Grey is,

in



373
Foreign Office.
June 4th 1914.
Immediate.
13753/14.
(Copy)
Sir,
I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter P. 2022 of the 27th inst. on the subject of the relations of Sheikh bin Saud of Nejd with the Ottoman Government. I am to state in reply that recent dispatches from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople have impressed him with the importance of avoiding at this particular juncture any action of a ^{valuable} ~~valuable~~ likely to lead colour to the suspicions already strongly entertained at Constantinople that His Majesty's Government are supporting bin Saud's policy of making himself independent. It seems to him essential that His Majesty's Government should proceed very cautiously. The situation has been informally but carefully explained to Haki Pasha, and it has been suggested by His Highness to his Government that he should be authorised to discuss the question here with the view to a satisfactory arrangement being arrived at here. In these circumstances Sir E. Grey considers that nothing should be done until the result of Haki Pasha's suggestion is known.
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369
370 374

in fact, convinced that it would not be compatible with our engagements that Bin Saud should be treated otherwise, or that independent communications with him should be held except in cases where ^{they} cannot be avoided; and he trusts that instructions in this sense will be issued.

From a recent but informal communication made by Hakki Pasha, there appears to be little doubt that the Ottoman Government are persuaded that Bin Saud would come to ~~terms~~ terms with them were it not for British influence and the hope of British support. Sir E. Grey fully recognises that arrangements must be made to protect British interests, but only subject to the sovereign rights of Turkey.

Sir E. Grey has no objection to the bestowal of the decorations to which you refer on the occasion of the official celebration of the King's birthday on the understanding that the information contained in the final sentence of the Viceroy's telegram is definite.

I am, etc.,
Sd/ W. Langley.

To
The Under Secretary of State,
India Office.



374 (370) 2.8.0. for Burshire.

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I am, etc.,
Edw. W. Langley.

To
The Under Secretary of State,
India Office.



CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 1206 (Confidential), dated Bushire, the 26th April 1914.

From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The HON'BLE LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR P. Z. COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

In amplification of my telegram No. 480, dated 20th April 1914, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of the letter, noted in the margin, which has been received from the Political Agent at Kuwait in regard to Bin Saud and the Turkish authorities.

ENCLOSURE.

No. C-13, dated Kuwait, the 14th April 1914.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. G. GREY, I.A., Political Agent,

To—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, C.I.E., Political, Resident, in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

In continuation of my letter No. C-12, dated 7th instant, I have the honour to report further on the subject of Bin Saud and the Turkish Government.

2. The Turkish plans in regard to the negotiations have again changed. A letter, of which a translation is attached, was received on the 12th instant from Saiyid Talib. It intimates that the management of these affairs has now been entrusted to him; that he is coming to Kuwait in company with the Binbashi Saiyid Umar Fauzi Beg and the chief of the Baghdad staff; and that they hope to meet Bin Saud when he arrives in the immediate neighbourhood. Sir Mubarak has promised to inform Saiyid Talib of the arrival of Bin Saud at Subaiyah some 20 miles south of Kuwait where he is expected to be in about ten days' time; the party will then come to Kuwait, and if Bin Saud is still in the neighbourhood when they arrive the meeting may take place, but it is doubtful whether Bin Saud will consent to an interview as he is said to be determined to give no reply other than that contained in his letter to Saiyid Talib, the enclosure to my letter No. C-12, dated 7th instant.

3. Possibly the position of affairs may change when and if the deputation have found that a personal discussion fails to modify the attitude of Bin Saud in regard to the negotiations, but it would apparently be advisable to press the Turkish Government for an early reply to the Foreign Office memorandum of March 9th last, and, if possible, to induce them to abstain from further attempts to arrange matters without our assistance pending the consideration of such reply by His Majesty's Government.

SUB-ENCLOSURE.

Dated the 15th Jamadi-al-Awal 1332 (11th April 1914).

From—SAIYID TALIB OF BASRAH,


To—HIS EXCELLENCY SHAIKH SIR MUBARAK AS SABAH,

After compliments.

According to the orders of the Home Department the solution of the present local difficulty, i.e., that between the Government and the Amir Bin Saud, has been entrusted to me, and I have asked for a special arrangement. In compliance with my request the Chief of the Staff at Baghdad, he whom you have already interviewed, Saiyid Umar Fauzi Bey, the Basrah Chief of Staff, and formerly Mutasarrif of Firan, (and I), we three are to interview the aforesaid Amir, who, according to your invitation, is shortly to be in the neighbourhood of Kuwait. So we hope you will complete this memorable deed and that it (the meeting) may be at Malah* or in some suitable place

* Some 10 miles S. of Kuwait. favourable for a conference; and that you will inform us of that by telegraphing to Fao or by a special messenger, it is for you to decide.

And I will bring the decoration with me and present it to Your Excellency. We hope for an early reply, and salaam.





CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 1494 (Confidential), Bushire, the 19th May 1914.


From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

To—The HON'BLE LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR P. Z. COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

In continuation of my letter No. 1350, dated 10th May on the subject of the Turks and Bin Saud, I have the honour to state that the Political Agent, Kuwait, reports on the 10th May that no further news has reached him regarding Turkish projects, and that he does not expect any for some days.

2. Bin Saud has not visited Kuwait, and is at present encamped at Jahra, 21 miles out, whence he intends to set off for his own country almost immediately. The Political Agent has not seen him again nor has there been any correspondence between them. He further reports that in the opinion of Shaikh Sir Mubarak, the Turks will be more likely to declare war upon Bin Saud than to reopen the subject of mediation on the part of His Majesty's Government. Should the latter proposal again come to the fore, a difficulty will, the Political Agent considers, be encountered in connection with the return of Turkish garrison to Hasa, which appears to be the principal condition of settlement in the eyes of the Turks, and, at the same time, the point which Bin Saud is least inclined to concede.

3. I am not inclined to share Shaikh Mubarak's fears of war by the Turks upon Bin Saud, but I agree with the Political Agent in thinking that, should we be asked to mediate, we should find the greatest difficulty in inducing the Amir to accept the presence of Turkish troops at Hasa, and I would venture to suggest that we should do our utmost to dissuade the Turks from insisting on any such proposal. Even if we succeeded in persuading the Amir to accept Turkish troops, the possibilities of future friction would be considerable. The payment of revenue, flying the Turkish flag over Hasa boats, and the Amir's Hofuf residence or his tents while in the Sanjaq, and perhaps the presence of a Turkish Civil Adviser with a small escort of Turkish infantry for his personal protection and as a badge of rank and dignity, so to speak, would appear to be far more acceptable indications of Turkish suzerainty from the Arab point of view.





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CONFIDENTIAL.

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Kuwait 377
(373)
No. 1737 (Confidential), dated Bushire, the 7th June 1914.

From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
To—The HON'BLE LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR P. Z. COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Foreign
Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

In amplification of my telegram No. 650, dated 1st June 1914, I have the honour to forward herewith, for information, copy of a despatch No. 35, dated 30th May 1914, to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, with which I have been favoured by his Majesty's Consul at Basrah.


Enclosure.


No. 35, dated the 30th May 1914.

From—R. W. BULLARD, Esq., His Majesty's Acting Consul, Basrah,
To—HIS EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR LOUIS MALLET, K.C.M.G., C.B.
His Majesty's Ambassador, Constantinople.

I have the honour to inform you that the Vali of Basrah is reported, on good authority, to have telegraphed to the Ministry of the Interior stating that Bin Saud is negotiating with other Arab Shaikhs with the object of bringing them all under the Turkish flag and urging that the Government take no further action against him for the present. He adds that it will be possible to regain possession of Hasa amicably in a few months.

The purport of this telegram, so little in harmony with the result of the recent negotiations between the Turks and Bin Saud at Kuwait, is believed to be due to the inspiration of Saiyid Talib, who is said to have telegraphed to Constantinople in a similar sense. It is certain that the Vali is strongly influenced by Saiyid Talib, and that, being a man of indolent character, any suggestion involving the postponement of a difficult question would be welcome to him.





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No. C.-29, dated Kuwait, the 26th June 1914.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. G. GREY, I.A., Political Agent, Kuwait,

To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a letter No. C.-28, dated 26th June 1914, which I have addressed to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure to Serial No. (185).

No. C.-28, dated Kuwait, the 26th June 1914.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. G. GREY, I.A., Political Agent, Kuwait,

To—The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire.

In continuation of my letter No. 20-C., dated 20th May last I have the honour to report further regarding Bin Saud and the Turks.

2. Yesterday Sir Mubarak received a communication from a Turkish friend at Basrah giving details of an agreement which is said to have been arrived at between

Two enclosures.

Bin Saud and Abd-ul-Latif Mandil, a former agent of his at Basrah, acting on behalf of the Turkish Government. I attach a translation of this document and also a translation of a congratulatory telegram which accompanied it. This telegram is supposed to have been sent by Anwar Pasha, the Minister of War, to Bin Saud. It will be observed that no mention whatever is made in the terms of the agreement of foreigners or the interests of Foreign Powers.

3. It is known that Abd-ul-Latif Mandil has recently visited Bin Saud in Riyadh, but this solution cannot be accepted until some confirmation of the report has arrived from Bin Saud himself. Sir Mubarak is much disturbed at the thought that Bin Saud could have concluded a formal agreement without consulting him, and has sent off a messenger to Riyadh to ask for details. Unfortunately he cannot return for some ten or twelve days, but I will inform you as early as possible of the reply.

4. I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosures direct to the Government of India in the Foreign Department to save time.

Sub-Enclosure No. 1.

Translation of a letter received by Shaikh Sir Mubarak from Basrah on June 26th undated and unsigned.

SIR,

Bin Saud. His affair with the Government is settled according to her desires, peace is established between the two, and shedding of Muslim blood is averted. He is appointed Wali and Commander-in-Chief of Nejd without interference, and (the collection of) all rates and taxes are to be in his hands; he is to pay from them the expenses of the country and what is (left ?) over will send to the proper places*

1. i.e. will render an account to Constantinople.

2. This apparently gives Bin Saud the opportunity to require no Turkish troops.

he will place upon the coast regular troops as required,† and will call for cannon and small arms from Government when required. He will correspond direct with the Home and War Departments and not through the Wali of Basrah, and will place Turkish flags on every town in Nejd both far and near: he will appoint whom he likes and dismiss whom he likes, he is the agent to whom choice is delegated, and a Firman to this effect will issue from Constantinople.

Yesterday a telegram came from the War Minister, I enclose a copy of it, and the Firman will go to Bin Saud in the "Marmaris" to Qatif. This is the news in Basrah to-day.



2

Sub-Enclosure No. 2.

Translation of telegram.

To—

HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF NEJD,
THE AMIR ABD-UL-AZIZ PASHA AS SAUD.

With great joy I congratulate and felicitate you, and I pray that God may crown all your deeds with success for strengthening the revealed Muslim religion and in the service of the great Ottoman Government ; and I wish you happiness and prosperity in all matters, and you may command me in everything.

(Sd.) ANWAR,
War Minister.

C-289FD



85.
CONFIDENTIAL.

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(375)

No. 2051, dated Bushire, the 28th June 1914.

From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The HON'BLE LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR P. Z. COX, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

In amplification of my telegram No. 725, dated 23rd June 1914, repeating to you the telegram dated 23rd June sent by His Majesty's Consul, Basrah, to the Embassy at Constantinople, on the subject of Turkish negotiations with Bin Saud, I have the honour to report that news has been received from the Political Agent, Bahrain, to the effect that Shaikh Mujbil and Thakair, an influential Najdi merchant, resident in Bahrain, whose brother's daughter was recently married to Bin Saud, has informed the Political Agent, Bahrain, that he had interviews with both the Turkish representative and Bin Saud. Both parties informed him that an arrangement was eventually arrived at.

2. Shaikh Mujbil did not see the text of the agreement, but he understands that the Porte was allowed to station five soldiers at each of the following places, 'Oqair, Qatif and Jubail to keep the Turkish flag flying but that no other Turkish garrisons would be placed in Hasa or Najd.

Bin Saud receives a monthly allowance of £ T. 250 as ruler of Hasa. He collects customs dues, deducts expenses of administration, and pays Turkey 1-10th of the balance. He flies his own flag.

Bin Saud's prestige in Bahrain has been greatly enhanced by these rumours. It is thought that he has agreed to exclude foreign traders and has been given "carte blanche" against Qatr.



On the other hand, the Political Agent, Kuwait, has never heard any such story and apparently discredits it; I was myself inclined to do so on first hearing it, as I did indirectly before Shaikh Mujbil reached Bahrain, when he was on his way from Kuwait.


However, the Political Agent, Kuwait, writing on the 16th June, agrees that further correspondence has undoubtedly taken place between the Turks and Bin Saud but Shaikh Sir Mubarak professes that he knows nothing on the subject.

A Kuwait report says that the Turks have agreed to leave Bin Saud in possession of Hasa and Qatif on payment of a yearly sum of money.

As far as one can venture to make any prophecy on these conflicting rumours it would seem that the Turkish envoys have failed to arrive at any definite understanding with the Amir but have patched up some vague truce with Bin Saud, which the latter will be free to abide by or neglect as he pleases and which they have misrepresented to Constantinople as a binding agreement.

The next few weeks should show whether the Amir will show any hostility to British traders, and the only matter that affords me any concern lest the "status quo" should be altered to the detriment of British interests is that Shaikh Sir Mubarak bin Subah is not very communicative.





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Kuwait 375
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(376)

CONFIDENTIAL

No. Cl.-97, dated Bushire, the 8th (received 18th) August 1914.

From—MAJOR S. G. KNOX, C.I.E., Officiating Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,

To—The Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign and Political Department, Simla.



I have the honour to state that reports received from the Political Agent, Bahrain, writing under date the 25th July, mention that Bin Saud has paid to Saiyid Talib at Basrah through Abdul Latif Mendil a sum of Rs. 20,000. This is in addition to a sum of Rs. 40,000 given to Saiyid Talib in Kuwait.


Presumably these sums were paid for Saiyid Talib's assistance in the negotiations with the Turks.

The execution of the Qatif merchant, Abdul Hussain bin Juma, has already been reported in my summary for the month of July. Dr. Harrison who has only just returned from Al Qatif confirms the account that Abdul Hussain's letters to the Turkish authorities were sent to Bin Saud by Said Talib.

It is perhaps needless to say that Dr. Harrison's visit to Al Qatif was in no way encouraged by the Political Agent, Bahrain, who does not appear to have been consulted. Dr. Harrison, according to his own account, was very well received. He is enthusiastic about the improvements already effected in Qatif by the Amir's officials. Several old springs have been reopened and cultivation has increased. To a letter however in which Dr. Harrison sought permission to travel in Najd, no reply has been received from Bin Saud.

C93FD-44-28 8-14-GCBP Simla





KS
LHS
Confidential.

No. Cf. 95 of 1914.

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 8th August 1914.

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(377)

To

The Political Agent,
Kuwait.

Sir,


I have the honour to request that you will favour me with a report showing, so far as information in your possession goes, what will be the attitude of Bin Sa'ud towards British authorities and British interests as the result of his recent settlement with the Turks.

For instance,

Does he realise and appreciate the fact that the satisfactory character of the settlement as regards himself and his local autonomy is the result of our friendly representations to the Turks or,

Does he consider that we left him in the lurch and resent our supposed neglect accordingly?

In this matter, Shaikh Mubarak's views will be of interest. I have noted that Shaikh Mubarak is none too pleased with Bin Sa'ud at present and it will be necessary to accept his opinions with some reserve. I am not altogether satisfied with Shaikh Mubarak's rather scanty explanations of his own discontent at Bin Saud's consenting to accept, even if only in name, the position and status of a Turkish official and would be glad to know if, in your opinion, there is any further explanation. It occurs to me as possible that Shaikh Sir Mubarak may be offended at the Amir consenting to accept any settlement at all without Shaikh Sir Mubarak's concurrence and that his vanity may be touched by his failure to obtain the position



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374
No. 37 of 1914.
British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bahrain, 8 August 1914.
Confidential.


To
The Political Agent,
Kuwait.

Sir,

I have the honour to request that you will favour me with a report showing, so far as information in your possession goes, what will be the attitude of Bin Saud towards British authorities and British interests as the result of his recent settlement with the Turks.

For instance, Does he realise and appreciate the fact that the attitude of character of the settlement as regards himself and his local autonomy is the result of our friendly representations to the Turks or, Does he consider that we left him in the lurch and reward our supposed neglect accordingly?

In this matter, Shaikh Mubarak's views will be of interest. I have noted that Shaikh Mubarak is none too pleased with Bin Saud at present and it will be necessary to accept his opinions with some reserve. I am not altogether satisfied with Shaikh Mubarak's rather scanty explanations of his own dis- content at Bin Saud's consenting to accept, even if only in name, the position and status of a Turkish official and would be glad to know if, in your opinion, there is any further explanation. It occurs to me as possible that Shaikh Mubarak may be offended at the Amir consenting to accept any settlement at all without Shaikh Mubarak's concurrence and that his vanity may be touched by his failure to obtain the position



(378) 377 382

position he no doubt hoped for by both sides appealing to
him to arbitrate between them.



I have the honour to be

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

Major,

Offg: Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.





CONFIDENTIAL.

Dated the 26th June 1914.

From—CAPTAIN W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR,

To—SIR ARTHUR HIRTZEL, K. C. B., Secretary, Political Department India Office, London.

I have been through the papers which you were good enough to have sent to me and apparently some of the information which I sent to the Political Resident at Bushire from Riadh has never reached Government—the reason may be that, as I wrote to Mr. Lorimer privately, the letter may have been destroyed on reaching Bushire some six weeks after his death.

I reached Riadh on the 9th March and found active preparations being made for the collection of a large force by Bin Saud; I stayed and travelled with Bin Saud until the 15th and during this time had many opportunities of ascertaining his feelings and intentions. I would add that being on exceptionally intimate terms with Abdul Aziz and his whole family he frequently showed me the confidential correspondence passing between him and other Arab* Chiefs, amongst them Sayid Mahomed al-Idrisi, the Imam Yahyah of Sana'a, Bin Sha'alan, the premier shikh of the great Anaizah tribe and others of lesser importance, as well as his communications with the Turkish authorities. I did my best to discourage his confidences seeing that I had no official status, but as he insisted they may now be useful.

Bin Saud was aware of the advent of Turkish troops and the new Vali of Basrah, Suliman Pasha, in Riadh before I met him in March, and fearing that the troops were intended for a descent on Katif, Ojair and Hasa he had issued orders for a general mobilization of his troops (i.e., townsmen and villagers as distinct from the nomad Bedouin, who do not count for much). This mobilization only called up a small proportion of the available fighting strength of each village—some 30 per cent. was my estimate after many enquiries—but even then Bin Saud had anything from 5,000 to 7,000 well-armed and mounted men ready to his hand. The military efficiency of Bin Saud's arrangements will be realized when it is understood that some of the villages are nearly 150 miles from Riadh, that the mobilization was practically complete within a fortnight, and that 1,000 men were despatched and posted in the coast villages (particularly Katif) within the first week.

Bin Saud told me that he was forced to make these preparations as he could not risk allowing the Turkish troops to effect a landing on the coast unopposed. He intended no aggressive action but was determined on a vigorous defence. He was exceedingly anxious as to what

reply* he would receive from the Political Agent, Bahrain, to his letter† of the 1st Rabi-ul-Thani 1332
29th February 1914
and what steps, if any, would be taken by His Majesty's Government in the event of the...

.....Turkish troops making for the coast. My position did not permit of more than counselling patience, deprecating any hostile movement and suggesting that in any negotiations which might be attempted he should be careful to remember that he had given us (when he met† Major Trevor and myself at Ojair in December)

certain provisional assurances regarding the Trucial Chiefs and British traders on the coast. He said he had no intention of committing himself definitely to the Turks so long as he had any chance of arriving at an arrangement with the British Government or at least of obtaining our support or good offices in his negotiations with the Turks, but at the same time he could not wait indefinitely and continue to maintain a large force in the field; and, unless he could obtain some sort of assurance he would be compelled to make his own arrangements in order to obtain a temporary respite at least from having to remain continually on guard. He told me then that the two conditions upon which the Turks would certainly insist would be (a) the re-establishment of their former garrisons, and (b) the exclusion of all foreigners; the former he would never agree to whatever happened, and thought that by accepting the latter he might be able to buy his desired respite, though he saw that such acceptance would probably close the door to any further negotiations with the British Government, much as he desired an understanding with them. The reports of the subsequent negotiations in April near Kuwait show that Bin Saud has not wavered in his resolve, nor do I think that he will so long as he can fence with the Turks, and continues to cling to his hope of drawing His Majesty's Government into any arrangement which he may make with the Porte.



So much for Bin Saud's own attitude which I am convinced will not alter until he has paired of obtaining the continuance or good offices of His Majesty's Government in his efforts for an arrangement with the Turks.

One reason, and that the most cogent for Bin Saud's determined attitude, is that he feels himself strong enough to oppose the Turks especially if he can keep the other great Arab Shaikhs firm in their resolution not to permit any further aggression or encroachment in Arabia by the Turks. During the past year there has arisen a loose kind of confederation or alliance between the following Chiefs—Bin Saud, Imam Yahyah, Saiyid Mahomed al-Idrisi, Bin Sha'alan and the Sharif of Mecca, with only Ibn Rashid, the Shammar Chief, left outside the coalition. The basis of the alliance is that the allied Chiefs should endeavour to settle their differences by agreement or arbitration as war between them only weakens all parties as against the common enemy (*viz.*, the Turks), that in the event of any aggression by the Porte upon any one of these Shaikhs all should combine for resistance and mutual help. Ibn Rashid has been left out of the confederation because the present ruler is a boy who cannot be trusted, who is hand in glove with the Turks and has no real authority over his own tribesmen. Whether the Turkish Government is aware of this combination or not I do not know, but I presume that it is for it has been at great pains to strengthen Ibn Rashid with arms and treasure within the last six months. Before I left Kuwait on the 3rd February I had heard rumours of large consignments of arms being despatched to Hail for Ibn Rashid from Damascus; at Riyadh Bin Saud told me that he had certain information to the same effect and that they must be intended by the Turkish Government for use against himself; in the north-central desert the news was confirmed; and finally I was informed in the vicinity of the Hedjaz Railway by Chiefs in a position to know, that some 30,000 rifles (all magazine arms of Mauser or Mannlicher pattern) with bayonets had been railed from Damascus to the station (? Tebuk) on the Hedjaz line for Teimah, that hundreds of boxes (accurate numbers were not obtainable) of ammunition accompanied the arms together with three breech-loading mountain guns (each said to be accompanied, I think, with some 500 shrapnel shell apiece) and that the consignment filled three large Railway waggons; further that three Europeans (probably European Turks) had taken a motor-car by the same route to Hail at about the same time (I think in January) who might be artillerymen for the mountain guns. In the northern desert it was common report that these arms were intended for Ibn Rashid and that he would probably make a move against Bin Saud within the year, perhaps in the autumn.

Bin Saud may have received accurate information later of the quantities and description of arms and of the plans concerted between Ibn Rashid and the Turks, and it is some such knowledge, I think, which probably accounted for his uncompromising and somewhat truculent attitude at Kuwait towards the Turkish deputation sent to interview him. It is action of this kind in the face of correspondence of the description reported* by the Political Agent at Kuwait in April which causes Bin Saud to view any Turkish proposal with the greatest suspicion.

From all that I heard throughout Central Arabia I feel convinced that the old methods of Turkish intrigue, of setting up one Arab Shaikh against another, will no longer have the success of past times in maintaining even that shadowy semblance of Turkish sovereignty over them which has hitherto passed unquestioned; throughout the country I was struck by the contempt with which the Arabs all regarded the Turkish Government, its troops and its civil officials. In attempting to show of what little account in Arabia Turkish authority really is, I am only endeavouring to explain that present Turkish methods invite further disasters.

I am aware that His Majesty's Government are committed to a policy of supporting and maintaining a strong Turkey in Asia and if such a desirable result can be brought about in Arabia so much the better. Unfortunately the Turkish Government appears to have no conception of its own weakness in Arabia, nor of the power and strength of the Arab Chiefs, nor does it appear to realize what are the probable consequences likely to ensue should forcible measures have to be resorted to in the end. The reports from Kuwait describing the course of the negotiations with Bin Saud I think sufficiently bear out the above view. The nearest parallel to the Turkish difficulties with Bin Saud which I can draw is our own case in Somaliland, only exaggerated ten times worse. Knowing something of the country, its difficulties in transport, supplies and the like, I would hesitate to suggest that less than two divisions, completely equipped for a long desert war, would be able to re-establish and maintain effectively the former Turkish occupation of the Hasa province. The Turkish occupation before May 1913 was not effective in any sense, and only existed because Bin Saud was more occupied elsewhere. He could have carried out his coup of May 1913 at any time in the last five years.

So far as my limited knowledge goes the Turkish Government does not appear to be in a position at present to undertake any expeditions in Arabia, nor indeed for many years to come. It must also be remembered that any future campaign against one Shaikh is exceedingly likely to raise the whole of Arabia against the Turks. It may be argued that the Arab tribes have not the necessary cohesion to maintain for any length of time a united front against the Porte.



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To a certain extent this is true, but at the present moment years of falsehood, intrigue and oppression on the part of Turkish officials combined with the disastrous loss of Turkish prestige resulting from the Tripoli and Balkan wars have had their effect. Moreover, the Arabs have now found a leader (Bin Saud) who stands head and shoulders above any other Chief and in whose star all have implicit faith. The other Shaikhs of the Arab alliance refer all kinds of matters to Bin Saud for his advice, more especially those affecting their relations with the Porte.

I am convinced that present Turkish methods in Arabia, if persisted in, will end in disaster—Turkey has not the power to coerce Arabia and should matters, with Bin Saud in regard to the Hasa province for instance, come to a head, the probable result will be a combination of all the Arab tribes, the expulsion of Turkish troops and officials from the Hedjaz, Yemen and Asir and the establishment of an independent Arabia with a loose form of confederation of which Bin Saud will be the head, while the holy cities of Mecca and Medina will pass under the absolute rule of the Sharif's family with the consent of Bin Saud. I admit that it is always rash to prophesy, but I have heard the subject discussed so often in Arabia on these lines and by so many widely separated Chiefs that I cannot avoid the conclusion that the Turkish Government is at present riding for a very bad fall in its present Arabian policy.

If the British policy of a strong Turkey is ever to be realized in Asia the Porte must be convinced of its mistake, however unpalatable the process may be. The only solution which I can see is a radical change on the part of the Porte towards a more straight-forward and honest policy with the important Shaikhs. Most of them are quite willing to accept Turkish suzerainty so long as it is one only in name and does not import meddling in their affairs. In the case of Bin Saud for instance—all he desires is to be left alone as the ruler of Nejd, which he is now in fact, allowed to collect his own taxes and customs and to administer the Shara's Law in the old time-honoured way. If the Porte would nominate him Mutaserif or Vali of Nejd on these conditions he would be willing to pay it a nominal tribute in a lump sum per annum, and I feel sure would loyally keep his part of the bargain as a Turkish vassal. He has no ambitions to become the Khalif of Arabia, and though his commanding influence will no doubt lead all the other Chiefs more or less during his lifetime, I do not think he would ever embark on a campaign to set himself up as Sultan of all Arabia.

It may be said that any solution on the lines suggested above will leave the whole of Arabia open to the exploitation of Foreign Powers, Great and otherwise. At present no Great Power has any real interests in Arabia with the exception of Great Britain, whose interests are confined to the coast-line, though I believe Italy is said to be trying to develop interests in Asir or Yemen. The discussion of this aspect of the subject requires more accurate and more extensive knowledge of recent events than is available to me; therefore it is with diffidence that I venture to suggest for consideration that with the Porte recognized and supported by His Majesty's Government as the Suzerain Power in Arabia and provided that the Turkish Government dealt frankly with His Majesty's Government in matters regarding Arabia no Foreign Power would find it an easy proposition to make good a footing in the country, apart from the fact that along nearly the whole littoral British influence is paramount and of very considerable account even in those portions actually administered at the moment by Turkey.

To sum up, the difficulties of the problem in Arabia are :—

- (a) The utter inability of the Porte to coerce Arabia at present or for many years to come.
- (b) The strong position in a military and geographical sense with which Nature has endowed the Arabs.
- (c) The probable coalition of all Arab tribes in the event of attempted coercion.
- (d) The desire of His Majesty's Government to promote a strong Turkey in Asia without detriment to legitimate British interests.

The remedies, so far as I can venture to suggest them, seem to be :—

- (1) The acceptance by the Porte of the *de facto* independent status of the great Shaikhs whilst maintaining a nominal suzerainty.
- (2) A franker and more honest attitude by the Porte towards the great Shaikhs.
- (3) Less suspicion on the part of the Porte towards British policy in Arabia with recognition of the special position which Great Britain there enjoys.
- (4) A frank invitation by the Porte for British co-operation in Arabian affairs.



4

Dated the 26th June 1914.

FROM—CAPTAIN W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR,

TO—SIR ARTHUR HIRTZEL, K.C.B., Secretary, Political Department, India Office
London.

In the papers you had sent to me and also in others which came to me officially in Kuwait, I have noticed that Saiyid Talib of Basrah seems to be regarded as a 'deus ex machina' or solver of all local ills in Arabia and Mesopotamia. I cannot understand how he has acquired this position, or rather how he has managed to maintain it in the reports of our own officers.

The man is a strong, wilful, utterly unscrupulous character, usually heavily in debt and consequently importunate. He has a dozen or more murders to his credit and holds Basrah in the hollow of his hand by means of a band of armed men who occupy his house there like a fort, issuing thence to execute their master's behests in the matter of replenishing his exchequer when required.

No Vali at Basrah is ever able to carry on his administrative work unless he first agrees to be the willing tool of Saiyid Talib.

Bin Saud, Shaikh Mubarak, and Shaikh Khazal all subsidise him with a regular monthly or annual salary solely to protect themselves from continual extravagant demands accompanied by threats. Not one of these Chiefs, however, would trust Saiyid Talib with any negotiation on their own behalf. Saiyid Talib generally induces the Central Government to depute him as their envoy for the solution of their difficulties in Mesopotamia, the local Vali generally being his strongest supporter for the simple reason that unless Saiyid Talib is allowed some of the pickings always available on these occasions, matters usually come to a deadlock through his instrumentality.

G. M. Press, Simla.—No. C. 289 F.D.—5-3-14.—3—C.W.M.



15
No. C-36 of 1914.

Political Agency,
Kuwait.

From

Lieutenant-Colonel W.G. Grey, I.A.,
Political Agent, Kuwait.

To

The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
Bushire.

dated Kuwait, the 2nd September 1914.


Sir,

I have now the honour to reply to your letter No. Cf.95 dated 8th August on the subject of the Amir Abd-ul-Aziz bin Saud: the prolonged absence from Kuwait of His Excellency the Shaikh having made it impossible for me to do so earlier.

2. Prior to Sir Mubarak's departure for Muhammerah early in July Shaikh Sir Khazal Khan was in Kuwait, and he was present at the interviews between me and Sir Mubarak during which Bin Sa'ud was discussed. I found it difficult to induce Mubarak to speak freely on the subject in the presence of his friend, and, rather than incur the risk of exciting Sir Khaza's suspicion or distrust by asking the other for a private interview while he was here, I thought it better to be satisfied for the time being with the explanation given by Mubarak on the occasions referred to, which was no doubt correct to a certain extent, viz, that he had no information regarding the settlement arrived at by Bin Sa'ud with the Turks beyond what we had heard from Basrah, and that he was displeased with Bin Sa'ud for having come to an ~~agreement~~ arrangement without consulting him and did not wish to hold any further correspondence with him on the subject.

3. Since his return to Kuwait however Sir Mubarak has been

more





(382) 381 385

more communicative and we discussed the question yesterday at some length. His relations with Bin Sa'ud are as cordial as ever though he has had no letter from him dealing with his relations with Turkey. The Shaikh assures me that Bin Sa'ud's feelings towards the British are unchanged, and that he considers that all questions concerning foreign traders, in or visitors to, Nejd and al Ahsa are to be settled by him alone without reference to Constantinople. This ~~same~~ view would appear to be correct provided that the requests of such persons are in accordance with treaty provisions, vide the communication from Haidi Pasha detailed in Foreign Department telegram No. 433-S dated 16th July last to your address.

4. Referring to your letter under reply, I do not think it is likely that Bin Sa'ud attributes his settlement with the Turkish Government to our previous efforts on his behalf though he may perhaps be aware that the satisfactory terms he has obtained are in part due to our presence in the field. I have no reason to doubt that the explanation of our apparent change of front which I gave him in April last (vide para 4 of my letter No. C-16 dated 29th idem) was accepted as satisfactory which it certainly appeared to be at the time. It is not difficult to understand Sir Mubarak's conduct in the matter under reference having regard to (1), his peculiar position between the Turkish Government and that of His Majesty, (2), the fact that we were obliged in the course of the recent treaty negotiations to make some concessions to Turkey which were distasteful to him, and (3), his known hatred of the Turks. He has been throughout the moving spirit in Bin Sa'ud's efforts to obtain British protection, and felt at the same time obliged to profess readiness to assist the Suzerain Power in her negotiations with him. The tactics of Sir Mubarak have not met with the result he hoped for, but the arrangement between Bin Sa'ud and Turkey is not likely to be of long duration according to the specific expectations of the former, who is not believed here to have become a pro-Turk, to have been in the least affected by the Pan-Islamic sentiments



382r

more commensurate and we discussed the question yesterday as
well as today. His relations with Bin Saud are as cordial as
ever though he has had no letter from him dealing with his
relations with Turkey. The British seemed to think Bin Saud's
feelings towards the British are unchanged, and that in con-
sequence they all question concerning foreign affairs, in or
outside the limits of the British Empire, are to be settled by his alone
without reference to Constantinople. This same view would
appear to be correct provided that the request of such per-
sons are in accordance with treaty provisions, and the con-
sultation of the British Government is required in Foreign Department
regarding No. 100-2 dated 18th July last to your address.

4. Referring to your letter under reply, I do not think it
is likely that Bin Saud's attitude his relations with the
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though he may perhaps be aware that the satisfactory terms he
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to be of long duration according to the specific expression
of the former, who is not believed here to have become a pro-
-Turk, so have been in the last letter by the British
Government.



(383) 382 386
sentiments of Anwar Pasha, or to have ceased to regard the
interests of himself and his people as paramount.

5. In accordance with instructions received I have held no
communication of any kind with Bin Sa'ud since my interview
with him of April 28th.

I have the honour to be,


Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

HS

Lieut-Colonel,

Political Agent, Kuwait.





BS
CONFIDENTIAL.

Docket Telegram.

From - Neel, A.R. Bushire.

To - Grey, P.A., Kuwait.

No. Of. 349.


Dated 17-9-14.

*
For information.

By order.

Encl

*
Copy of P.R's Of. 238 of 15-9-14 to Foreign.





CONFIDENTIAL

No. Cf. 238 of 1914.

384
388
(385)

British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bushire, 15th September 1914.

From

Major S.G. Knox, C.I.E.,
Offg. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

To

The Hon'ble Lieut-Colonel Sir Percy Cox, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.,
Foreign Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign and Political Department,

S I M L A.

Sir,

The attitude of Bin Saud towards British authorities and British interests as a result of his recent settlement with the Turks is a subject of sufficient interest to make it unnecessary for me to preface a report thereon with any long preamble setting forth the reasons that have induced me to submit such a document.

2. I have recently requested the views of the Political Agents of Bahrain and Kuwait on this question and their reports have now reached me.

The Political Agent, Bahrain, expresses the opinion that Bin Saud does not consider that the settlement he has made with the Turks is due to our friendly representations. The Amir, he thinks, prides himself on behaving skilfully played the British off against Turkey and, by causing Turkey to imagine that he was considering the advisability of applying for British protection and guidance, extracted better terms than he would otherwise have obtained. The Political Agent, adds that, if he has guaged correctly Bin Saud's attitude of mind, the latter will certainly not consider himself beholden to us, nor that he has anything to fear from us. He proceeds "In matters concerning our interests in Al Hassa, Bin Saud will probably endeavour to steer a safe course between offending us by obstruction, and

local



388
No. 38 of 1914
British Residency and Consulate-General,
Bahrain, 12 September 1914.

From
Major A.B. Knox, D.I.W.,
O.C. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

To
The Hon'ble Lieut-Colonel Sir Percy Cox, K.C.I.B., C.S.I.,
Foreign Secretary to the Government of India,
in the Foreign and Political Department,
S. I. M. A.

Sir,

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local



local susceptibilities, (to which I would add, Turkish³⁸⁵
susceptibilities) by appearing to be subservient to our³⁸⁹
wishes." (386)

The Political Agent, Kuwait, on the other hand, relying chiefly on the opinions delivered by Shaikh Sir Mubarak bin Subah, hazards the following indications as to Bin Saud's probable attitude:

"Bin Saud's feelings towards the British are unchanged. He considers that all questions, concerning foreign traders in, or visitors to, Najd and Al Hasa, are to be settled by him alone without reference to Constantinople. This view would appear to be correct, provided that the requests of such persons are in accordance with treaty provisions, vide the communication from Hakki Pasha, detailed in Foreign Department telegram No. 428-S. dated 10th July last. It is unlikely that Bin Saud attributes his settlement with the Turkish Government to our previous efforts on his behalf, though he may perhaps be aware that the satisfactory terms he has obtained ~~from~~ are in part due to our presence in the field. The arrangement between Bin Saud and Turkey is not likely to be of long duration according to the specific expectations of the former, who is not believed here (i.e. at Kuwait) to have become a pro-Turk, to have been in the least affected ^{by the} pan-Islamic sentiments ^{of} Anwar Pasha or to have ceased to regard the interests of himself and his people as paramount".

3. It will be seen that the Bahrain and Kuwait views differ little, though the latter is slightly more pro-English and anti-Turkish than the former. This is only natural as tinged with that violent hatred of the Turk which is so marked a characteristic of the Shaikh of Kuwait. My personal opinion inclines to the Kuwait view, and I look upon a reconciliation of Turkish and Najd interests as impossible. Whether it will be more easy to reconcile British and Najd interests is to my mind unfortunately almost as doubtful. The first rock on which we shall split will be

Qatar



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tople. This view would appear to be correct, provided
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treaty provisions, vide the communication from Haki Pasha,
dated in Foreign Department telegram No. 408-2, dated
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differ little, though the latter is slightly more pro-
British and anti-Turkish than the former. This is only
natural as linked with that violent hatred of the Turk
which is so marked a characteristic of the Sheikh of Kuwait.
My personal opinion inclines to the Kuwait view, and I look
upon a reconciliation of Turkish and Najd interests as im-
possible. Whether it will be more easy to reconcile British
and Najd interests is to my mind unfortunately almost as
doubtful. The first rock on which we shall split will be



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181
Qatar and the Qatar problem appears to me as insistent as any we have to deal with for the moment on the Arabian shores of the Gulf. It is not, however, easy to see how leisure can be found just now to deal with this petty but intricate problem. Fortunately up to the present, no confirmation has been received of the rumour reported under the heading "Qatar" in Bushire summary for the period ending with the 31st August; and it may, therefore, I hope be discredited. There is no doubt that the death of Shaikh Abdullah bin Jasim would but add to the difficulties of a solution.

4. While I have no wish to appear to run counter to the policy declared from home of not adding to Turkey's difficulties nor of running the risk of severing Arabia from the Empire, I cannot refrain from pointing out the danger of leaving Bin Saud and the Shaikh of Qatar entirely to their own devices, a policy which, it seems to me, can only result - and at no distant date - in our being presented with a "fait accompli" in the annexation of Qatar. ~~to the~~
5. ~~From~~ From Qatar to the Trucial Coast is but a step and, however difficult it may be to keep Bin Saud out of Qatar, it will be doubly difficult to turn him out of Qatar once he is there, and such an undertaking would undoubtedly embitter our relations with him permanently and would, therefore, be greatly to be regretted.

6. The present turn of affairs in Europe, so favourable to the Slavs and so destructive of German influence, to which the young Turk party have recently been looking as their strongest support against the hostile elements which they imagine - not without reason - to threaten them, encourage me to hope that a strong reversion to Anglophile feeling may be the next feature of Turkish policy. It might, therefore, be possible, even at some risk of exciting Turkish suspicion, to proceed quietly with our settled policy in the Persian Gulf of preserving, so far as is humanly possible, the status quo and therefore the independence

ence



Qatar and the Qatar problem appears to me as insistent as
any we have to deal with for the moment on the Arabian
shores of the Gulf. It is not, however, easy to see how
reliefs can be found just now to deal with this petty but
intricate problem. Fortunately up to the present, no con-
firmation has been received of the rumour reported under
the heading "Qatar" in Russia's summary for the period ending
with the last August; and it may, therefore, I hope be dis-
credited. There is no doubt that the death of Sheikh Ab-
dullah bin Jassid would add to the difficulties of a
solution.

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policy declared from home of not adding to Turkey's diffi-
culties nor of running the risk of severing Arabia from the
Empire, I cannot refrain from pointing out the danger of
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own devices, a policy which, it seems to me, can only
result - and at no distant date - in our being presented
with a "fait accompli" in the annexation of Qatar. It
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however difficult it may be to keep Bin Saud out of Qatar,
it will be doubly difficult to turn him out of Qatar once
he is there, and such an undertaking would undoubtedly ex-
acerbate our relations with him permanently and would, there-
fore, be greatly to be regretted.

5. The present turn of affairs in Europe, so favourable
to the Axis and so destructive of German influence, to
which the young Turk party have recently been looking as
their strongest support against the hostile elements which
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might, therefore, be possible, even at some risk of exci-
ting Turkish suspicion, to proceed quietly with our settled
policy in the Persian Gulf of preserving, so far as is
humanly possible, the status quo and therefore the independ-



387
391
ence of Qatar. In this policy, it is of course needless to remark, no hostility to Turkey finds a place.

7. I therefore make bold to solicit the permission of Government to proceed with the steps advocated in correspondence ending with my No.Cf.52 dated 21st July last, and also that the Political Agent, Bahrain, may be directed discreetly to pursue the policy of keeping in touch with events in Al Hasa and Bin Saud's subordinates in that province. It is even worthy of consideration, I venture to suggest, whether a warning might not be addressed to the Amir implying that Government had seen with much concern that there were discussions in the family of the late Shaikh Jasim bin Abdullah bin Thani; that the new Shaikh, Abdullah, the eldest son and lawful heir of the late Shaikh, had, in accordance with universal custom, succeeded to the Shaikhdom; that his maintenance in that position and the independence of the Shaikh of Qatar were objects of their solicitude and that they hoped that any malcontents of his family who were shortsighted enough not to perceive that their true interests lay in the enhancement of the dignity and position of the head of their family, would receive no encouragement at the hands of the Amir or from his officials.

8. I hope that a letter on these lines would make the Amir pause and that such a communication, combined with closer relations on our part with the Bin Thani family, would go far to prevent a break in the friendly relations with Bin Saud which must, for some time - and we may hope permanently - form the cardinal feature in our policy in that quarter of the Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,



Sd/- S.G.Knox, Major,


Offg. Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.



34
188

ence of Qatar. In this policy, it is of course necessary
to remain, no hostility to Turkey finds a place.
V. I therefore make bold to solicit the permission of
Government to proceed with the steps advocated in corres-
pondence ending with my No. 67.32 dated 21st July last, and
also that the Political Agent, Bahrain, may be directed
directly to pursue the policy of keeping in touch with
events in Al Hasa and Bin Saud's subordinates in that pro-
vince. It is even worthy of consideration, I venture to
suggest, whether a warning might not be addressed to the
Amir implying that Government had seen with much concern
that there were discussions in the family of the late Sheikh
Jasim bin Abdullah bin Thani; that the new Sheikh, Abdullah,
the eldest son and lawful heir of the late Sheikh, had, in
accordance with universal custom, succeeded to the Sheikh-
dom; that his maintenance in that position and the inde-
pendence of the Sheikh of Qatar were objects of their
solicitude and that they hoped that any malcontents of his
family who were disappointed enough not to perceive that
their true interests lay in the enhancement of the dignity
and position of the head of their family, would receive an
encouragement at the hands of the Amir or from his offi-
cials.
B. I hope that a letter on these lines would make the
Amir pause and that such a communication, occasioned with
closer relations on our part with the Bin Thani family,
would go far to prevent a break in the friendly relations
with Bin Saud which must, for some time - and we may hope
permanently - form the cardinal feature in our policy in
that quarter of the Persian Gulf.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
Sd/- S.G. Knox,
Major,
Officer Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.







389
(340) 393

Extract from the Basrah News paper "Sada-ad-Bastur"
no.69-42 dated 1st shawwal 1332 (=23rd August 1914).

Dignity of supreme Ministership.

The august dignity of supreme ^{the} Ministership has been conferred upon His Excellency the great Amir Abdul Aziz Pasha-as-Saud, Governor-General of Najd and its Commandant, in return for his sincere loyalty and his attachment to the Ottoman throne. This is a copy of the telegram sent to His Excellency by the Minister for Interior:-

The Sublime Porte,

no.8285.

To


Abdul Aziz Pasha bin Saud.

Governor-General of Najd and its Commandant.

In consideration of your loyalty to the illustrious Government and your great attachment to the High Caliphate, an august irade has been issued directing that a supreme ministership may be conferred upon Your Excellency and the Royal firman, which was issued in regard to your appointment as Governor-General of Najd and its Commandant, has been despatched several days ago through Javid Pasha, Governor-General of Baghdad.

We congratulate you for this royal favour which has been conferred upon you and we expect from your high-mindedness that desirable result will be obtained and that peace and order will be established amongst the people and justice be administered in accordance with the principles of the Ottoman Government, which is the only refuge of the Muslims throughout the world; and that this will lead to prayers being given up for the great Caliph and ensure for you the continuance of the royal favour.

dated 24th Ramzan 1332 (17-8-14).
Sd/- Javid. Minister for Finance and Acting
Minister for Interior.





Kornit Bin Saud?

390
(391) 394

From

Lt. Col: Sir P.Z Cox, K.C.I.E., C.S.I
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf

To

The Secretary to the Government of India
in the Foreign and Political Department
Delhi.

Dated, Basrah, the 12th January 1915.

Sir,

In continuation of my letter dated, Kurnah, the
9th January, I have the honour to enclose, for the in-
formation of the Government of India, a translation of
dated 28th November 1914. the marginally cited
letter which has since reached me from Ibn Saud.


I have the honour to be

Sir

Your most obedient servant

(s'd) P.Z. Cox
~~P.Z. Cox~~

Lt: Col:
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.





(391) 391 395

Translation of a letter dated the 9th Muharram
1333 (28th November 1914) from Amir Abdul Aziz bin
Abdur Rahman bin Faisal to the Political Resident in
the Persian Gulf and H.B.M.'s Consul-General, Bushire.

After compliments and enquiries after your health.

We have received your august communication dated
the 14th Dhil Hijjah 1332 (3rd November 1914) in which
you state that your honour has already mentioned in
your previous letter that the exalted Government of
Great Britain has declared war against the Ottoman
Government and that you have been ordered by the illus-
trious Government to invite us to co-operate with the
Shaikh of Muhammarah and the Ruler of Kuwait -- our
cordial friends and sincere allies -- and attack
Basrah and liberate it from the Ottoman Government, or
come to Basrah and prevent any reinforcements reaching
it or Qurnah, until the British troops arrive to seize
the place; and you mention the liberation of Basrah and
its severance from the Turkish dominions, which is one
of our chief objects, in this connection, and ask ~~us~~ us
to prevent plundering of goods belonging to the British
merchants in the town of Basrah and its neighbourhood
and to protect them from damages and turn out the
Turkish troops from Al Hasa and Qatif and banish them
from our town. The co-operation with the above-mention-
ed two friends is incumbent on us (and so it is for us
to) use our good offices with our friends, the illustri-
ous Government, in all useful actions which may be re-
quired by her. And I am using my endeavours and efforts
in furthering the common interests of all friends. You
should rest fully assured and be confident in this
question.

I am one of the greatest helpers to the Government
of Great Britain and she will, God willing, obtain



Translation of a letter dated the 28th November
1833 (28th November 1814) from Amir Abdul Aziz bin
Abdur Rahman bin Faisal to the Political Resident in
the Persian Gulf and N.E.M.'s Consul-General, Basrah.

After compliments and enquiries after your health,
to have received your kind communication dated
the 14th (11th) 1233 (3rd November 1814) in which
you state that your honour has already mentioned in
your previous letter that the exalted Government of
Great Britain has declared war against the Ottoman
Government and that you have been ordered by the
British Government to invite us to co-operate with the
Shah of Khwarizm and the ruler of Khorasan -- our
cordial friends and sincere allies -- and attack
Basrah and liberate it from the Ottoman Government, of
course to Basrah and prevent any reinforcements reaching
it or Basrah, until the British troops arrive to relieve
the place; and you mention the liberation of Basrah and
its severance from the Turkish dominions, which is one
of our chief objects in this connection, and ask us to
prevent plundering of goods belonging to the British
merchants in the town of Basrah and its neighbourhood
and to protect them from damage and turn out the
Turkish troops from Al Basrah and Qatif and banish them
from our town. The co-operation with the above-mentioned
two friends is incumbent on us (and so it is for us
to use our good offices with our friends, the illustrious
our Government, in all useful actions which may be re-
quired by her. And I am using my endeavours and efforts
in furthering the common interests of all friends. You
should rest fully assured and be confident in this
question.

I am one of the greatest helpers to the Government
of Great Britain and she will, God willing, obtain



392 392 396
satisfactory results as we have mentioned to our mutual friend, Captain Shakespear. As to the Ottoman soldiers, we did not allow a single one of them to remain (in these parts) after our occupation ~~of~~ and have turned them all out.

But as to the following three matters mentioned by you, namely, the promise of the exalted Government to protect and safeguard us against the Ottoman Government by affording us her assistance and her future protection (to us) against any attack and hostility which may be made by sea, her recognition of the independence of my chiefship on all the parts of Nejd, Al Hasa and Qatif, and the conclusion of treaties between us, will depend on our arrival at Kuwait. I am leaving my headquarters on this date and am bound for Kuwait and we will make the necessary verbal negotiations in order that we may earn the approval of our friend, the Government of Great Britain. I hope you will continue to entertain sincere friendliness by delighting my mind with the news of your welfare and of the conditions of the British Government.

This is what was to be stated and may you ever be successful.


*In later papers reference
may be made to the
War files I and III*


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393 394
satisfactory results as we have mentioned to our
mutual friend, Captain Shakespear. As to the Ottoman
soldiers, we did not allow a single one of them to
remain (in these parts) after our occupation and
have turned them all out.
But as to the following three matters mentioned
by you, namely, the promise of the exiled Government
to protect and safeguard us against the Ottoman
Government by affording us her assistance and her
future protection (to us) against any attack and
hostility which may be made by her, her recognition
of the independence of my chieftainship on all the parts
of Nejd, Al Hasa and 'Asir, and the conclusion of
treaties between us, will depend on our arrival at
Kuwait. I am leaving my headquarters on this date
and am bound for Kuwait and we will make the neces-
sary verbal negotiations in order that we may earn
the approval of our friend, the Government of Great
Britain. I hope you will continue to entertain
sincere friendliness by delighting my mind with the
news of your welfare and of the conditions of the
British Government.
This is what was to be stated and may you ever be
successful.

For later reference
may be made to
the file I am in
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


394 398
395
Translation of a letter dated 13th Shawal 1332 from Bin Saud
to Shaikh Jabir bin Mubarak, Ruler of Kuwait.

After compliments,

My brother you know that this world is a house of pride
although a man lives happily in his vanity and only the good deed
remains with God and nothing but the truth rises in the world and
you know from us I hope the families of al Saud and al Sabah
and are one family and cannot be separated by the world which se-
-parates others and moreover God brought us together and nothing
is hidden from your connections between us and your father and
yourself and only love excels love and unity, unity.


Then from the date of Al Bakariya to the death of your father
and you remember what happened to us from several matters that
came over us both known and secret and the proofs are known and of
course you got our letters and we yours nor do we consider diffi-
cult what comes from you, : we only think it a sign of firm friend-
ship and so it is and the death of Mubarak - God have mercy on
him - nor did it enter into our mind nor did we hope but that our
connections would be the stronger as we are both aware and the ~~facts~~
facts were opposite that, but God knows there is no help for it
but you account us as a hair on the skin of a wolf (enemies) and
I find no cause for it. No secret known to God is hidden from you
nor what the world could know - unless as the Proverb says "You
did me wrong and were estranged from me". I did not discover why
on the day we were slaughtered by Ibn Rashid we did not receive
from you the reinforcements we hoped for, oh/friends, and in place
of reinforcements we got only hard words in Mubarak's letters,
on account of the Ajman. Then I sent Nasir bin Saud asking pardon
and time, for I did ^{not} make a demand opposed to yours except for the
camels of the Umtair which they returned and on the day that Nasir
came Mubarak compelled him to go to the Ajman and the day he went
he found them at dinner. The man Dhaidan rose up and said Wel-
-come ! the property of the long-necked one your master, ^{Bin} Saud
He is so and so, and the fellow Sanad came and told me when I was
in





296 395 399
in Washam. I was angry and made peace with Bin Rashid but the
people of Nejd cried against me and I refused to cause you anger,
Oh Jabir - I came down and did not listen to the people of Nejd
and the day I entered Hasa the Ajman came and fell upon me and
Saad came to me and, thinking that he had come from you, I enquired
of him and when ~~he~~ replied that whatever they take in fighting
from other tribes I could take back excepting Bin Subah's which
they would ret~~ain~~ without paying for it, I at once attacked them ~~and~~
and a fierce fight ensued but Mahomed is stronger than any of us.
In the fight the dearest and the bravest Shaikh Saad was killed.
Whatever happened has happened to me, and whatever ^{was} lost has been
lost but by God's help I dispersed them and they did not take to ~~their~~
heels until they saw that they were completely defeated. After
all these troubles and fighting which I had with them they came to
you and you accepted and harboured them in your country and more-
over you allowed them to sell the looted donkeys and property of
the Hasa people at Koweit. When I came to Awaini Nejd people,
Bedouin and others, gathered round me but in spite of all this I
was ashamed to leave your flag. When your father died I left the
flag and proceeded and God has cursed and scattered the Ajman and I
trust that He will still make them go from bad to worse and as
long as I am after them they will never prosper and I am like a
poison to them, wherever I can touch them, they be killed. Now
I ~~am~~ sending a rider in the person of Bin Isbadiyah Nash to find
out the proper news of ourselves. Really when I heard that Bin
Rashid was coming I was afraid that these dirty lot (the Ajman)
would induce him to loot your animals and I advised you to keep
them with my Arabs. They would be safer with them than with your
men whom you were gathering for nothing. But instead of doing
this you, on the contrary, told the people that Bin Saud was try-
ing to take your animals: when I heard this, I was really surprised
and thought it best to leave your animals where they were. Oh ^{father of}
Ahmed ! I do not write you this letter ^{nor am} ~~and~~ sending my men with it
in fear or with the expectation of getting anything from you but
because he will be able to explain to you better than my writing.
The news which I have received has come to me from friends and
enemies but I do not take any interest in it nor ^{do} I believe that

I






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I hear, because my conscience is clean and you must remember and be sure that if I do anything, it is for your welfare and interest and be sure, whenever you are in difficulties or troubles, I am ready to help you in any way and you must reckon me as closer to you than the sword which is in your hand. I do not believe all ^{what} I have heard though there must be some truth in it, we will take it in another light and leave it alone, and I have especially written this letter because I have heard that the Ajman are at Safwan and that they intend coming on your side to join your tribes. You know dear brother that this affair will cause ^{on} great trouble between us and loss ^{on} both the sides. I am compelled to inform you this and you can do whatever you like as you do not seem to understand what sort of people the Ajman are. I hope I will get a chance to exterminate them altogether. There is no doubt about the truth of this report because they were seen with some of your tribes. The Ajman will probably attack my tribes and the latter in the course of the fight might cause some damage to your men who are with their enemies. I fear this will cause enmity between us and my tribes will probably loot the property of ~~of~~ the Ajman who are with your men and when any of my men come to Koweit you will probably imprison and punish them. I do not wish that such a ~~thing~~ thing should happen and that my men should be punished for the sake of Ajman.

What I really think and what my desires are that all these troubles should be avoided and no changes or any modifications ^{be} made in our present relations as you know full well ~~that~~ all who are our friends, first ~~is~~ God, and then we are their supporters and I would like to warn you of the consequences. God is above. I do not mean all this my only idea is to preserve our friendship for ever and to look after the interest of our Mussalman brethren in general and hope God will help in ^{furthering} ~~progressing~~ our religion. All further news and information you will no doubt hear from your servant El Rabahi.






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
Translation of a letter dated 2nd Zilkada 1334 - 1st September
1916 from Shaikh Jabir bin Mubarak to Bin Saud, Ruler of Nejd.

After compliments,

I received your letter in which you mention that from the time of Bakaria up to the present you always take interest in our well-fare. I think this should be so for our mutual benefit. The Proverb says the talk of the past affairs will trouble the mind, so dear brother if we have done a good turn it is no praise or honour for we consider our property is yours and yours as ours and whatever you do is to our benefit and whatever we do is to yours. Dear brother trust in God and be sure that we are still brothers in the strict sense of the word. You, Abdur Rahman, has specially stated that we have forgotten the past and have become very mean and proud. Dear brother we have ^{not} up to now harmed outsiders and do you ~~expect~~ think we will do to you, but what can we say ~~the~~ father of Turki (Bu Turki) if you take matters in that light. However you must remove these suspicions from your mind and by God we are as what we were before. You have said that we are trying to shelter and harbour the Ajman. Such a thought never came in our minds and that is because they are your enemies. You must be sure that whoever is your enemy whether the Ajman or mightier than the Ajman we will not have anything to do with him.

Your man Rabahi told us that you wish that we should send a special man from us. As desired we are sending Saif al Atigi with Haza who will please you. Dear brother we have no enmity between us and our tribes can come and go openly. The love is in our hearts this is sufficient and further information will be given to you verbally by our servant Saif al Atigi and your man Rabahi.





No. 10/107

398 402

Chief Political Office,
Basrah, 5th October 1916.

D.P.R., Bushire.

P.A., Koweit. ✓

P.A., Bahrain.

Forwarded for information.


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[Signature]

Captain,
Dy. Chief Political Officer.

Translation of a letter from Bin Saud to Sir Percy Cox,
dated 3rd September 1916.





399 403
(400)

Translation of a letter from Ibn Saud to Sir Percy Cox dated
3rd September 1916.

After Compliments.

With a cordial and respectful hand I have received your letter dated the 15th July 1916 -14th Ramzan 1334 and was pleased to hear of your good health. All that Your Honour communicated to me has been understood by your sincere friend.

The August letter of His Excellency Lord Chelmsford, the new Viceroy and Governor General of India, which Your Honour enclosed together with the Arabic translation thereof has reached me safely. I thank you very much. I am greatly obliged and thankful for its highly valued contents. I pray God that His Excellency's footsteps may be blessed with good fortune and prosperity.

I beg to represent to you that I was tardy in answering His Excellency's auspicious letter. As owing to my not being acquainted with your ceremonial customs I was not sure whether I should answer at once or after a short while, and owing to my intimacy with Your Honour I was anxious to obtain your advice on the point.

Your Honour informed me with regard to events and news in a previous letter despatched through His Majesty's Consul at Bahrain, all of which news I have understood thoroughly. Your Honour also stated with reference to news from the Hejaz that El Idrisi, assisted by the Sherif, had captured the town of Kufudah, one of the ports of the Red Sea, with its citadel and the troops there. This is very likely true because the Idrisi has been disobedient to the orders of the Turks from the beginning, and according to what I have heard, his ideas are sound and he is zealous, both for the Arabs and for Islam: and truly one who possesses zeal for the Arabs and for Islam is bound to fight the Turks.

You went on to inform me that the newspaper Al Muk-
attam



344 P. 2
1000
Translation of a letter from Ibn Saud to Sir Percy Cox dated
2nd September 1914.

After completion
with a cordial and respectful hand I have received your
letter dated the 12th July 1914 - 14th Ramadhan 1334 and was
pleased to hear of your good health. All that your Honour
communicated to me has been understood by your sincere friend.
The August letter of His Excellency Lord Chelmsford,
the new Viceroy and Governor General of India, which your
Honour enclosed together with the Arabic translation thereof
has reached me safely. I thank you very much. I am greatly
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your advice on the point.

Your Honour informed me with regard to events and
news in a previous letter despatched through His Majesty's
Consul at Bahrain, all of which news I have understood through-
ly. Your Honour also stated with reference to news from the
Hejaz that El Ibrahim, assisted by the Sherif, had captured the
town of Khatibah, one of the ports of the Red Sea, with its
alibah and the troops there. This is very likely true because
the Ibrahim has been disordered to the orders of the Turks
from the beginning, and according to what I have heard, his
ideas are sound and he is serious, both for the Arabs and for
Islam; and truly one who possesses zeal for the Arabs and for
Islam is bound to fight the Turks.

You went on to inform me that the newspaper Al Nakh-
lah



400 404 (401)

Mukattim had reported that the Arabs from Medina to Damascus were backing the Sherif, but you said you had not yet received official news to that effect.

With regard to the news of the Sherif at al Medina, the latest reached me on the 15th Shawal = 15th August. It was to the effect that about 7000 Infantry and Cavalry had arrived at Medina and that immediately on arrival they had come into conflict with the sons of the Sherif and that a skirmish had taken place at long range at a place about 4 hours to the south of Medina. After that the Turks had become superior to the sons of the Sherif in numbers and strength and consequently the latter had had to fall back to a place called Rabigh, on the coast of the Red Sea, between Mecca and Medina.

With regard to the fighting among the tribesmen of the Hejaz, whose country and habitat extends from Medina to Jeddah and Yemboe, they have become separated into two divisions: the Beni Salim and Faddah are siding with the Turks but the Nasrui are with the sons of the Sherif.

On their return after the skirmish that took place between them and the sons of the Sherif, the Turks attacked Awali (a town near Medina which has considerable date gardens belonging to a tribe called the Beni Ali who had been siding with the sons of the Sherif in revolt against the Turks) and bombarded the town, plundered it, outraged the people and perpetrated many iniquities upon them.

A Sherif has now been created at Constantinople who is named Hydar. They claim that he is a new Amir for Mecca. There arrived with him a deputation and some troops and on their arrival at Medina they committed barbarous acts against the townspeople, imprisoning and hanging them. No one who possesses zeal for Islam and Arab patriotism can tolerate such things. This is the latest news received from Medina.

At this moment while writing, I have received news

that



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W
Hutchinson had reported that the Arabs from Medina to Damascus
were backing the Sherif, but you said you had not yet received
official news to that effect.

With regard to the news of the Sherif at al Medina,
the latest reached me on the 15th August - 15th August. It was
to the effect that about 7000 Infantry and Cavalry had arrived
at Medina and that immediately on arrival they had come into
conflict with the sons of the Sherif and that a skirmish had
taken place at long range at a place about 4 hours to the
south of Medina. After that the Turks had become superior in
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if the latter had had to fall back to a place called Rabiha, on
the coast of the Red Sea, between Mecca and Medina.

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is named Hydar. They claim that he is a new Amir for Mecca.
There arrived with him a detachment and some troops and on
their arrival at Medina they committed barbarous acts
against the townspeople, torturing and burning them. No one
who possesses real for Islam and Arab patriotism can tolerate
such things. This is the latest news received from Medina.

At this moment while writing, I have received news
that



402
401 405

that on account of what the Turks perpetrated at Awali and against the townsmen of Medina, the Harb (Beni Salim) and the Al Fahdah, who had previously sided with the Turks came to an understanding with the Masruh who are co-operating with the sons of the Sherif, and all of them joined forces and became one. They ambushed the Turks and cut their communications in and out of Medina, on account of the Turks brutal proceedings. My informant also alleges that the Harb sent to the sons of the Sherif asking them to advance towards Medina and the surrounding places with a view to cutting communications with the town and destroying the Railway. This is the news which reaches me while writing, but God knows whether it is true. Inshallah, I shall inform you when it is confirmed. According to what we learn about the doings of the Turks, their oppression and tyranny of any one who comes that within their reach is such that it is clear and certain that they will never set their affairs aright and will never succeed.

Then Your Honour spoke to me regarding Bin Rashid. I have just heard news of his arrival at his dwelling place Hail. Thank God he is certainly in evil plight. With reference to your hope that you would hear soon about the doings of my men in that direction, I have explained to Your Honour in my previous letter the primary difficulty. Now I beg to inform you that the difficulty in the way of attacking Bin Rashid in the neighbourhood of Hail at present is not due to any strength in him which prevents it, nor to any weakness in me or my forces, but it arises from political reasons which make it ex inexpedient to force hostilities on them (sic) at present. But whether it be a question of fighting with Bin Rashid or other Arabs in enmity with the British Government or of co-operation and assistance to people like the Sherif (problems concerning us in our dealings



1019/402
that on account of what the Turks perpetrated at Mecca and
against the townsmen of Medina, the Arabs (Bedouins) and
the Al Fakhrah, who had previously sided with the Turks came
to an understanding with the British who are co-operating
with the sons of the Sherif, and all of them joined forces
and became one. They surrounded the Turks and cut their
communications in and out of Medina, on account of the Turks
being in the neighbourhood. My informant also alleges that the Turks
sent to the sons of the Sherif asking them to advance
towards Medina and the surrounding places with a view to
cutting communications with the town and destroying the
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God knows whether it is true. I shall inform you
when it is confirmed. According to what we learn about the
doings of the Turks, their oppression and tyranny of any one
who comes into their reach is such that it is clear
and certain that they will never get their effective rights
and will never succeed.

Then your honour spoke to me regarding Bin Fakhrah.
I have just heard news of his arrival at his dwelling place
Hail. Thank God he is certainly in evil plight. With
reference to your hope that you would hear soon about the
details of my man in that direction, I have explained to your
honour in my previous letter the primary difficulty. Now I
beg to inform you that the difficulty in the way of
attaching Bin Fakhrah in the neighbourhood of Hail at present
is not due to any strength in him which prevents it, nor to
any weakness in me or my forces, but it arises from political
reasons which make it unexpedient to force hostilities on
them (also) at present. But whether it be a question of
fighting with Bin Fakhrah or other Arabs in unity with the
British Government or of co-operation and assistance to
people like the Sherif (problems concerning us in our
dealings



(403) 402
406

dealings with one another and affected by our individual views and interests) it is evident and well known to Your Honour that none of us will let an opportunity pass which will benefit us against the enemy, and that the reason for abstention from action is that we are watching for such an opportunity as please God, will secure a successful issue. If, however, the case is otherwise, and if you discern in the matter anything conducive to my interests and yours there is no doubt that I will not, Inshallah deviate from your opinion or your point of view, after consultation between us, either in writing or by confidential messenger, or other might be a meeting between me and Your Honour at any place you please, so that we could exchange views on the subject. That is what I should like best, for there are necessarily many matters in one's mind which affect the interests of both parties.

If you so order it and if you think it advisable that we should have a meeting, you must give me sufficient notice to enable a meeting to be arranged. I will await a reply to this letter and the receipt of your instructions.

Inshallah, you will inform me of good and gratifying news of the victories of the Great Government in Iraq and elsewhere. It is ever our hope that your friendship with me will be perpetual.

In conclusion I wish you good health and prosperity
May you be preserved etc.

4-10-16.



403
403

decisions with one another and affected by our individual
views and interests) it is evident and well known to your
Honour that none of us will let an opportunity pass which will
enable us against the enemy, and that the reason for abstain-
ing from action is that we are watching for such an
opportunity as please God, will secure a successful issue. If,
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matter anything conducive to my interests and yours there is
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on your point of view, after consultation between us, either
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meeting between me and your Honour at any place you please,
so that we could exchange views on the subject. That is what
I should like best, for there are necessarily many matters
in and of themselves which affect the interests of both parties.
If you so order it and if you think it advisable
that we should have a meeting, you must give me sufficient
notice to enable a meeting to be arranged. I will await a
reply to this letter and the receipt of your instructions.
Inshallah, you will inform me of good and profitable
news of the restoration of the Great Government in Iraq and
elsewhere. It is ever our hope that your friendship with me
will be perpetual.

In conclusion I wish you good health and prosperity
May you be preserved etc.

4-10-18.



403

407

Telegram R.

From - Political, Basrah.

To - P.A. Bahrain.

No. 6883.

Dated 15th December 1916.

H.T. Bamora leaves Basrah for Baharain via Bushire
December 20th taking 4 maxims complete 500.303 M.L.E rifles
xx 260000 cartridges consigned to you for transmission to Bin
Saud. Details by post. 2000 M.L.E carbines will be sent to you
direct from India for same destination.

Political.

No. 14818
63/3

Chief Political Office,
Basrah, 15th December 1916.

✓ D.P.R. Bushire.
P.A. Koweit.


Copy forwarded for information.




Am
Captain,
Dy. Chief Political Officer.

*The material has
arrived and is
being shipped
to Bin Saud's
agent*
27.12.16

RC
251





File with
Bin Saud's file.

404

HONORABLE POLITICAL AGENCY
RECEIPT
No. 57
Date 8-1-17
408

Telegram No. 177. D. 7 Dec 17


Re, From Political, Basra -
8/1/17

Have my reports reached you as to
result Bin Saud's letter to Ajami!

Reply -

Your Telegram No. 177 Dec 27.

No - Hamilton



405 409 (406)

22

17/12-


السلامة من الرصاص


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
به عبد العزيز بن عبد الله بن فيصل الخطاب لا اله الا الله محمد رسول الله
 عن نفق الخياط الكرم والوالد رفاهية المذبح السليم وعنا وما اكرم خير سيدنا وصونا العقبان
 نساله وفي وصونا القطيف قدما احبا بكم تفراف عنيده مجابح حصة بي جي لادن قنصل الدولة الكويتية
 بالبحرين واذن للغاية منوها من جبابكم واشكر ما عيده المحبة وما ابدتني معنائه الصداقة والمجبة وهما زارني
 مترجيب اليكم ثم جودكم بودتكم والتقالا جبار سلاطنتكم وتعدون بطيعة لنا كتابا الرضة مجابح احكام سياسي
 سر برين حول لوكي نربطنا تغدونه لحضرة والباري خفيكم مورث ١٤١٢ هـ

From Ben: Sand.

Request - Send 2 wires to
Bahmani about his departure









407 411 (408)
Dated 30th January 1915.

To

Ajaimi Beg El Sadeon,


After Compliments.


I have thought it expedient to write you this letter in order to obviate any misunderstanding.

When the British troops occupied Basrah in November last and you retired from Zubair messages were received from you through friends of yours here, namely through Mr. Van Ess and Bait Wakil and through Ahmed Pasha Sana to the effect that you now wished to enter into relations with the Great British Government and to have a meeting with me. In each case I replied that the British Government had no quarrel with the Arabs of Iraq or with their Sheikhs so long as they wished to have friendly relations with the British that, on the contrary, the British Government wished to be good friends to the Arabs and under them immune from Turkish oppression.

I added that I was quite ready to have a meeting with you and that you were free to come in to Basrah and see me, but that, if as your friends explained, it might be difficult for you to come in to Basrah, I was ready to meet you at any convenient rendezvous.

You made no response, however, to those messages. Then later your friend, Muhammad Asaimi, came to see me and I received him in a friendly way and he brought a note purporting to come from you in which you invited me to commit anything I had to say, to him. I gave him the same reply as that mentioned above and added that though you had not pursued your overtures, I was still ready on hearing from you in writing, to have a meeting with you to discuss your affairs and the intentions of Government. Now the time is slipping away and it has become necessary for the British authorities to conclude that those of the Sheikhs of the Basrah Vilayet who have not used their opportunities to come to a friendly understanding with the British Government have no wish for friendly relations





408 4/12

relations with them, but desire to show hostility. We must then (409)
treat them and their property accordingly.


In order that you may fully understand the position, and that you may not when it is too late say that there was a misunderstanding, I have thought it well to explain this and give you this further opportunity of meeting me and saying anything you have to say and of hearing my views as the representative of the Government.

If you wish to avail yourself of this opportunity and have a meeting, then I am ready to give you a / safe conduct to come to the rendezvous and go back in safety and I suggest Shaiba or Gurnah as the place. If you wish for the meeting, it should be at once and the arrangement can be made if you send me a messenger three days ahead of you. But it is necessary that a reply should reach me within one week from date of despatch of this letter.

Sd/- P.Z.Cox.

Chief Political Officer.

T.M.E.





409
413 (410)

From

Ajaimi al Mansoor.

To

Abdul Aziz ibn Saud.

Dated 17th Rabi I
11th January 1917.



A.C.


I have received your valued letter at a propitious hour with the hand of friendship and have understood all the friendly sentiments contained therein.

But about your statement regarding "your present efforts in making reference to the English in my absence, and of their acquiescence in your desires regarding myself, and your asking for my alliance with you and agreement with you and your saying that that will not be possible without a meeting; and that the object thereof is the preservation of the rights of the Arab race and that we have taken up an attitude of disaffection which is baneful to the Arab race."

Oh my honoured brother! It is known to me and is beyond doubt that my attitude is the one which is necessary in order to earn the approval of the Most High God and the elevation of the name of the Arabs, by the discharge of loyalty; and what greater loyalty is there than this, that I should carry out faithfully what God ordered me in his unchangeable book in regard to Jihad against non-believers, the enemies of God and of our religion. The "blame of the blamer" cannot apply to me, who walk in the love of God and his prophet and of our country, and in the protection thereof from the pollution of the Infidel.

I had great hope, from your piety and your Arabic zeal, that you would approve my opinion and my action for the enhancement of the name of the Arabs in this my attitude; and this is not disaffection by the grace of God. Rather it is a simple attitude, for if the Turkish Government be a protection to the purity of Islam, it is my help and the helper of





410 414 (411)


my tribes with an around me. And verily I am an absolute ruler by the order of God and the Government, and according to my conviction and belief I am walking in the true path which pleases God and the Arab race, with constant and unremitting attention, and that is the spirit of Islam. This is the position and I finish what I have to say by quoting the word of God (Who has said) "you cannot direct to the right path whom you like; it is God who directs whom He wishes".


If I had given any promise to them in the past, or afterwards, I should have been bound to carry out my promise. But I gave undertaking for the service of my religion and my Government and my zeal, and it was incumbent on me to act according to my real honour, and therefore it is not proper for me to release myself from what was demanded by my said religion and zeal and honour. The great God is the best of helpers and co-operators, and if you argue on the score of religion, then the discharge of my duty should be according to the promise which I previously gave to my Government and that is the first attribute of the Arabs.


This is what had to be explained.

Sd/- Ajaimi Saadoon.

T.M.V.









412 (413)
416

From

The Hon'ble Lt.Col.Sir P.Z.Cox, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E
Political Resident and Chief Political Officer.

To


H.E. the Amir Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman al Faisal.
Hakim of Nejd etc.

A/c.

I now take up the pen to write to Your Excellency on a number of subjects which need communication between us, but in the first place I must express my great - pleasure in hearing via Bahrain firstly that you recovered from the fever which overtook you on your return journey from Katif, and secondly of your departure from your capital of Riyadh on 24th January (Rabial Awwal 29th) with your troops in the direction of Qasim. I hope that before you started you had received the news which I asked the Political Agent Bahrain by telegraph to send to the effect that Government had been pleased to accept the recommendations which I made in regard to the assistance to be rendered to Your Excellency in the matter of arms and ammunition and funds.

Soon after sending you my letter of 23rd January I received your welcome letters of 14th Safar (10th Decr) written from Qair, and later I received those of 22nd Safar (18th December)

The letter which you enclosed to the address of His Excellency the Viceroy of India was duly received and sent on to India, and I thank you very much for the kind reference which you made to your friend and officers of the Military Administration. As you know, apart from the personal regard which I have for Your Excellency, we
are





413 417 (414)


are all ~~now~~ merely the instruments of our Government & endeavour to act as we know they would wish.

I will only deal with one important matter in the body of this letter and that is your own present plans. The other matters which need mention I will deal with in separate sheets.

As mentioned above, my last news of your honour's movements is that received from Bahrain to the effect that you had left Riyadh for Qasim.

I will now tell you what the position is and in what way we hope you will be ^{able} to co-operate in our common interests.

On the Tigris we have not ceased to make steady progress since you left. There has been continual trench fighting and we have now obtained possession of the junction of the Shatt-al-Charrat with the Tigris at Kut. This the whole of the right bank of the river from the Hai junction opposite Kut downwards to Shaikh Saad and so on to Basrah is in our hands. The enemy have retired up river from Kut except those in the Samiyat position on the left bank who still remain, but now that we have got possession of the river bank behind them up to the Shatt-al-Hai, their position has become very difficult.



Then on the desert side, as you know, the Railway is running to Nasiriyah and troops and supplies can all pass by rail and it makes us very strong there.

Then South of Khamisiyah our friend Sa'ud as Salim as Subhan who has been joined by the Aslam, Dhaifir and Budur and many other Shammar, is holding the Shamiyah



are all these merely the instruments of our Government &
endeavour to act as we know they would wish.
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bombardment and we have now obtained possession of
the junction of the Tigris and the Euphrates with the Tigris at
Kut. This the whole of the right bank of
the river from the Kut junction opposite
but downwards to Basra head and so on
to Basra is in our hands. The enemy have
retired up river from Kut except those
in the Baghdad position on the left
bank who still remain, but now that we have the posses-
sion of the river bank behind them up to the Tigris-
Euphrates junction their position has become very difficult.
Then on the desert side, as you know, the
railway is running to Baghdad and troops and supplies
can all pass by rail and it makes us very strong there.
Then south of Baghdad our friend Sa'ud bin
Said bin Sultan who has been joined by the Arabian, Persian
and Bedouin and many other elements, is holding the
Baghdad



4/4 418
(415)

Shamiyah between Leina and Nasiriyah and will endeavour to cut all communications between Hail or Medina and Iraq.

From the North Nawwaf Ibn Sha'lan threatens Ibn Rashid, and now your honour with your tribes and troops will be operating from Qasim and threatening him from that side.


We know (and it is also apparent from the report of the emissary Syed Muhammad bin Abdullah Ul Ufq) that the Turks are exerting great endeavours to get Ibn Rashid to move to the assistance of their troops at Medina. I myself hardly think it possible that he, Ibn Rashid will dare to leave Hail now, as he is weak and has so many enemies around him, but in any case it is clearly important to prevent him at this juncture from giving any assistance to the Turks and Your Excellency is now in an excellent position to keep him employed and to threaten him so vigorously that he will fear to leave Hail and may even have to come out towards Qasim to defend himself against you.

If you can act on these lines and prevent him moving towards Medina, while at the same ^{time} to our friends on the side endeavour to keep the ~~Hejaz~~ Hejaz Railway out north of Medina the Turkish garrison in Medina will completely isolated from assistance and supplies and will have to retire or surrender.

This is how your friend sees the matter and it is hoped that your view of the position will not be different.

Any how I shall hope to receive frequent news of your movements via Kuwait and pray God to prosper your fortunes and give you victory.

As





415 419⁽⁴¹⁵⁾

As regards the world war, there have recently been some important developments.

Firstly. The internal position of Germany has become acute and she has made proposals for peace. but there were proposals which were not sincere, and only meant that she is now exhausted with fighting and hoped to get an armistic while peace discussions were proceeding, after which she would be ready to fight again. The result was that the Allied Powers unanimously refused to listen and will not have peace except on the terms that we wish. Especially we must insist on a guarantee that Germany shall never be in a position to make such a war again. In desperation she has now begun to violate all the laws of nations and humanity more than ever, and this has so exasperated the neutral nations that even America has now severed relations with Germany and dismissed the German Ambassador.

It looks as if America would now come into the war. but as yet no hostile act has occurred and it is possible that Germany may offer such apologies and reparation that war will be averted. Any how the American people and also the Spanish Government who were before quite neutral in their feelings are now entirely in favour of our Allied Powers and will give them all possible co-operation in the way of supplies and ammunitions.

So that you will see that the prospects of the Allies are now very favourable.

I will now conclude this long letter with my best regards to Your Excellency and will touch upon the matters mentioned below on separate sheets.



As regards the world war, there have recently
been some important developments.
Firstly. The internal position of Germany has become
acute and she has made proposals for peace, but these
were proposals which were not sincere, and only meant
that she is now exhausted with fighting and hoped to
get an armistice while peace discussions were proceed-
ing, after which she would be ready to fight again.
The result was that the Allied Powers unanimously
refused to listen and will not have peace except on
the terms that we wish. Especially we must insist on
a guarantee that Germany shall never be in a position
to make such a war again. In desperation she has now
begun to violate all the laws of nations and humanity
some time ago, and this has so exaggerated the neutral
position that even America has now severed relations
with Germany and dismissed the German Ambassador.
It looks as if America would now come into the
war, but as yet no hostile act has occurred and it is
possible that Germany may offer such apologies and
reparation that war will be averted. Anyhow the
American people and also the Spanish Government who
were before quite neutral in their feelings are now
entirely in favour of our Allied Powers and will
give them all possible co-operation in the way of
supplies and munitions.
So that you will see that the prospects of the
Allies are now very favourable.
I will now conclude this long letter with my
best regards to your Excellency and will leave upon
the matters mentioned below on separate sheets.



416 420⁽⁴ⁿ⁾

I am leaving to rejoin the Army Commander almost at once and hope I shall be able to send you good news from there.

Please find enclosed a packet which our friend Shaikh Khazal asked me to have sent to you.


May you be preserved.

P.M. and C.P.O.

Matters mentioned separately.

1. Your telegram to the Sherif in reply to him and his letter signing himself "King of the Arabs".
2. Your dependents in Oman.
3. The lamented death of our friend Shaikh Jabir.
4. The question of stoppage of supplies going to the enemy.
5. The Lmmissary Saiyid Muhammad Abdullah Yamani.
6. Despatch of photographs to Your Excellency.

FM





417 421 (418)

1. The telegram to H.H. the Sheriff in reply to his message to you.

You asked me whether it was from him direct or sent through me.

These are the facts. The telegraph from here to Bahrain is as you know by wireless and on the wireless system only cypher telegrams are allowed during the war, so this telegram had to be sent to me in cypher and was sent on to Bahrain in cypher to be decyphered and sent on to Your Excellency.

The same course was followed in the case of your reply. It was received by me in cypher and sent on to High Commissioner Cairo who would have decyphered and sent on to its destination.

As regards the Sheriff signing himself "Malik el Bilad al Arabiyah", your statemanship will I know cause you to agree with me that it is not worth while at this juncture raising this question between yourself and the Sheriff. You can rest completely assured that the title which he uses or does not use has no meaning in reference to yourself. The Sheriff has given us definite assurance that he fully recognises the independence of yourself and your country and you can completely rely on our assurance and the terms of our treaty with your honour.

2. Your dependents who have claims in Oman. I have written to my Dy. Resident at Bushire and to the Shaikhs of Oman through our Agent on the Oman Coast reminding them ~~as~~ your honour is our friend and ally and that all possible co-operation is to be afforded to your dependents for the recovery of their just claims.



1. The telegram to H.H. the Sheriff in reply to his
message to you.
You asked me whether it was from his direct or sent
through me.
There are two facts. The telegram from here to
Bahrain is as you know by wireless and on the wireless
system only cipher telegrams are allowed during the war.
No plain telegram had to be sent to me in cipher and was
sent on to Bahrain in cipher to be deciphered and sent
on to your Excellency.
The same course was followed in the case of your
reply. It was received by me in cipher and sent on to
High Commissioner Cairo who would have deciphered and
sent on to its destination.
As regards the Sheriff's reply to your letter of
Bilad al Arabiyah, your Excellency will I know cannot
you to agree with me that it is not worth while at this
moment raising this question between yourself and the
Sheriff. You can rest completely assured that the title
which he uses or does not use has no meaning in refer-
ence to yourself. The Sheriff has given me definite
assurance that he fully recognises the independence of
yourself and your country and you can completely rely on
our assurance and the terms of our treaty with your
honour.
2. Your dependants who have claims in cash. I have
written to my Agent at Basrah and to the British
Agent at Basrah and the Agent on the coast of Basrah
that all your dependants are our friends and ally and that all
possible co-operation is to be afforded to your
dependants for the recovery of their just claims.



418 422 (419)


3. You will already have heard of the death after a short internal illness of our lamented friend Shaikh Jabir. We are in the hands of God and fate did not allow him to enjoy his position long. May he rest in peace. Shaikh Salim has succeeded to the Shaikhsnip without disturbance and has undertaken to fulfil all the obligations and treaties entered into by his father (may God rest him) with the British Govt.


4. Col. Hamilton has already written to your honour about the stoppage of supplies going to the enemy from Kuwait. This is as you will recognise an important and urgent matter. Poor Shaikh Jabir owing to his easy going nature and perhaps owing to his sickness was slack in this matter, but I hope Shaikh Salim will be stronger and that you will coöperate to the utmost and approve of our not letting any merchandise out of Kuwait except on passes signed by your Excellency or your Deputies. This is one important way of winning success against the enemy.


5. As regards Syed Muhammad Abdullah Yamani, many thanks to your honour for kindly sending on his letter to you for me to see.


According to my information this man was formerly the Agent of Imam Yahya in Constantinople and formed part of the Turkish mission to Bin Rashid and to Yemen, but thank God his letter to you shows that his heart was not really with the Turks and I hope we may hear that on your arrival at Qasim you were able to stop the mission from going to Yemen and to seize what they were conveying.

6. I venture to send you a set of the photographs which









No. 4157
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Chief Political Office,
Basrah, 17th March 1917.

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C.P.O., H.Q.

*
Copies submitted for information.

Atman
Captain,


Deputy Chief Political Officer.

Copy to P.A.Koweit.

* Letter dated 8-2-17 from Abdulaziz bin Abdur Rehman al
Faisal al Saud, Ruler of Najd
.. .. 8-2-17 from Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rehman
al Faisal al Saud, Ruler of Najd.



T.M.N.





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Translation of a letter dated the 15th Rabi ath Thani 1335=
8-2-17 from Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rehman al Faisal al Saud Ruler
of Najd and its dependencies, to the Hon'ble Sir Percy Cox C.P.O

A/C.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your esteemed letter dated the 23rd January 1917 and to say that I duly understood all you mentioned there in specially your excuse for not writing to me during your stay in camp with our friend His Excellency the Army Commander, as you had no clerk with you. I know for certain that you are busy with very important operations in that place.


During my journey via Bahrain I received the telegram about your friendly proposals having been accepted by the High Government.

I received your letter through our friend Col. Hamilton and I perused it with pleasure.

The two matters which are firstly, there does not attach much importance to Bin Sadun; it is he and his people who will suffer; secondly regarding Bin Subhan I have duly sent to him the necessary promises and assurances which will hold good as long as he behaves in a way pleasing to our friend the High Govt and all our sincere friends. You say that he is expressing enmity and grievances against our enemies and that he has no intention but to serve the Arab race and the British Govt. and that his conduct will be agreeable to the British Govt. and to your honour. "It is incumbent upon a lover to accede to the wishes of his beloved".

About local news nothing worth mention has happened. As I wrote to you before we are making efforts and endeavours.

Please continue writing and showing the same sincere love for your friend and let me hear the good news of the victories of the British Govt. and its allies in the battle fields.





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Translation of a letter dated the 15th Rabi ath Thani 1335
8-2-17 from Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman al Faisal al Saud ruler
of Najd and its dependencies to the Hon'ble Sir Percy Cox C.P.O

A/C.


As I informed your Honour in my last letters, my son Turki al 'Abdul Aziz and my brother Muhammad bin 'Abdur Rahman have marched with sufficient forces and are waiting for an opportunity to strike at the enemy. As regards myself, I am by the grace of God, quite well now and have this day started following my son Turki and my brother Muhammad al 'Abdur Rahman and am proceeding to Qasim.

According to the latest news to hand, Bin Rashid is in his town waiting for Rashid bin Lailah. The Turkish Officials are instigating him to set out on an expedition. God willing, he will fail in what he undertakes. By the help of God we shall find an opportunity to strike at him or at his tribes and shall punish them and extirpate them and shall turn them back. Good news will soon come to you.

As regards the goods exported from Kuwait and sent to Bin Rashid, this matter is neither hidden from you nor from any body else. You must know of the friendship of Bin Subah and Bin Rashid and that is based on the commerce of caravans and gaining profits. Bin Rashid is not afraid of Bin Subah and the main proof of this is that the caravan which was interfered with by Bin Subhan was led by Nasir bin Takhim. It was coming to Kuwait; part of it was seized by the interceptor and part of it was left unmolested. Nasir bin Takhim with 10 followers reached Kuwait and they were there when our friend Col. Hamilton British Consul of Kuwait informed us.

The persons who run the caravan traffic with the said town (i.e. Kuwait) come from Zubair and Khamisiah etc. I have been able to get the names of some of them and I have noted them in a slip of paper attached herewith.

The goods that go to Syria, Baghdad and to our enemies cannot





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cannot remain hidden from Bin Subah, nor can the matter remain hidden from the notables of the town.

My statement and information is not based upon personal motives but I have mentioned it as people attributed the traffic to our subjects of Nejd. The matters that are harmful to our friend the British Government I am obliged to report at once since we have joint interests and it effects both sides, and you have priority over every body else.

We have sent to the Amir of Mecca the Sharif, presents and we are helping him in all circumstances. Please convey my regards to all my highly esteemed friends and accept for your honour best respects, may you remain preserved and salams.

Translation of the attached slip.

Muhammad bin Hamad.


Abdullah bin Ghanam.

Abdul Aziz bin Hijris.

Muhammad bin Said.

Nasir bin Takhim.

FRE





Confidential

D.O.No. 2754

Foreign & Political Deptt.

Simla, the 29th April 1917.

My dear Wilson,

Seven copies of each of the papers received with the Chief Political Officer's Memoranda Nos. 1 to 4 and 6 of 1917, are sent herewith in continuation of my demi-official letter No. 581 W, dated the 21st March 1917.

Yours sincerely,

Sd. Dneys Bray,

No. 6657
52/5

Chief Political Office,
Basrah, the 5th May 1917.

To

C.P.O., Baghdad.

Reference above.

One copy of each filed here. One copy of each sent herewith.

One copy of each of memorandum Nos. 2 & 6, dated 18th and 17th January 1917 respectively sent to


P.A. Koweit & ✓

P.A. Bahrain.

One copy of memorandum No. 6, dated 17th January 1917, sent to P.O. Baghdad.

S.B.

ATM
Captain,
Deputy Chief Political Officer.





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Memorandum No. 6, dated 17th (received 25th) January 1917.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SIR P. Z. COX, K.C.S.I., Chief Political Officer,
Basrah,
To—The Director, Arab Bureau, Care of Director, Military Intelligence, Cairo.

Contribution to the History of Tribal Fights
in the Shamiyah desert.

I forward, herewith, for information, a
copy of the paper noted in the mar-
gin.

Copy with Compliments to—

- (1) Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London, S.W.
- (2) Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and
Political Department, Delhi.
- (3) Political Secretary, India Office, London, S.W.
- (4) Chief of the General Staff, Indian Expeditionary Force "D,"
Adv. G. H. Q.
- (5) Secretary to the Government of India, Army Department, Delhi.

A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY OF TRIBAL FIGHTS IN THE SHAMI-
YAH DESERT.

Compiled from Arab reports recorded by A. P. O. Zobeir.

Human nature being what it is and at bottom the same in the Arab as in the European, pugnacious, ambitious and covetous, sometimes loyal but mainly treacherous, occasionally enlightened but always restless, the tribal fights in the Shamiyah desert may be expected to exhibit the same to and fro change and interchange, of alliances as may be found in the history of the relations between the various nations which compose Europe. The redeeming feature of the picture is its comparative bloodlessness. Normally an Arab fight means the taking of an enemy by a surprise raid and the casualties may be in some cases more, in other rather less than those of an American football match. As a rule no prisoners are taken. By that it is not meant that they are killed, ill-omened as the phrase is to us more barbarous Europeans. A man who surrenders gives up his rifle, his horse, and even his clothes except the bare minimum that will save a blush. He is then let go. At a time however the fight is waged without respite and without mercy, and considering the numbers engaged with sanguinary results. The history of these fights has its own intrinsic interest apart from any lesson it may convey as to the possibility of relating the tribes together under the influence of an external power. For those concerned the story has landmarks as great to Bedouins as are Hastings and Waterloo to us. What to Ibn Rashid and Ibn Suwait are Hastings or Waterloo compared with the battle of the Reeds or the Battle of Neba?

We will begin from the time when Sa'd'un Pasha the Muntafik Chief had been driven back from north of the Euphrates and made the Shamiyah desert his own particular "dira" and sphere of influence. The great Muntafik family of Sa'd'un—not native to Iraq by origin, for they boast themselves descended from the nobles of Mecca—had built itself a ring of wells and forts extending from Chabashiyah through Chabdah and Shagrah to Abu Ghar and Neba', a ring of defiance to any attempt of the alien Turk to reduce their proud souls to subjection. The great Sa'd'un had once carried his arms to the very walls of Basrah itself. When the disciplined forces of the Turks at length drove this unruly element into the desert, Sa'd'un Pasha set up his standard there and virtually proclaimed himself king of the Shamiyah.

But there was another enemy beside the Turk. These desert forts were both a defence against the inevitable raids of Arab enemies and a base for their own raids. The Beduin has no work and no play. His only work and his only play is the 'Chazzu' or raid. The fashion was set and sealed by that

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arch raider, the prophet; and though a raid appears to us in the light of mere theft, to the Bedouin it is a legitimate ebullition of spirits, albeit it has rules more binding with them than the rules of International Law with us.

To return to Sa'dun, if one man could be regarded as king of the desert more than another, it was Ibn Rashid the great Turkish Amir. His traditional enemy, Ibn Sa'ud, Emir of Najd, was at this time at the lowest ebb of his power. There was no one to contest Ibn Rashid's supremacy. When, therefore, Sa'dun Pasha set up his standard in the Shamiyah, Ibn Rashid said: "this cannot be. There cannot be two standards in the desert." Whether his or Sa'dun's actions were influenced by secret encouragement from the Turks, it is difficult to say. At any rate some sixteen years ago rumours came to the environs of Khamisiyah that Ibn Rashid was preparing a great raid on Sa'dun. Sa'dun, therefore, collected his forces and made all ready to repel the attack. Besides Muntafik tribes he had with him the Dhafir, a Bedouin tribe part of which comes originally from Hijr, north of the Hedjaz who had long ago been driven out and had settled in the district between Kuwait, the Shammar, and the Euphrates. This tribe in its day has been as strong as any in the Shamiyah. In the time of the present Shaikh's grandfather Sultan Ibn Suwait, or of his brother, Ja'lan, its easily dissolved elements were united by the personal influence of the Shaikh. Without such personal influence, the temptations to disunion are obvious from the position of the tribe, situated as it normally is between Shammar and Muntafik, and therefore requiring to have influence with both sides. On this occasion a number of the Dhafir were with Sa'dun. Many of them did not enter into the affair at all. The Muntafik and the Dhafir together were ready for all emergencies. But no raid came. Thinking they had been collected by a false alarm, the tribes to a great extent dispersed Sa'dun himself remaining encamped east of Khamisiyah by the reeds. This was Ibn Rashid's chance. And one day Sa'dun's followers observed a mysterious cloud of dust on the southern horizon. They sent out the usual scouts who returned to report the coming of a host of Shammar. It was too late for all Sa'dun's followers to flee. He himself escaped towards Sakhariyah. The Shammar easily defeated the rest and captured a great booty of horses and camels. This was the well-known battle of the Reeds, *Al Bariayah*. Ibn Rashid encamped for a time at Tell-al-Jibarah and then retired to his own country.

Sa'dun Pasha, desirous of avenging his defeat, took advantage of a quarrel between Mubarak Ibn Sabah, Shaikh of Kuwait, and Ibn Rashid to ally himself with Ibn Sabah. A famous merchant of Kuwait, one Yusuf al Ibrahim who had seceded from Mubarak after his act of fratricide (he had killed his two brothers Muhammad and Jara) went over to Ibn Rashid. Mubarak, angry at his defection, employed some of his wealth in the arming of Ibn Sa'ud and readily accepted the invitation of Sa'dun to join forces against the common enemy. This time Ja'lan Ibn Suwait, Shaikh of the Dhafir, refused to join the confederacy. The three, Sa'dun, Ibn Sabah and Ibn Sa'ud joined forces in the Najd. But Ibn Rashid was too strong for them and defeated the confederacy with ease in a battle known as "Al Turafiyah" from the place where it was fought, this took place the year after the Battle of the Reeds.

From this time there appears to be a gap in important events. Though there were continual raids, there was no fight of any importance. Ultimately a quarrel arose between Ibn Sabah and Sa'dun. A section of the Dhafir, called As Sa'id, consistently friendly to Sa'dun captured a number of Ibn Sabah's camels. Ibn Sabah asked Sa'dun to procure their return. He refused and his refusal led Ibn Sabah to call in aid from Ibn Sa'ud. Ibn Sa'ud was not strong. Two of his tribes, the Mutair and the Ajman, had left him. Hence it was only a meagre force he sent to the help of Ibn Sabah. Such as they were, their forces reached Arkhaimiyah where they were surprised by a mixed body of Dhafir, Zayyad, and Muntafik (including the Budur) under Sa'dun. The Zayyad are not a Muntafik tribe. They belong to a confederacy known as the Beni Muchaim and dwell south and about Samawah. But their friendship with the Dhafir dates back to many years ago and bodies of them continually



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appear in Shamiyah fights. There was no real battle on this occasion. The forces of Ibn Sabah and Ibn Sa'ud were captured without a struggle hence this event is known as the 'Hadiyah' or the Gift. That such events are possible is only intelligible to those who know the distance and peace that can be accomplished by Arabs intent on a raid.

The 'Hadiyah' took place in the spring nine years ago. The following summer Sa'dun went to Baghdad on a visit to the Wali Kadhim Pasha. The Mutair, a Najdi tribe, normally of the following of Ibn Sa'ud heard of this, and judged it a good opportunity for a raid. They came to Ibn Sabah and said "Now that Sa'dun has gone to Baghdad, there is great chance of booty from the Dhafir and the Mantafik. Let us make a raid upon them." Not loath to attempt revenge upon the Dhafir for his late disaster, Ibn Sabah and the Mutair made a considerable raid on the Dhafir at Shagrah and succeeded in capturing much booty. News of the raid came to Sa'dun at Baghdad and was reported to the Wali. The Wali offered to establish Sa'dun in the position of Emir of the 'Iraq tribes and Kuwait if he would overthrow Ibn Sabah. Sa'dun always ambitious, agreed to the project, and set out to collect his forces. Among others he took with him the Dhafir. His forces arrived as far as the Ashgag, between Safwan and Jahrah to the west. Ibn Sabah hearing of their approach, and always in touch with the Dhafir, to the extent even of allowing them to take 'Khawa' on goods going from Kuwait or paying them a certain sum to forego their ancient practice, got into secret touch with the leaders of this tribe. The mare of a Sa'dun noble, Yusuf-al-Mansur, was killed by them and made a ground of quarrel, with the result that the Dhafir quietly deserted Sa'dun and frustrated the enterprise. Sa'dun gave up his quest, but though still nominally friendly with the Dhafir determined to take revenge for their treachery. He wrote secretly to Ibn Rashid inviting him to co-operate in the punishment of the Dhafir. Were he to agree to this, he was to appear with a following at the Dahanah, the sandy desert in the middle of Shammar territory. Meanwhile, Sa'dun himself would take his following including the Dhafir to the Dahanah. Ibn Rashid fell in with the plan, and the parties met at the Dahanah. Ibn Rashid called the headmen of the Dhafir to him and asked them for an explanation of their conduct. There seems to have been no excuse for them, and Ibn Rashid fined them 500 camels. The Dhafir were fairly trapped and had to submit to this imposition. But Sa'dun knew them too well to let Ibn Rashid depart without taking further safeguards against the future conduct of the tribe. Hence it was arranged that five of the Dhafir chiefs should go as hostages with Ibn Rashid. So the parties dispersed. But the Emir's chiefs, whether of their own free will or under the secret persuasion of the captive Dhafir, came to the Emir and represented the harshness of his judgment. Had not the Dhafir already paid their fine of 500 camels? Was it just further to take captive five of their chiefs? The Emir was convinced by their arguments and released the hostages two days after he took them. As might be expected, the liberated chiefs hastened to their tribe, intent on revenge, collected their 'Khail' and 'Jaish,' and overtook and routed Sa'dun and his following south of Shagrah at Al Jarabiyat.

Sa'dun retired to Khamisiyah while the Dhafir settled in the environs of Zubair at Safwan and Shwebdah. One section of the Dhafir, the Sanid, were at the time with the Shammar, but now came to join Sa'dun at Khamisiyah. Sa'dun and his following with the additions of the Sanid moved to 'Alowi. This was within easy distance of the Dhafir, who straightway collected their forces, drove Sa'dun out, and returned to their tents.

The Turks had chosen this time to send agents to Basrah and to approach Sa'dun on the question of making him Emir of the dirat al Muntafik on the Shatt al Hai, Mubarak Ibn Sabah was then at Muhammerah and had got into touch with Saiyid Talib. It is said that he offered Saiyid Talib 3,000 liras to persuade the Government to seize and imprison Sa'dun. Saiyid Talib agreed and represented to the Turkish agents how fatal a policy it would be to make a turbulent spirit like Sa'dun head of a combine of tribes notorious for its unruliness. "Let me only bring Sa'dun to Basrah" he said "and the rest is easy."



What follows is famous in Arab history. The Turkish agents complied with the infamous proposal of Saiyid Talib. Sa'dun was invited to his house, the well-known bait al Naqib, accepted the invitation without suspicion, and duly appeared. By arrangement of Saiyid Talib, Sa'dun was to sleep secure for the night, and was next morning to be invited to a repast while Saiyid Talib was to excuse himself on the plea that he had business in the haram. When Sa'dun had eaten, the Turkish agents sent men in the guise of emissaries of the Wali to invite him to appear before the Wali at the Sarai. The plan was successfully carried out. Sa'dun left bait al Naqib with the supposed emissaries of the Wali. When, however, they reached the Sarai, they were told that the Wali had gone to Ashar. Sa'dun still unsuspecting? was taken to Ashar in a bellam and from there straight to a Turkish gunboat where he was informed he was a prisoner. The boat left quietly in the night, and on his arrival at Baghdad Sa'dun was taken to Aleppo where he remained a prisoner and ultimately died. From the time of Saiyid Talib's signal act of duplicity, the great Muntafik chief passes out of history, and his place is taken by his second son, 'Ajaimi.

'Ajaimi was at this time besieged by the Budur in a fort north-west of Nasiriyah, at Maiyah. The Turkish agents secured his release and let him go. He fled to the Ghazzi. But the Shaikh of the Ghazzi, Ibn-Hubiyib, was not prepared to take the onus of protecting this restless spirit on his shoulders, and 'Ajaimi was compelled to seek protection elsewhere. Isolated but not despairing, he mounted his dhalul, rode almost alone to Hail, and knelt his camel before the great Emir. "I claim your protection, O Emir," he said, "and your help to avenge me on my enemies. This you owe me as a right. For it was while under your protection my father, Sa'dun, was set upon and defeated by the Dhafir." At Hail he stayed for sometime until at length Ibn Rashid consented to help him attack the Dhafir. 'Ajaimi went to call in help of Juwarin. Ibn Rashid on the first occasion he met the enemy fled and brought in the help of Dhari Ibn Tawalah and the Aslam. Ibn Rashid returned to the fight and attacked and defeated a combined body of Dhafir and Budur between Shagrah and Abu Ghar. 'Ajaimi arrived one day late. Ibn Rashid returned to Hail and left the Mutair, whom he had also called to his help as a protection to 'Ajaimi.

This was in the spring of 19 . Next winter the Dhafir and the Budur returned from their summer quarters north and west of Nasiriyah. 'Ajaimi was still able to call in the Mutair, but fearing he was not strong enough to repel attacks, he appealed to the Muntafik sympathies of sections of the Bani Malik and drew a body of them to his side. The opposing forces met somewhere between Shagrah and Arkhaimiyah. But before they met, the Budur had entered into secret negotiations with the Bani Malik, for the Budur too are a Muntafik tribe. The Bani Malik either fled or offered only a weak resistance, with the result that 'Ajaimi and the Mutair were routed, and their effects and animals were captured. 'Ajaimi fled with his scattered forces to Safwan, where he remained until the summer. He then removed to Ghabashiyah, where he perpetrated a ruthless act of robbery upon an unoffending relation. His father's cousin, Mazyad came to settle with him and deposited in a building known as "Mazyad's treasury" the sum of 60,000 liras. 'Ajaimi appropriated the whole vast sum and moved to the Shatt-al-Hai.

Another winter arrived and the Dhafir as usual began to move south-east towards their well-known settling places, Diraisiyah, Dafinah, Abu Ghar and Sulaibiyah. Mazyad who had been looking about him for opportunities of revenge went to the Dhafir and appealed to them for help. Meanwhile, 'Ajaimi too crossed the Euphrates with the idea of revenging himself for his late defeat. Always generous with his money, whatever its source, with the sum he was able with the sum robbed from Mazyad to attract a band of 400 mercenaries from various directions. His force consisted of some Mutair, some Shammar, some Bani Malik and other miscellaneous mercenaries. With these he invaded the Dhafir district and brought up against the Dhafir and the Budur at Naba. Then ensued one of the bloodiest fights in the history of tribal warfare in the Shamiyah desert. The Dhafir and Budur inflicted a severe defeat on Ajaimi and his following,



427
430
(428)

and are said to have killed nearly 300 of them, their own losses being 40 killed.

The following day Mazyad, overjoyed at the result, mounted his horse and galloped and curvetted before the victorious Arabs. This incongruous act met with disfavour in the eyes of Nemesis, and the unfortunate old man—he was then 80 fell and broke his neck.

'Ajaimi was now at the end of his resources and was reduced to making peace with his enemies. Hence he invited Humud ibn Suwait, Chief of the Dhafr, to join up with him near Chaddah. Humud consented and settled alongside of him with some fifty tents. The rest of the Dhafr repudiated his overtures. Whether 'Ajaimi originally meditated treachery or was driven to what he did by the unfriendliness of the rest of the Dhafr, it is difficult to say. At any rate he quietly sent word to the Mutair, acquainting them with this splendid opportunity of revenge. The Mutair arrived, all out for a raid. Humud ibn Suwait protested to 'Ajaimi against this gross act of treachery, and 'Ajaimi repenting attempted to dissuade the Mutair, but the Mutair were inexorable. They had come for a raid or a fight at 'Ajaimi's express invitation and were determined to carry it out. 'Ajaimi had to submit to his own arrangement, and reverted to his original intention in calling up the Mutair—"Qalab ala ibn Suwait," as the Arabs say, that it turned round against him. Humud and his 50 tents fell an easy prey to the Mutair, and this affair is since known as the Qalbah.

A speedy revenge overtook 'Ajaimi. News of the event soon reached the Budur, ancient friends of the Dhafr and their refuge in time of trouble. And two months after the Qalbah the Dhafr and the Budur defeated 'Ajaimi at Shagrah. As the fiercest of Arab fights cannot permanently weaken a tribe, inasmuch as prisoners are normally released and live to fight again another day, there was no hope that 'Ajaimi was put out of court for good and all. So little depressed was he by his late defeat that not more than two months later he engineered a raid by Ibn Rashid on the 'Araih Section of the Dhafr at Tugayyid, while he himself and the Mutair defeated the Suwait Section at Al Qasair.

Meanwhile, greater events than any tribal dissension were looming, over Arabia, Turkey had declared war on Great Britain, and the Turks who were joined by 'Ajaimi with 250 sowars were gradually driven from Fao and Basrah. But other events, not of such significance to the world at large, though the greater purport to the Jazirat al Arab, began to make their appearance events which introduce us to elements and dissensions not within the scope of this account, which concerns chiefly the Shamiyah desert. But it will be useful to describe one great struggle so as to explain certain elements which can never be altogether out of relation with the Shamiyah. This is a famous fight between Ibn Sa'ud and Ibn Rashid. The events which led up to it are somewhat as follows:—Ibn Sa'ud delivered an ultimatum to the Mutair, who are really one of his own tribes, though they had of late joined Ibn Rashid or 'Ajaimi indifferently when they offered occasions for plunder. He demanded their return to his suzerainty on pain of permanent hostility. The Mutair were willing to return to their old allegiance, and celebrated their decision by pilfering a caravan of thousand camels which was on its way from Zubair to the followers of Ibn Tawalah, Chief of the Aslam Section of the Shammar. They were then ready to return to their own country and join forces with Ibn Sa'ud. At the beginning of their war with Great Britain, the Turks had tried to persuade Ibn Rashid to attack Ibn Sa'ud in force. Ibn Rashid nothing loath, collected his forces; meanwhile the Turks changed their minds. It occurred to them that if they could persuade Ibn Rashid to keep them in the 'Iraq and Ibn Saud to attack Kuwait, they would at the same time completely overawe the Arabs of the 'Iraq and overthrow a great stronghold of British influence. It was accordingly decided to call upon the notorious Saiyid Talib to proceed on a mission to Bin Saud to induce him to co-operate. At that moment Saiyid Talib was occupied in offering us his services on extravagant terms and while he was still hesitating to abate his demands, the sudden declaration of war preceipitated matters and placed him in a dangerous situation from which the



mission to Bin Sa'ud offered him a providential means of escape. On reaching Ibn Sa'ud he placed himself in communication with the British authorities and was allowed at his own suggestion to proceed to India *via* Kuwait.

Meanwhile, when the possibility of Turkey's entry into the war had become likely His Majesty's Government had decided to send an emissary to, Ibn Sa'ud in our own interests in the person of Captain W. H. I. Shakespear, formerly Political Agent at Kuwait, who was then in England. By the time he had reached the Persian Gulf, war had already been declared, but it was none the less desired to maintain touch with Ibn Sa'ud and if possible to get him to move up towards Iraq in our interests. Captain Shakespear accordingly proceeded from Kuwait on this mission and found Ibn Sa'ud with a large force moving towards the Shammar country to attack Ibn Rashid, and very confident of success. His force included contingent of the Ajman tribe, a redoubtable though at the same time disreputable tribe from the Al Hassa district who had long been estranged from their overlord but were still under his suzerainty and obeyed the order for a general union of forces. The Mutair too were on their way to join and in the circumstances, it was believed in the desert that Ibn Sa'ud was bound to defeat his traditional enemy for, in addition to the large numbers of his fighting men, he had with him three or four Turkish mountain guns with trained gunners. But there is one factor in any Arab fight which is outside prophecy and that is treachery.

It is believed that there could have been no doubt as to the result, had it not been (according to the tales of the Bedouin) for the treachery of the Ajman. They are said to have turned upon their own side at a critical stage of the conflict, killed large numbers, confused the rest, and made off with a large booty of camels.

Adherents of either side naturally give very different versions of what occurred, but there is no doubt that while both parties suffered severely from the shock of the encounter and from the depredations of the Ajman and other marauders after it, Ibn Sa'ud was the hardest hit and was for the time crippled. It was in the course of this action that Captain Shakespear, who insisted on being present as an interested spectator, though pressed by his friend and host to remain at a distance, met his lamented and untimely end.

No two accounts give the same version of the precise circumstances of his death, and until the clouds of war have passed over and reliable sources from both sides can be reached under conditions of peace, it is hardly possible that they can be ascertained with certainty.

But to return to the fight. The Mutair were some distance away when the fight began. When they drew near and heard the sound of shots, they worked round the fight for south and finally came up right behind the Shammar to where they had left their camels. These they seized and made off with and secured large booty. They then returned to their own country and to the defeated Ibn Sa'ud said: "Why did you fly? See, we have captured the very dhulul of Ibn Rashid himself." As indeed they had. But nothing could compensate for the reversal of fortune created by the treachery of the Ajman. And to this day Ibn Sa'ud cherishes the hope of wiping them out to a man. Only their repute as fighting men—and it is often said there are no Arabs their equals—has preserved them from extinction. For they have many enemies and no friends.

Arabs themselves say that of Bedouin the stoutest fighters are the Ajman, and of the Muntafik the Budur. The Shammar too are redoubtable, as are the Zayyad, who occasionally appear to the help of the Dhafir. Less reputable fighters, though famous raiders, are the Mutair and the Dhafir. There is no tribe to touch the Dhafir for what seems to us mere thieving, though it is dignified by the Prophet under the name of a raid. It will be noticed in this brief history of tribal dissensions that the Budur continually saved the Dhafir from disaster. And indeed the Dhafir owe everything to the Budur. Certain tribes like the Azairij are distinguished fighters on their own ground but helpless for a field. It is not so with the Budur. At home or abroad they display the same consistency of valour, and they have a quality almost peculiar to them the quality of always rallying to the standard of their head chief in the face of a common enemy, notwithstanding their internal quarrelsomeness and a certain reputation for ruffianism. It




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428
430-a
(428)

is different with an another similar tribe, the Juwarin, who certainly at the present time find no chief round whom they will readily rally at need. So with the Zayyad, who belong to a western confederation known as the Bani Huchaim. Brave enough as fighters, they are split up into so many ill-united sections that one cannot conceive them rallying to one standard. Most of the Shamiyah tribes have taken part on one or other of the many raids and fights recorded in this history, Dhafir, Budur, Juwarin, Ghazzi, Zayyad. But the protagonists are the Dhafir and the Budur. It is a curious alliance, Bedouin and camel with Muntafik and donkey tribe, originating in a blood feud against a common enemy 'Ajaimi.

Until the latter is eliminated from Shamiyah by inducement or force, he will remain, though of no military importance, a chronic source of intrigue and centre of unrest and as such a nuisance to us and a valuable asset to the Turks. So much so that Ibn Rashid is said to resent 'Ajaimis competition for their favours and at this moment their relations are definitely strained. It may be too that it was because they realised the incompatibility of these two elements that the Turks after inviting Ibn Rashid to sit on our flank in the Shamiyah desert finally asked him to return to Hail and await a more favourable opportunity for a second visit to the 'Iraq. For 'Ajaimi had gradually won the powerful Zayyad tribe to his side, and the Zayyad cannot tolerate the Shammar at any price. It says much for 'Ajaimi's ascendancy that though Ibn Rashid has departed, the elements he has left behind with us are in closer touch with 'Ajaimi than they are with their ancient overlord. Even Dhari ibn Tuwalah, who should know 'Ajaimi seeing that he was with him only a year ago, reluctantly pays a tribute to 'Ajaimi's personality. 'Ajaimi is a 'nafar,' as the Arabs say of him, an individual, a man who counts.

The 6th December 1916.





2. Register please
R.H.
2/5



429
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(432)

Telegram No 1730 From Cox Baghdad
dated 19th May 17.

Please write following message to
Bin Saud on my behalf and send
by special messenger begin -

According to the news which
reaches me to in Baghdad Ibn
Rashid's position is now so weak
that he is in no little danger of
losing Hail to his enemies from
the North who, if they once succeed
in occupying the place will
naturally claim to retain it -

For this reason Your Honors
will realize that it is important
in your own interests that you
should do your utmost to
obtain possession (Hail?)



I propose very shortly to send Officer S
you on my behalf to give you
further information on this (Subject?)
by word of mouth and to ascertain
your views and learn in what
way it may be possible for us
to further your plans — Ails —

Adm^r R. A. Kewick

Repeat! Barr

Ref

20/5/17




D/- 20-5-17 ⁴³⁰
432
(431)

Your telegram No. 1730 -

Message to Bin Saud will
be sent tomorrow.

Please bear me in mind
when selecting officers for
mission proposed -

Hamilton 561





Letter.

From C.P.O.

To Abdul Aziz bin Saud, K.C.I.E.

Dated 13th April 1917.


After compliments.

431 (432)
433

After compliments.

I have learned from my Deputy at Basrah arrival of your esteemed letter of March 27th by the hand of your servant Isa bin Marmih and the purport^{of it} has been telegraphed to me. I thank you very much on behalf of Army Commander and myself for your kind congratulation on the success of this Force and the conquest of Baghdad. Your letter to His Excellency the Viceroy is being forwarded to its destination. I feel sure that the news of the conquest of Baghdad must have been a great source of relief and rejoicing to yourself and all the Arab leaders who are in alliance with the British Government and are supporting the common case of the Arab nation. The proclamation which was issued by the Commander of the British Forces on our occupation of Baghdad of which you will have received a copy convincing you of the loyal policy which the British Government is following in the support of the Arab case and it will give you fresh stimulation to direct your utmost efforts to complete the expulsion of the Turks root and branch from Arabia. You may rest assured that I will do my best to be-friend the Najidis whom I may meet within Baghdad. I am in frequent communication with Shaikh Saiyid Mahmud Sakri Al Allusi. He begs me to send you his compliments and assure you of his welfare. As regards Bin Hadhal your letter to me will reach in due course. Meanwhile his Agent has been to see me and I am endeavouring to get in touch with him. In the matter of the leakage of merchandise from Kuwait it is not hidden from me that the evil has been very serious in the past but on the one hand Shaikh Salim is now making special efforts to put down smuggling and on the other hand all possible strictness is required from Your Excellency to ensure that the smuggling

is





(433) 432 434

is not assisted by dependents of yours at distant points in your territory. I am sure that you are doing your utmost to guard against this. You will I hope understand that during this advance the burden of my daily work has been very heavy and it has been impossible for me to do all I wish in the writing of letters and so you will pardon my silence on this account.

Your sincere friend.

P.Z.Cox.

(Signed on his behalf by Captain Wilson)

Translated on April 13th by K.S.Mirza Muid. and sent to Abdul Wahab on April 13th.

No. 432
9/2

Chief Political Office,
Basrah, the 14th April 1917.

G.P.O., Baghdad.

P.A. Koweit.

P.A. Bahrain.

Copy forwarded for information.

Atman
Captain,
Deputy Chief Political Officer.

*0 - Request returned
same with Kh
K - Kasim Caravan
Rth
2/5*





is not assisted by dependants of yours at distant points in your
territory. I am sure that you are doing your utmost to guard
against this. You will I hope understand that during this
advance the burden of my daily work has been very heavy and it
has been impossible for me to do all I wish in the writing of
letters and so you will pardon my silence on this account.
Your sincere friend.

F. S. Cox.

(Signed in the name of Captain Wilson)

Translated on April 1917 by E. S. Wilson and sent to
Abdul Wahab on April 1917.


Chief Political Officer,
Bahrain, the 14th April 1917.

No. 2292
278

E. F. O. Bahrain.
E. A. Kowat.
E. A. Bahrain.

Copy forwarded for information.

Deputy Chief Political Officer,
Bahrain.





Telegram
From Political Base.

433

435

(434)


No. 4506

dated 11-6-17.

Political Agent Koweit.

Letter received for you -
from Bin Saud enclosing
copies of correspondence Bin Rashid
of which following is purport
Bin Rashid wrote Bin Saud
proposing peace stop. Bin Saud
replied peace with him must
include alliance with British
and King of Hedjaz stop.
Bin Rashid rejected these terms
stop Bin Saud adds capovans
reach Bin Rashid from Koweit
and Iraq and asks instructions
for machine guns and for
ammunition stop. Full translation
leaves private post -

Political





434

436

Telegram No. 646 11-6-17.


To C/o Baghdad Rep^d Palestine Comm.
From P. A. Howe

Messages arrived from Bin Saud last night
with letter dated June 3rd acknowledging
message conveyed in your let No 1730
of May 19th to my address —

He traverses view that there is any chance
of mail being taken or even accepted by
northern tribes and so regards liaison
offices he reiterates request that letter
should have a thorough knowledge of Arab
ways & customs. His covering letter to
me informs me that he is on his way
to Riadh to keep Ramazan, having
left his son Turki in Kasim with
sufficient force to hold Abu Rezhid
in check — letter being forwarded

Adm^d Baghdad
rep^d Basra — Hamilton

Ref 11/6.





I enclose cypher
message to Bin Percy
Mr O'Neill. ^{Baghdad - Please}
number identical
Rlb
20/5

435 (136)
437

These are the following message
from Sir Percy Cox to Bin Saud
translated into Arabic with a
short covering letter from me and
(2) tell Mulla Abdallah to go to
H. S. the Shaikh and ask if he could
~~give me a~~ send a special
messenger ~~with~~ to bear an important
letter to Bin Saud from Sir Percy.
Tomorrow.
Message -

"According to the news which reaches
me here in Baghdad Ibn Rashid's
position is now so weak that he
is in no little danger of losing
Hail (his enemies from
the North and who, if they
succeed in occupying the
place will naturally claim



to retain ~~to~~ it. For this reason
Your Honour will realize that it is
important in your own interests
that you should prevent such
an inconvenient development and
should do your utmost to obtain
possession of it yourself.


I propose very shortly to send
officers to you on my behalf to give
you further information by word
of mouth on this subject and
to ascertain your views and to
learn in what way it may be
possible for us to further your
plans -

End of message

Rlb

20/3

Confidential letters to him and






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438

(438)

من السريسي كما كرس حاكم السياسي دولت البرية القصرية الانكليزية في بغداد
 الاجناب الاجل الامير الافرغم صاحب السعادة المحب الشيخ عبد العزيز بن محمد الفاضل
 دام بقاءه
 بعد السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته مع السوال عن عز خا طركم دمتم بمجد ورو بقاء
 الميدي لمفرتكم حسب الاجناب التي تاصلنا في بغداد احوال بن رشيد هل ايام سالقة
 ضعيفة حتى يوجه خطر ان حائل تروح من يدو المايه عده وانه اهل الشام وهؤلاء
 اهل الشام اذا اخذوا المكان طبيعيا يصير لهم حق ان يملكوه فلاجل هذه الواجب
 المرام ان تستعدون كل الاستعداد لمنع هذه الامور وتجاهدون كل جهة كم
 لتقبضون على حائل بلجبل على اي وجه يكون في وقت قريب سارسل لكم احد من
 موظفين الحكومة من اجل الذين سيخرج جنابك ابلغ من ذلك شفاها في
 جميع اللازم بهذه النصوص ويستغرم افكاركم ويعرف في اي صورة نقدر
 لنا عدمكم في ترفيتكم هذه الما لزم ودمتم محرومين
 (ا) شعب ١٢٢٥ مطابق ٢١ سي ١٩١٧

الله
 ٢١/٥





No. 647 of 1917.
Political Agency, Kuwait.
The 12th June 1917.


438 (438)
440

The undermentioned letters are forwarded to the Chief
Political Officer, Bagdad, with reference to my telegram No.
646 dated 11th June 1917.

W. Hamilton
Lieut-Colonel,

Political Agent, Kuwait.


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- (1). Letter from Bin Saud to the Chief Political Officer,
I.E.F.D., Bagdad.
(2). Covering letter from Bin Saud to the Political Agent,
Kuwait.





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441

من عبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن الفيصل السعود الملقب بالأمير الأكرم ذوالكرام الذي قدم حضرة صاحب السيادة
محبا العزيز المازلي هاملتن المحترم فضل دولة العجمة البريغيا الفضل بالكونية دامت ساليه
اليوم الغرض من مزاجكم الكرام ورد العيا كتابكم الورداني للورخ - انبعاث ١٢٢٥ استرقنا
عليه والذي ذكرتم صادره من الحب معلوم منصوص تلغرافاته للرسول من محب الجميع صاحب
الغمامه حاكم السياسي العام بالعراق اخذنا ما با بادير النجيل والتكريم من السال في القصص
تلونها مسرورين واسربرها الفخار وبطركناكم جو بلتها نزج من سعادتم قد نوهها
لاعتاب فخامته احوالنا تسركم من كل الوجوه لم نجدت امر زاة شان استحق ذكره
لبنائكم المحبي الامن بقاية الكمال في مما لكنا برهنت الايام ابقينا الابن تركي المعبود العزيز
بالقصيم مع عبود كافيته لمراقبة احوال ابن رشيد وحر كاتة فحنى قوجرنا الارياض بموجب
هلول سرور رضا والبارك والاشغال با مودر احييتنا الدارمة وتوكل من البار من
خريب ستا نيكم اخبار تكون سببا للمرجة والسرور لطافة المحبين فالرعا استبانتا
بالاخبار المسره ودرام المخالصة لخدمتكم هذا لزم ودمتم سالين ١٣١٠ انبعاث ١٢٢٥






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
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
442

من عبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن الفيصل آل سعود المحارب الأصيل الذي ذواله الكرام العالية والشمس المضيئة طيبة السما
 محبا للجهاد صاحب الفخامة الكارل سر برسي كاسر المغنم حاكم السياسة العام بالعراق ذات معاليه
 بعد السلام التام والتمت والكرام وردة الدنيا بالشرف برقيتمكم بواسطتكم محبا لجميع صاحب
 السعادة المحارب حلتس المحترم بتاريخ ١٢ شعبان ١٣٤٥ وما عرف جنابكم العالي من جهة اخبار
 التي تاصلكم في بغداد من قبل ابن رشيد بهذه الايام اذ احواله ضعيفة وانه حائل على خطر
 من أعدائه اهل الشام ان يستولون عليه ويظهروا من يدهم فتبطلتكم مع الحل للذكور يكون
 لهم حق طبعيا للملك وتشيرون اليه ان هذا الساعي والاجتهاد على قضا حائل
 باني حال نصير بالجملة وقد ترون ان فخامتكم ترون من المناسب ارسال واحد من اصدق
 لتراجع وايام شفاها وبعرف افكارنا باني حال قساعة ونا في ترتيبنا لا شك
 ان سياستكم ودرائتكم ابلغ ولكن نتج نرفع لسانكم لفضيلة الجدة على حقاقتي التي
 تكمن والتي لم تكمن وها هي - اما من قبل ابن رشيد فهو ضعيف واما قبض أعدائه اصل
 السال على حائل فهو من التسفاعة وغير ممكن ولم نجد احد يتكلم مع ذلك من أعدائه ولا مع
 له اعداء متبينين ان كان ولا به البادية والشاهرا فهو لا يملك لهم اصبه للتجرب على هذه
 الامر كما قيل في امثال العربية ذكر القصدي خيد من ان تراه ولم اهل لابن رشيد اعداء الا
 ان كان ابن شعلان او ابن هذال وهما الان متصفا دحاف ابن رشيد فاما صدقة ابن
 هذال منه ظاهريه بموجب عدم الخصب في وطنه وهذه الذي احملة على ذلك واما ابن
 شعلان مصادقته معه اجبرته الحكومة الظالمة الزكية وايضا لو كانو معادينه
 ما يقتضون بذلك ولا تصور العقل ومن الحالة فاما من جهة مساعدتها واجتهادنا
 في امر الفرض على حائل رجاءا بالله يمكن ان يكون عاجلا او آجلا فاما الان فيس يمكن لاجل بعض
 الموانع الطبيعية وعدم وجود بعض الاسباب المقتضية نفقه من ذكرها فالحاشيكم لاجل
 استخفافكم بالمهام الامور في تلك الاطراف ويمكن ان اهل الاغراض الشخصية يؤولون
 على غير حقا فترايب ارسال احد من الموصفين كثير موافق حتى يبلغه افكارنا
 شفاها وبيانا هذا هو رأي العين لم يمكن تصورها للخاصين عننا بل في الالة فتكم
 لتزول الاشتباه فتحن ممتنعين ومشكورين لحضرتكم بهذا الخصوص ولكن ينبغي الوظيف للامور
 يكون رجلا له اطلاع كلي على امور العرب واحوالها كما ذكرنا لجنابكم المجي في اجلاء ايضا نذكر فخامتكم
 من قبل ابن رشيد كوفو مصنفين انه لا يتجرس على امور التي تحادرون منها قطعاً وقاضية لاعلم
 للدين للثورة واطرافها ولا على غير هذا لان نحن ملاحظين هذه الامور ومراقبين احواله فلهذا
 ما يمكن على ادق حركه مخافة مننا فالرجو بمرسوم او طشان من صحتكم ورفنا هيتم هذه الامور
 رفعه لعلكم رستم سالتين ١٢ شعبان ١٣٤٥



MESSAGES, SIGNALS AND FIELD TELEGRAPHS.				No. of Message	
Army Form G. 8121. Method for India.				No. of words.	
Received	Sent	Prefix	Code		
At	At	Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			
From	To			Station Call	
By	By			Date	
To					
See instructions on cover					
Sender's Number.		Day of month		Is reply to message.	
<p>March 14/21 M. Called today to request information regarding hostile acts of Bu. Scouts. These were done 4 days ago. Killed 200 men were attacked by S.B.F.I. near AL HATHA and in past few days. # M.T.E.I.R. committed murder together as WAFAH and</p>					
From					
Place					
Time					
May be forwarded as now corrected.				Class of message.	
Censor.		Signature of Addressee.		How sent.	
How received.					





442
444
(443)

MESSAGES, SIGNALS AND FIELD TELEGRAPHS
Army Form C. 211. Modified for India. No. of Message

Received	Sent	Prefix	Code	m.	No. of words.
As	As	Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			
From	To	Station Call			
By	By	Date			

To _____

See instructions on order _____


Sender's Number.	Day of month	In reply to number
------------------	--------------	--------------------

and MALAH which is only two hours distant from KUWAIT and SHAIKH thinks that BIN SAUD could slip round if he wished and that Kuwait Bedouins would have retaliated but for his strict orders and should say what he is for justice and suggest BIN SAUD be written to requesting to him

From	Place	Time
------	-------	------

May be forwarded as now corrected.	Class of message.
Censor.	Signature of Addressee.
How received.	How sent.

Lal Chand & Sons, Calcutta—No. 2403 Army C.—10 2 17—2,00,000 Bins.





443
(444)

445

MESSAGES, SIGNALS AND FIELD TELEGRAPHS

Army Form C. 2121. Modified for India.

Received	Sent	Prefix	Code	m.	No. of words.
As	As	Office of Orders and Service Instructions.			
From	To				
By	By	Station Call Date			

To

See instructions on cover.

Sender's Number.	Day of month	In reply to number.
RAA	Take steps in matter	
	Western and SHAIKH SAUD	
	to believe and of Bin	
	Saud persist in policy	
	of provocation there will	
	be. skirmishing.	

Printed No: 71


From	Place	Time

May be forwarded as now corrected.

Censor.	Signature of Addressee.	Class of message.

How received. How sent.

Lal Chand & Sons, Calcutta—No. 5403 Army C.—10.2.17—2,00,000 Bks.





EGP A.P.H.S. 444

No. of Message 444

No. of words 445

Received. At. To. By. Political Kuwait

From. To. Political Kuwait

By. Political Kuwait

See instructions on cover.

Sender's Number. 73

Day of month. 27.1.18

Hour of day. 18

AAA

881 aaa kindly repeat your 71 to sir P Corg C/o Political Basra where he arrives 27th

Political Bagdad


From. Time. Title.

Signatures of Addressee.

How received.

Lal Chand & Sons, Calcutta—No. 6192—Army F. C. 2121—10—1906

KOWEIT 26 JAN 18





MESSAGES, SIGNALS AND FIELD TELEGRAPHS. 445 (446)

Army Form C. 2121. Modified for India. No. of Message

Received	Sent	Prefix	Code	m	No. of words.
At	At	Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			447
From	To				Station Call
By	By				Date

To: Sir P. Cox,
C. O. Political, Basra.

Sender's Number: Day of month: In reply to number:

AAA


Shaikh Salim called on me today to request me inform Government of hostile acts of Bin Saud's tribes. Twelve days ago Kowait tribesmen were attacked & looted by Ghei near Al-Haba and in last few days Mteir committed similar robberies at Wafrah and Maleh which is only two hours distant from Kowait. Shaikh thinks that Bin Saud could stop raids if he wished. Hints that Kowait Bedouins would have retaliated but for his strict orders. Shaikh says relies on us for justice. Suggest Bin Saud be written to requesting to take steps in

From: Place: Time: Class of message:

How received: How sent:

Signature of Addressee:

Ind Chand & Sone, Calcutta—No. 5403 Army C.—10 2 17—2,00,000 Bks.





MESSAGES, SIGNALS AND FIELD TELEGRAPHS. (446) 446
 Army Form C. 2121. Modified for India. No. of Messages

Received	Sent	Prefix	Code	m.	No. of words.
At	At	Office of Origin and Service Instructions.			448
From	To	Station Call			
By	By	Date			

To

See instructions on cover.

Sender's Name

Day of month

Is reply to number

AAA

matter etc. as

Shaikh Salim is bellicose and if Bin Saud persists in policy of provocation there will be skirmishing.

Political NO. 71

Rel

27/1

From

Place

Time

Class of Message

Any to forwarding as now corrected


P. A.

Signature of Addressee

How sent

How received

2nd Chind & Sons, Calcutta—No. 5463 Army C.—10 2 17—2,00,000 Bica.






- 448 447
449
- (1) Political Baghdad
 - (2) Sir P. Cox. Basra.

In continuation my 71
26/1 news brought last
night that Shei attacked
Rashaidah Fortesmen under
Koweit seizing their Camels
aaa Rashaidah helped by
Arwagin followed up and
he captured Camels aaa
Shei subsequently re-attacked
but were driven off with
loss of two men killed aaa
added Political Baghdad
repeated Cox Basra.

Political 74

28/1/18.





Copy,

(449) 448
453

Telegram - X. Ordinary.
From - Cox Baghdad.
To - Bahrain, repeated Basrah and Bushire.
No, 4027.
Dated and received 28th September 1917.

Your telegram No. 158 C. Please write to Ibn Saud and inform him that I am equally anxious to send an officer to him and hope to do so almost immediately. Ask him to be patient pending further communication which I will send through you very shortly.


Then tell him that Ibn Rashid is at Medain Saleh and beg him to instruct Turki to take all possible advantage of his absence to harass his adherents and if possible to threaten Hail.

Addressed Bahrain repeated Basrah and Bushire.

Copy given to P. A. Kowat
[Signature]

Handwritten notes:
Hail
2
56/10/17

AL.





449 (450)
451

Telegram X (Ordinary).

From. Cox Baghdad.

To. Secretary of State, reptd. to Foreign, High
Commissioner Cairo and Political Basrah.


No. 4035.


Dated. 28th recvd. 29th September 1917.


Affairs of Ibn Saud.

It was my hope that projected mission of Storrs in June last and latter's passage on to Sheriff with Ibn Saud's envoy would have effect both of dispelling atmosphere of distrust prevailing in Sheriff's circles and of enabling us to decide if there were any means by which we could make Ibn Saud more actively useful. The project having unfortunately fallen through it seemed imprudent to repeat experiment with another Officer at that season, but we are now reaching end of hot weather and the juncture is favourable review position and revive project if that course seems to be indicated.

The appreciation of Ibn Saud presented in Arab Bureau Bulletin No. 53 hardly does adequate justice to him even in some points of fact but the later notes in bulletin 59 and 60 in a great measure remove unfavourable impression and demonstrate that distrustful attitude of Sheriff and his sons is uncalled for. Incidentally the divergence of the Sheriff's statements quoted on pages 333 and 346 respectively on the subject of Sheriff Abdulla's doings in Nejd in 1914 showing Sheriff's own insincerity in that respect. In any case visit of Ibn Saud's father to Mecca should promote better understanding.









451
452
453

Telegram X Ordinary.

From Cox, Baghdad.

To Secretary of State, repeated Foreign, H.C. Cairo and Political
Basrah

No. 4035 Part II

Dated 29th September 1917.
30th


As regards information reported from Aden it will be noted that it was gathered second hand from Turkish sources which would naturally seek to convey most unfavourable impression as regards Ibn Saud. Moreover I see from the original Aden report that passage of money referred to is said to have occurred "before the outbreak of hostilities in the Hejaz". If that is the case the report has no practical bearing on Ibn Saud's attitude since his public announcement of his adherence to us in November last.

It is possible however that report may refer to mission reported in my telegram No. 766 dated January 31st to Bureau address. Saiyid Muhammad Abdulla Yemani seems to have been one of this party. The report of arrival of this mission in Qasim reached Koweit by caravan in mid December at which time Ibn Saud was still on his return journey home via Bahrain after his visit to Basrah. His first act on reaching home was to send me original letters (referred to in my telegram) which he found awaiting him. On my writing to him to beware of Abdulla Yemani he replied proposing to send me a representative to give fuller information.

It seems clear from comparison of dates that Abdulla Yemani and party never came in contact with Ibn Saud himself as they had passed through Qasim before the latter reached Riadh. If as is quite possible a consignment of Turkish notes and some thousand liras got through it must have been due to slackness or connivance of Ibn Saud retainers in Qasim on whose complete loyalty he cannot depend.

In above connection it will be realised from what follows that Ibn Saud has a very difficult task in present condition to keep his tribes together.

Some





453 452
454


Some weeks ago he sent in urgently to Bahrain asking us to send him out a Doctor as there was a suspicious Epidemic prevailing in Riyadh. No British Doctor being available (in force) American Doctor Harrison in whom I have confidence having offered to go I agreed to his doing so. He has now returned and following is summary of his news:-

Ibn Saud appeared quite satisfied with what we have done for him and had only praises for us but he is greatly hampered and preoccupied by the difficult task of making his tribes pull together and he thinks we do not fully realise this. They resent prolonged stress of war and the severe restrictions placed upon their trade and consequently public feeling in Nejd is not really for us; and though owing to loyal attitude of Ibn Saud there is no overt talk against us yet there is no word spoken in our favour. Incidentally our failure (for obvious reasons) since our occupation of Baghdad to open pilgrimage routes and allow free trade is not understood and has caused disappointment and adverse comment.

Another difficulty for Ibn Saud is that the money lavished on tribes by the Sheriff from our handsome subsidising has righted market for Ibn Saud who cannot compete and finds it difficult to keep his chiefs contented.

Ibn Saud's potential value from military point of view has never been over estimated here and he himself has always maintained that unless assisted with artillery and personnel he was not in a position to attempt to capture Hail. In January last I think we were all agreed that it would have been mistaken policy to push him into any project beyond his powers in which he might have suffered disaster; and though it is true that we have presented him with three machine guns and two mountain guns yet we were unable to give him any personnel from here and without it they are of doubtful use. In short it is clear that if we require to make more military use of him we must really approach subject seriously and lend him an Egyptian or Indian battery with personnel

to





(454) 453
455

to run it for him. I myself doubt whether game would be worth the candle but Egypt may have other views.


In any case however I think it would be for the common good if we were now to send a mission to him consisting of a Political Officer from here and one from Egypt in whose opinion Sheriff would have confidence together with a Military staff officer preferably a gunner who could see the country and make proposals in accordance with practical possibilities. Short of giving him such material assistance and personnel we may depend on his loyalty doing his best on the allowance that we make him to keep his tribes together and to harass and seduce Ibn Rashid's adherents as opportunity offers but I do not think we can expect much more.

Above sent with cognisance of Army Commander.

Addressed to Secretary of State and repeated to Foreign and High Commissioner, Cairo, Political Basrah.

Cox..

FPE





May 11, 1917.

THE NEAR EAST.

31

SHEIKH SIR ABD-EL-AZIZ IBN SAUD, K.C.I.E.

By C. STANLEY G. MYLREA.

In the present world war the Arab is only indirectly concerned, but he has been forced to take sides and to show by the weight of his resources whether he wishes one European Power or another to be the paramount influence in his part of the world. Both England and Germany have their champion in the interior of Arabia, and the two Powers have been able to make use of the feud which has for so long existed between the house of Ibn Rashid, backed by the powerful and numerous Shammar tribe, having its capital at Hail, and the house of Ibn Saud, backed by the rest of the Nejd tribes, and having its capital at Riyadh.

It was comparatively easy for the Turks, under German guidance, to win Ibn Rashid to their side, if only for the reason that Ibn Saud seemed to be leaning towards the British. They could promise him unlimited supplies by way of Baghdad and Mesopotamia. Now, however, that Baghdad and Busrah have come under British control, Ibn Rashid can receive little or nothing from Mesopotamia, and Damascus remains his only certain source.

Ibn Saud, on the other hand, is absolutely dependent on the ports of the Persian Gulf; and, indeed, since his capture of the province of El-Hasa from the Turks, in 1912, his own territory is now washed by the waters of the Persian Gulf.

Germany has spared no effort to keep the friendship of Ibn Rashid, sending him with liberal hand both money and munitions. She has also endeavoured to wean Ibn Saud away from England, but her intrigues in this direction have met with no success. On the contrary, some of Ibn Rashid's best men are leaving him and coming over to England's side, a sure indication on their part that they believe that England will win this war. There is no doubt that in proportion to the vigour with which the Mesopotamian and Egyptian campaigns are prosecuted, will it become increasingly difficult for Ibn Rashid to get any benefit out of his alliance with Turkey and Germany.

The man of strongest personality in Arabia to-day is Abd-el-Aziz Ibn Saud; and his loyalty to the British, in a country where self-interest is the first instinct, is undoubtedly equal to considerable strain. He is a man who has only of recent years come into prominence, and prior to 1897 was an emir without a dominion, for Ibn Rashid held his capital, Riyadh. But in that year Mohammed Ibn Rashid died, and Ibn Saud, backed up by Sheikh Mubarek of Kuwait, who furnished him with four-score camels and riders, seized Riyadh suddenly one night, completely overwhelming its defenders. From that time Ibn Saud's star has been in the ascendant, since in force of character he far surpasses the successor of Mohammed Ibn Rashid; and to-day he is the strongest man in Arabia and the man of the hour.

It is now nearly three years since I first met Abd-el-Aziz Ibn Saud. He was at that time in camp some twenty miles west of Kuwait, near a small town called Jahreh, and had come up from El-Hasa, which he had conquered from the Turks some two years previously. He wanted to discuss the then burning question of British and Turkish relations with Central and Eastern Arabia. He could not be persuaded to accept Kuwait's hospitality, most probably fearing Turkish treachery; for there were several Turkish agents in the town at that time, and Ibn Saud's head was a tempting prize. In his own camp, however, he was absolute master, and could protect himself.

In response to an invitation from the Sheikh, I went out to his camp to treat him and some of his people professionally. Having come up from malaria-stricken Hasa, many of Ibn Saud's men were down with fever, and needed the benefits of modern medicine. His camp was a fine sight, and the two hundred odd glistening white tents made a brave show in the strong sunlight of a May morning. I was rather surprised to find white tents, but "the black tents of Kedar" are going out of fashion among the aristocracy, and the "house of hair," the true Arab tent, is now the dwelling of the Bedouin only. As a matter of fact, the true Arab tent has been much overrated by travellers; for when it is a little bit old, it leaks like a sieve in a shower of rain.

The Sheikh's marquee was at the end of a long avenue of tents pitched much truer to line than one expects in this part of the world, where no one has a straight eye. On my arrival I was at once conducted into the presence of Ibn Saud. He rose to welcome me as I entered, and pointed me to the seat of honour beside him. The tent was furnished in the typical desert style. Persian carpets covered the floor, and, for pillows, camel saddles overlaid with sheepskins were ranged along the sides of the tent. A pleasing dash of colour was added by the gaudy camel housings which hung from the tent poles; but the air of comfort was toned down by rows of exceedingly good rifles which were hung up ready for instant use.

The minute Ibn Saud stood up, I was struck with the personality of the man. In stature he is a good six feet, and with his broad, powerful shoulders presents a truly athletic figure, clean cut and symmetrically developed. He has all the graces of a polished Arabian nobleman, and, in addition, his open countenance invites confidence. As he talks, you feel that he is sincere; there is a ring of truth in all he says. His frequent gestures accentuate the beauty of his shapely hands. Our conversation touched upon many subjects, but perhaps the following instance shows up the man's character in all its desert ruggedness. We were talking of the opening up of Central Arabia to the white men. He said: "They will be welcome, but on one condition only, that they do not interfere in religious matters. In Central Arabia, we are not only one religion, we are all one sect. In many parts of the Mohammedan world you have all the principal sects living together—Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi, Hanbali. In Central Arabia we are all Hanbalis, and there is absolute harmony in consequence. Introduce new faiths, and there will be an end of peace." (The Sheikh's idea of peace, when one considers the endless raiding and petty fighting for which the Arab is famous, is obviously relative.)

"Ours is the true religion," he went on, "but we must follow the teachings of the prophet Mohammed, on whom be prayers and peace. Only recently people have been inviting me to join my interests with theirs because they are Moslems." (The Sheikh mentioned no names, but was no doubt referring to the Turks who had been using the cry of Pan-Islam in order to induce him to come into their political schemes.) "But are these people Moslems? They have thrown aside all of the Prophet's ordinances, they neither pray nor fast nor give alms nor make the pilgrimage. They murder, they oppress, they lie, they steal. They have forsaken the old religion, they are infidels. I will have nothing to do with such people."

"Listen!" he cried, and he sat up straighter, and his eyes glistened. "I will tell you a story. By the orders of the angel Gabriel, a large idol was set up just outside the gates of Paradise. Presently a believer came along and was about to pass into Paradise when the idol's attendant stopped him and said: 'You must offer a beast to the idol.' 'I cannot,' replied the believer, 'for I do not respect idols. Allah has no partners; He is One.' 'Well, then,' said the attendant, 'you must offer a fowl.' The believer still refused. 'In any case,' the attendant went on, 'you must at least offer a fly.' This time the believer yielded, and at once came the order from Gabriel, 'Away with him to Jahannum.' After a while another believer came along, and again the attendant demanded: 'You must sacrifice a beast to the idol before you enter Paradise.' 'Never,' said the believer, 'I believe in Allah; He has no partners.' 'Then, tempted the attendant, 'if you cannot afford a beast you must offer a fowl.' 'No,' persisted the believer, 'I offer no fowls to idols.' 'I really cannot let you pass unless you offer at least a fly to the idol,' the attendant maintained. But the believer was unshaken. 'Beast, fowl, or fly, it is all the same to me; I make no reverence to stone images.' This time came the order from Gabriel, 'He is a true believer; admit him to Paradise.' And," added Ibn Saud, "I will follow my Prophet absolutely. Not even a fly will I offer to any other religion."

It was on November 19 of last year that Ibn Saud next visited this part of the country. The circumstances were markedly different. On the former occasion the vague claims of Turkey to Kuwait were a subject of discussion, and the Crescent and Star still flew from Mubarek's flagstaff. At that time the decision of this question was of momentous importance to Ibn Saud. England and himself regarded one another as unknown quantities, and the Turk was standing by, waiting to see how the sum would work out. Then Ibn Saud would not trust himself in Kuwait.



WHITE HORSE
WHISKY.

GREAT AGE
AND
BOUQUET.




KING GEORGE.



KING OF SPAIN.




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(456) 455
457

Kamayad al Bahāiri of Awazin
and Hairfān al Sharāki of Awazin
were out herding in the Shagg
when they met ten men of the
SBEI riding 5 camels on a
raiding expedition. They were
four men of whom one ran
away and one was captured
by the raiders. The two men
mentioned though surrounded
put up a fight and killed
two of them and the others
fled - One rifle, a musket
was left by them and brought
in. ~~The raiders had meanwhile~~
~~captured one~~ The raiders got
off with two hawks and
a shotgun but these men
captured a thelul and 2 rifles.
The raiders said that they were
SBEI and the man killed
was Tālmis - They did not
recognize any of the rest.
This happened two days ago.





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TREATY

In the Name of God the Merciful and Compassionate.

Preamble.

The High British Government on its own part, and 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdur 'Rahman bin Faisal Al-Saud, Ruler of Najd, El Haaa, Qatif and Jubail, and the towns and ports belonging to them, on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors, and tribesmen, being desirous of confirming and strengthening the friendly relations which have for a long time existed between the two parties, and with a view to consolidating their respective interests - the British Government have named and appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Percy Cox, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., British Resident in the Persian Gulf, as their Plenipotentiary, to conclude a treaty for this purpose with 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdur Rahman bin Faisal Al-Saud.

The said Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Percy Cox and 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdur Rahman bin Faisal Al-Saud, hereafter known as "Bin Saud" have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:-

(I)

The British Government do acknowledge and admit that Najd, Al Haaa, Qatif and Jubail, and their dependencies and territories, which will be discussed and determined hereafter, and their ports on the shores of the Persian Gulf are the countries of Bin Saud and of his fathers before him, and do hereby recognise the said Bin Saud as the independent Ruler thereof and absolute Chief of their tribes, and after him his sons and descendants by inheritance; but the selection of the individual shall be in accordance with the nomination (i.e., by the living Ruler) of his successor; but with the proviso that he shall not be a person antagonistic to the British Government in any respect; such as, for example, in regard to the terms mentioned in this Treaty.

(II)

In the event of aggression by any Foreign Power on the territories of the countries of the said Bin Saud and his descendants without reference to the British Government and without giving her an opportunity of communicating with Bin Saud and composing the matter, the British Government will aid

Bin





(452) 457
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Bin Saud to such extent and in such a manner as the British Government after consulting Bin Saud may consider most effective for protecting his interests and countries.

(III)

Bin Saud hereby agrees and promises to refrain from entering into any correspondence, agreement, or treaty, with any Foreign Nation or Power, and further to give immediate notice to the Political authorities of the British Government of any attempt on the part of any other Power to interfere with the above territories.

(IV)

Bin Saud hereby undertakes that he will absolutely not cede, sell, mortgage, lease, or otherwise dispose of the above territories or any part of them, or grant concessions within those territories to any Foreign Power, or to the subjects of any Foreign Power, without the consent of the British Government. And that he will follow her advice unreservedly provided that it be not damaging to his own interests.

(V)

Bin Saud hereby undertakes to keep open within his territories, the roads leading to the Holy Places, and to protect pilgrims on their passage to and from the Holy Places.

(VI)

Bin Saud undertakes, as his fathers did before him, to refrain from all aggression on, or interference with the territories of Kuwait, Bahrain, and of the Shaikhs of Qatar and the Oman Coast, who are under the protection of the British Government and who have treaty relations with the said Government; and the limits of their territories shall be hereafter determined.

(VII)

The British Government and Bin Saud agree to conclude a further detailed treaty in regard to matters concerning the two parties.

Dated 18th Safar 1334 corresponding to 26th December 1915.

(signed and sealed) 'Abdul 'Aziz al-Saud.

(sd) P. Z. Cox, Lieutenant-Colonel,
British Resident in the P. Gulf.

(signed)





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(Signed) CHURCHFORD,
Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

This Treaty was ratified by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council at Simla on the 18th day of July A.D. one thousand nine hundred and sixteen.

(Signed) A.H. GRANT,
Secretary to the Government of India,
Foreign and Political Department.

In compliance with you No. 1073 of 9.10.17.

P.C. Hall
10/10/17

Inner envelope sealed with my
private seal - a swan standing in
a lake with a perch in its mouth.
R







459(a)


(460)

البرقياني بغداد بتاريخه فيروزي الحاكم السيدي بلكايت
 فان كان ضيخان و سلطان الخليل وغيره من المحض
 بحرون معاهدات شكافلين بظهم بمابض ويقدموها لنا
 ويشرعو فيها انهم قابلي ان يبقوا في اراضينا بما مكن
 الذي تخصها لهم ولديهم يدخلون او يتطوعون الكوت
 ونفادها وانهم حقاً وجزاً بالمقطع طاقين لادامنا
 وبشرط انهم يكونوا ملكهم بموجب الظهير ولكن اظن
 بمعية ما تذكرون يلزم ان تقبل بدوا بسرعة وقت ومكن
 تسهيل العمل باسرع وقت وبقية اكمال المقاد
 حيث كويت يلزم تكا بالمقطع منظره من الجاه اما تفكر
 هكذا يلزم نرجوكم ان تنظروا فاي اجل الحمايق يلزم ان
 نخطات فيها الذي تقدر ان تحصلوا عليها من ضيخان









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(462)

INDO-EUROPEAN TELEGRAPH DEPARTMENT.

RECEIVED.

FORWARDED.

Monthly No. _____

to _____ at _____ by _____



from _____

No. _____ Date _____ Original date and time tendered by sender. _____

OFFICIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

To Political Bagdad & Political Basra

My 74 28/1 a.m. SBEI riders
 twelve days ago attacked hawkair
 party of one of the Shaikhs family
 capturing one camel & two hawks
 they were driven off with loss of
 one man killed one camel & two
 rifles captured as Shaikh attaches
 importance to matter & believes
 these raids & robberies are not
 being properly discouraged by BIN SAUD
 advised Basra Political Bagdad Political 153








461 463

Write a letter to Abdulaziz Bin
Saud = in full? sense
After Compliments.

I was very glad to hear of Your
Excellency again from our
friend Colonel Cunliffe Owen who
arrived, safe & well, from Gatif
some days ago - He said that
Your Ex - was in good health
and he was full of gratitude
for all your kindness &
hospitality - All of us who
have been the guests of Your Ex-
cellency have the same story
to tell of the courtesy and
hospitality of yourself and
your officers & the people of
Nejd [Here put in some
Arab proverb about the
hospitality & courtesy of
Nejd]

As regards public news





(464) 462 464

You are aware that from a long
time past that the lower classes
in Russia succeeded in con-
-trolling the Government of that
unhappy land and as the
uneducated masses will do when
the rulers are abolished have
proceeded to great excesses - The
result is that some portions
of the Empire actually called in
the enemy to protect them &
to restore order - The Germans
then advanced & the Russians
retreated abandoning guns &
material. Today I hear that
these rascals have signed
peace - May God continue
to unite them... Meanwhile
we hear that JAPAN acting
in concert with the allies is
taking action in SIBERIA &
will seize all the depots of
arms & ammunition especially



10/4
 (2)
 We are aware that from a long
 time past that the Arab
 in Russia is much in the
 - looking to the Government of that
 unhappy land and as they
 persecuted those who do not
 the rulers are absolute here
 proceeded to great excess - the
 result is that some portions
 of the Empire actually called in
 the army to protect them &
 to restore order. The Government
 then ordered the Russian
 authorities to send some
 material. Today I hear that
 these troops have arrived
 here. They are continuing
 to unite them. When they
 are here that Tatars who
 in contact with the others is
 taking action in 1858 &
 will seize the depot of
 arms & ammunition especially





the vast accumulations at ^{(465) 463} 465
Vladivostok where there is said
to be millions of pounds worth
of ammunition —

As regards my private news I am
returning home to my family,
whom I have not seen for some
years — my children are nearly
grown up & I have to see about
their future — I shall often &
often think of KASIM WASHY
& RIADH, where I received
such great kindness from your
Excellency — ~~may~~ Remember
me, to ~~your son~~ your son Turki,
your honoured father the Imam
Abdurrahman, the friend
of the British to your brave
son Turki, beloved of all the
tribes, to the Gallant Bin
Jaluwi and other members
of the royal family of AS SAUD



The first recommendation of
 the Committee was that a
 the building of houses
 of some nature -
 The second and third were
 concerning those to be
 when there had been
 years - the children are
 grown up & there is
 their future - I think
 after that of 1850 in
 1851, when I received
 back from London from
 the country - the
 as to the London
 your business for the
 Abdullah, the friend
 of the British to the
 in the, before of all
 tribes, to the
 future and other
 of the people of the







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Telegram.R.

From Political Bahrain

To Political Baghdad repeated Basrah, Kuwait,
Philby, Bombay

No. 63 C

Dated 21.3.18 Recd. 22.3.18 (17.00)

Bin Sa'ud arrived Haba .

He expects to be there about twenty days.


Copy to B.O.Kuwait for information.

Colonel Cunliffe Owen for information - I hear
from Bombay that Philby left for Basrah ; the date was
not stated but presumably two or three days ago.

R

23.3.18

Captain
Political Agent, Kuwait





No. 318/1C

POLITICAL AGENCY.

Bahrain, the 14th March 1918

766 (468)

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To

The Chief Civil Commissioner,
BAGHDAD

MEMORANDUM.

With reference to your telegram No. 1805 of 23rd February 1918, I beg to enclose in original, a letter received from Ibn Sa'ud two days ago, together with a translation thereof. The contents were not wired to you as the latter part regarding the attack on Ras Haldah and Shaikh Salim's hunting party appears to have been very badly written and its meaning seems to be rather obscure.

Copy of this Memorandum together with translation and copy of Ibn Sa'ud's letter has been sent to Political Agent, Kuwait.

Sd/- G. A. MunGavin.

Political Agent, Bahrain.


Copy to Political Agent, Kuwait.

Political Agent, Bahrain.

Mr R 6/4/18

Recd on 7/4

P.A. The telegram referred to in the attached is of file 10/4 headed "British relations with Bin Saud" which is a Confidential file and kept in P.A. cupboard. 10/4/18





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Translation of a letter dated Jamadi al Awwal 1338 (= part of February and March 1918) from His Excellency Shaikh Sir Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman Al Faisal As Sa'ud, K.C.I.E., Ruler of Najd, to Captain P.C. Loch, H.M.'s Political Agent, Bahrain.


After Compliments,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 8th, 11th and 13th Jamadi al Awwal 1338 (=20th, 23rd and 25th February 1918) respectively, and to say that I was very pleased to note the contents especially regarding your kind endeavours and efforts in sending on the letters that I had sent enclosed in your letter and which you mention to have forwarded to their respective addressees, namely the Hon'ble friend of all Sir Percy Cox and Mr. Philby. ~~and~~ The good news about the latter's intention to return to your side has added to my pleasure.

As regards your mention that you have not received one of the letters of Colonel Cunliffe-owen dated 1st February 1918, I beg to say that I had sent this via Basa through the Amir of that province, and have written to the aforesaid to make enquiries to find out the reason for which it has not ^{been} received by you; I am also making necessary enquiries. With regard to the pleasure you had in visiting Dohah with Mr. Hill, I.C.S., Deputy Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, to see the friend of all Shaikh Abdullah bin Qasim Al Thani with whom you had lunch, I pray to God, that this visit may be one of the best occasions to confirm the friendly relations between the two nations.

With reference to your mention respecting the export of horse-shoes and nails and your asking for the assistance of the Deputy Political Resident at Bushire and your exerted endeavours for the same I beg to convey my gratefulness and thanks to your honour.

With regard to the telegraphic message conveyed to me in your letter from the Hon'ble friend of all Major-General Sir Percy Cox in which he mentions that Colonel Hamilton, Political Agent, Kuwait, reported to him an attack by the tribesmen of Sbai





(no) 468 470



"Subai" on "Ras Haldah" two hours distant from Kuwait and that their attack was on a shooting party composed of the relations of Shaikh Salim Al Mubarak capturing a camel and two hawks, I beg to state that I had no knowledge of the former and I do not consent to it, ~~and~~ I am extremely displeased with its occurrence and will punish the aggressors most severely; but as regards the latter, it is not as has been mentioned to the Chief Civil Commissioner but it is as I am explaining ^{it} below:-


"The actual event which took place is that a party of the "Al Sahul" who were proceeding to Kuwait, met a man with a camel at a about a place called "'Irq" carrying with him two birds; they enquired after him in order to know his intentions, and whether he was one of the subjects of our friends upon which he informed them that he was one of the subjects of Shaikh Salman Al Hamud As Subah, and they informed ^{him} that they were also the subjects of Bin Sa'ud, ~~and~~ then they enquired about his friends, and he told them ~~xxx~~ that they were behind him, and he was sent accompanied by two men who were of the friends of "Al Sahul" after they had exchanged confidence to one another, and as soon as they reached the friends of the men of the abovementioned Shaikh and his friends, the friends of the camel-man killed the abovementioned two men of the "Al Sahul's" friends and ran away, having escaped, and the party of the "Al Sahul" returning to our side with the aforesaid two birds which are well looked after with us, and the camel escaped towards Kuwait, and I was informed of this displeasing news, and this is the truth of the affair, while I do not consent, as I have stated above, that, any one, should aggress any of the subjects of "Al Subah" more particularly, as they enjoy the favourable consideration of the High Government whom I have to please in order to acquire their satisfaction," and I request your honour to report the facts as explained above to His Honour with my respects.

This is what had to be said and may you be preserved.

P.S.

The last letters I sent you from Colonel Gunliffe-Gwan he had given me twice and I sent them all at one time and the last you received was before his arrival to Naas.





بسم عبد الرحمن الرحيم


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(471)

من عبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن الفيصل آل سعود الوهاب الجل الأكرم ذوالكأرم الشيم بحسبنا العزيز صاحب العادة
قبطان بي جي لادن المحترم فضل الدولة الفخيمة البريطانية العظمى بالبحرين راساً معاليه
السلام وعرض الاحترام وردت اليها محورات معادكم المحبى للوضه ٨ - ١١ - ١٢ عا دى الاول ١٣٣٧ هـ
المطابق ٢٥ - ٢٤ - ٢٤ فبراير ١٩١٨ م تلوناها مسررين خصوص من هاتكم المبدولة وساعكم
الكرمي لارسال مكاتيب المرسولة بطبي كتابكم الذي قد منا لخصتكم فذكرون ان معادكم تفضلتم
بارسالها لصاحبها لكل من حضرة صاحب الفخامة محب الجميع سرى كاكسى المخم ومعاودة المستر
عليه المحترم وايضا اخباركم السارة واستبشارنا بوجع المولى السيد الى طرق معادكم رازي سرراً
اما تعريفكم بعلم وصول مكاتيب معادكم الكرنل كليف اوزن المحترم الموضع افبري
١٨٨٨ م ارسلناه بطريق الاصل فاستد امير البلدة المذكورة وكبتنا للومى الى ليعق تحقيقات
اللازمه ما هي اسباب الوجع لعدم وصوله ونحو ذلك نجي تحقيقات المقضية فامان قبل
السور الذي حصل بقبلكم الى الدوحة بعجة المستر بل آى سى اس قاعقام رئيس الخليج الفارسي
لزيازة صديق الجميع الشيخ عده بن قاسم ال ثاني المحترم وحضور معادكم على الملأه معده
حضره فرجوانا شاعده ستكون من احدى الوسائل لتأكيد روابط العدايده فيما بين الاثنين
فاما استعاراتكم من خصوص تحيل هذا يافا الخيل والماسير واستحصال المساعدة التي
تقتضيها الى قاعقامه الرياسته في مندوبه وشعر اجتهادكم المصروفه لاجلها صار موجهاً
للمرتبة فلهذا نرفع لعدائكم تشكراً آتياً -

فاما تعريف حضرتكم في كتابكم الاخير من طرف البرقيه السيد الوارده من صاحب الفخامة محب
الجميع الماجور جنرال سرى كاكسى المخم فذكر خاتمته فيها ان معادكم الكرنل هاملتن المحترم فضل
الدولة الفخيمة الكويت اخبره بخصه بمحاجة قبيلة سبيع على رأس حله لهدا عن مسافه
عن الكويت وايضا هجومهم على القناصل المذكورين من اقرباء معادكم الشيخ سالم ال مبارك
المحترم واخذهم البعير منهم وصغرهم اما الاول ما عندنا مندوبه ولم نرضى به وتكدرنا طرقي غايه
من وقوعه ونسئل فاعلاد تشكيد وخجائيد بالمجاراة الشديده فاما الثاني ليس كما هو رر فخاله
الحاكم السلس الملك العام بل هو مثل ما نشره آتياً: الوقعة الجايزه القصيده جماعة من
السور قاصدين الكويت صا ذوا راعى زلول حول موضع المسمى "عروق" حامل معد طيرين
وسئلوا عند اجل الاستطلاع على هوشه هل هو من منسوبين اصداً فاعلاد فاجبروا انه من منسوبين
الشيخ سلمان المحمود اصباح وعرفهم انهم انفس من منسوبين ابن معوه وسئلوا عن زلفانه
وعلمهم انهم في خلافه ارسلوا ومعد اثنين من زلفا السور بعد ما عطا الوثائق وحين
وصولهم عند زلفاء رجال الشيخ المولى السيد زلفا فقتلوا رجلين المذكورين وفروا هاربين
وجامع السور رجموا الى طرفنا استجيب الطيرين المذكورين وهما محفوظين عندنا والذلول هرب
الى حقه الكويت واخبرونا بهذا الخبر المذكور وهذا حقيقة الامر ولم نرضى كما ذكرنا آتياً



470 (472)


ان يتعدا حد على منسوبين الصباح وكيفية انضمام عليه مراعاة الدولة الفخمة التي لمع
خاطرها الاستحلاب رضاها فوجوا ان سعادتكم تخبرون الحقائق كما تشنوا حالها
وتعوضون احترامنا هذا ما لم نر في عدد رستم محفوظين ^{عند الامير} ^{عند الامير} ^{عند الامير}
بسم هذا لحاق خيراتنا بعد


سعادة المحب:

اخر ما يتبادر لسلطاننا الحضرته من سعادة الكون كليفات ورون اعطانا نأدفعه
ارسلناها جميع دفعة واحدة آخر ما جاءكم قبل قدومه الى الاضواء هذا ما لم نر في عدد رستم
محرمين

True Copy.

Atfal Hsani
Interpreter
14 ³/₁₈







(473) 471 472

Yuseuf Al Bawani, was a broker employed by
by Maraffi some years ago, when gun-running
was in vogue. He was dismissed as his services
were no longer required.

The Shaikh seems to have an especial liking
for the man & takes his advice in all matters.
He reads the "majlis" every night, & has five or six
of his own selected men with him. Molla Sala,
Abdul Aziz, & A. Lahff are not admitted.

He is very anti-British, as proved in Sorphi's case.
Has been heard to remark before the Shammur caravan
left "why should we look to the English, we should look
to our own."


When the Shaikh in the day time decides, at night
another decision is arrived at. When I told him at
5 pm on the 28th Sept. to wait twelve hours for the C.P.O.'s
reply, he agreed: but at night, sent for the Amirs and
told them to leave early in the morning.


I put all this down to the bad influence Yuseuf
has over the Shaikh, & if he was threatened with de-
portation, no doubt the Shaikh would turn to his
fathers & brothers advisers.

Colonel Frey had on one occasion threatened
him, but it seems to have had no effect.

He has been blaming Mr. Sala, for giving me
information & informed the Shaikh he called on me
of "Eet" day for some purpose.

All Arab officials would like to see him away.






(474)

472 476

بسم الله وحده

الحضرة ذيل المعادة عبد العزيز باشا السعود والي ولاية نجد وقائدها
المكتوب المأخوذ من ابن رشيد في قصص الجبال التي يرسلها إلى المدينة
توفيق فرعون أفندي طبا أرسلته لظرفكم أرجوكم أن تقضوه هذا المكتوب
إلى اللومى إليه وتساو عو في إرسال الجبال التي تنتظرها بفارغ الصبر
قد نصرت ابن رشيد بأعطاء محافطين حبا يلزم لإبصار الجبال
من منطقته إلى المدينة سالمة آمنة فبناء على ذلك عرفتم أني قد خل
الجبال في أراضي ابن الرشيد والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته
١٧٤٠ كانون ثاني ١٢٢٢ قande الحملة الحجازية
المبرلوا






475

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477

ذبح الحمية توفيق فرعون فندى


كنت مرسلًا كتابًا لابن الرشيد لامرأى الجمال من أراضيه وقد جاء الجواب يقول فيه
لا محذور في أمر مال الله دولة من أراضى ابن الرشيد بناء على ذلك الجمال التي لترتبه
في المال سوقوها ومتى قربت من أراضى ابن الرشيد أخبر وعبد محمد بك الذي هو في
حبال بالكيفية واسلم عليكم ١١٢٠ هـ الجمعة ١٢ شعبان ١٢٤٤ قاندة حملة الجمال لغزبه
المبرلوا





بسم الله وحده

475
 474
 (476)
 الحضرة ذي السعادة عبيد العزيز باشا العود والي نجد وقوماندانها دام موقفا
 اخذة جوابا ناطقا بان لا محذور في امرار الجبال من اراضي الرشيده التي تدر كها توفيق
 فرعون افندي بما ان احتياجي الى الجبال كالمبرجة ارجو من سعادته المعاونة
 لارسالها كسبت الى توفيق فرعون افندي بان انجز عبد الحميد بك الذكي هو
 الآن في حائل عنده ابن الرشيد اذا قربت الجبال من اراضي الرشيده او قبل بهامت ومعاودة
 نجاحكم وصول الجبال عن قريب الى المدينة المنورة امينة سالمة وارجو ان تقبلوا
 احتراما من المخصوصة اليوم انتم كعم فيصل وان شاء الرحمن قريباً اوصل
 لسعادته نبشيرة الاضفريه الكاملة والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته
 في اذار الحجة الثرية ١٢٤٤
 قامة حملة الحجاز الفرية
 الميرلوا






بسم الله وحمد

جهاة غربية
اركان حربية
عدن

474
477

حضرة والي ولاية نجد وقائدها الامير ابن سعود العظم

مما لا يخفى على جنابكم العالي حالة المضايقة الحاصلة على اهالي المدينة من جهة
الارزاق بسبب تعدي العصاة والاشقياء في هذه الايام احبانا مع الخو
المحدي وانقطاع الوارد من جهة السواحل لتعدي اعداء الاسلام والمسلمين
قوم الانكليز الكافرين وقد حررواكم قبل ايام قليلة بهذه النصوص
وحيث انه الآن قد تشكلت جمعية تجارية في هذا الطرف بقصد جلب
بضائع من طرفكم خدمة لاهالي المدينة وتخفيف ازمة الشدة عندهم
فلذا اننا ارجوكم اخبارنا بسرعة عن درجة امكان المساعدة لهم بمثل
الاموال في ذلك الطرف وتأمين الطريق الى اي محل يكون حتى نرسلهم
الى طرفكم العالي ونرجو الختام اقبلوا فائق الاحترام والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله
وبركاته ٣٢ جماد الثاني ١٣٣٥
قائد الحملة التجارية
الميرلوا






476 478
(478)

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الاجنب بالاكرم المكرم توفيق ابن فرعون سلمه الله تعالى
بعد مراد السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته بلغنا انكم بعض الوحشة من بلاد
الطريق الذي منظرها وحيث ان شغلكم متعلق بالكل يومه وانكم من طوارفها
الساعين في مساعدتها حررنا لكم هذه الكلمات تاميناً لكم ولما يتعلق بكم
من الاشغال فعليه لانما ذروا كل شئ ولا تكون لكم فكر بده انك انت الله
تعالى والسلام

الامير
جورج
رئيسه
○





473

عن المدينة المنورة
٦ محرم الحرام ١٢٩٦

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
الحمد لله وحده


محاضر
مستفيس قوامه ألف
شبه قسم
مقرر

حضرة صاحب السعادة والي نجد وقومته انزها الامير عبد العزيز باشا بن سعود المحترم
ادام الله اقباله
من مدني سنة وجاري مكاتيب الذين ارسلتها لخدمتكم لم اخذة منبرها والاجاب
واحد اثنى انزها وقفت بيده العصاة في انشاء الطريق لكن كذا اثنى
انه جنابكم لم تناظرون محكم لسبب ان خونت الانكليز قاطعوا الطريق
عن اليمن ابقي ارسال مقدر من المصارف الارفقائنا و اخوان دينهم وما ياشبهه
بان امن الطريق هو الرضا الذي حضرتم فيه واسلم التداير ايصال المصارف
تود بقاء جنابكم العالي فلهذا ارجو بكمال الالهيته من فخامتكم بشروع جواب
الموافقة مع النجاء الذين ارسلناه و قد كرون لنا من يكون تسليم المصارف
في المدينة و في الختام اقبلوا فائق احدي و سلام عليكم و رحمة الله وبركاته
قائد القوة الغربية
المجازية مبرلوا

Given me by Bin-Saud
at Riyadh 11/12/17.

Relly

3/3






٤٧٨ ٤٧٩
من ماضي ابن اشرم الى جناب المكرم عبد العزيز بن سعود المكرم
السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته ومغفرته ومرضاته وبعد طول استدعائك والله ان اليوم
اعز ما يكون اموالكم وانما لمزوم الا اوجركم وبعد والله ان اليوم اني مثل تركي
وهذه الولد راضك وانت لازم ترد لي انك انك بالبلاد والاطالع ترد لي مع
الولد لول اموالكم وانما نحن مع اموالكم والا اليوم صرة خضول ونسلم
على عبد الرحمن والعيال وانت سالم كلهم
مضني ابن اشرم

من ماضي ابن اشرم الى جناب عبد العزيز بن سعود المكرم
السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته ومغفرته ومرضاته وبعد طول استدعائك
اما بعد اليوم معروفك تغنا لجمعين شرد اليوم الذي في نفسك الايجرا
لانك اكله ابن رشيد ولا اصغر شرد والذي بنك بنياه الله واليوم
هنا ممنونين المضاة لازمك ان بقا بغيره او قريب فحنا ممنونين وشكرين
لك اليوم وروم والذي في نفسك تحبنا به وانت سالم كلهم
مضني ابن اشرم

بسم الله

من محسن الفرم الى المكرم العزيز بن عبد الرحمن الفرم
سلمه الله وهداه واعزه على من عاداه امين الله عليه ورحمة الله وبركاته
ومغفرته ومرضاته وبعد الواصل اليك يا اخي يا صديق يا صديق
هذه اوله يوم جينا اغرنا على ابن ارمال وخفنا منه المدايه وهذه
حذيتك من الى جاضرهم منظرهم رجائك المزيه راح من عنده العرب قبل
اجي وهل حين جيت اهل عنده الذي بي ما عنده من بني على احمد وانا في
بصير عتبها الطرفه ويا صديق يا اخي حنا نطلب من الله ثم منك الماشحه
وناخي عنده الاولي الخاطراتم هذا ما لازم تعرفه جنابك وسلم على الله الدائم محمد وتركي
والعيال والعزب عليك وانت سالم كلهم وحافظنا نهد ربيهم
□







479 480
(481)

Sir,

The attached
papers are to be
filed in File No: $\frac{x}{4}$
headed "British relations
with Bin Saud" which
is a Confidential file
and is with you:

Mykhed
20/2/18





No. 4158
9/2

482 480 481

Chief Political Office,
Basrah, the 17th March 1917.

C.P.O., G.H.O.

Copies submitted for information.

Register received

Amman

Captain,
Deputy Chief Political Officer.

Copy to :-


P.A., Koweit.

Put 25/3

KUWAIT POLITICAL AGENCY
No. 374
26-3-17

Translation of a letter dated 16 Rabi Al Awal=8/2/17, from Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman al Faisal to the Chief Political Officer.

Translation of a letter dated 7th Rabi al Akhar 1335=31/1/17, from Sharif Mohammad bin Abdullah al Hajuri al Yamani to the Imam Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman al Faisal al Saud.





(483) 481 482

Translation of a letter dated 16 Rabi Al Awal =8/2/17, From Abdul Aziz Bin Abdul Rahman Al Faisal to the Honourable Sir Percy Cox, Chief Political Officer.

In the Name of God the Most Merciful and Compassionate.

After offering salams and respects, the cause of writing this letter is to ask about your welfare, and if you ask about us we are, thanks to God, quite well, and true to the ties of friendship and love. I submit this letter of mine with our messenger 'Abbas Al Falaji who went to Syria to settle private matters with some people from Najd at Syria, and also with the Anazah. We are sending this man in order to place before you the details of the condition of the Turkish Government with her subjects in Syria, and what he saw with his own eyes. As regards what the friend of all, Col. Hamilton, the Consul of the Great Government at Kuwait, has said respecting the trade between the People of Najd and those of Kuwait, and the sending of imported goods to the enemies, I mean to Hail, Medinah and Syria, it cannot logically be admitted that we should give help and assistance in money or goods. It is not hidden from Your Excellency that I have written to you on the matter and that I was aware of what was happening before it took place, and requested you to mark this thing specially, and undoubtedly you still remember. I have taken the necessary precautions that lead to preventing this thing which causes harm to both sides. I also beg to inform you respecting Al Sharif Muhammad Al Hajury who came from Medinah, apart from the letters we have previously ~~xxxxxx~~ sent to you: he went to Yaman, and it happened that I was at Al Hasa at the time. We received a letter from him which you will find enclosed. I sought information from the people who know something about those of Yaman, they say he has a tribe and authority in their country. I send the letter to you; perhaps the Great Govt. has views concerning Al Yaman. This man is sure to be under Al Idrisi if he is under anyone; He will be of your party. It is probable that Al Imam Yahia wishes to unite with Great Britain as we hear that they
are




Translation of a letter dated 18 Rabi' Al Awwal - 1282/17, from
Abdul Aziz Bin Abdul Rahman Al Faisal to the Honorable Sir Percy
Cox, Chief Political Officer.

In the Name of God the Most Merciful and Compassionate.
After offering salams and respects, the cause of writing this
letter is to ask about your welfare, and if you ask about us we are
thanks to God, quite well, and true to the ties of friendship and
love. I submit this letter of mine with our messenger 'Abdus Al
Faisal who went to Syria to settle private matters with some people
from Hajd at Syria, and also with the Anasah. We are sending this
man in order to place before you the details of the condition of
the Turkish Government with her subjects in Syria, and what he saw
with his own eyes. As regards what the friend of Ali, Col. Hamilton,
the Consul of the Great Government at Kuwait, has said respecting
the trade between the People of Hajd and those of Kuwait, and the
sending of imported goods to the enemies, I mean to Hajl, Hadinah
and Syria, it cannot logically be admitted that we should give help
and assistance in money or goods. It is not hidden from Your
Excellency that I have written to you on the matter and that I was
aware of what was happening before it took place, and requested you
to mark this thing specially, and undoubtedly you still remember.
I have taken the necessary precautions that lead to preventing this
thing which causes harm to both sides. I also beg to inform you
respecting Al Sharif Muhammad Al Hajury who came from Hadinah, apart
from the letters we have previously mentioned sent to you; he went
to Yaman, and it happened that I was at Al Hana at the time. We
received a letter from him which you will find enclosed. I
sought information from the people who know something about those
of Yaman, they say he has a tribe and authority in their country.
I send the letter to you; perhaps the Great Govt. has views con-
cerning Al Yaman. This man is sure to be under Al Idhal if he is
under anyone; He will be of your party. It is probable that Al
Imam Yabis wishes to unite with Great Britain as we hear that the



482 483
(484)

are in great trouble because they are unable to get anything from abroad. We beg of you to excuse us for writing at such length as we must explain to you what we hear and see. Your view is of course the best. This is what had to be said. I hope you will continue sending me news of the victories of our friend the Govt. of Great Britain and her Allies in the battlefields. Please maintain friendship with your lover and accept my respects.





483
485 484

Translation of a letter dated 7th Rabi Al Akhar 1335=31/1/17,
from Sharif Mohammad bin Abdullah at Hajuri al Yamani to the Imam
Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman al Faisal al Saud.

A/C.

We have arrived in your country and we wish to see you and to
have a verbal conference with you referring to the interests of
Islam and the Muslims. It is not hidden from you that we came to
you having heard that you have entered into an agreement with the
British Government with a view to preserve the land of the Moslems.
Saiyid Muhammad^{bin}/Ali Idrisi of Tahama, Yaman has also agreed with
them. They are in the sea and he on the land and thus the Turks
will be completely beaten and through the Germans Yaman and other
places have gone out of their hands. Please communicate with me
through Saiyid Muhammad bin Ali al Idrisi who is at Sabya and
Shaikh 'Abas at Hajour. Yahya is at Thawab near our town Hajur;
he (i.e. the Idrisi ?) is following him and defending the Italians
(or possesses Italians guns). My town is distant six hours journey
and the district of Hajur is seen from the mountains of the town of
Al Zayud.

Three years ago that we came out of Hajur and the Wali
Mahmud Nadim came to us and he did (not ?) succeed in making peace
between me and Yahya at Thawab. Everybody knows my influence in
all the mountains of al Zayud from Ta'aza to Sa'dah, Hashid and Bakil.
If the matters progress favourably, let me know what is necessary and
I will refer to Imam Yahya. He has the Arab chiefs under him and we
shall explain the matters to them. Then the conditions will improve
and Imam Yahya will help.

No Arab likes to have his land and town ruined and people
killed.

I guarantee this to you, to the satisfaction of God and His
Prophet and for the welfare of Islam, according to what you expect
from us and we rely upon God and you.

Our



Translation of a letter dated 7th Rabi' al Awwal 1338-31/1/17.
 From Sharif Muhammad bin Abdullah al Hajuri al Yamani to the Imam
 Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman al Faisal al Saud.

We have arrived in your country and we wish to see you and to
 have a verbal conference with you referring to the interests of
 Islam and the Muslims. It is not hidden from you that we came to
 you having heard that you have entered into an agreement with the
 British Government with a view to preserve the land of the Muslims.
 Sayid Muhammad Ali ibn al-Husayn has also agreed with
 them. They are in the sea and he on the land and thus the Turks
 will be completely beaten and through the Germans Yaman and other
 places have gone out of their hands. Please communicate with me
 through Sayid Muhammad bin Ali al-Husayn who is at Babay and
 Sheikh 'Abbas al-Hajuri. Babay is at Thawab near our town Hajuri.
 He (i.e. the ibn al-Husayn) is following him and defending the Italian
 (or possesses Italian guns). My town is distant six hours' journey
 and the district of Hajuri is seen from the mountain of the town of
 al-Yayud.

Three years ago that we came out of Hajuri and the Wali
 Mahmud Hashim came to us and he did (not?) succeed in making peace
 between us and Babay al-Thawab. Everybody knows my influence in
 all the mountains of al-Yayud from Ta'aza to Sa'dah, Hashid and Babay.
 If the matters progress favourably, let me know what is necessary and
 I will refer to Imam Yahya. He has the Arab chiefs under him and we
 shall explain the matters to them. Then the conditions will improve
 and Imam Yahya will help.

No Arab likes to have his land and town ruined and people
 killed.

I guarantee this to you, to the satisfaction of God and His
 Prophet and for the welfare of Islam, according to what you expect.
 From us and we rely upon God and you.

Our




(486) 784
485

Our salams to Imam Abdur Rahman, your sons and all Shaikhs.

P.S.

You know that there is nothing between us but virtue and honour.
The mountains range all about Yaman. You know not O Imam. God is
witness and He orders what he likes.





485 486
487
Telegram (P).

From - Arbur, Cairo.

To - Political, Baghdad.

No. A.B.624.

Dated the 6th and recd. the 7th December 1917.

Strong rumour, which King Husain evidently wishes us to believe, is reported by him to effect that Ibn Saud is taking hostile action against Shakh Salim of Koweit. We have provisionally told King's representative here that we ignore and discredit the rumour. Is there any foundation for this rumour, or anything in the actual relations or differences about Ajman or supplies etc. which make hostilities likely in near future.

Arbur, Cairo.

Telegram X.

From - Arbur, Baghdad.

To - Arbur, Cairo.

No. 5816.

Dated the 7th December 1917.

Your telegram of 6th December, 624 A.B.

There is no foundation for the rumour nor are any such developments in the least degree likely.

Arbur, Baghdad.

No. 10102
9/2

OFFICE OF THE CIVIL COMMISSIONER.
Baghdad, the 7th December 1917.

C. G. S., G.H.Q.


Copy for information.

ATM...
Civil Commissioner.

Copy to:-

D. C. C. Basrah.
P. A. Koweit. ✓

N.J.G.





Telegram X.

From - G.O.C.-in-Chief, Baghdad.

To - Foreign, Delhi, repeated Secretary of State
for India, London, and Prodrone, Cairo.

No. 5777.

Dated the 6th December 1917.


Copy sent
with my Memo.
No. 7115, dated
22-10-1917
to G.O.S.

486
487
(488)

Please see Cox's telegram 4488, dated 20th
October in which the inability or disinclination of
Shaikh of Koweit to prevent a large caravan leaving
Koweit was reported.

That particular caravan may have been bona fide
but since then we have continued to receive evidence
of large quantities of supplies from Koweit reaching
enemy destinations. Shaikh Salim when remonstrated
with simply denies statements while averring that
nothing can leave the town without his knowledge.

At present there is practically no steamer
traffic to Koweit and the port receives its supplies
almost entirely by dhow from other ports, so that
control from the source (i.e. Bombay and Karachi) is
not possible. Neither do we desire in view of the
urgency of the food question to deprive Mesopotamia
of a conveniently situated additional clearing station
for foodstuffs. But it is becoming urgently necessary
so to supervise and register all export as to ensure
its not passing to enemy destinations. In order to
do this, no other course seems left to us but to place
troops at Koweit to form blockade cordon round the town
and regulate export under the supervision of the
Political Officer, with such assistance as may be
necessary. It is considered that ^{two} ~~the~~ platoons would
suffice. Though the Shaikh is new and we have not
much





487 488
(488)

much experience of him Cox thinks that if the urgency of the matter in our common interests is brought home to him he will accept the arrangement without serious opposition but that in any case we should go through with it and if necessary locate one of H.M.'s ship there for a time until he has got used to our presence.

Request authority to proceed on above lines.

Addressed Foreign; repeated Secretary of State and High Commissioner, Cairo.

General, Baghdad.

OFFICE OF THE CIVIL COMMISSIONER.

Baghdad, the 6th December 1917.

No. 10034
7/10

C. G. S., G.H.Q.

Copy for information.

AT M. M. C. for

Civil Commissioner.


Copy to:-

D.C.C. Basrah.

P. A. Koweit.

D.P.R. Bushire.

N.J.G.





Copy of Telegram.

(1). Chief Political Officer, Bagdad.

(2). Political, Basra.

488 489
(40)


Arrived Boraidah October 30th. Was given distinguished reception by Turki bin Saud and by Governor and public of town. Turki is posted here by Ameer to watch Ibn Rashid, counter his intrigues in Kasim, control confederation of tribes and prevent anyone of them such as the Mtair from raiding tribes which are sending quotas to assist Shereef. He is also directed to try by diplomacy to seduce Shammar from Ibn Rashid. Ibn Rashid is reported in Medina with Fakhri Pasha and Ibn Lailah at Damascus with Jemal Pasha. Both are endeavouring to squeeze money and arms from Turks. Turki Bin Saud says it is not possible capture Hail by coup de main, weak though Ibn Rashid is, because one suburb of Hail has been strongly fortified and garrisoned by Turks. Its reduction would take time and require siege material.

As regards provisionment of Hail and Medina, Turki says firm action is being taken to prevent leakage from Kasim and now most is being taken direct from Iraq and Koweit by Aslam Shammar and tribe of Ibn Hadhdhal. He denies that letter which he gave to Shammar who descended on Koweit with large caravan in latter part September was a pass for Musabileh. He meant it only to be a safe conduct to few Shammar passing through his tribes.

I venture to suggest that special Blockade officer with small establishment should withxx the formal assent of Shaikh be at once stationed at Koweit to scrutinize all passes and make certain that the destination of goods is not to enemy countries. I am leaving for Riadh today and will wire through Bahrein after seeing Ameer. Meanwhile if any additional officer or officers are to be sent to join me they should proceed at once to Bahrein.

32s. Col. Hamilton. 1164

Dated 10-11-17.





491 489 490

Copy of a telegram No.3484 of August 29th,1917 from
Major General Sir Percy Cox,K.C.S.I.,K.C.I.E. Baghdad to
Captain P.G.Loch,Political Agent,Bahrain.

Your 131 and 132. Please ascertain from Dr.Harrison
and telegraph briefly firstly what Bin Sa'ud considered
that he had already done for us. Secondly where we had
failed him and what more he wanted us to do for him.
Thirdly what more he could do for us or for the general
cause ? If you could follow this up with a report from
Harrison by letter I should be very much obliged.

Copy of a telegram No.139-C of August 30th,1917 from
Captain P.G.Loch,Political Agent,Bahrain to Major
General Sir Percy Cox,K.C.S.I.,K.C.I.E. Chief Political
Officer, Baghdad.


Your telegram No.3484. Firstly Bin Sa'ud considers
that his throwing in his lot with us has had great
effect throughout Arabia including on the Sharif of
Mecca; he has largely neutralised ibn Rashid whose
peace overtures he rejected saying that he must first
make his peace with British; he has maintained friendly
relations with the Sharif of Mecca.

Secondly. He was apparently quite satisfied with
what we had done for him and had nothing but praise for
us.

He mentioned no wants except that he was very
anxious for a merchant vessel to call at one of his
ports twice monthly as hardship was being caused by
scarcity of goods.

He thinks we did not make sufficient capital out
of capture of Baghdad in one respect: if we could have
put on even one rotten old steamer for passenger traffic
effect on Arab mind would have been great.

Thirdly





(492) 490 491

thirdly. No useful information.

Harrison says that Bin Sa'ud is hampered and pre-occupied by the difficult job of making his various tribes pull together; Real feeling in Najd is not for us: though there is no sign of talk against us owing to attitude of Bin Sa'ud yet there is no word spoken in our favour. The prices paid by the Sharif to tribes have rather spoilt the market.

From my own observation here and at Qatif I can bear witness to moral value of opening the Tigris route even to limited extent and pilgrimage to Karbala and Najaf, though I see it may not be feasible for military reasons. Copy by post to Bushire and Basrah.

Copy of :-

- (1) G.P.O's telegram No.3484 of 29-8-1917 to P.A.Bahrain.
- (2) P.A.Bahrain's telegram No.139-C of 30-8-1917 to G.P.O.Baghdad.
- (3) Dr. Harrison's report of 1-9-1917

to:-


- (a) D.P.R.Bushire
- (b) D.C.P.O. Basrah
- (c) P.A.Kuwait

Copy of Dr.Harrison's report has been sent to G.P.O.

No.886

September 5th, 1917.

P.S. Lock
Captain,
Political Agent,
Bahrain.





Confidential

(493) 491 492

Translation of a letter dated 5th Rabi-el-Thani 1336,
(= 18th January 1918) from Shaikh Sir 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdur
Rahman al Faisal as Sa'ud K.C.I.E., Ruler of Najd, to Captain
P.G. Loch, H.B.M.'s Political Agent, Bahrain.

The object of writing this cordial letter is to enquire
after your health and to say that you will be glad to hear that
I am well; and that nothing of importance has occurred which is
worthy of mention.

I have received your letters and have noted all you wrote
in them.

I am sending herein a wireless message for the friend of
all Colonel Hamilton with the request that you will kindly
transmit to him, and it is as follows:-

His Honour Colonel Hamilton, His Majesty's Political Agent,
Kuwait. In your telegraphic message, which I received, you
mentioned the coming of 'Abdul 'Aziz Al Hasan to me and requested
me to be on good terms with His Excellency my brother Shaikh
Salim Al Mubarak; no doubt it is not hidden from your honour
that we are brothers, and it is of course a binding duty on us
that we should be on good terms, and there is no difference
between me and His Excellency; even if he were to ask me for a
number of my subjects or were to commit a big mistake, I would
not hesitate to forgive the latter, and comply with the former
accordingly. But as regards the question of the Ajman and their
stay in the vicinity of Kuwait, it will not be possible for him
to obtain my consent to same. It is therefore a question which
is impossible, and I have informed you of the fact.


I hope you will unceasingly write to me your cordial letters.
This is what had to be said and may you be preserved.

No. 158 of 1918.

The foregoing together with the original Arabic letter is
forwarded to Colonel R.E. Hamilton, Political Agent, Kuwait, for
information with reference to my telegram No. 36-C. of February
5th, 1918.

Bahrain,
5th February 1918.

P.G. Loch Captain,
Political Agent, Bahrain.






492
493
(494)

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

من عبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن بن فيصل آل سعود والجناب الرجل الكريم ذوالالكرام الوسم بمنا العزيز صاحب السيادة وقبطان في حيلنا
 قنصل الدولة العثمانية البريطانية العظمى . واثم معاليه آتت
 السلام وعرضنا هذه الامور لكم لذكرتكم الباعث لتبقيتم هذه النسيئة الوادية النقص عن من اجلكم اكرم اهلنا
 على ما تجوز قسركم من كل الوجوه ولم يدرى ان يكون منكم في استحقاقكم وسعدت اليكم بكم فيكم واسرنا
 وايضا وبما استعتم همارك بالمب معلوم بعثنا بغير هذا الكتاب الوادي البرقية لجمع سادة انكز هملتن
 المتدتم ترسلون اليه وهي : سعادة انكز هملتن المتدتم قنصل الدولة العثمانية البريطانية العظمى . البرقية
 المذكورة التي تلقيناها نذكرون فيها قدوم عبد العزيز آل حسن الطوف المحي فلتتسون من المب مصافاة سعادة الاخ
 الشيخ سالم ال مبادي المتدتم فالارتب ما يحتمل على سادتنا اخوان والمصافاة من الواجبات علينا لا عرفينا
 وبين حضرتهم لوان المشارة يطلب منا جعلت من رعايانا او يصدر منه خطأ كبير لم نتردد ند محرم
 وتجرى مطالبة كما ينبغي فاما مسئلة العجاني واقامتهم في اطراف الكويت لم يمكن ان يدرك طريقتنا ومن كذا كذا
 فلهذا امرنا بتبجيل وتحقيقه عرفنا لا سادتهم فالرجى دوام المرسلة الوادية لئلا نالهم رخصتهم محرمين اذ ربيع ثمانية تسعة

Transcribed
5/4/18





Telegram.

From. P.A. Koweit.

To. Political Bahrain.


No. 1252.

Dated 29th. December, 1917.

493
494
(495)

Please convey following message from me to Bin Saud - begins: Arrived Koweit and conveyed your message to Shaikh Salim who was very pleased. He is sending to you Abdulaziz Bin Hassan with a message of peace and I hope that you will receive these friendly advances according to your promise. The Koweit standard is being kept out only in order to control the tribes and to maintain safety of roads. As soon as the present unrest subsides the standard will be brought in. Shaikh Khazaal is here. He and Shaikh Salim and I send many salams and Inshallah that the happy relations which have hitherto always existed between us may be continued and the tribes and possessions of Ibn Sabah and Bin Saud may remain undivided. Ends.

A.L.





494
495
(496)

Telegram.

From. P.A. Koweit.


To. Political Bahrain.

No. 1252.

Dated 29th. December, 1917.

Please convey following message from me to Bin Saud - begins: Arrived Koweit and conveyed your message to Shaikh Salim who was very pleased. He is sending to you Abdulaziz Bin Hassan with a message of peace and I hope that you will receive these friendly advances according to your promise. The Koweit standard is being kept out only in order to control the tribes and to maintain safety of roads. As soon as the present unrest subsides the standard will be brought in. Shaikh Khazaal is here. He and Shaikh Salim and I send many salams and Inshallah that the happy relations which have hitherto always existed between us may be continued and the tribes and possessions of Ibn Sabah and Bin Saud may remain undivided. Ends.

A. L.





495

496

(497)

Telegram.

From. Loch, Political Bahrain.

To. P.A. Koweit.

No.


Dated.

Your telegram No.1252. Bin Saud replies that it is incumbent him be friendly with Shaikh Koweit, and he would forgive him much, but he cannot consent stay Ajman in vicinity Koweit.

Original translation by post.

Loch.

A.L.





(498) 496
497

Telegram.

From. Loch, Political Bahrain.

To. P.A. Koweit.

No.


Dated.

Your telegram No.1252. Bin Saud replies
that it is incumbent him be friendly with Shaikh
Koweit, and he would forgive him much, but he cannot
consent stay Ajman in vicinity Koweit.

Original translation by post.

Loch.

A.L.





Confidential

497
(497) 498


Copy of a report dated the 1st September 1917, from
Dr. P.W. Harrison, Bahrain, to Captain P.G. Loch, Political
Agent, Bahrain.

Continuing our conversation of last night, I may say that the trip to Riyadh is not an extremely hard one, even in Summer unless the effort is made to travel very rapidly. From Hasa to Riyadh may be done in six ~~day~~ or seven days in comparative comfort and in the Spring, such a trip would be a pleasure. Most of the territory passed over seems utterly barren, but the strip of sandy desert or "Dahana" as the Arabs call it, abounds in excellent forage. This serves to support nothing more than thousands of gazelle, but if an occasional well could be sunk in this area the number of sheep, camels etc, that could be raised would be almost unlimited.

The road from Hasa to Abu Jifan (Hunter's Map of Arabia 1 = 32 m. sq. J. 6), and from there to Riyadh, which was the road travelled both going and returning, contains nothing which suggests any mineral resources to an untrained eye. In places the country is somewhat rough, more particularly between Abu Jifan, and Riyadh, but no mountains are seen, nothing indeed, than comparatively low hills.

The most complete peace and quiet reign everywhere. Unprotected caravans travel anywhere without fear. A camel-load of money (Silver), revenue from Hasa on its way to Riyadh, accompanied our caravan of nine individuals, it was quite unescorted by soldiers, but this fact did not even excite surprise or comment.

Hasa is the Commercial center of Central Arabia. Its Capital city is made up of three divisions, one of which is called the "Kut" or Hofuf. Beduins come here to sell "Ghee" etc. and to buy dates and what other things they wish, in numbers that are six times as large as I was assured that nowhere in Arabia could they be obtained in such large numbers. The local resources are large. P. 10 miles. There are some fifty odd (or






500 498 499
of these contain several thousand population. a closer touch with the outside world would bring about a very considerable commercial development, for their principal product, namely their dates are superior in quality to anything raised elsewhere. They are disposed of to poor advantage now, owing to very inferior packing, none whatever going to Europe. Bassa's population is for the most part Shi'ah in religion the Artisans, Gardeners, etc., belonging to that section of Islam. The Sunnis are for the most part property owners, and form a sort of Aristocracy both of money and position. The place is tolerant and would welcome more contact with the outside world, especially if obviously profitable.

(The above in regard to Bassa is based on a residence of 4 days and is of necessity in large part gathered from conversations etc. rather than from personal observation)

The religious and Political center of Central Arabia is Riyadh. Judging from the character of the people, it will remain the center. It is a small place, smaller than 'Amarah, apparently a large part of the population is made up of those connected in some way with the ruling house. It has no independent Commercial importance, nor has it any prospect of attaining to such. A narrow rim of Date Gardens surrounds the town. Water can be obtained in many places, but only at a depth of ninety feet, more or less, which makes irrigation very laborious. The soil appears to be excellent.

The people are all Sunnis and all Wahabis, although this latter term they dislike. They consider themselves Hanbalis. 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Sa'ud is not to them a Political leader. He is their religious head. It is on this basis that he commands the devotion of the Bedouins, and is gradually uniting them to him. His military strength depends on his success in uniting numerous tribes and it is easy to see that nothing occupies his effort and attention, as this does. The members of the different Bedouin tribes visit him in great numbers, his guest houses frequently containing a thousand or fifteen hundred of them. They are cordially welcome to stay as many days as they wish, the customary Arab rule of three days being quite suspended.






501 499 580

No one goes away without a gift, which appears to average in value certainly several Rupees.

Riyadh is the center of the organization of the "Ikhwan" a Bedouin society which exists to promote the spread of pure religion in the extreme Wahabi sense, among the different tribes. The abolition of all intertribal warfare is one of their cardinal doctrines. Three hundred and more of these "Ikhwan" are being educated in Riyadh to be religious teachers of the different tribes. They are supported by the Ruler and to join their number any one of the "Ikhwan" has only to signify his desire for similar training. The society numbers many thousands in many different tribes and supports the present ruling house in Riyadh enthusiastically.

Very little is heard in ordinary conversation, concerning the present European war. The Bedouin knows very little about it and cares less. The city dwellers are better informed, but they say very little because they dare not. As far as can be judged, Najd is pro-British only because the ruler compels it. The war has had almost no direct effect upon the people. Rains in the desert, and good date crops in the cities, have made times rather better than usual.


'Abdul 'Aziz the ruler, himself, is an Arab of very unusual endowments. A courteous host, and a natural gentleman, he is a ruler of great force and even severity. He has acquired a considerable knowledge of the world and shows great intelligence in his grasp of present conditions. There is no doubt of his personal regard for several of the British Political Agents whom he has met, most of all for the late Captain Shakespear, and for Sir Percy Cox and Captain Loch. His admiration for the British administration of India and the Gulf, is very great, though not unmixed with criticism, of certain things, particularly the character of some of the native under officers. The campaign in Mesopotamia has not been without mistakes, in his opinion, as for instance the failure to assign at least one steamer to protect trade upon the fall of Baghdad, so that Arabs travelling in the desert carried the news everywhere, and so have spread






the maximum influence on Arab attitude. He feels too, that ^{(502) 300} adequate management might certainly secure for the carrying trade of the Gulf, two steamers, instead of one, thus securing for Majd along with the other districts served, bi-weekly visits, instead of the considerable hardship of the present irregular monthly service.

His own personal relations with the British however, seem to have afforded him the greatest pleasure, and there can be no doubt of his conviction that his own best interests and those of his country are to be advanced by cultivating present pleasant relations. It is easy to see that he is anxious to promote further association with the "English" and looks forward to increasing its intimacy.





503
No. 25/6/20 Office of the Civil Commissioner
Baghdad, the 28th August.

From,
Lt.-Col. Sir A. T. Wilson, K.C.I.E., C.
Acting Civil Commissioner in Mesopotamia

To,
The Political Agent,
Bahrain.

Sir,
I have the honour to enclose
a copy of a letter No. P. 4053 of
from India Office with enclosure
enclosure in original for transmission
with a suitable covering letter.

I have the honour to
Sir,
Your most obedient servant

Acting Civil Commissioner

Copy to:-

The Secretary to Government of India
in the Foreign and Political Department
Simla.


with one spare copy for transmission to
Lt.-Col. Hamilton if no objection.

D.P.R. Bushire.

P. A. Kuwait. /

Regd No 173
18/9/20

G.D.





502
504 501
Copy of a letter No.P.4053 dated 19th Ju
from the Under-Secretary of State for India, Po
Department, India Office, London, S.W.I., to the
Commissioner, Baghdad.

I am directed by the Secretary of State to
to forward for transmission to His Excellency
Azis ibn Saud an autograph letter from His Maje
King thanking Him for the gift of two oryxes pres
in 1917 to Lieutenant Colonel R.E.A. Hamilton, C.I.E.,
when at Riyadh.

A copy of the letter is enclosed for your records
together with a copy of a note submitted to His
His Majesty in explanation of the matter; it will be
observed that one of the animals died at Bombay.

On the stall of the oryx now deposited with the
Royal Zoological Society in Regents Park the following
inscriptions have been affixed:-

"Arabian Oryx.


(Great Southern Sand Desert of Arabia.

Presented by His Majesty the King May 14th 1920).

Oryx from the Empty Quarter - Great Southern Sand Desert
of Arabia

Presented to His Majesty the King by His Excellency
the Imam Sir Abdul Azis ibn Saud K.C.I.E., Ruler of
Central Arabia in December 1917".

I am to request that you will arrange for the
delivery to His Excellency at a convenient opportunity
of His Majesty's letter.





BUCKINGHAM PALACE.

10th July 1920.

503

105

My friend,

It has given me great pleasure to accept the gift which Your Excellency offered through the hands of Colonel R.E.A. Hamilton whom you presented with two cryxes on the occasion of his visit to your capital three years ago. Owing to the difficulties and dangers of transport which existed during the war now happily and victoriously ended, it is only recently that your gift has been delivered to me; and I regret that I was therefore unable to convey ~~my~~ my thanks to you as I should have desired to do through your son Feisal, of whose safe arrival in ~~Ed~~ after his visit to the United Kingdom I have heard with much satisfaction.

I trust that the friendly relations which exist between Your Excellency and my officers will long continue.


Your sincere friend,

(SD) GEORGE R.I.

Allegiance the Imam Sir Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud
K.C.I.E.,

HAKIM OF NEJD.

G.D.





THE KING'S ORYX.


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When Lieutenant Colonel R.E.A. Hamilton, C.I.E., visited Riyadh in Central Arabia on a political mission at the end of 1917, the Ruler of Central Arabia, His Excellency the Imam Sir Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, K.C.I.E., made over to him two fine specimens of the Oryx (*Oryx Leucorys*) with a request that they might be presented to the King-Emperor on his behalf. Owing to the impossibility of getting them to England during the war and for several months afterwards, Colonel Hamilton had to deposit them in the Zoological Gardens at Bombay. One of them, the male, unfortunately died there. At the end of May last a passage was finally secured for the female and Mr. Millard of the Bombay Natural History Society brought her home with him and deposited her in the Zoological Gardens, Regents Park.

Both specimens were captured young and brought up in Ibn Saud's garden at Riyadh. The habitat of the Oryx is the Great Nefud, on broad belt of red sandy desert which surrounds the Oases of Central Arabia. These animals are very shy and are rarely seen and are said by the Arabs to be "drinkless cattle". Doughty, the great Arabian Explorer, had only heard of them. Sir Wilfred and Lady Anne Blunt were the first Europeans to see them in their natural home near Hail nearly forty years ago. It is alleged that an Arabian Oryx was brought to Europe in 1857 by Captain John Shepherd of the India House who presented it to the London Zoological Society.

The Arabs call the Oryx "Al Wathaihi", or wild ox, and all sorts of legends have grown up about them in Arabia and Europe. The low exactly like a cow and this may be the connection with the "reem" of the Bible, translated variously as wild ox and unicorn - see Deuteronomy XXXIII-17 and Job XXXIX - 9 et seq.

The Oryx is supposed to be the original unicorn as seen beside it. If the






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heraldic supporters of the Royal Arms introduced by
King James I in substitute for the Red Dragon of Wales.

The specimen now in London has a fine pair of
horns. Its body is white, the whole of the forelegs and
the lower part of the hind legs are brown with white
fetlocks. The white face has dark brown markings on the
nose, between the horns, on the cheeks and on the throat
while a brown stripe runs down the chest.

G.D.





CONFIDENTIAL

No. 336-c

Political Agency., Bahrein.

Dated ^{18th October} 29th September, 1920.

From

Major H.R.P. Dickson, C.I. E.,
Political Agent, Bahrein.

To

The Civil Commissioner,
B A G H D A D.

Sir,

In acknowledging receipt of your letter No. 25162 of 9/2 of the 28th August 1920, with enclosures, I have the honour to state that the Autograph letter from His Imperial Majesty the King Emperor was forwarded, duly translated in Arabic, to His Excellency the Imam Sir Abdul Aziz bin Abdur Rahman Al Faisal As Saud, K.C.I.E., Ruler of Nejd, Hassa and Dependencies, on 17th September 1920, by the hands of a special * messenger.

ikh Hezam
al Mashari
adun.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

John Dickson

Major,

Political Agent, Bahrein.


Copy forwarded with compliments to :-

- (1) The Secretary to Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.
- (2) The Deputy Political Resident in Persian Gulf, Bushire.
- (3) The Political Agent, Koweit, ✓

for information.

No 217

4/10/20





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